Flexibility is the ability to bend without breaking. Some need this flexibility in order to be able to comply with regulations or standards. Others abuse of this flexibility, bending things to the point of breakage. The key is to be able to implement regulations so that there is enough room for flexibility but not enough room for abuse, which is quite difficult. The question that lies on the table is whether “flexible mechanisms” should be including in the next protocol. In order to answer this we must evaluate the “flexible mechanisms” used in the Kyoto Protocol (Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI), and Emissions trading). Based on the Climate Change Business Forum’s (CCBF) article “Market Mechanisms”, the CDM gave developed countries the flexibility to financial assistance to developing countries that heavily depend on fossil fuels, as opposed to being confined to solely concentrating on their own country. This was beneficial to developing countries but allowed leeway for developed countries to ignore their own responsibilities. The CCBF also summarizes the JI, stating that it is very similar to the CDM, apart from investing in green projects in other developed countries as opposed to developing countries. Emissions trading seems like a good idea to me because the European Union has been conducting it, with some sort of positive outcome, and I think it can become a global phenomenon. I feel it gives countries more of an incentive to “go green” at a faster, more efficient rate, so they may profit by selling their carbon allowance. According to the UNFCC’s article “Uniting on Climate Change,” “concerns have been voiced that the mechanisms could allow Parties to avoid taking climate change mitigation action at home, or could confer a ‘right to emit’ on Annex I Parties or lead to exchanges of fictitious credits, undermining the Protocol’s environmental goals.” I too share this concern, because although there are many benefits to these “flexible mechanisms”, the flexibility in these mechanisms provide loopholes that many countries will be willing to jump through to save as much money as possible, taking the easy way out. So how do we draw this distinction between necessary flexibility and abuse? We can try to impose regulations, such as those set up by the Marrakesh Accords, which created “no right, title, or entitlement to emit [greenhouse gases],”but I honestly do not think there is a concise answer. Despite my lack of trust, I do think that there should be only enough flexibility in the next protocol so that each country is equally accommodated, and accounted for, a task not easily completed on such a large scale, especially because of implementation issues. What do you think?

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