

INDIA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN INDIA; ELEVATION OF THE STATUS OF THE MISSIONS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES; EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ALLEVIATE FAMINE CONDITIONS IN INDIA ¹

701.4511/1-746 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Merrell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1946—5 p. m.

18. For your information, Brit Govt through BritEmb here has asked Dept to reconsider question of raising status of Indian Agent General² to that of fully accredited Minister. It is understood Chinese Govt has agreed to raise status of Indian representative in China and of Chinese representative in India.

Dept has informed BritEmb that, for reasons previously given (Dept's 869 Nov. 7³), it prefers to postpone making any decision in this matter.

Repeated to London and Chungking.

BYRNES

701.4511/1-946 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, January 9, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received 5:11 p. m.]

24. Deptel 18, January 7, 5 p. m. Secretary External Affairs⁴ and private secretary⁵ to Viceroy⁶ have on several occasions indicated to me great interest of Govt of India and HMG in raising status of Indian Agent General.

This is naturally a most difficult subject for me to comment on in view of the fact that the Dept may believe that I consider myself a

¹ For previous documentation on the political situation and the status of the respective missions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 249 ff., and pp. 255 ff., respectively.

² Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VI, p. 263, footnote 44.

⁴ Sir Olaf K. Caroe.

⁵ Sir Evan M. Jenkins.

⁶ Field Marshal Viscount Wavell.

candidate for Minister which I do not but I feel that I must now offer my opinion which is as follows:

1. If the Office of Chinese Commissioner is changed to Legation it would be most embarrassing to this mission to retain present status, particularly since we have never endeavored to conceal the fact that HMG's attitude has been responsible for our "quasi-diplomatic" status.

2. If it is learned that US Govt is stumbling block, adverse criticism will be incurred on all sides.

3. I believe that hesitancy on ground that such action would be criticized as a stop-gap or delaying measure is not well founded. On balance, I think reaction of Indian Nationalist Group would be one of gratification rather than the reverse and would make for atmosphere more favorable to a political solution.

4. In addition, raising status of missions would constitute further step toward independence of GOI from Whitehall and pave way for projected appointment of Indian member [*minister?*] for external affairs. This in my opinion would facilitate conduct of relations between US and India.

MERRELL

701.4511/1-946 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Merrell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1946—8 p. m.

47. Dept has carefully considered views expressed your 24 January 9 but continues to believe that the proposed exchange of fully accredited diplomatic representatives with India would be tantamount to a public announcement that this Govt considers India at the present time self-governing and in effective control of its external relations and also would be interpreted as indicating US approval of present unrepresentative GOI.

Important factor in Depts decision is possible establishment this year of representative interim Viceregal council at Delhi which would constitute far more appropriate occasion than present for change in form of diplomatic representation. Change then might be made on US initiative and would clearly reflect US approval such significant step toward Indian self-government.

ACHESON

845.00/2-2146 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 21, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received February 22—6:12 a. m.]

2179. In discussing Cabinet Mission to India,⁷ Patrick⁸ Under Secretary of India Office observed to us that essential point was emphasis on urgency in implementing announced policy as soon as elections are completed and he said that no change in basic policy was involved nor would Mission affect position of Viceroy who had been previously consulted and fully approved. Reason for handling matter in this way was to avoid loss of time such as had characterized Cripps' negotiations⁹ by enabling Mission to make decisions on spot within scope of its terms of reference and at same time to give clear evidence of earnestness of British intentions. Patrick said he personally entertained misgivings regarding "throwing in all our reserves" at one time and observed that it would be difficult in circumstances to determine next step if Mission failed. Govt higher ups, however, had thought otherwise and in addition it had been necessary to take weather conditions into account since it might be difficult for man of Pethick-Lawrence's advanced years to make journey later in season. Asked whether famine and riots had been motivating causes for decision to send Cabinet Mission Patrick replied in negative.

Regarding work of Mission Patrick said its main task would be to get representative Indian leaders to work together in setting up constitution making body and new executive council. If that could be achieved Mission could pack and come home and leave actual constitution making to Indians but if it failed job of attempting to carry through plan with only partial Indian support would have ominous implications. Stumbling block was of course Pakistan and Patrick observed that whereas he had felt at the time that Jinnah¹⁰ might be using this demand primarily for bargaining purposes it was obvious that movement had now gained such momentum that doubtful if Jinnah or anyone else could apply the brakes. It was on this point

⁷ British Prime Minister Clement Attlee had announced on February 19 that a special mission of Cabinet members would be sent to discuss with Indian leaders and the Viceroy an agreement on constitutional issues with the object of preparing India for independence. The mission was to be composed of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.

⁸ Sir Paul J. Patrick, Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State, India Office.

⁹ Sir Stafford Cripps, then Lord Privy Seal, had headed a mission to India in 1942. For documentation on efforts by the United States to prevent failure of the Cripps Mission to India, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 619 ff.

¹⁰ Mohammed Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League.

that talks between Gandhi ¹¹ and Jinnah had broken down last year when in reply to Gandhi's question re possible integration of Pakistan in common defense plan for India Jinnah had replied that "his people" looked to linking up with the Arab states.

Referring to persistent allegations particularly in US that British exploiting communal and native state issues to prolong British control Patrick said that irrespective of degree to which such considerations may or may not have figured in British official thinking in past there was no question regarding complete sincerity of present Govt's desire to fulfill its pledges in respect of India. Such difference of opinion as does exist is largely between those who feel that Britain has certain responsibility to be discharged and others usually the inexperienced who would be willing to cut India loose without further ado.

Re Parliamentary group which recently returned from visit to India Patrick said that Mission had not been productive of any constructive result because views of members had been so widely divergent. He did not think that group would prepare depart [*report*] but assumed that members would use floor of Parliament as means for ventilating their views.

Sent Dept. as 2179; repeated New Delhi as 2.

WINANT

845.00/2-2846 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, February 28, 1946—7 p. m.

[Received 8:50 p. m.]

266. Department's telegram No. 191, February 26, 6 p. m.¹² Evidence obtained from secret British sources lends support to opinion expressed in official British circles here that in both Calcutta and Bombay riots Communists probably played an active part in efforts to regain prestige which has waned since last August. Current position according to these sources may be summarized as follows:

Since end of war Communists have given ample evidence of reversion to aggressive tactics employed in their illegal days. In face of waning influence as a party, in a country too obsessed with idea of independence to give much thought to class war, they feel necessity of using all means available to attract public eye. Confirmation of this change of front

¹¹ Mohandas K. Gandhi, Indian nationalist leader, formerly President of the Indian National Congress.

¹² Text reads as follows: "Press reports that Brit are attributing recent disturbances in India to Communist instigation. Please telegraph your views re this charge, together with Brit estimate of possible Soviet implication." (845.00/2-2646)

is found in resolution passed by Central Committee in December, contents of which has only recently been learned. Resolution declares unprecedented opportunity to make final bid for power is offered by present situation in view of unparalleled hatred against British rule. Resolution expresses fear opportunity may be lost through drift of Congress and Muslim League into "suicidal channels of national strife" or unilateral compromise with British, expresses determination to prevent "factional games" of Congress and League leaders from turning mass discontent against each other instead of against common enslavement by taking the lead in "organizing struggles of workers and peasants" and by participating fearlessly "in every outburst of popular fury against British rule and police terror".

As Department is aware, Communists have, since September been faced with widespread hostility from Congressmen and others acting in name of Congress. Noteworthy incident in this connection was looting of party headquarters printing press and book store January 23 during Subhas Bose's¹³ birthday disturbances in Bombay. Among more recent incidents is assault described by source as "brutal" on a leading Bihar Communist at election meeting addressed by D. C. Joshi, General Secretary of the Communist Party, who subsequently fled from the province in disguise escorted by party volunteers; and in Cawnpore feeling between Communists and the Congressmen is so bitter that the Congressmen have decided to soft pedal their agitation against a cut in rations rather than allow Communists to utilize resulting discontent to organize a general strike.

While Communists have been expelled from Congress and anti-Communist feeling is widespread among Congress membership, there is no doubt that certain Congress leaders hope to win over groups now under Communist influence—particularly trade unions. Gandhi, for example, publicly condemned looting of Communist headquarters in Bombay referred to above and Vallabhbhai Patel¹⁴ visited premises week after incident occurred. In Tanjore a new association of pro-Congress landowners has been formed with view to enticing farmers away from Communist influence by offering increased wages.

Of possible significance is fact that following riots in Calcutta in November, Secretary of Bengal Provincial Communist Party Committee publicly denied charges that Communists were responsible for disorders. No such denial in connection with Bombay disorders has

¹³ Subhas Chandra Bose was an Indian nationalist leader who collaborated with the Axis during World War II and formed, under Japanese auspices, the Indian National Army from Indian prisoners of war in Burma and Malaya. He had been killed in an air crash in 1945 but many Indians refused to believe that he was actually dead.

¹⁴ Indian nationalist leader, formerly President of the Indian National Congress.

to date come to attention of Mission. Telegram re possible implication of Soviet follows.¹⁵

Sent to Department; repeated to London, Moscow, Chungking, Calcutta, paraphrase to Bombay.

MERRILL

845.00/2-2846 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 28, 1946— 7 p. m.

[Received 11:14 p. m.]

2441. RefDeptel 1801, February 26.¹⁶ Indication of official British view in recent disturbances in India furnished in statement made by Attlee in Commons on February 22 when he said Congress Party had disclaimed participation in mutiny but that "left wing elements and Communists were trying to work up sympathy".

Following are personal observations made to us on this subject by various officials:

Patrick, Assistant Under Secretary of India Office, who several months ago attributed disorders largely to Socialist Congress Party, an extremist offshoot of the Congress Party (reEmbtel 12927, December 10, 1945¹⁷), recently, but prior to naval mutiny, stressed complicity of left wing youth groups whom he referred to as "Communists", but he said he had no knowledge of tie-up between these factions and Moscow. In this, as in previous discussions, he described Indian extremism as essentially a local product with little evidence of Soviet inspiration.

Henderson, Parliamentary Under Secretary for India, spoke without hesitation of implication of Indian Communist Party in recent disturbances and of association of that party with Moscow. In further discussion, however, he said that he had no actual proof of exertion of Soviet influence in India but that by process of rationalization he had arrived at that conclusion in same way that he assumed that Communist Party in Britain was Soviet backed, although he could not produce evidence to that effect. Henderson added that there was, of course, much more than the Communist activity behind recent disturbances and he mentioned such trouble—creating elements as natural reaction from war examples set by unruly British and American troops, economic maladjustments and various other factors. Lord

¹⁵ See telegram 272, March 1, from New Delhi, p. 84.

¹⁶ Same as telegram 191 to New Delhi; see footnote 12, p. 80.

¹⁷ Not printed.

Pethick-Lawrence speaking on general question of further status of India, made significant remark that British wanted to set up an India for Indians but not an India for some other power.

Major Baig, now here en route to Washington to serve as First Secretary in Indian Agency General, discounted importance of Communist agitation and said greatest trouble lay with leaders of both Congress and Moslem League who follow policy of arousing masses by tendentious statements and then of turning innocent when natural violent reaction is produced. He also attributed present situation to announcement of British intention to turn over government to Indians, which he said interpreted by Indian public as sign of weakness of which advantage to be taken.

GALLMAN

845.00/2-2846: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, February 28, 1946—7 p. m.
[Received 7:21 p. m.]

2442. Reference Department's 1800, February 26.¹⁸ Patrick did not go so far as to indicate that British Government actually prepared to establish interim council without participation of one of major parties. He merely mentioned difficult prospect that would be presented in event that situation should develop in such a way as to make it necessary to face that problem.

This point was also raised by member of Embassy staff last night in a conversation with Henderson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, who replied indirectly to effect that formation of an interim council with only one of main parties participating would be "one of the alternatives" which would be presented if mission failed but he took great pains to emphasize that this time British Government intends making an all-out effort to persuade Indians of complete sincerity of British intentions and to bring about reconciliation between Congress and Moslem League. He seemed intent on keeping aim fixed on this objective and on avoiding discussion of possible retreat to less desirable positions.

Asked in what way he envisaged a compromise between currently irreconcilable attitudes of Congress and Moslem League, Henderson said he thought that key lay in degree to which Jinnah might yield on

¹⁸ Text reads as follows: "Did you gather that Brit Govt intends establish interim representative Executive Council (ref second sentence of second paragraph urtel 2179 Feb 21) even though one of major political parties refuses to participate?" (845.00/2-2146)

Pakistan issue and he made it clear that he personally viewed Pakistan concept as unsound. It was he said just about as practical as suggest making southern England an independent country. On whole Henderson seemed less pessimistic re prospective solution than most observers but it was difficult to determine to what extent this was result of his natural buoyant idealism and to what extent a deduction from something more tangible.

GALLMAN

845.00/3-146 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, March 1, 1946—6 p. m.

[Received March 9—4:30 a. m.]

272. Reference Department's telegram 192, February 26¹⁹ and Mission's 266, February 28. Consensus among British Civil and Military Intelligence officials here is that evidence gathered to date indicates Communists were noticeably active [apparent omission] disorders in Bombay but did not initiate them and did not organize street fighting or looting. Officials in question state Communists have been endeavoring form cells in armed forces but it is not clear at present whether they were directly responsible for RIN mutiny. In opinion of best informed Military Intelligence officer here inflammatory speeches by Congress leaders during recent months probably had more to do with causing mutiny than any other factor. (On other hand an officer of Mission is informed by a US Government official recently arrived from Bombay [apparent omission] him main cause was failure of Naval HQ Delhi over period of many months to take action of fully justified complaints of ratings.) Intelligence officer under reference is somewhat puzzled by report that Red Flag Union ordered workers back to work in mill while disorders were at height. Whether this was experiment to test organizational discipline is not clear.

Intelligence officials here state they have been unable discover any direct contact between Moscow and Indian Communists although, as Department is aware, it is assumed direct control may be initiated at such time as positions on various other USSR frontiers may be consolidated. In this connection continuation of anti-imperialist broadcasts in Hindustani from Moscow indicates clearly a desire to spread disruptive influences without becoming directly involved in

¹⁹ Not printed; it stated that expressions of regret tendered by the Government of India for the desecration of an American flag at Bombay were acceptable and suggested that further action by the Government of India might consist of formal presentation of a new flag to the Consulate General at Bombay in a private ceremony (811.015345/2-2146).

Indian politics (reference Department's telegram 142, February 8; ²⁰ report going forward by mail ²¹).

Intelligence officer under reference states there has been no Moscow directed activity in India for 10 years, a contention which does not seem to jibe with a remark made to our Military Attaché at Kabul some months ago by USSR Military Attaché who said in a suspiciously frank manner his government had "only about 30 agents" operating in India but they were so closely watched that their work was ineffectual.

Sent Department repeated to London, Moscow; Chungking; Calcutta. Paraphrase sent to Bombay.

MERRELL

845.00/4-446

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] April 4, 1946.

You will recall that a mutiny in the Royal Indian Navy at Bombay and Karachi during February was accompanied and followed by civil disturbances in various places in India, more particularly in Bombay and Delhi. We cabled George Merrell and Howard Donovan ²² for their estimates of possible Communist implications. They both replied that while the Communists undoubtedly took advantage of the situation to fan the flames, there was no evidence that they actually instigated the riots.

The civil disturbances which occurred in Karachi and Madras were on a somewhat smaller scale and involved fewer people. It is accordingly interesting to note that reports just received from the Consulates in Karachi and Madras indicate that both offices consider that the riots in those two cities were actually organized by the Communists. Macy, ²³ for example, says that "there was undoubted evidence of organization—probably of Communistic origin." Bower ²⁴ of Madras reports that an official from the Communist Party Headquarters in Bombay was identified during the riots in Madras.

²⁰ This telegram stated that the Department would appreciate any available information on a report from British sources that radio transmission had been inaugurated from Moscow to India with special emphasis on Bengal (845.7461/2-846).

²¹ Not printed.

²² Consul General at Bombay.

²³ Clarence E. Macy, Consul at Karachi.

²⁴ Roy Bower, Consul at Madras.

The following excerpts from Bower's report are of interest and are in substantial agreement with Macy's estimate of what occurred in Karachi:

"Anti-White feelings were exploited, certainly, but the emphasis was on labor solidarity against employers of any race. It was all permeated with anti-British and anti-White feelings, but there was ample evidence that the prime movers were ready to attack fellow Indians.

In summary, one notes an intermingling of anti-British and anti-class impulses. While the former is more obvious, the evidence points to premeditated Communist exploitation of it for their special ends, that is, to promote class friction as a means of influencing the masses."

It is possible that these reports from Karachi and Madras are more accurate reflections of Communist implications than the one received from New Delhi and Bombay where the riots were on a much larger scale and where, accordingly, the underlying impulses were much more difficult to identify.

LAMPTON BERRY

845.00/4-1546 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI, April 15, 1946—3 p. m.

[Received April 17—1 : 20 a. m.]

491. My telegrams 477 and 487, April 12 and 13.²⁵ Such reactions to Reuter Washington story regarding willingness US to offer assistance as have come to attention of Mission have in general been unfavorable. Certain responsible individuals among Congress and League leaders and British officials have indicated that if the report implies US has any intention of intervening at this time, they would not view such intervention with enthusiasm. In this connection I feel following remark made to Weil²⁶ in course of private conversations during past two days is not without significance.

When the subject was mentioned to Asaf Ali²⁷ he said "I don't like it". He went on to say that if it were decided to hold plebiscites there might be some merit in asking a UNO commission to supervise them, but he somewhat inconsistently added that plebiscites might quite possibly come out in exactly same way as recent elections, which he felt had been conducted unfairly.

²⁵ Neither printed; telegram 477 reported on an article in the *Statesman* alleging that the United States favored submitting the Pakistan question to international arbitration (845.00/4-1246). Telegram 487 related the highlights of interviews held by the British Cabinet Mission with Indian political figures (845.00/4-1346).

²⁶ Thomas E. Weil, Secretary, U.S. Mission, New Delhi.

²⁷ Prominent Muslim member of the Indian National Congress.

Liaquat Ali Khan ²⁸ reiterated official Muslim League opposition to international arbitration on ground that Congress through its extensive publicity channels had unfair advantage over League in influencing world opinion and, whatever the award, would "have three quarters of India" while Muslims—if decision was against Pakistan—"would have nothing".

A particularly well-informed British officer on General Staff whose friendly attitude toward Mission is unquestioned indicated tactfully that if statement had been official he would have regarded it as gratuitous.

Major Wyatt of Cabinet Delegation said "What? Are they going to interfere now?" While Mrs. Naidu Congress working committee member and confidante of Gandhi, remarked: "It would probably be too late in any case". The perhaps most unfortunate effect of Reuter story is that it tends create impression officials in Washington may have decided—a week before completion of Cabinet Delegation's talks with political leaders—that present negotiations will fail.

In referring to possibility of international arbitration Gandhi and Rajagopalachari ²⁹ are undoubtedly confident any American involved would be likely to lean toward idea of a United India—partly as result of British and Congress publicity in US and partly because of history of our own country. I am convinced that whatever decision is made—whether by Cabinet Delegation or by international tribunal—millions of Indians of one community or another are going to consider it unjust and not only will those making decision fail to win prestige or good will among these millions but there will arise question of how decision is going to be enforced.

I feel consideration should be given to fact that US initiative in Indian political settlement which did [not?] please Muslims, being already embittered by US official views on Palestine immigration announced last year,³⁰ might create repercussions in other countries of Middle East.

While it is clear that if Indian problem is eventually taken up by UNO the US would inevitably play its part in attempting to reach a solution, it is my considered opinion that no useful purpose would be served if US were on its own initiative to intervene at this juncture.

Sent Department 491 repeated London 50, Calcutta 75, paraphrase to Bombay.

MERRELL

²⁸ General Secretary of the Muslim League.

²⁹ Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, Indian nationalist leader and member of the Indian National Congress.

³⁰ For documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the future status of Palestine and toward the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 678 ff.; also *ibid.*, 1946, vol. VII.

[For text of an exchange of messages between the Viceroy of India, Lord Wavell, and President Truman, dated April 15 and May 3, respectively, on the food crisis in India, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 19, 1946, page 861. A Department of State press release, May 24, on shipment of grain to India is reprinted *ibid.*, pages 857-858.]

845.48/6-1046

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 632

NEW DELHI, June 10, 1946.

[Received July 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the Department, a copy of an article³¹ published in the Communist organ *People's Age* for June 2, 1946, under the heading "100 Million Indians Threatened with Starvation Death—Where Anglo-American Food Politics Has Brought Our Country"; and to comment on the generally unfavorable publicity the United States has received in the Indian press during the last two months in connection with the food problem. The article in question not only represents an effort on the part of Indian Communists to exploit the food crisis, but is also indicative of the attitude of the Indian press in general on the subject of the United States and food.

It will be noted that the *People's Age* article quotes the Indian Food Mission in Washington as stating: "Not a grain of American wheat has reached India", and attributes to the President the following remark: "The world is a bitch with too big a litter. We have to decide which of the puppies to drown." The article states Americans are eating twice as much as is necessary to maintain good health; that they are feeding cattle more than enough to make up "India's total 1946 shortage" because feeding cattle "brings more profit"; that the United States' "new . . . colony", Japan, is receiving food at the expense of India because General MacArthur³² obtains his food data from Japanese officials "who are by and large the same who ruled Japan in war-time"; that "there is no requisitioning of food at the farms and rationing at the food shops" in the United States because "it would be bad for trade"; that the Truman administration is "tied hand and foot to the big banks which control American farming interests" and that "MacArthur, boss of Japan, is himself linked up with American high finance"; that Mr. Hoover's³³ plan for a World Food Administration

³¹ Not herein reprinted.

³² General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.

³³ Former President Herbert Hoover, at the request of President Truman, undertook a special mission at this time to study and coordinate the food supplies of 38 countries.

represents a plot "to guarantee unlimited profits" and means that "the bitch has not got 'too big a litter' but it is chained to American big business butchers and the puppy which does not pay a cut-throat price will be 'drowned'".

The article then accuses the British of "playing the same game with some variations arising from the fact that they have a huge political empire—not one but many Japans to feed". The British, the article continues, "pretend they can't blackmail the world with food simply because they are a 'poor importing country' " but that in reality two of the four big exporting countries—Australia and Canada—are "under her thumb", and a third, the Argentine, "is soaked with British capital, with a Fascist government kept in power by them"; the British "attack Americans for 'eating too much' but eat "twice as much as is needed for good health" and have in stock over 4,000,000 tons of grain; the British criticize Americans for favoring Japan but put the British zone in Germany first and India next; the biggest scandal of all is the British refusal to allow shipment to India of 500,000 tons of rice offered by the Indonesian Republic. The British, says the article, "like the Americans, would like to use food as a weapon for political domination" but they need food from America to carry out this policy and try to frighten Americans by saying that if sufficient food is not provided for scarcity areas they will play into the hands of "political extremism".

The concluding paragraphs of the article may be summarized as follows: American policy is "to let the British burn their fingers in an Indian famine and then rush in to the rescue on their own terms—cut-throat profits and a share in the political and economic domination of India", while it appears "the British game" is "to warn America that an Indian famine would mean the blowup not only of British Imperialism but of the whole world Imperialist system". The British want to use the threat of famine to push through the Cabinet Mission's plan and obtain American backing for it. India is "starving to death in a mad world in which two gangs of cut-throats are using food to dominate nations"; leaders of the "two great parties" are "blind to the American game, blind to the British game, and blind to their own people's suffering". The only way out is to unite and form an interim government with full powers to appeal to the world for food; other Asiatic countries and the Soviet Union will help such an Indian government, and if Anglo-American reaction still holds out, India will have the whole world's support if it goes in for trade sanctions against Britain and America.

Alleged U.S. Opposition to Soviet Exports to India

The article summarized above is followed by a story headed "U.S. Won't Allow Soviet Food Exports to India". Opening with an excerpt from a report in the *Times of India* for May 28 to the effect that American officials in Washington "are understood to be opposed to India's seeking help from Soviet Russia in the matter of food", the story goes on to say that the U.S.S.R. has pledged to export 1,100,000 tons of grain to France, Poland, Finland and Rumania; that this grain will be delivered because "Socialist harvests don't fail"; that the Soviet Government "never thinks of using food as a weapon of political blackmail like the Anglo-American Imperialists" and that this is why "she has saved most of Europe from starvation—despite her limited resources". Three months ago, the article alleges, the United States and British were "mainly interested in preventing Soviet food aid to starving countries because they wanted to dictate their own terms and wanted no Soviet 'competition'".

It will be noted that on the same page as the articles in question there is a cartoon showing the President seated at a table almost hidden by a mammoth loaf of bread. He is flanked by physically gross characters, one of whom is apparently intended to represent Japan, while the other two probably represent Britain and Germany. While the people at the table make ready with knives and forks an emaciated Indian child in the foreground stares at a "Notice" which reads: "Dogs or Indians Not Allowed". The caption is the aforementioned remark attributed to the President regarding "a bitch with too big a litter".

The Party Line

People's Age has thus utilized a collection of half-truths and maliciously twisted facts (a) to attack the two leading Western democracies jointly, (b) to present a picture calculated to create discord between the two countries, and (c) to support the current official policy of the Communist Party of India—namely, to advocate political unity among Indians in order to oust the British. In view of the Labor Government's announced intention of granting independence to India, Indian Communists can hardly be criticized for encouraging agreement among Indian political parties, but one cannot avoid the suspicion that the Communists' eagerness to see the British go stems from the belief that if British authority is withdrawn their opportunities for spreading their doctrines will improve.

Generally Bad Press Received by the United States in India

Attacks on the United States in connection with the food problem are not confined to the Communist press in India. During the past few months virtually all dailies read by the Mission—pro-Hindu, pro-

Muslim and pro-British—have exhibited a remarkably anti-American bias in their editorials and in their handling of news stories on the subject of food. Even the *Statesman*, a paper which often manifests a friendly attitude toward the United States, has recently carried a series of special articles cabled from the United States by a correspondent named Stuart Gelder from which the reader gains the impression that the average American is not only a glutton, but a racketeer, or at best a candidate for an institution for the feeble-minded.

Reasons for anti-American attitudes in the Indian press have been referred to in previous communications. In the first place, it has become obvious that during the early part of our participation in the recent war, our Government—through various official channels—“oversold” itself to Indians. Rightly or wrongly many of them gained the impression that the United States was going to “liberate” them from British rule. When this hope was not realized, Indians were bitterly disappointed and in many cases not only decided to question the United States’ “sincerity” as a democratic nation, but began to class the United States with Britain as an imperialistic power. In some cases this disillusionment dates back to the first World War: Vallabhbhai Patel, for example, remarked to an officer of the Mission some months ago that many Indians had entertained high hopes when President Wilson announced his Fourteen Points, and that when these failed to materialize they came to the conclusion that Britain and the United States’ professions of belief in democracy could not be taken seriously.

Having experienced disillusionment as a result of our Government’s official publicity during the early part of the late war, Indian editors have found it easy, and well suited to their own political objectives, to continue to class the United States as an imperialist power: our Government’s participation—direct or indirect—in the reoccupation of the Dutch East Indies and Indo-China, and its policies vis-à-vis China and Palestine, have been seized upon as material for scores of unfriendly or bitterly critical editorials. Currently the difficulties experienced by the U.N.O. and by the Foreign Ministers at Paris³⁴ are being cited as evidence that the Western democracies are sincerely interested neither in world peace nor in the welfare of small nations and dependent peoples.

Some of the strongest criticism of the United States in recent months has centered around the Government’s reported attitude toward the Palestine problem. Indian editors and commentators, as has been indicated in previous communications to the Department, frequently

³⁴ For documentation on the Second Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris, see vol. II, pp. 1 ff.

ask how a Government dedicated to democratic principles can justify support of an immigration policy for Palestine which is reportedly opposed by the majority of the population of that country.

When the foregoing factors are considered it is perhaps not surprising that the Indian press in general is hypercritical of the United States' efforts to avert famine. An additional factor in this case is the series of contradictory reports which have emanated from Washington—from both official and press sources. In this connection there is no evidence that British officials in London or in New Delhi have gone out of their way to dispel the illusion created in some quarters that Great Britain is making a more determined effort than the United States to cope with the food problem.

The Remedy

Under the circumstances I feel the prevailing attitude of the Indian press toward the United States is not apt to change as a result of any obvious attempt to bring pressure on editors. An increase in the quantity of official handouts and releases cabled from Washington would, in my opinion, merely aggravate the suspicion which Government-sponsored news services so frequently arouse.

Officers of the Mission will, of course, continue to cultivate acquaintance with members of the Indian press with a view to helping them understand the United States. As the Department is aware, this is a long and delicate procedure, and the number of individuals which can be influenced in this way is necessarily limited. For the time being, however, I believe this is the only positive approach which is advisable. Any sort of program patently designed to influence the Indian press would do more harm than good.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE R. MERRELL

845.00/9-346

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman ³⁵

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1946.

Subject: Raising of Status of Indian Agency General in Washington, and of the American Mission in New Delhi

As a result of negotiations which have been going on between the Viceroy of India and representative Indian leaders, a new Executive Council (Cabinet) is to take office on September 2, 1946. The new Cabinet will be composed of outstanding leaders of the principal Indian political party, [*parties?*] together with representative leaders of certain minority groups. The British plan likewise calls for the convening of a Constituent Assembly in the immediate future, which will

³⁵ A marginal notation reads: "Approved Sept. 3 '46 Harry S Truman."

have authority to draft a new Indian constitution providing for the complete severance of India from the Empire and Commonwealth if the Indians so desire. Although the second most important Indian political party has refused to participate thus far in these developments,³⁶ it is believed that the new government will be representative of at least 80 percent of the Indian people.

It is anticipated that one of the first acts of the new government will be to request the exchange of fully accredited diplomatic representation between India and the United States.

While the Viceroy will continue legally to have the power of veto, until the new constitution comes into effect, we feel that representative Indian leaders capable of speaking in the name of the great majority of the Indian people will now be in effective *de facto* control of the affairs of India in view of the violent repercussions which would probably follow a decision of the Viceroy to act contrary to the advice of his new Cabinet on any important issue. We accordingly believe that if the new government should express a desire for the exchange of fully accredited representatives with the United States, we should without hesitation agree to receive an Indian Ambassador and to send an American Ambassador to India.

I should appreciate receiving your views on the subject in order that we may act with a minimum of delay in case the new Indian Government would like to have such an exchange effected.

DEAN ACHESON

701.4511/9-946 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 9, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received September 9—7 a. m.]

8026. We informed Patrick on Saturday of contents of Dept's 6479, September 6.³⁷ He seemed pleased at decision because: (a) it would give a certain prestige to interim government and (b) it might have some effect on Moslem League's intransigence and possibly make Moslems more conciliatory to Congress following this direct evidence that US Govt considers Interim Govt respectable enough for an exchange of ambassadors.

³⁶ Reference is to the Muslim League.

³⁷ This telegram was also sent as No. 708 to New Delhi. The pertinent portion reads as follows: "For your confidential info Dept indicating Bajpai informally we are now prepared exchange Ambassadors with India should GOI request. Important, however, initiative be taken GOI." (701.4511/9-646)

However, Patrick showed some concern that US willingness to establish direct diplomatic relations with India might encourage Nehru³⁸ to take decisions in foreign policy which would meet with British disapproval. Technically, said Patrick, Interim Govt comes under Govt of India Act, where it will remain until a new Indian constitution is formulated. Therefore, he continued, there might still be "Whitehall interference" in decisions of Interim Govt, but British Govt would make every effort to avoid such interference. He added that nevertheless subject might be raised by questions in Parliament as to decisions and activities of Interim Govt.

Patrick said he would immediately inform Pethick-Lawrence of remarks made to Bajpai, and that a telegram would be despatched to Wavell.

Repeated New Delhi 31.

GALLMAN

845.5018/9-2046 : Telegram

The Commissioner in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

NEW DELHI, September 20, 1946—2 p. m.

US URGENT

[Received 5:10 p. m.]

965. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is sending following personal message to Acting Secretary through Agency General:

"In view of very serious food situation in India which is being aggravated by delay in arrival of promised allotments due to shipping strikes in America, would earnestly request you and, through you, the labour leaders to permit and arrange for earliest despatch of food ships to India. We would be very grateful to you and to the labour leaders concerned if they will make a special exception in favour of sending food grains abroad which will bring urgently needed relief to millions of people".

Am sure Nehru would appreciate widest publicity.

MERRELL

845.5018/10-746

The Acting Secretary of State to the Agent General for India (Bajpai)

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1946.

MY DEAR SIR GIRJA: Although I addressed a letter to you on September 30,³⁹ in answer to the message from the Honorable Pandit

³⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru, President of the Indian National Congress, as well as Vice-President of the Executive Council, Minister for External Affairs and Minister for Commonwealth Relations, Interim Government of India.

³⁹ Not printed.

Jawahar Lal Nehru, Vice-President of the Viceroy's Executive Council and Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs, new information concerning shipments of bread grains to India is now available. I should appreciate, therefore, your disregarding the information contained in the previous letter referred to.

In spite of the maritime strikes, 87,052 tons of wheat were loaded in United States ports for shipment to India during September. In addition to this, it is my understanding that the officials of your staff procured a considerable amount of wheat flour in the commercial market.

Although we are now experiencing another maritime strike, some loading of grain for India is proceeding. One cargo is being loaded in Albany now. Officials of the Department of Agriculture informed me that 117,500 tons of wheat have been scheduled for loading in the early days of October for shipment to India. This latter quantity represents the carry-over from the September allocation. You may rest assured that we will continue to emphasize the loading of this grain until the total quantity has been shipped.

I should appreciate your transmitting this information to the Honorable Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

701.4511/10-1646 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner in India (Merrell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT

801. Following pertinent excerpts from Dept's reply to Indian Agent General's proposal to raise respective Missions to Embassies are for your confidential info only :

"The Govt of U.S. is very glad to agree to proposal of GOI, it being understood that Indian Amb to US and American Amb to India shall in no case enjoy less favorable treatment in matters of precedence than is accorded to reps of like rank from other countries.

As you doubtless aware, Ambs accredited to Govt of US are accorded precedence just after the President, the Vice President, and Ex-Presidents, and just before Chief Justice of Supreme Court and Secretary of State. It would be expected that American Amb to India would enjoy no less favorable treatment in this regard than that accorded to Indian Amb to US.

Upon receipt of concurrence of GOI to foregoing, it is suggested that Dept and Agent General arrange for simultaneous announcements to be made in Washington, New Delhi, and London."

Following paragraph will appear in Dept's press release at appropriate time:

"The Honorable George R. Merrell, at present American Commissioner to India with personal rank of Minister, will act as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of American Emb with personal rank of Minister pending designation and arrival in India of an American Amb." ⁴⁰

ACHESON

701.4511/11-846

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1946.

Sir Girja paid me a courtesy call this morning in order to be presented by Mr. Woodward ⁴¹ in the capacity of Chargé d'Affaires. He mentioned two matters in the course of our conversation which are worth recording.

First, I told him, in answer to his inquiry, that we had not yet selected anyone as Ambassador to India and that we were going about this carefully and might take some time because we attached great importance to the post. Sir Girja said that he would like to say to me in a purely personal way, not under instructions or officially, that he thought conditions in India made it possible for an American Ambassador, if he so desired and if he were well qualified, to exercise a peculiarly important influence at this time. He said that in his opinion any constitution which would come out of a constituent assembly in India would create a relationship between the Government of India and the Government of Great Britain more attenuant than that of such dominions as Canada, Australia and New Zealand and more in the nature of Eire. He thought, therefore, that there would be factors which would result in the Indian Government not leaning heavily upon Great Britain for advice or guidance. He felt also that while Nehru would not wish to be put in a position of choosing between close relationships with the Western Powers and with the Soviet Union nevertheless the facts were such that ultimately he must choose. In the light of these conditions an American Ambassador might exercise very considerable influence in the direction of friendly and helpful advice—in fact rather more so than might be possible in countries which we might consider more important and whose constitutional structure and foreign policies were more settled.

⁴⁰ For text of the Department of State press release, October 23, on elevation of the missions at Washington and New Delhi to Embassy rank, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 3, 1946, p. 827; see also *ibid.*, November 24, 1946, p. 971; and December 1, 1946, p. 1001.

⁴¹ Stanley Woodward, Chief of Protocol.

Sir Girja stated the reasons, which he had already mentioned to Mr. Henderson,⁴² why he thought the United States might wisely support India for membership in the Security Council.⁴³ In this connection I said to Sir Girja that I recognized the very weighty reasons making for a conclusion that India should be a member and also the reasons leading to the conclusion that an Arab state, Syria, should be. As I understood our position it was that we were not opposing anyone, certainly not India, but that at the present time the balance, in our judgment, fell on the side of supporting Syria. Should it appear that the general view in the Assembly did not accord with our views but favored India we should certainly not interpose stubborn objection but would be willing to reconsider and very probably go along with such a view.

DEAN ACHESON

845.00/11-3046: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1946—3 p. m.

US URGENT

7979. Dept deeply concerned serious deterioration Indian political situation and believes any halt in constitutional progress there may well cause widespread chaos similar China which would last for many years and could have worldwide repercussions. U.S. also looks forward mutually advantageous economic relations with stable peaceful united India in which all elements population including Muslims have ample scope realize their legitimate political and economic aspirations. It is in interest of all UN that early and amicable settlement Indian constitutional problem be reached and that Indians grasp this historic opportunity start on road political stability and economic well-being. Dept believes decisions Indian leaders will affect world peace and prosperity for many future generations.

In light foregoing Emb requested cable fully progress impending London talks using both Brit and Indian sources. Informal contact should be established Indian leaders for this purpose. As opportunities offer Emb might in its discretion impress upon Indian leaders particularly Nehru and Jinnah deep interest U.S. in successful conclusion talks pointing out U.S. has long taken sympathetic interest

⁴² Reference is to Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁴³ For documentation on this subject, see volume I.

progressive realization Indian political aspirations and has also welcomed forward-looking spirit behind programs social and economic advancement recently formulated in India.

For Emb's confidential info Dept believes it would be wise for Congress as most powerful party to accept Brit and Muslim League interpretation those features Brit constitutional plan pertaining compulsory groupings of provinces northeast and northwest India by majority decisions of appropriate representatives of constituent Assembly. Though this might mean downfall present Congress govts Assam and NWFP these areas have little economic importance and their strategic significance would in any event enable Indian Union Govt through defense and foreign affairs powers to concern itself with developments there.

Dept believes concession by Congress this point would probably bring Muslim League into Constituent Assembly and might also be basis for League's public acceptance Brit constitutional scheme as providing adequately for legitimate Muslim aspirations and for undertaking by League it would cooperate loyally within framework Indian Union subject only to proviso re re-opening constitutional question after 10 years experiment.

Sent London rptd Delhi.⁵⁰

ACHESON

845.00/12-246 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, December 2, 1946—5 p. m.

[Received December 2—1: 54 p. m.]

9849. According India Office Viceroy and Indian leaders will arrive London about 4: 30 p. m. today. Viceroy has telegraphed that flight has been tiring and that passengers have been deafened by noisy airplane. Talks themselves will take place Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday when an extremely tight schedule of Cabinet level appointments has been arranged. Leaders will probably depart Friday on return journey.

India Office emphasizes that talks will not have character of a conference and will consist largely of personal and separate interviews between Indian leaders and PriMin and his ministerial colleagues dealing with India. India Office said that this is "Prime Minister's party" and that regular officials might or might not be consulted.

India Office assumes that PriMin will keep Mr. Bevin⁵¹ informed

⁵⁰ As telegram 893.

⁵¹ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

and that sooner or later reports of talks will be sent to the Dominions but India Office is not aware of arrangements having been made in this regard. India Office said that in circumstances decision regarding extent to which Embassy will be kept informed will have to be taken by PriMin who may decide that it is more appropriate for Mr. Bevin to advise the Secretary of developments.

India Office understands and appreciates US interest re Indian problem as outlined paragraph (1), Dept's 7979 of November 30 and said that in the past American sympathy and statements have been "helpful".

In light foregoing Embassy will do its best to carry out Dept's instructions reference telegram but it is uncertain to what extent information re talks will be obtainable and it is unlikely that brief stay Indian leaders will embrace opportunity for establishing appropriate informal contact during which deep US interest can be impressed upon Indian leaders. Moreover, there is distinct possibility that existing tension may cause Nehru, Jinnah or both to interpret whatever is said to them by Embassy as US interference or taking sides. While Congress and League are capable of bending any statement made to their own purposes, Embassy believes that Dept should consider whether the thought that eyes of the world rest anxiously upon the Indian leaders in London might find more palatable and effective expression in a Departmental statement or at a Departmental press conference.

Embassy will not fail to keep Dept advised of developments as fully as possible.

Repeated New Delhi as 50.

GALLMAN

845.00/12-246 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Gallman)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1946—4 p. m.

US URGENT

NIACT

7996. In press conference today I made following statement on India:

"The United States awaits with deep concern the outcome of the current talks in London between the Indian political leaders and the British Government. I feel most strongly that it will be in the interest of India, as well as that of all the whole world, for its leaders to grasp this opportunity to establish a stable and peaceful India.

The crux of the internal problem now confronting India appears to arise from differences of opinion between the two principal parties as to the conditions under which provinces can elect to join or remain out of sub-federations in northwest and northeast India. I am confident that if the Indian leaders show the magnanimous spirit the occasion demands, they can go forward together on the basis of the clear provisions on this point contained in the constitutional plan proposed by the British Cabinet Mission last spring to forge an Indian federal union in which all elements of the population have ample scope to achieve their legitimate political and economic aspirations.

The United States has long taken a sympathetic interest in the progressive realization of India's political destiny. It has welcomed the forward-looking spirit behind the comprehensive programs of industrial and agricultural advancement recently formulated in that country. Lastly, by our recent establishment of full diplomatic relations with the interim government of India, we have expressed in tangible form our confidence in the ability of the Indian leaders to make the vital decisions that lie immediately ahead with full awareness that their actions at this moment in history may directly affect world peace and prosperity for generations to come."

Please transmit copies this statement appropriate Brit authorities⁵² and Indian leaders.

Difficulties establishing informal contact Indian leaders (urtel 9849 Dec 2) appreciated but if at all feasible suggest you convey text press statement personally Nehru and Jinnah and if opportunity offers elaborate US position along lines last two paragraphs Deptel 7979 Nov 30.

Delhi requested take parallel action in transmitting press statement personally to Weightman⁵³ and Vallabhai Patel and in discussing US position with Patel.

Sent London, repeated New Delhi.⁵⁴

ACHESON

845.00/12-746 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in India (Merrell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1946—1 p. m.

US URGENT

NIACT

912. Brit Govt has told us through Brit Emb here it believes it might be helpful if we expressed informally to Congress leaders, particularly Nehru, views this Govt as indicated last two paragraphs

⁵² Telegram 9912, December 5, from London, transmitted the text of a brief note from Mr. Attlee expressing his appreciation for being sent a copy of Mr. Acheson's statement (845.00/12-546).

⁵³ Hugh Weightman, Secretary, External Affairs Department, Government of India.

⁵⁴ As telegram 897.

Deptel 893 Nov 30 to you.⁵⁵ Upon arrival Nehru New Delhi and prior meeting Congress Working Committee tomorrow night, please emphasize to him views this Govt as expressed aforementioned telegram.

ACHESON

845.00/12-1146 : Telegram

The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 11, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received December 12—1:35 a. m.]

1200. 1. When I called on Patel to discuss Acting Secretary's statement (reference Department's telegram 915, December 10⁵⁶) and reiterated points therein Patel said he appreciated Department's concern over possible effect of conditions in India on rest of world but felt US Government unduly influenced by British. He recited familiar story of how British had created communal electorates for purpose of dividing Indians and said India was now reaping results. Nowhere else in world said Patel had a constitutional plan been set up on basis of communal divisions. He said Congress had been ready to believe in sincerity of Labor Government's offer of independence but that Labor Government was not living up to promises.

He went on to say Churchill⁵⁷ "had won the war" but still had "a finger in India"; that Jinnah had gone to London to solicit Churchill's help and to some extent had gained it. Patel said he had been opposed to sending Congress representatives to London and had asked Nehru not to go; that Congress could never accept HMG's statement in which British had altered original cabinet mission plan; that Congress had been tricked but was "bearing it patiently"; and that Indians were peace loving people and Congress policy had always been one of non-violence but that if Labor Government persisted in deception it would be "bad" for British in India.

Patel remarked that US Government seemed to follow policy of favoring the "strong"; that vote of US Delegation at UN against Indian proposal re South Africa was an example.⁵⁸ He went on to say that if US Government had been in "full possession of facts" he was sure it would not have adopted attitude parallel to that of HMG re cabinet mission plan. When asked by Weil, who accompanied me, what facts he thought might not have been brought to attention of US Government he reiterated Congress view that Congress had been

⁵⁵ Same as telegram 7979 to London, p. 97.

⁵⁶ Not printed; it requested reports on the reactions of Nehru and Patel to the statement by Mr. Acheson (845.00/12-1046).

⁵⁷ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940-1945.

⁵⁸ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 126 ff.

brought into interim government under false pretenses and that neither Viceroy nor League had lived up to respective promises. It was pointed out to Patel that US Government was familiar with Congress views as expressed by him and that it was Embassy's impression that attitude expressed in Acting Secretary's statement was influenced not by question of whether US wished to support British but entirely by considerations affecting future of Indian people and people of world. Patel, however, did not seem inclined to accept view that US Government's attitude was not determined by policy of supporting British whenever possible. Since Patel seems obsessed with idea British are insincere in their independence offer I felt no useful purpose would be served by pursuing this point further.

Toward end of conversation Patel with reference US Government's concern over peace in India and throughout world repeated Congress argument that if they made "concession" currently requested by British they would be putting a "premium on violence" and he remarked that in course of American revolution there was period when fighting became necessary.

While Patel showed considerable animation when stating his case his manner throughout conversation was cordial.

2. Rajagopalachari told me last night at dinner [apparent omission] at my house he had read my message to Nehru⁵⁹ and thought it "very good"; said I should "not waste my time" talking to him (implication being that he agreed) but should talk with other Congressmen—particularly Patel. He said Congress had made concessions to Sikhs, untouchables and Hindu Mahasabha as well as to League and if it continued making concessions would itself "become a minority".

He went on to say US view as presented in approach to Nehru was strong endeavor to support British; that Jinnah should be persuaded to accept HMG's latest statement.⁶⁰ When asked if Congress would accept it if League did he replied Congress could not commit itself in advance.

Rajagopalachari made the surprising statement that US had been first to introduce idea of ten year experiment—that British had not

⁵⁹ Telegram 1196, December 10 (not printed) reported on a brief conversation in which Nehru invited Merrell to dine with him on Friday, December 13. At the time, Merrell had given Nehru a personal and confidential communication on the U.S. view on the Indian situation which, Merrell said, Nehru "had undoubtedly introduced into thus far inconclusive deliberations of Working Committee." (845.00/12-1046)

⁶⁰ Reference is to a statement of December 6 by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom supporting the Muslim League's contention that decisions by simple majority vote should prevail in the inter-provincial groups of the regional areas. The Congress Party had contended that each province should be allowed to vote separately on whether or not to join the groups. The position of the Department of State was given in telegram 7979 to London, November 30, p. 97.

recommended this. I told him I was under impression this had been envisaged in original cabinet mission proposal and [apparent garble] called upon by Rajagopalachari to verify his belief confirmed my statement.

Later in evening Rajagopalachari said Congress could not possibly agree to interpretation of cabinet proposals which would inevitably place millions of Hindus under Muslim rule particularly in Bengal-Assam group. When asked how basis for a democratic government could be established as long as mutual distrust between Hindus and Muslims exemplified by this view persisted, Rajagopalachari evaded the issue.

For report on my brief interview with Nehru see my telegram 1196, December 10.⁶¹

Please repeat to London.

MERRELL

845.00/12-1046 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in India (Merrell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1946—7 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

919. When you see Nehru (re last para urtel 1196 Dec 10⁶¹) suggest you stress following points re US position toward Indian political impasse:

(1) Recent expressions of US interest in Indian political impasse were made solely on US initiative and stem from US feeling that early establishment Indian Federal Union by peaceful means would be great step forward toward world stability and prosperity at a time when there are so many dark clouds on international horizon elsewhere. Important dispel any Indian belief US actions inspired at instance Brit.

(2) US realize that Indian problems must in last analysis be solved by Indians themselves.

(3) We believe that since we are in position of a politically disinterested outsider and since we have had considerable experience in problems of a federal system our views might be given sympathetic consideration by the responsible Indian leaders.

(4) While we are aware that some features of the Brit cabinet mission plan are open to honest and objective criticism, particularly the limited powers of union center, we feel that the plan presents a fair basis for constitution-making in a difficult situation where current political realities cannot be ignored.

⁶¹ See footnote 59, p. 102.

(5) US historical experience in federalism indicates necessity inaugurate federal union in atmosphere of unsatisfactory compromises and with weaker central govt than desired by forward-looking elements.

(6) We have found that a central govt initially with limited powers gradually acquires, as experience demonstrates necessity therefor, the additional authority which it must have to meet problems of the Federal Union.

(7) Our hope that Congress accept clear implications Brit Cabinet Mission plan re pronounced groupings is based on understanding that revision Congress attitude this point would rest on reciprocal undertaking by Muslim League to work loyally within framework Indian Federal Union subject only to reopening constitutional issue after 10 years of experiment.

Sent Delhi, rptd London.⁶²

ACHESON

845.00/12-1246: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 12, 1946—6 p. m.
[Received December 12—4:50 p. m.]

10059. I had the opportunity today to talk with Jinnah at a luncheon given by him. During conversation I was able to touch on points brought out in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Dept's 8133 December 11.⁶³

Jinnah said he appreciated sympathetic interest shown by US Government in political situation prevailing in India and he was especially appreciative of statement issued by Mr. Acheson on December 3rd. The problem of India, however, was a very complicated one and while leading US Government officials had shown an understanding of that problem, public in the States, and in fact throughout the world, was ill-informed. Much remained to [be] done to develop an informed world opinion. That, he seemed to think, had to be done first and that would take time.

During our talk Jinnah gave no evidence of thinking that a solution of the present impasse might be worked out within a reasonable time. He did not seem disturbed by this but seemed to view future developments coldly, calmly and in a very detached way.

Sent Department 10059; repeated New Delhi 61.

GALLMAN

⁶² As telegram 8133.

⁶³ Same as telegram 919 to New Delhi, *supra*.

845.00/12-1146: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 14, 1946—11 a. m.

[Received 2:18 p. m.]

1206. I had good opportunity of stressing points in Deptel 919, December 1 [11] to Nehru last night. He replied at once that neither he nor his colleagues had any idea that expressions of US interest had been made at instance British; they realized opinions were offered spontaneously and in interest of India and world. He said also that Congress realized thoroughly necessity of starting union with weak center.

He then embarked on restrained but lengthy attack on Jinnah who he said had Hindu background and lived according to Hindu law, Nehru himself being imbued with more Muslim culture, linguistically and in other ways, than Jinnah. He said Congress had endeavored at various stages to learn what Jinnah wanted and had never been able to receive satisfactory replies; that even Pakistan had never been adequately defined. Congress was convinced that whereas Jinnah might want some change he did not want democratic government; that prominent Leaguers being landholders preferred to continue under antiquated land laws. Congress had not liked British cabinet mission proposal but in interest of peaceful and fair settlement had formed interim government on understanding that League would cooperate. On contrary League members had announced publicly that they joined Cabinet in order to fight. Now they were saying privately that if they entered Constituent Assembly it would be with purpose of wrecking it.

Nehru believed League was on point of joining Constituent Assembly when London talks were called and HMG "threw spanner into works" by announcing that constitution would not be forced on any unwilling parts of country. There was now little incentive for League to join. Nevertheless he felt League would join in end just as it had joined interim government.

Finally Nehru stated that despite foregoing Congress would probably shortly follow HMG's suggestion of submitting question of voting in sections to federal court although it realized that under circumstances it would be difficult for court to give fair decision and that in any event if decision were unfavorable to League and HMG they would not accept it.

Please repeat to London.

MERRELL

845.00/12-1946 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in India (Merrell)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1946—7 p. m.

939. Your reports on talks with Congress leaders most helpful. Suggest you now in your discretion seek early opportunity discuss with Jinnah or Liaquat Ali Khan or both our attitude re present constitutional impasse as outlined Deptels 893, 897, and 919.⁶⁴ Point to be particularly stressed is our doubt that Congress attitude re provincial groupings can be modified unless accompanied by public declaration or other tangible evidence of Muslim League willingness to cooperate loyally within framework of Indian Federal Union to be established in accordance Cabinet Mission plan.

You may add that we are fully aware as indicated Acheson statement of need for providing in Indian Federal Union ample scope for Muslim political and economic aspirations but that atmosphere for creating necessary safeguards can never be achieved unless the concept of union itself is generally accepted by the principal parties.

We perceive no objection your mentioning that you have also discussed question with Congress leaders.

Sent to New Delhi, repeated to London.

BYRNES

845.00/12-2746 : Telegram

The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 27, 1946—4 p. m.

[Received December 28—1:15 a. m.]

1228. From Weil. In conversation lasting hour and 50 minutes yesterday, I discussed with Liaquat Ali Khan points indicated in Deptel 939, December 19. With reference to Acheson December 3 statement, Liaquat said he agreed chaos in India would have repercussions throughout world and added he felt statement had been timely and was appreciated since in past he had felt perhaps Muslim League position had not been fully understood in Washington. He stressed "sacrifice" made by League in accepting Cabinet Mission plan June 6 even though it had not provided fully for realization of Muslim aspirations.

Liaquat said that under circumstances it was not likely a "miracle" would occur to bring about Congress-League agreement. He then discussed at length communal warfare in Bihar; said official estimates of 5,000 Muslims killed and 60,000 driven out of province were incor-

⁶⁴ November 30, December 3, and December 11, respectively.

rect—that figures being collected by League indicated 30,000 Muslims killed and 100,000 Muslim refugees. He said his proposals to govt that rural Muslim population in Bihar be concentrated in villages of their own, that arms be issued to limited number of “responsible” persons for self defense and that Muslim personnel in Bihar police force be increased had been turned down. When I asked if these proposals presupposed impossibility of restoring communal harmony Liaquat said not necessarily but that even if conditions remained quiet for a while there was no telling when Hindus might again attack Muslims.

I asked whether Jinnah’s renewed references to Pakistan indicated League had abandoned idea of trying to work Cabinet Mission plan. Liaquat said not necessarily but that as result of Congress behavior League was beginning to feel that perhaps outright Pakistan would be only means of obtaining their objectives—namely to give Muslims scope for development culturally, educationally and economically. Liaquat said the next move was up to Congress; that League could do nothing until AICC announced decision regarding Dec 6 statement;⁶⁵ that if Congress accepted statement unconditionally, League Council would decide whether to reverse July 29 resolution to stay out of Constituent Assembly.

I said that while logic of League position was understandable it had occurred to Dept that if some sort of assurance were given to Congress that League was willing to cooperate within framework of Indian Federal Union doubts and fears now affecting Congress attitude might be reduced and chances of unconditional acceptance of Dec 6 statement by Congress correspondingly increased. Liaquat said he did not see why Jinnah should give any assurances of this sort; that Congress with its “brutal” majority in Constituent Assembly was unjustified in entertaining fears; that if any party had cause to fear it was League; that if League intended to join Constituent Assembly merely for purpose of making false gesture of cooperation it could have done this long ago; that fact that League was waiting for Congress decision regarding Dec 6 statement was in itself evidence of League’s sincerity vis-à-vis Constituent Assembly. When I referred to Congress fears regarding group constitutions in sections with majority of Muslim members Liaquat said Muslim members would not be so stupid as to formulate constitutions which would be unfair to non-Muslim population.

When I inquired whether he thought that in spite of bitterness now prevailing there was any sort of move, however dramatic, which either Gandhi or Jinnah might make in effort to avoid disaster Liaquat said he doubted it; that declarations seemed to have little value and that

⁶⁵ See footnote 60, p. 102.

Congress would have to prove by deeds whether it really desired to cooperate with League. When I asked if unconditional acceptance of Dec 6 statement would be regarded as evidence of Congress sincerity Liaquat said that this might be a beginning.

Liaquat discussed at some length his suspicion that Congress had no intention of trying to work the Cabinet Mission plan; that their aim was to establish a "Hindu Raj"; and that they felt strong enough to succeed. Liaquat said HMG had made two major mistakes: (a) they should never have regarded Congress acceptance of Cabinet Mission plan as genuine but Cabinet Mission was so eager to make negotiations appear successful that it recognized Congress acceptance even though Congress interpretation of plan was contrary to Cabinet Mission's; (b) HMG should never have allowed interim govt to be formed in first instance without League participation.

Liaquat cited, as examples of Congress lack of desire to cooperate, its refusal to adopt Viceroy's suggestion of coalition govts in all provinces. He said that when he and Nehru discussed this proposal with Viceroy he maintained that if Congress-League coalition were formed in Bengal Congress-League coalitions should be formed in all provinces with a view to establishing a basis for Congress-League cooperation at center. Liaquat said that Nehru flatly refused to consider Congress-League coalitions in Hindu majority provinces. As further evidence of Congress' lack of sincerity Liaquat also cited Nehru's speech at Meerut and referred with some bitterness to Patel's Meerut speech in which he reportedly referred to "balance sheet" of communal riots.

Liaquat said in London he had told HMG that if they intended to withdraw from India within two or three years whether conditions at that time were peaceful or not they should withdraw immediately since after two or three years Hindus would have most of administrative machinery in their hands and Muslims fight for survival would be more difficult than it would be in immediate future. Liaquat also stated he had said in London that if chaos developed in India, USSR would move in but that officials in London had merely stated they hoped Cabinet Mission plan would work and a peaceful transfer of power would be possible.

I gathered from Liaquat's remarks that he is not convinced British will withdraw from India regardless of conditions but probably believes and hopes they will remain indefinitely in hope of managing peaceful transfer of power.

With reference to Assam which is causing so much concern in Congress circles Liaquat said Muslim majority in section would not lay themselves open to charges of unfairness by formulating a group constitution which would ignore rights of non-Muslim population.

He reiterated familiar League contention that large proportion of Assam population—particularly hill people—claimed by Congress as Hindus are merely non-Muslims; that having gained control of their votes Congress fears possibility of losing this control and therefore opposes grouping system which might result in their changing their political loyalties.

In accordance Deptel 939, I told Liaquat Dept felt acceptance by Congress of British and League interpretation of Cabinet Mission plan would be desirable and that this view had been conveyed to Congress leaders.

Throughout conversation Liaquat's manner was cordial and he seemed anxious to explain every angle of League position. His bitterness against Congress however is so strong that he seems unable to recognize merits of League's volunteering assurances of cooperation at this time.

Please repeat London. Paraphrase sent Moscow. [Weil.]

MERRELL

845.00/12-2946 : Telegram

The Chargé in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, December 29, 1946—noon.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

1231. From Weil. In accordance Deptel 947, December 26⁶⁸ I asked Liaquat Ali Khan yesterday to convey Department's views to Jinnah. In course of an hour's conversation Liaquat undertook to explain why he felt Jinnah would not be receptive at this time. Liaquat expressed opinion that if Congress accepted December 6 statement and prior to League Council meeting which Jinnah would call to consider Congress decision we conveyed to him our views on importance of League cooperation within framework of Indian Union establishment in accordance Cabinet mission plan he believed expression of our views might have its effect on Jinnah but seemed convinced Jinnah could not be persuaded to offer assurances of any sort until such time as Congress might accept December 6 statement.

In support of his position Liaquat reviewed and expanded on points brought out in conversation December 26 (Embtel 1228, December 27) : He said Congress fears regarding grouping were quite unjustified ; that he felt that if assurances concerning treatment of minorities under grouping plan were to be given by any one they should come from Congress—in regard to Muslims living in Hindu majority provincial group ; that in any case His Majesty's Government had declared they

⁶⁸ Not printed.

would not agree to independence unless adequate safeguards for minorities were provided. With framework provided by Cabinet mission plan—if League agreed to participate—Liaquat said League position was that Congress had never officially raised this question and that it would be difficult for Jinnah to give Congress assurances on this point when Congress had not actually accused League of not intending to work within framework of Cabinet plan once it accepted it.

I said I appreciated his point of view re Congress fears about grouping but that these fears were a potential obstacle to acceptance by Congress of December 6 statement; and that regardless of whether Congress had made any definite accusations concerning League's intentions vis-à-vis working Cabinet mission plan there seemed to be considerable doubt on this point in Congress circles—increased possibly by Mr. Jinnah's recent references to Pakistan. I said that while I understood logic of Liaquat attitude question arose as to whether in view of gravity of situation assurances to Congress that League would cooperate within framework laid down by Cabinet mission in [if?] Congress accepted December 6 statement might not encourage him to accept statement.

Liaquat said Jinnah could not commit himself until such time as League Council might meet; that since Bihar massacres feeling against Hindus had been running so high that if Jinnah gave Congress assurances without consulting Council many of his followers might think they were being betrayed and chances of Council members following Jinnah's lead when they met would be reduced accordingly. Liaquat said he could tell me frankly that when Council met in June to consider Cabinet mission plan Jinnah had brought pressure on various members to gain their support for acceptance of plan but that now situation was different; if Jinnah appeared to prejudice issue he might be faced with rebellious Council. Liaquat added he felt it would be better to allow League followers as long a time as possible in which to "blow off steam" (re Bihar riots) after which they would be more likely to accept Jinnah's lead at a Council meeting.

I asked Liaquat whether he thought same argument would apply if Jinnah merely said he would recommend to Council that it accept and work Cabinet mission plan *in toto* if Congress accepted December 6 statement. Liaquat said for my private information Attlee had asked Jinnah this question in London and Jinnah had said he could make no commitment but that if Congress accepted December 6 statement he would call meeting of Council.

I remarked it was my impression that US public who had long taken friendly and lively interest in Indian independence were now somewhat puzzled by events in India; that they seemed to feel Indian lead-

ers were moving toward an abyss with their eyes wide open to danger ahead; and that observers interested in peace in India and world at large wonder whether it was not in the power of one Indian leader or another to make a move at this time—however “illogical” from a partisan point of view—which might clear atmosphere and lead to a peaceful settlement. Liaquat said he could understand these views but did not see how Jinnah could be expected to volunteer assurances to Congress when League was minority party merely trying to defend itself against Hindu majority.

Liaquat then discussed at length his conviction that Congress leaders have no intention of trying to work Cabinet mission plan conscientiously but are determined to seize power without regard for Muslim rights. As evidence of Nehru's lack of interest in Congress—League cooperation he said for my “private information” Asaf Ali was appointed Ambassador⁶⁷ without any consultation with League members of interim government—that first he (Liaquat) had known of appointment was when he read press report in London. Asaf Ali he added did not command respect or confidence of Muslim Indians. Liaquat said that as soon as League joined interim government he proposed two League representatives—Begum Shah Nawaz and Ispahani—he appointed to UN delegation but that Nehru refused on ground that number was limited to five and appointment of these two would mean replacing two who have already prepared themselves for work at UN meeting. Liaquat also said when League joined interim government he proposed that in interest of efficiency and cooperation questions concerning more than one department be discussed by Ministers concerned prior to full Cabinet meetings regardless of whether these Ministers were Congress or League members but that Nehru refused to agree on ground it was preferable to thrash out all questions in full Cabinet meetings. When I asked whether all votes in Cabinet meetings were along party lines Liaquat answered in affirmative.

In reply to my question Liaquat said he was convinced Gandhi had no desire for Hindu-Muslim cooperation but was working for Hindu domination of India—to be attained through violence if necessary. When I asked Liaquat whether he believed Gandhi's activities in East Bengal were deliberate attempt to embarrass Bengal govt and to divert attention from Bihar he said there was no question about it.

Liaquat's suggestion that Jinnah might be receptive to an expression of our views if Congress accepts December 6 statement is clear indication that he (Liaquat) does not resent our present approach and would seem to indicate he is quite sincere in belief that Jinnah would not respond if approached at this time. Incidentally Liaquat told me

⁶⁷ To the United States.

December 26 Jinnah was fatigued by London trip and has not been well since return which may mean he is currently in one of his touchier moods.

There is no doubt in my mind that a "statesmanlike" declaration by Jinnah at this time even though it involved risk of loss of prestige among his followers might make Congress leaders feel they would be placed "in wrong" if they did not accept December 6 statement but partisan bitterness on both sides is so great that I am afraid it may be too much to hope for "statesmanlike" behavior on part of any of the leaders involved. None of them has yet demonstrated clearly that he has the vision or courage to rise effectively above party and communal considerations.

If Gandhi advises Congress leaders to turn down December 6 statement it will be difficult to believe he is more interested in preventing suffering among Indian people than he is in preserving power of Congress Party.

With reference to possibility of approaching Jinnah in event that Congress does accept December 6 statement it occurs to me that if Jinnah is in Bombay at time there might be some advantage in conveying views through Consulate General and copying telegram to Delhi so that Embassy can inform Liaquat. If message were given to Liaquat in Delhi for transmission to Jinnah in Bombay time might be lost and security involved since Liaquat does not appear to have any regular means of direct secret communication with Jinnah.⁶⁸

Please repeat to London. [Weil.]

MERRELL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA ON AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

[Signed at New Delhi, November 14, 1946. For text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1586, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2573.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA RESPECTING A MUTUAL AID SETTLEMENT

[Signed at Washington, May 16, 1946. For text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1532, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1753.]

⁶⁸ In answer to this point, the first paragraph of Department telegram 953, December 31, to New Delhi, reads as follows: "Since Liaquat Ali Khan obviously reluctant convey our views to Jinnah (urtel 1231 Dec. 29) suggest you request Bombay discuss US position with Jinnah. Question of timing left yours and Bombay's discretion." (845.00/12-2946)