Social Engineering and Bonds in the USSR and Nazi Germany

In Beyond Totalitarianism, edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick and Michael Geyer, two chapters discuss the framework and implementation of social engineering, and then the creation and destruction of bonds in both the USSR and Nazi Germany. Specifically, in chapter six, “Frameworks for Social Engineering,” authors Christopher R. Browning and Lewis H Siegelbaum focused on the trajectories of dictated social identities within both political systems. No attempt was made to homogenize the two systems; rather, differences regarding the criterion ascribed, the methodology of implementation, as well as what portion of each population was affected were all noted. Continuing on in chapter seven, “Energizing the Everyday,” authors Sheila Fitzpatrick and Alf Lüdtke discussed various practices and relationships within both Nazi Germany and the USSR, and how these were demonstrative that bonds were created or transformed, connecting people in a myriad of ways. Several types of bonds and relationships were discussed in order to challenge the Arendtian notion that new and new types of bonds could not be generated in “totalitarian” societies.

In Yuri Slezkine’s article “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” the author demonstrated the rationale behind the Party’s emphasis on nationality and the creation of national identities for the smaller minorities and nations under its control. Slezkine argued that with the eradication of class after the Russian Revolution, the resulting development of national cultures and subsequent administration system served as a way to organize society without the use of class, making nationality essential in a Soviet citizen’s identity. Browning and Siegelbaum address this topic in chapter six, but take it one step further. They argue that while the state certainly used nationality as a way to define and categorize the general population, Soviet citizens could exercises considerable latitude (or artifice) in constructing desirable social identities.1 I found it surprising that regulations regarding nationality were not as resolute as Slezkine’s article depicted. In reality, the policing of social identities was far from simple. Browning and Siegelbaum noted how for example, parents of nationally or socially mixed offspring would choose to emphasize the identity of the parent that would be more advantageous2 or children could publicly “disown” their parents in favor of a Soviet self. 

Reading this article in dialogue with Slezkine’s article, I realize that I should not be so surprised by the flexibility and subterfuge executed by the Soviet citizenry. In a practical sense, though Slezkine described the extensive work of ethnographers in categorizing and modernizing each nationality, there were simply too many nationalities to differentiate that regulation proved futile. I wonder how much Soviet officials knew of the subterfuge going on, and if they did know, did they ignore it? Why would they?

  1. Christopher R. Browning and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Frameworks for Social Engineering,” in Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, ed. Michael Geyer and Shelia Fitzpatrick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 235. []
  2. Ibid, 235. []

2 thoughts on “Social Engineering and Bonds in the USSR and Nazi Germany

  1. It is kind of hard to answer your question. On one hand, one must consider the fact, according to Yuri Slezkine, that at one point in the early years after the revolution, The Soviet Union had to deal with “over 192 languages” ((Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism.” In Slavic Review. Vol 53, no. 2, 1994. 445)) Based off the many different ethnic groups, it would not be surprising if the state at some point did not do much about that. On one hand, one could argue, based off of Slezkines piece, that the Soviet State would have known that this was going on. Slezkine had said that during the great retreat, the state had narrowed the amount of ethnic groups accepted because of the difficulty to handle so many groups. it might be possible that the state might have known about it and could have done something about the ‘subterfuge’. Particuarly, as Bedford brings up at the end of their blog, people were ratting each other out left and right in fear of getting in trouble with the state. The trust factor with one another was relatively low.

    I would conclude that the state definitely knew about it, particularly because of the fact that they had established a state of fear where people couldn’t trust each other. especially their own children. However, I am stuck between yes and no in terms of them ignoring it.

  2. I plausible to believe that officials knew there was some about of subterfuge going on. There were a large number of not only people, but also nationalities that had to be dealt with. There was also a great amount of ambiguity in terms which the state used to identify people. People would often choose to associate themselves with an identity that was more advantageous than another, making categorizing difficult (( Browning and Siegelbaum, “Frameworks for Social Engineering”, 234-235)). Like Henry mentioned above, I am unsure the extent to which they ignored the issue.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *