Monarchs in the Middle East have various challenges that could uproot their regimes. There have been plenty of monarchies in the Middle East, with many of them surviving until the present day, however, the fallen monarchies in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Iran are significant in understanding what threats monarchies face. For starters, each monarchy fell via coup. These countries “lacked the means to legitimize the monarchy through parliamentary institutions,” leading to their legitimacies being questioned (Lucas 2004, 109). Because these “sultanistic” monarchs were more involved in day-to-day politics than their “linchpin” counterparts, they faced higher scrutiny than others, as they were directly responsible for the outcomes of certain policies (Lucas 2004, 111). This can lead to increased dissatisfaction among the populace if a ruler is not meeting the needs of the people, and potentially ignite a coup.
Monarchs also must keep a close watch on their militaries, as they can cause the monarch’s downfall. Both Iraq and Syria’s monarchies fell in 1958 and 1961 respectively because of ambitious officers and their desires to reform the country, especially when the prior monarchs were weak (Cammett et. al. 2019, 355). Middle Eastern governments put “disproportionate importance on the military and security forces” and are collectively one of the highest spenders on their coercive apparatuses in the world (Cammett et. al. 2019, 356-357). Because of this, their militaries are generally the strongest power in the state, so if they see an opportunity to take down the monarch, then they have a very clean chance to do so, as the monarch has little power except for them.
However, most of the surviving monarchies were able to use this to their advantage, as they had very close ties to the military, and often had extensive patronage systems throughout as well. The Gulf States like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar “often appoint members of the royal family to top military positions, yielding the double benefit of ensuring familial solidarity and military loyalty” (Cammet et. al. 2019, 376). The ruler or ruling family can ensure that the military will stay loyal, as their family members or friends in leadership positions often keep the military in line. Monarchs, especially in the wealthy Gulf States, buy off their militaries’ support with higher wages and benefits, making the soldiers less likely to coup, and garner loyalty (Cammett et. al. 2019, 367). While militaries can be a danger for some less effective monarchies, smart or rich monarch can buy off the support of their military or instill their trusted family and friends into positions of power to keep their loyalty.
Monarchs now have a new and modern challenge, which is to keep young activists on social media from sparking uprisings. During the 2011 Uprisings, Morocco’s February 20 uprising was aided in spreading across the country by social media, where activists could connect and coordinate their events (Khatib and Lust 2014, 206-207). Facebook became a massive catalyst for democratic activism, as people began flocking to the streets after seeing news from Tunisia, Egypt, and others, leading many monarchs to become worried about their positions as people called for change. However, monarchs had the upper hand in staving off these protests, as Moroccan activists were not nearly coordinated enough on the issues they wanted changes on to take down the monarchy (Khatib and Lust 2014, 219). In addition, the Moroccan regime gave the “promise of constitutional reform” which alleviated the concerns of most protestors (Khatib and Lust 2014, 220). While social media and a large amount of youth activists may have been a challenge, regimes like the Moroccan monarchy were able to stave off many of the protestors by promising democratic reforms, which sputtered out the already divided coalition.
Monarchs also have to deal with outside powers meddling in their affairs, especially if they are important politically or economically. Bahrain was nervous that Iran or the United States were involved in sparking the uprisings of 2011, despite both not being involved in the planning or instigating these protests (Khatib and Lust 2014, 194-195). Despite this, the Bahraini government was petrified of influence from outside factors, primarily Iran, as they would’ve been the likely support of Shia resistance, especially since Iran wanted influence in the region to compete with Saudi Arabia. However, Bahrain’s regime also benefitted from the outside influence, as Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations sent troops in to stall out the uprisings (Khatib and Lust 2014, 194). Because of the potential for Iranian influence with a fallen Bahraini government, Saudi Arabia wanted to keep the monarchy alive to keep stability and limit Iranian influence. While monarchies have to watch out for outside factors taking them down, the fear of instability often keeps support for them, as their instability would be worse in their eyes than a repressive monarchy.
Bibliography:
Cammett, Melani Claire, Ishac Dewan, Alan Richards, and John Waterbury. 2019. A Political Economy of the Middle East. London, UK: Routledge.
Khatib, Lina, and Ellen Lust. 2014. Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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