Climate Justice:
Some Challenges for Buddhist Ethics

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Abstract

It has often been suggested that the Buddhist teachings can help us to meet the moral challenges posed by the climate crisis. This paper, by contrast, addresses some challenges the topic of climate justice presents for Buddhist ethics. Two arguments to the effect that Buddhist ethics is incompatible with calls for climate justice are considered and rejected. It is then argued that for Buddhists such calls must nonetheless take second place to the paramount concern with overcoming suffering.

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**Introduction**

It is often suggested that the Buddhist teachings can help us to meet the moral challenges posed by the climate crisis. Those teachings, it is said, have “something distinctive to contribute at this crucial time” (Stanley et al. 8). They shed light on “the root causes of the climate crisis and [suggest] ways to minimize its potentially tragic consequences.” They describe “a pathway of principles and practices we can follow to minimize climate change and the suffering it causes.”

These claims are well taken. The Buddhist teachings include much that is relevant to the moral problems posed by the climate crisis. They state that humans can change the climate for the worse. They condemn the greed which is, arguably, one of the main drivers of global heating. They recommend compassion for all sentient beings and, therefore, for all those who stand to suffer the effects of that heating—not just our compatriots, but also strangers in distant lands; not just our conspecifics, but also sentient nonhumans; and not just our contemporaries, but also future people.

In short, then, the Buddhist teachings may well be able to help us to meet the moral challenges posed by the climate crisis. But can they shed light on those moral issues that fall into the category of climate

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3 See, for instance, the suggestion that when people become “excited by illicit lust, overcome by unrighteous greed [and] afflicted by wrong Dhamma [i.e., in this context, a false conception of how things are] . . . sufficient rain does not fall” (*AN* 3.56; Bodhi *Numerical 254*).

4 For some criticisms of the common assumption that climate change is driven by vices such as greed and ignorance, see Vogel 205-207.
justice? Images of Buddhists marching under the banner of climate justice would suggest that they can. In the following, however, I consider two arguments for thinking that they cannot: one based on Buddhist teachings of rebirth, another premised on Buddhist conceptions of kamma. After rejecting both arguments, I move on to argue that concerns with climate justice, or indeed with any other noble but worldly end, must occupy a subsidiary place in Buddhist ethics. They must, I suggest, take second place to the paramount concern with overcoming suffering.

1. Clarifications

Buddhism encompasses a tremendous variety of traditions, from Tibetan Vajrayāna to Japanese Pure Land Buddhism. In this paper, I focus on the works that make up the Pāli Canon, the canonical scriptures of Theravāda Buddhism, as well as those later texts, such as the Milindapañha, which Theravādins also regard as authoritative. (From hereon, I refer to these various teachings as “the Buddhist teachings” and I use the word “Buddhist” to refer to anyone who takes these teachings to be authoritative.) Although I focus on Theravāda Buddhism, however, much of what I say refers to certain teachings, concerning rebirth and the like, that are accepted by just about all Buddhists. So some of the arguments I present may well apply to other Buddhist traditions, too. (I leave it to others to assess whether they do in fact so apply.)

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6 Accordingly, when I use words from Indic languages, I transliterate from the Pāli rather than the Sanskrit (though when the Sanskrit term is more familiar, as is the case with words such as karma, I include the Sanskrit too).
The phrase “climate justice,” for its part, is occasionally used to denote the field of climate ethics as a whole. More usually, though, it is used to refer to a certain subset of ethical issues pertaining to the climate crisis. (See further discussion in Gardiner.) One prominent such issue concerns the distribution of what I shall call “climate costs” and “climate benefits.” This topic—one of distributive justice—is my main concern here.

2. A Putative Injustice

To focus the discussion, it will help to examine a precisely-formulated claim that would typically be endorsed by those who call for climate justice. To this end, consider the following:

(A) Those who bear the greatest climate costs are typically not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating.

Two remarks on this claim. First, the use of the word “typically” is significant. Imagine that the CEO of some notoriously dirty fossil fuel company gets caught in a typhoon which would not have occurred had it not been for global heating. Such situations are not likely; nonetheless, because they are possible, it is only typically the case that those who bear the greatest climate costs are not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating.

Second, (A) may be thought to apply between and/or within nations. That is to say, the word “those” could be taken to denote those nations and/or those citizens of a particular nation. (On the former, see Althor, Watson and Fuller; on the latter, Rao.)

In discussions of climate justice, then, (A) is typically held to be true. It is also typically supposed that the state of affairs to which it
refers—that is, the uneven distribution of climate costs—is unjust. More precisely, it is typically thought to violate the “polluter pays” principle. (See, for instance, Garvey 74-76.) If the world were justly ordered—the thought runs—then the greatest climate costs would be incurred by those who bear the greatest causal responsibility for global heating. The polluters would pay.

3. The Argument from Rebirth

We have been considering the following proposition:

(A) Those who bear the greatest climate costs are typically not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating.

That proposition might seem obviously true—but could Buddhists consistently accept that it is true?

If Tim Mulgan’s interpretation of the Buddhist teaching of rebirth is correct, then it is not clear that they could. In his discussion of rebirth and intergenerational justice, Mulgan (7) claims that “something like” the following view “is common ground between all Hindu and Buddhist traditions”:

*The Rebirth View*: each currently existing person has died and been reborn innumerable times prior to this life and will be reborn many times in the future. When a new human body is formed, a new person is not created. Rather, an already existing person is reborn. (Mulgan 6)

The Rebirth View has some interesting implications. For example, if it were true, intergenerational non-identity problems, of the sort identified by Derek Parfit (Chapter 16), could not arise. After all, as Roy Perrett notes,
such problems presuppose that “[i]f any particular person had not been conceived when she was in fact conceived, it is in fact true that she would never have existed”—a presupposition which is, according to Buddhism, false because “every person who is born has already pre-existed beginninglessly” (32-33).

If true, the Rebirth View would also seem to bear upon the truth of (A). Consider the group of persons who bear the greatest climate costs. (Call them “climate victims.”) Now mentally abstract any particular person from that group. If we set aside the possibility that anyone has been reborn, then it would seem likely, though not certain, that that person (let’s call her Maya) has contributed little to global heating. But if the Rebirth View is true, it is not clear that that impression is accurate. For, if that view is true, then it is possible that Maya herself, in some former life, made a significant contribution to climate change. Perhaps she once owned a gas-belching coal-fired power station in 1950s New Jersey. Perhaps she was once Robert Street, who in 1794 patented the first internal combustion engine to use liquid fuel. And what applies to Maya—the thought runs—must also apply to any other contemporary climate victim. But if that is true, then is it really the case that those who bear the greatest climate costs are typically not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating? It is not clear that it is.7

Call this the argument from rebirth. It certainly complicates matters, but it does not establish that the Buddhist teachings are inconsistent with the claim that (A) is true. First, even if we grant that Maya (or any other climate victim) might, in some former life, have been a great contributor to climate change, much rests on the degree of probability

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7 Similar arguments could be deployed against the claim that those who bear the greatest climate costs have typically benefited least from anthropogenic global heating and the processes that caused it. For example, even if Maya has received little benefit from climate-changing manufacturing processes, she may have done so in a previous life.
alluded to by the word *might*. It is a further question whether that probability will be sufficiently high to render (A) false. And, indeed, there are reasons to think that it will not be high enough. In Buddhism, rebirth as a human, rather than as an animal or some other kind of nonhuman, is considered a rare event. So, on the assumption that it is specifically human beings that have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating, the chances that Maya, or any other particular climate victim, made a very great causal contribution to global heating in any particular former life will be low. Furthermore, global *per capita* greenhouse gas emissions have, presumably, increased over time. Hence the further back into history one looks, the less likely it becomes that any particular individual would have made a great causal contribution to global heating.

Second, the Rebirth View is not, in any case, an accurate interpretation of the traditional Buddhist conception of rebirth. Granted, Buddhists do tend to believe that life is a beginningless cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. However, they do not typically hold that each and every currently existing person “will be reborn many times in the future,” for it is generally held that some such persons will realise *nibbana* (Sanskrit: *nirvāṇa*) in this very life. More tellingly, Buddhist scholars and teachers do not suppose that rebirth simply involves one person’s being reborn as another. Their view is complicated; however, a simplified account would run as follows: When Person A is reborn as Person B, Person A and Person B are ultimately neither the same person nor different persons.\(^8\) At the level of ultimate (*paramattha*) truth, there is only a shifting bundle of causally-connected psycho-physical elements (*khandhas*). Though it is useful—that is, *conventionally* true—to label this shifting bundle as “Person A” at one time and as “Person B” at another, such labels do not ultimately refer to anything. As Mark Siderits (62), explains, “at the level of ultimate truth no

\(^8\) Compare the famous discussion of personal identity in the *Milindapañha*. King Milinda asks, in effect, whether the person who is reborn is the same person or a different person. The monk Nāgasena replies, “Neither the same nor another” (*Miln*. II.2.1; Mendis 40).
statement about persons could be true; all such statements are simply meaningless.” Set aside the question of whether this conception of personal identity (or its absence) is plausible, and set aside the question of whether it is consistent with other Buddhist teachings. (On these issues, see Gowans 79-88.) If, as many scholars and teachers of Buddhism maintain, this conception is true, then the Rebirth View cannot be ultimately true.

Third, even if, contrary to what I have just suggested, the Rebirth View is an accurate interpretation of the traditional Buddhist conception of rebirth, the fact is that some Buddhists, particularly in the West, do not accept that conception. Some radically reinterpret it; others reject any conception of rebirth altogether. So, even if the argument from rebirth works, it would only prevent some Buddhists from consistently endorsing (A).

4. Arguments from kamma

So far, then, we have been presented with no good reason to think that Buddhists could not consistently accept that this proposition is true:

(A) Those who bear the greatest climate costs are typically not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating.

Now suppose, for argument’s sake, that it really is true and that Buddhists can consistently acknowledge its truth. Could they also acknowledge that its referent—that is, the uneven distribution of climate costs—is unjust? That is to say, could they consistently acknowledge that

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9 Stephen Batchelor (303-306) takes the former route; Owen Flanagan (213) takes the latter.
(A) captures how the world really is and that it is unjust that the world is that way?

To address this question, one needs to consider the Buddhist conception of *kamma* (Sanskrit: *karma*). On this conception, the moral quality of a person’s actions, which is primarily a function of the underlying intentions, causally affects that person’s happiness: morally good actions result in happiness, either in this life or a future one; morally bad actions result in unhappiness. (See further discussion in Gowans 77.)

The following passage from David Little (82) indicates how this conception might be thought to bear upon questions of distributive justice:

According to the law of *kamma*, wealth and poverty, in any given instance, are the respective consequences of complying or not complying with the prescriptions of the *dhamma* [i.e., in this context, the Buddhist teachings]. Accordingly, wealth and poverty are, speaking generally, assumed to be distributed justly—that is, on the basis of dhammic performance in a previous life. In a word, the Theravadins assume a cosmic distributive system determined on the basis of “just deserts.”

If Little is correct, then the law of *kamma* justifies the distribution of climate costs. So, if he is correct, and if, moreover, that law is an essential component of the Buddhist teachings, then a Buddhist could not consistently judge that the state of affairs referred to by (A) is unjust. On the contrary, the Buddhist teachings would imply that that distribution is

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10 Compare Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer’s claim that “when the doctrine of kammatic [i.e., karma-based] retribution is understood as an exceptionless moral explanation and justification for the present distribution of wealth and poverty in society, it undercuts moral criticism of the distribution per se” (12).
kammically-justified. They would imply that those people, like Maya, who stand to suffer most from the effects of the climate crisis are experiencing the results—the rotten karmic fruits (phalas)—of their past misdeeds.

One could resist this conclusion by either radically reinterpreting or jettisoning the law of kamma. (See Wright and Flanagan 77, respectively.) But most Theravādins would, I assume, reject any such move. Accordingly, in what follows, I will assume that the law of kamma holds true and ask whether Little’s views on its implications are correct. I will ask whether the law of kamma implies that any distribution of climate costs must be kammically-justified.

The short answer is that it does not. Many people, it is true, conceive of kamma as a vehicle of cosmic justice, but that is not the view that holds sway among scholars and teachers of Buddhism. The canonical view is, rather, that the law of kamma simply describes “the way the natural world works” (Carpenter 94). Just as sowing apple seeds eventually produces apples, so meritorious or auspicious (puñña) actions are thought to give rise to auspicious karmic fruits. As such, the law of kamma is regarded as a “natural law . . . like a law of physics” (Harvey An Introduction 16; compare Gowans 171).

To be sure, that last claim is potentially misleading. Though physical laws are usually thought to be morally neutral, the law of kamma is both a natural law and a moral one. Be that as it may, it is like a law of physics in one respect: an appeal to the law of kamma, like an appeal to a law of physics, can explain, but not justify, why things are the way they are.

These observations have two interesting implications for our discussion of climate ethics. The first concerns the distinction between

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11 Gowans (8). There are of course some exceptions. For instance, Riccardo Repetti (171) argues that kamma is a “cosmic law of desert.”
natural and anthropogenic climate change. As Peter Harvey ("Freedom of the Will" 49) notes in his study of Theravāda, kammic results can “come through the actions of other people.” For the Theravāda, then, it is possible that what we ordinarily call anthropogenic climate change could be to some extent the result of kamma and, in this sense, both anthropogenic and natural.

The second implication concerns climate justice. Suppose that the law of kamma really does explain the distribution of climate costs. Suppose, indeed, that it fully explains it. As we have seen, the law of kamma is like a natural law in that an appeal to it can merely explain, rather than justify, why things are the way they are. (This remains the case even though any such explanation must refer to the moral qualities of certain actions.) So if a particular distribution of climate costs can be entirely explained by reference to that law, then it must presumably be entirely natural. After all, if asked to justify the distribution, one could do nothing more than throw up one’s hands and say that that’s just how the world works.

Now, if something is natural, in this sense, it must fall outside of the domain of justice. It must, as John Rawls (102) claimed, be neither just nor unjust. Imagine, by way of illustration, that a meteorite lands on a Siberian village. It is bad, of course, that the meteorite landed on the village, rather than in some uninhabited place, but it is not unjust that those particular villagers, rather than some other group of people, were the victims. The same applies to climate costs. If those costs are naturally distributed, then in helping those who bear their brunt we are not rectifying an injustice. We are not fixing an unjust distribution of climate costs. We are simply reducing those costs.¹²

¹² David Schmidtz (219) makes a similar point about what he calls the “natural distribution” of cleft palates. It is, he claims, bad to have a cleft palate; but in intervening “to fix
But do Buddhists really believe that the law of \textit{kamma fully} explains such things as climate costs? The Buddha, for his part, expressly criticised the view that “[w]hatever a person experiences . . . is all caused by what was done in the past” (\textit{AN} 3.61; Bodhi \textit{Numerical} 266-267). Accordingly, the standard Theravādin view is that not everything that befalls a person is the result of \textit{kamma} (Harvey \textit{‘Freedom of the Will’} 50-51; Harvey \textit{An Introduction} 23; Jones 66-67).

One upshot of this discussion is as follows. To the extent that the distribution of climate costs is due to \textit{kamma}, it counts as natural and, therefore, as neither just nor unjust. But in trying to assess to what extent the distribution is in fact due to \textit{kamma}, we find ourselves confronted by an epistemic problem. Awakened beings may have some special insight into the workings of the law of \textit{kamma}, but the rest of us simply cannot know to what extent it accounts for the distribution of climate costs.\textsuperscript{13} Hence appeals to the law of \textit{kamma} provide, at best, weak reasons to conclude that a Buddhist could not consistently judge the referent of (A) to be unjust.

\section{The Place of Distributive Justice in Buddhist Ethics}

We have been considering the following proposition:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(A)] Those who bear the greatest climate costs are typically not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{13} Compare Harvey’s observation that although, in Buddhism, “a person’s wealth and poverty may be due to past karma, this is only one possibility” (\textit{An Introduction} 202). On our inability to know which phenomena are the results of \textit{kamma}, see Carpenter (109).
We have so far been presented with no compelling reason to think that a Buddhist could not consistently accept either that it is true or that the state of affairs to which it refers is unjust. It is, however, a further question whether the Buddhist teachings give us any reason to think that that state of affairs really is unjust (or at least, would be, were it to obtain).

It is not clear that the Buddhist teachings do give us any reason to think that that state of affairs would be unjust. What little the scriptures have to say about distributive justice is of a very vague nature. There is a story of a king whose failure to address the systemic causes of poverty has various bad consequences—but little else.\(^\text{14}\)

This lack of attention has at least three explanations. First, the Buddha and the bhikkhus and bhikkunis that followed him had their eyes set on the final extinction of suffering, and, to achieve that goal, one does not need much at all by way of material goods. So the question of how such goods ought to be distributed rarely comes up.\(^\text{15}\) Second, when the matter of goods-distribution does get addressed, it tends to be addressed with reference to a specific institution—that of almsgiving. Little is said about how material goods should be distributed, save that society should be ordered in a way that allows laypeople to accumulate merit by giving alms to monks and nuns. Third, the Buddhist teachings are typically focused on individual rather than social transformation. (See Goodman 55-56.) Granted, issues that would nowadays be thought to fall into the category of social justice do occasionally get addressed; but, on these occasions, the message is typically that a well-ordered society will result if

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\(^\text{14}\) Cakkavatti-sihanāda Sutta (DN 26). See Fenn for an interesting discussion of this sutta’s implications for social justice. Harvey (An Introduction 201-203) provides a brief survey of canonical Buddhist remarks on distributive justice.

\(^\text{15}\) To put the point in Rawls’s terms, since the relevant (very minimal) goods are typically too abundant to count as moderately scarce, the “circumstances of justice” tend not to arise. (See Rawls Chapter 22.)
everyone performs their social obligations as parents, teachers, wives, employers, laypeople, and so forth. (See, for instance, DN 31.) In some suttas, the role of the ruler receives special attention; but here, too, the emphasis is on the social consequences of the ruler’s discharging, or failing to discharge, his obligations as a ruler. (See Harvey An Introduction 115.) Here, too, social change is thought to flow from individual change.

Nonetheless, the fact that the Buddhist teachings have little to say about distributive justice does not preclude the possibility of a Buddhist account of distributive justice. For it could be argued—and has, on several occasions, been argued—that such an account is implied, if not explicitly set out, in those teachings.16

There is no need, here, to give detailed descriptions of the various Buddhism-inspired accounts of distributive justice that have been developed. For even if we were to accept some such account, it would be a further question whether it could yield the conclusion that (A)’s referent is unjust. And the answer to any such question is, I suspect, likely to be “no.” From a Buddhist standpoint, it is of course bad that certain people have to suffer the effects of global heating; but it does not seem to be bad that those people, as opposed to any other people, have to suffer those effects. It is very hard to see why, from the impersonal standpoint of the Buddhist teachings, the world would be a better place if it were rich Americans, rather than, say, poor Bangladeshis, who stood to suffer most from the effects of global heating.

16 See, for example, Cho, Blumenthal, and Contestabile. Note, however, that none of these writers appeals exclusively to what I have called the Buddhist teachings. In fact, Cho and Contestabile look primarily to Mahāyāna sources.
6. **Justice and Nibbāna**

Suppose, contrary to what I suggested above, that the Buddhist teachings imply that it really is unjust that those who have contributed the least to global heating tend to suffer the most from its effects. Do they also imply that we should try to rectify that injustice? Do they imply that we should strive to bring about a just distribution of climate costs and benefits?

They do—but with one qualification. According to Buddhism, the ultimate goal is, as we saw, the ending of suffering—certainly for oneself and ideally for every other unawakened sentient being, too. Set aside the question of whether this goal is more likely to be achieved in a society ordered along traditional lines, with a basic division between an alms-giving laity and an alms-receiving community of Buddhist monks and nuns. It nonetheless seems plausible that some social configurations of material goods will prove more effective than others in ending suffering. Yet for Buddhism, as for any other soteriological tradition, these configurations will not be good in themselves (Cho 80-1; compare Blumenthal 331). Though the uniformly positive assessments expressed in documents such as the *International Dharma Teachers’ Statement on Climate Change* make no mention of the fact, achieving distributive justice could not, for Buddhism, be an end in itself. On the contrary, calls to secure climate justice, or indeed any other worthwhile but essentially worldly end, must for Buddhism take second place to calls to eradicate suffering once and for all by realising nibbāna.

The point may be made by means of the following thought experiment. Imagine a world—conceivable, though not probable—in which humanity has stepped up to meet the moral challenges of global heating.

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Spurred on by demands for justice, we have managed not just to halt global heating, but also to achieve a just distribution of climate costs and benefits. Would Buddhists applaud these achievements? Not, presumably, if they had been secured by means that would merit their disapproval, such as the use of cruel technologies to minimise methane emissions from cattle or the execution of couples who have more than two children. But what if global heating had been halted by other means? Would Buddhists applaud the achievement then? They would; however, they would add that even this magnificent achievement might not be enough. For this cool and pleasant future world might still be burning, as the Buddha said in his very first sermon, “with the fire of lust, with the fire of hate, with the fire of delusion. . .” (SN 35.28; Bodhi Connected 1143). Global heating may have been stopped, but the world might nonetheless be on fire.

7. Conclusions

We have been considering how the following claim sits with respect to the teachings of Theravāda Buddhism:

(A) Those who bear the greatest climate costs are typically not those who have made the greatest causal contributions to global heating.

In Section 3, I asked whether, given their belief in rebirth, Buddhists could consistently hold that (A) is true. I argued that they could. In Section 4, I asked whether Buddhists could consistently hold that the state of affairs to which (A) refers is unjust. I argued that they could do this, too. In sections 5 and 6, I asked what place concerns with climate justice could occupy within Buddhist ethics. I argued that they could only occupy a subsidiary place.
That said, I have not suggested that the Buddhist teachings and the moral imperative to respond to global heating are in tension. On the contrary, from the standpoint of the Buddhist teachings, the climate crisis clearly does present a moral challenge—and one, moreover, that those teachings may well help us to meet. (See further, Stanley et al.) Instead, my arguments have focused on justice. With regard to this topic, I have not argued that the Buddhist teachings are at odds with all calls for distributive justice; merely that they are hard to square with certain such calls. After all, as we have seen, those who call for climate justice would typically claim that (A)’s referent is unjust. They would, I suspect, say the same about the state of affairs referred to by the following proposition:

(B) Those who bear the greatest climate costs have typically benefited least from anthropogenic climate change and the processes that caused it.

It is unjust, they would claim, that the world is that way. But from the standpoint of the Buddhist teachings, it is, I have argued, hard to see what could justify any such claim. From that standpoint, it is of course a bad thing that anyone has to suffer the effects of global heating. However, it is not at all clear that it would be better if, contrary to the facts, those who caused the heating were to suffer the most from it. Moreover, even if some Buddhist account of justice did yield the result that the state of affairs referred to by (A)—or (B)—was unjust, calls to rectify that injustice would take second place to calls to extinguish the fires of greed, hatred, and delusion, and the suffering to which they inevitably give rise. Calls for the extinction of those vices would come first; the demands of Extinction Rebellion second.
James, Climate Justice: Some Challenges for Buddhist Ethics

Abbreviations


Works Cited


