Colette Sciberras
\nUniversity of Durham<\/p>\n
In this article, I defend Buddhism from Paul Waldau\u2019s charge of speciesism. I argue that Waldau attributes to Buddhism various notions that it does not necessarily have, such as the ideas that beings are morally considerable if they possess certain traits, and that humans, as morally considerable beings, ought never to be treated as means. These ideas may not belong in Buddhism, and for Waldau\u2019s argument to work, he needs to show that they do. Moreover, a closer look at his case reveals a more significant problem for ecologically minded Buddhists\u2014namely that the P\u0101li texts do not seem to attribute intrinsic value to any form of life at all, regardless of species. Thus, I conclude that rather than relying on Western concepts, it may be preferable to look for a discourse from within the tradition itself to explain why Buddhists ought to be concerned about the natural world.<\/p>\n
Read article<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" ISSN 1076-9005 Volume 15, 2008 Buddhism and Speciesism: on the Misapplication of Western Concepts to Buddhist Beliefs Colette Sciberras University of Durham In this article, I defend Buddhism from Paul Waldau\u2019s charge of speciesism. I argue that Waldau attributes to Buddhism various notions that it does not necessarily have, such as the ideas that beings … Continue reading Buddhism and Speciesism<\/span>