Vishnu Sridharan<\/p>\n
For over two millennia, the free will problem has proven intractable to philosophers, scientists, and lay people alike. However, Buddhism offers us unique insight into how, when, and why human agency matters to us. In his 2009 book, Consequences of Compassion<\/em>, Charles Goodman argues that the ultimate nonexistence of the self supports the ultimate nonexistence of free will. Recently in this journal, Riccardo Repetti has critiqued Goodman\u2019s view and made the case that free will does, in fact, ultimately exist. This article first illustrates how Repetti\u2019s view of the self is, actually, entirely consistent with Goodman\u2019s. It goes on to argue that Repetti misconstrues elements of hard determinism as entailing that our wills have no influence on final outcomes. Lastly, it shows how, if Goodman and Repetti are in agreement on the ultimate nonexistence of the self, as well as the causal efficacy of the will, their disagreement about the ultimate existence of free will may be inconsequential. <\/p>\n Read article<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" ISSN 1076-9005 Volume 20, 2013 The Metaphysics of No-Self: A Determinist Deflation of the Free Will Problem Vishnu Sridharan For over two millennia, the free will problem has proven intractable to philosophers, scientists, and lay people alike. However, Buddhism offers us unique insight into how, when, and why human agency matters to us. In his … Continue reading A Determinist Deflation of the Free Will Problem<\/span>