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<\/a>EU: "We'll go farther than we are already!" USA: "We'll go as far as we are already!"<\/p><\/div>\n
Why hasn’t America set a dramatic GHG reduction target as a sign to the rest of the world that it “means business” on climate change? Certainly our friends in the European Union – who have taken some ambitious stances of their own – would appreciate such a move, and countries like China actually expect this before they are likely to lift a finger themselves. So, if it could do so much good for international cooperation, why wont America just be “aspirational”?<\/p>\n
The answer is not entirely a lack of political will. It also involves some subtle characteristics of the American system as compared to that of the EU. The key factor is that the US government would be liable to domestic legal consequences for falling short of a commitment it made; unlike the EU, who can “aim high and fall short” without\u00a0 similar legal\u00a0 ramifications. Consequently, the US negotiating position is based firmly upon where domestic actions already seem to be taking the country – otherwise it might promise more than it can actually deliver (really, what it does is “under promise and over deliver”). This is the opposite of the EU approach, which sets a target first\u00a0 for where they want to go and then tackles the issue of finding a way to get there. An example of the US method working is the EPA’s Acid Rain Program – a system that used cap-and-trade to greatly reduce pollution causing acid rain, and at a fraction of the cost everyone anticipated. Success. At least, this is the way two employees from the US EPA explained it to me (off the record) when our mosaic\u00a0 group met with various professionals in Washington, DC, last week to learn about climate change and international negotiations.<\/p>\n
Now, this explanation left me with two questions, which I asked of our speakers. First, what about the problem of not taking as much action as we actually could because we are afraid of setting the bar too high and we underestimate the benefits that might result? For instance, what if people had rejected the Acid Rain Program because they thought the cost would be too high, when in reality it was relatively tiny? One of the speakers gave a long, roundabout reply, but had to admit that “yes, we could miss opportunities that way”.<\/p>\n
My second question followed-up on this answer to ask, “well, if this is the way the American system works, then what can<\/em> we do to send a signal to the rest of the world that we are, in fact, serious about action on climate change”? The answer was that we explain how our system works to the EU (and others) and basically ask them to just “trust us, we’ll get there” – the same way they said the EU asks us to trust them with their method.<\/p>\n “Trust us, we’ll get there”?! You have got to be kidding me! I did not push this issue with the speakers who were generously giving us their time, but I was thoroughly dissatisfied with this answer. It simply doesn’t cut it – not when action from America is so critical to reaching an international agreement and we are not showing signs of domestic progress. America is in no position to ask for “trust”, and credibility will only come from dramatic action – or at least the promise of it.<\/p>\n