{"id":2901,"date":"2016-12-02T03:06:40","date_gmt":"2016-12-02T03:06:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-117pinsker\/?p=2901"},"modified":"2017-01-17T17:37:32","modified_gmt":"2017-01-17T17:37:32","slug":"general-shermans-march","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-117pinsker\/2016\/12\/02\/general-shermans-march\/","title":{"rendered":"General Sherman’s March to the Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"
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General Sherman on Horseback
(Courtesy of History.com)<\/p><\/div>\n

From November through December 1864, Union General William Tecumseh Sherman led his army through Confederate-controlled Georgia on what became known as his “March to the Sea.” Over the course of their two-month, 235-mile trek, Sherman, his officers, and their men, destroyed or burned numerous buildings deemed essential to the Confederacy. Sherman believed his march was not one of rash or hostile greed or hatred; rather, he saw it as a response to the changing nature of war. To him the Union was, \u00a0“not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and [we] must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war.\u201d [1]<\/a>Sherman\u2019s \u201cMarch to the Sea\u201d shows Union strategy and prowess at the end of the war \u2013 aiming for and achieving the decimation of Confederate territory in order to convince Southern citizens to stop backing the war effort.<\/p>\n

An occupation and march such as this was almost impossible without the leadership of men such as Sherman. His armies were aided by his confidence, strength, and organization for much of the early part of their campaign. The wings of infantry under his command moved, as planned, along roads and pathways determined before the march even began and did so with little to no disturbance by enemy forces. The disorganized enemy\u2019s inability to execute an effective defense\u00a0allowed Sherman and his men to march to Savannah with minimal casualties. With little Confederate resistance, the army was also able to\u00a0deliver the harsh reality of war to the Georgian towns and institutions that it came across.<\/p>\n

But the tactics and the strategy of Sherman\u2019s March require thoughtful consideration. Noah Andre Trudeau, in his in-depth study\u00a0Southern Storm\u00a0<\/em>(2008), notes how\u00a0careful planning and military ingenuity of the march was unparalleled. The fact that Sherman\u00a0was able to march so many men over an unfamiliar terrain, sometimes without the benefit of well-defined roads; negotiate fifteen river crossings, each more than 230 feet wide[2]<\/a>; transport the necessary food and supplies for 62,000 troops with just 2,000 wagons (half the number the similarly sized Army of the Potomac used in its assault on Virginia in 1862); and still manage to emerge unscathed from the rubble in the Confederate stronghold of Savannah, was astounding. Not only was Sherman\u00a0able to navigate miles of enemy territory, but he was able to do so while being almost completely cut off from his supply base in Atlanta. By turning the nature of military strategy on its head and removing the necessity for consistent contact with a stable base, his foraging of Confederate property and efficient wagon techniques made his army a self-sufficient and mobile force for Confederate destruction.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n