{"id":4072,"date":"2018-04-02T19:36:34","date_gmt":"2018-04-02T19:36:34","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/?p=4072"},"modified":"2020-08-03T14:28:37","modified_gmt":"2020-08-03T14:28:37","slug":"nsa-secrets-of-the-vietnam-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/2018\/04\/02\/nsa-secrets-of-the-vietnam-war\/","title":{"rendered":"Best Kept Secrets of the Vietnam War: the Untold Story of the Significance of Social Intelligence"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/w.soundcloud.com\/player\/?url=https%3A\/\/api.soundcloud.com\/tracks\/437016837&amp;color=%23ff5500&amp;auto_play=false&amp;hide_related=false&amp;show_comments=true&amp;show_user=true&amp;show_reposts=false&amp;show_teaser=true&amp;visual=true\" width=\"100%\" height=\"300\" frameborder=\"no\" scrolling=\"no\"><\/iframe><br \/>\nBy Catie Nolan<\/p>\n<div style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/0429182051b_Film3.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-4671\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/0429182051b_Film3-300x168.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"168\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/0429182051b_Film3-300x168.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/0429182051b_Film3-768x431.jpg 768w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/0429182051b_Film3-1024x575.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/0429182051b_Film3-500x281.jpg 500w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p class=\"wp-caption-text\">Bracken in Nhu Trang in 1966. <em>Courtesy of Jimmy Bracken<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Upon returning home from Vietnam in 1969, if you had asked Jimmy Bracken what he did in the Vietnam War, he would have told you that he was \u201cassigned to the Army Signal Corps\u201d [1]. \u00a0But this was a lie, and Bracken swore to keep it a secret for 25 years following his deployment. In an oral history interview, Bracken reveals his role as a social intelligence gatherer for the Army Security Agency (ASA) in South Vietnam between 1966 and 1969. \u00a0Bracken reflects on his experience in Vietnam and claims that he \u201cdidn\u2019t really have that much of an impact\u201d [2]. Bracken\u2019s disposition is one not represented in H. W. Brands\u2019 <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">American Dreams<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">. \u00a0By primarily focusing on military combat in Vietnam, Brands fails to recognize the role of the ASA in detecting Vietcong communications. \u00a0Undercover designations intended to mask soldiers\u2019 identities and NSA policy laws hinder public knowledge on these veterans\u2019 impact on the Vietnam War. \u00a0Due to the secrecy and high classification of an operation, its role, and its agents, ASA missions and units were unknown and until recently, have been kept secrets from the public. \u00a0The absence of historical documentation to support Jimmy Bracken\u2019s reflection of his role within the social intelligence force of the ASA highlights the NSA\u2019s obstruction of the ASA\u2019s history in Vietnam. \u00a0The NSA\u2019s ability to legally obstruct documents by deeming them as classified prevented historians from producing accurate representations of the history of social intelligence in the Vietnam War.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Bracken\u2019s undercover role within the ASA was to gather Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) via radio and provide tactical information to military forces to best execute attacks using the location of VC units. \u00a0In Vietnam, the ASA utilized Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF) equipment, \u201cto identify, triangulate and analyze enemy radio communications\u201d [3]. According to William LeGro, the author of <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, these ARDF units were the &#8220;single most valuable intelligence resource available to American and Allied forces during the war in Vietnam&#8221; [4]. \u00a0ASA units served under a military unit and were codenamed to protect the unit&#8217;s true mission; many ASA units had codenames as Radio Research Units [5]. \u00a0Upon receiving his draft notice in 1965, Bracken registered within the Army Security Agency (ASA), a subordinate group of the National Security Agency (NSA). \u00a0Bracken spent a year learning Vietnamese at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center in Monterey, California. This time in Monterey intended to prepare him to translate encrypted Vietnamese messages intercepted via radio that following year. \u00a0After landing in Saigon with the 237th Radio Research Group in 1966, Bracken traveled to Nhu Trang with a Morse-code translator and radio repair guide. Bracken recalls that \u201cNot many other people were doing what I was doing\u201d as he reflects on his duty in Vietnam [6].<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The difficulty in his job was not only translating a language he had learned in the span of one year, but also finding Vietcong and North Vietnamese radio broadcasts. \u00a0Bracken typically remained in the same location, either \u201cin a tent or the back of his pick-up truck, and listen[ed] to the radios,\u201d spending hours a day searching for signals [7]. \u00a0Bracken recalls his experience in intercepting radio transmissions: \u201cI heard a lot of static\u2026 and every now and then, you\u2019d pick up a voice transmission. Most of the time it was just reaching numbers, which was the way they coded their messages\u201d [8]. \u00a0Bracken usually heard a series of four-digit groupings. Each group would translate into one letter or number (i.e. &#8220;1235 = a&#8221;) [9]. Most of these messages translated into numbers and were coordinates that the Vietcong was sending to artillery. Bracken would make a tape of the transmissions, then send the tape to one of the larger military bases in Nha Trang or Phu Bai, or to NSA at Fort Meade. \u00a0There, cryptologists would \u201clisten to the tapes, transcribe the encrypted messages, and then go back over them\u201d [10]. When Bracken would intercept coordinate communications, he recalls that \u201csometimes I\u2019d look at those coordinates to make sure it wasn\u2019t where I was sitting, so I didn\u2019t have to worry about ducking\u201d [11]. While James L. Gilbert\u2019s <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Most Secret War <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">provides historical analysis on the impact of Radio Research Units, the contents of these transcripts are not available for public view.<\/span><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_4674\" style=\"width: 250px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/size0.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-4674\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-4674\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/size0-240x300.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"240\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/size0-240x300.jpg 240w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/files\/2018\/04\/size0.jpg 348w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 240px) 100vw, 240px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-4674\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Soldier using Ground-based Radio Direction-Finding.<em> Courtesy of US Army (https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/125717\/3rd_rru_arrives_in_vietnam_may_13_1961)<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Enacted in 1959, Public Law 86-36 authorized the protection of names employed by the NSA, as well as classification of the functions of the NSA. \u00a0This law also established the National Security Agency \u201cas the principal agency of the Government responsible for signals intelligence activities\u201d and enabled the Agency \u201cto function without the disclosure of information which would endanger the accomplishment of its functions\u201d [12]. \u00a0The NSA was permitted to withhold any information that could inhibit the Agency\u2019s goal of obtaining social intelligence or achieving a goal involving national security. The Agency prohibited employees from discussing any matter pertaining to their role, mission, or any classified detail involving the NSA. Throughout the Vietnam Conflict, \u201cASA would designate all of its units as \u2018Radio Research\u2019 to shield its presence\u201d [13]. \u00a0Bracken recalls that his undercover designation was to \u201cthe Army Signal Corps,\u201d a military signal gathering effort [14]. Bracken did not actually work for the military, but this cover allowed the NSA to protect its presence in Vietnam. Knowledge of the NSA\u2019s involvement in Vietnam was not available to the public until the 2000s when the National Security Agency released documentation describing social intelligence involvement in Vietnam. \u00a0I<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">n a declassified report by the NSA released in December of 2007, senior historian Robert Hanyok researched highlights how a \u201ccryptologic communitywide history\u201d began in 1967 but abruptly stopped in 1971, the same year the NSA deployed ASA units in Vietnam [15]. \u00a0An attempt to record \u201cthe Army Security Agency\u2019s official history never got beyond a draft stage\u201d [16]. According to Hanyok, \u201cit seemed the SIGINT [signals intelligence] community simply was uninterested in any thoughtful reflection on its effort during the conflict\u201d [17]. \u00a0While halting this effort to record history raised suspicions, the NSA was legally entitled to discontinue historical recordings. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0Enacted in 1967, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) \u201cprovides that any person has the right to request access to federal agency records or information,\u201d with the exceptions for \u201c<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">law enforcement and national security records\u201d [18].<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In 1964, the amendment of Title III to Public law 88-290 allowed the Secretary of NSA to employ any person and grant them temporary and limited access to classified cryptologic information. \u00a0\u201cDuring any period of war declared by the Congress, or during any period when the Secretary determines that a national disaster exists, or in exceptional cases\u201d the Secretary \u201cmay authorize the employment of any person in \u2026 the Agency, and may grant to any such person access to classified information, on a temporary basis, pending the completion of the full field investigation and the clearance for access to classified information required by this subsection\u201d [19]. \u00a0This law allowed NSA to hire \u201cany\u201d civilian and authorized the deployment of NSA employees to Vietnam and control their ability to discuss their role and the information involved [20]. In addition to its ability to recruit employees and grant them access to national classified information, this law marks a significant increase in the power of the NSA and creates a loophole in which troops can be deployed without a congressional declaration of war. The implementation of laws similar to these allowed the NSA to obstruct public access to the NSA\u2019s plans of national security and intelligence, in addition to the recognition of those involved. \u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The NSA\u2019s motive to inhibit public knowledge of and access to a number of historical documents concerning ASA forces is unclear, their obstruction inhibits historians\u2019 understanding of the significance of social intelligence in Vietnam.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> \u00a0Historian H. W. Brands omits the involvement of American social intelligence in the Vietnam War. \u00a0In response to President Ngo Dinh Diem and US officials in Saigon request for US assistance, John B. Willems of the Department of the Army proposed the establishment of programs \u201cto provide training to the South Vietnamese and at the same time establish US intercept operations in the country in February of 1961 [21]. \u00a0President Johnson approved the deployment of \u201csecret operations against the Viet Cong\u201d [22]. On May 13th, 1961, the 3<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">d<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Radio Research Unit\u2019s \u201centry marked the first time an entire Army unit had deployed to South Vietnam\u201d [23]. \u00a0This unit was the 400th United States Army Security Agency Operations Unit, \u201cwith a cover designation as the 3<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">d<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Radio Research Unit\u201d [24]. \u00a0These Army Security Agency personnel were among the earliest U.S. military personnel in Vietnam. \u00a0Brands claims that \u201cAmerican troops in Vietnam had functioned chiefly as advisers\u201d until March of 1965 (Brands 140). \u00a0Realistically, it only was until May of 1961 that \u201conly individual advisors had been assigned\u201d [26]. Prior to the escalation of the Vietnam conflict and buildup of US forces in 1965, \u201cASA direct support units began entering Vietnam as part of the Army\u2019s approved force structure\u201d in 1961 [27]. \u00a0The ASA command was intended to function as a \u201cstrictly tactical support role\u201d [28]. Their arrival in Vietnam demonstrated that they would need to quickly reinvent \u201cwhat they thought they knew about SIGINT\u201d to fit the environment. It was this \u201cextremely hot and humid climate\u201d that Bracken described that would require the implementation of trucks to transport Direction Finding radio equipment and their teams [29]. \u00a0US SIGINT found itself constantly challenged to \u201cimprove its methods and systems\u201d in order to combat the VC [30]. Brands recognizes the US\u2019 difficulty in \u201cthe land, the jungle, [and] the sun\u201d of Vietnam environment, but does not address how SIGINT played a significant role within US combat forces \u201cto demonstrate America\u2019s steadfastness\u201d [31]. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In addition to misrepresenting US presence in Vietnam before 1965, Brands fails to address the significance of social intelligence in his recounting of the war. \u00a0Brands discusses how the Vietnam War was largely fought via combat on the ground and in the air. The absence of recognition for social intelligence forces causes veterans of the ASA to feel their duty was insignificant. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Dave Sandelin, <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">an ASA veteran in the Vietnam War, \u201c<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">whose job was to find the enemy through their radio transmissions,\u201d would likely agree with Bracken\u2019s feeling that he did not feel like he did much for the war effort [32, 33]. \u00a0Bracken\u2019s stated that ASA veterans \u201ccould not declare his role or discuss the details of our involvement in Vietnam for 25 years\u201d [34]. Sandelin declared that \u201cThere were a lot of people that made great contributions to the U.S. military that never got any recognition\u201d [35]. \u00a0A cause of these sentiments are the laws like Public law 88-290 and 86-36 that impeded the discussion or release of any information pertinent to these veterans or their involvement in Vietnam (until recently). This lack of public knowledge likely contributes to why the ASA and its veterans received little recognition for its role in Vietnam. <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">\u00a0The ASA\u2019s deployment of its first Radio Research Unit in 1961 demonstrates larger US involvement that described in <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">American Dreams<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, likely because this operation could not be discussed until 25 years after the conclusion of the war. \u00a0By this time, much of history of the Vietnam War has already been deciphered by what was already know.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The ASA\u2019s absence from Vietnam War history demonstrates how the supporting factors that contribute to an event can be left out of historical narratives<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> \u00a0The classification of secrets during and following the Vietnam War obstructed historians\u2019 inclusion of social intelligence and its significance within events of the Vietnam War. \u00a0Jimmy Bracken\u2019s reflection on his role within the social intelligence force provides insight on the lack of historical documentation of the ASA and its narratives. While social intelligence does not demonstrate as direct an impact as combat forces, combat forces depend on this essential information to efficiently execute military attacks and defense. \u00a0Social intelligence forces like the ASA tend to receive less recognition than combat forces in historical recountings due to US policy on the intelligence operations\u2019 classifications, which impeded public knowledge on the existence of these programs and their effects until almost 30 years after the conflict resided. <\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[1] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 25, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[2] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 2, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[3] Captain Kevin Sandell, &#8220;&#8216;Spooks and Spies&#8217; &#8212; Local ASA vets tell stories of combat, intel collection,&#8221; U.S. Army, last modified November 13, 2017. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/196814\/spooks_and_spies_local_asa_vets_tell_stories_of_combat_intel_collection\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/196814\/spooks_and_spies_local_asa_vets_tell_stories_of_combat_intel_collection<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[4] Sandell, &#8220;&#8216;Spooks and Spies,'&#8221; U.S. Army.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[5] Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[6] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 25, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[7] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 2, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[8] Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[9] Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[10] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 25, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[11] Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[12] &#8220;Legal Basis for NSA and Cryptologic Activities,&#8221; in <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Part 1 of U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, vol. 4, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 374, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/books.google.com\/books?id=9hh3VshHZ4oC&amp;pg=PA371&amp;lpg=PA371&amp;dq=%E2%80%9Cto+function+without+the+disclosure+of+information+which+would+endanger+the+accomplishment+of+its+functions%E2%80%9D+%5BU.S.+Intelligence+Agencies+and+Activities:+Intelligence+costs+and+fiscal%5D&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=XJH709uNdb&amp;sig=NrnssjAxrWqkixU8q_R5wGRWYXU&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjtsunDh-PaAhVuT98KHawnDcYQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&amp;q=to%20function%20without&amp;f=false\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/books.google.com\/books?id=9hh3VshHZ4oC&amp;pg=PA371&amp;lpg=PA371&amp;dq=%E2%80%9Cto+function+without+the+disclosure+of+information+which+would+endanger+the+accomplishment+of+its+functions%E2%80%9D+%5BU.S.+Intelligence+Agencies+and+Activities:+Intelligence+costs+and+fiscal%5D&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=XJH709uNdb&amp;sig=NrnssjAxrWqkixU8q_R5wGRWYXU&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjtsunDh-PaAhVuT98KHawnDcYQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&amp;q=to%20function%20without&amp;f=false<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[13] James L. Gilbert, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Most Secret War: Army Signals Intelligence in Vietnam<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Fort Belvoir, VA<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">: Military History Office, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, 2003), 6, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/babel.hathitrust.org\/cgi\/pt?id=uiug.30112064013359;view=1up;seq=1\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/babel.hathitrust.org\/cgi\/pt?id=uiug.30112064013359;view=1up;seq=1<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[14] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 25, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[15] Robert J. Hanyok, <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, The NSA Period: 1952 &#8211; Present (2002), 7:455, https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/nsa\/spartans\/aftermath.pdf. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[16] Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[17] Ibid., 456.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[18] U. S. Department of State, &#8220;The Freedom of Information Act,&#8221; U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act, https:\/\/foia.state.gov\/Learn\/FOIA.aspx.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[19] &#8220;Public Law 88-290: Title III &#8211; Personnel Security Procedures in National Security Agency,&#8221; in <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Public Law<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (United States Government Publishing Office, 1964), 169, <\/span><a href=\"http:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/statutes\/pl\/88\/290.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">http:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/statutes\/pl\/88\/290.pdf<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[20] Ibid., 169.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[21] Gilbert, The Most Secret War, 4.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[22] History.com Staff. &#8220;Vietnam War Timeline.&#8221; History.com. https:\/\/www.history.com\/topics\/vietnam-war-timeline.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[23] Gilbert, The <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Most <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Secret War, 7.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[24] Ibid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[25] H.W. Brands, <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">American Dreams: The United States Since 1945<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> (New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 140.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[26] Gilbert, The Most, 7.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[27] Ibid., 32.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[28] Robert J. Hanyok,<\/span> <i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, The Burden\u2019s First Fanfare: American SIGINT Arrives in Republic of Vietnam, 1961 &#8211; 64 (2002), 7:125, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/nsa\/spartans\/chapter4.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/nsa\/spartans\/chapter4.pdf<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[29] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 2, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[30] Robert J. Hanyok,<\/span> <i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, Xerve\u2019s Arrows: SIGINT Support to the Air War, 1964-1972 (2002), 7:234, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/nsa\/spartans\/chapter6.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">https:\/\/fas.org\/irp\/nsa\/spartans\/chapter6.pdf<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[31] Brands, 145, 139.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[32] Joe Habina. &#8220;Intelligence group played key role in military effort.&#8221; <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Charlotte Observer<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, November 8, 2014. http:\/\/www.charlotteobserver.com\/news\/local\/community\/city-news\/ article9228452.html.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[33] Phone Interview with Jimmy Bracken, April 2, 2018.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[34] Inid.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">[35] Habina<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Timeline<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.knightlab.com\/libs\/timeline3\/latest\/embed\/index.html?source=1HhEQMUc4elSN3ivxPzhxRUr8c4QPSoG_hftlnVsv1CU&amp;font=Default&amp;lang=en&amp;initial_zoom=2&amp;height=650\" width=\"100%\" height=\"650\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Catie Nolan Upon returning home from Vietnam in 1969, if you had asked Jimmy Bracken what he did in the Vietnam War, he would have told you that he was \u201cassigned to the Army Signal Corps\u201d [1]. \u00a0But this was a lie, and Bracken swore to keep it a secret for 25 years following [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3618,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2773],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4072","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-1960s"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4072","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3618"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4072"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4072\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4072"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4072"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4072"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}