Discussion – Page 4 – History 282 US Diplomatic History

James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade

On March 4, 2019

James Buchanan, courtesy of Dickinson College Archives

Introduction

On December 19th, 1859, President James Buchanan delivered his third State of the Union, where he declared, “All lawful means at my command have been employed, and shall continue to be employed, to execute the laws against the African slave trade. After a most careful and rigorous examination of our coasts, and a thorough investigation of the subject, we have not been able to discover that any slaves have been imported into the United States except the cargo by the Wanderer.” [1] Buchanan’s State of the Union indicated to international and domestic forces that the Buchanan administration had taken significant strides to combat the illegal slave trade. Beginning in 1858, Buchanan accomplished more to suppress the illegal slave trade than any American president. [2] President Buchanan expanded American naval action to patrol the waters of Cuba, the African coast, and the United States; increased funding for the enforcement of the slave trade; and concentrated the duties of the slave trade under the Department of the Interior. [3]

Buchanan’s words, however, proved untrue: a year after the Wanderer ship landed, the schooner Clotilde smuggled 116 Africans into Mobile Bay in the autumn of 1859. [4]

Although dramatized, Buchanan’s 1858 State of the Union Address demonstrates the ways in which Buchanan used his administration’s successful campaign against the slave trade as an international and domestic posture. Following the successful campaign against the slave trade, President Buchanan used the abolition of the slave trade to advocate for the annexation of Cuba. Moreover, Buchanan’s attempts to abolish the slave trade indicated the president’s moderate stance to an increasingly fractured American public. Pragmatic and advantageous, President Buchanan gained political leverage by launching a successful campaign against the slave trade and used it to advocate for his own domestic and expansionist political interests.

A Brief History of the United States and the International Slave Trade

Legally abolished in 1808 under the Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807, the American slave trade continued illegally throughout the early 19th century. The 1807 Act provided no means to effectively enforce the law and despite revisions to the law in 1818, 1819 and 1820, American citizens continued to engage in the trafficking of persons. Despite frequent reports of American violation of slave trade laws, the American government “turned a blind eye to the involvement of American citizens in the trade.” [5]

American participation in the illegal slave trade greatly frustrated the British government, which emerged as the leader in the slave trade abolition in the late-18th century. Throughout the early 19th century, Great Britain repeatedly pressured the United States to grant British officials the right to search American vessels suspected of carrying slaves. [6] Unlike other European countries, the United States refused the British right of search. The legacy of British impressment and conscription, which onset the War of 1812, remained active in the American imagination, resulting in a general unwillingness to concede any amount of sovereignty to grant the British the right of search. [7]

By 1839, the United States became one of the few countries opposing the British right of search, escalating American involvement illegal slave trade; the United States flag became the “only viable cover for the slave trade to continue.” [8] As described by a New York slaver interviewed for Debow’s Review in 1855, “We run up the American flag and if they come on board, all we have to do is show our American papers, and they have no right to search us. So, they growl and grumble and go off again,” when asked if they were fearful of British fleets paroling water.” [9] Increased American violation of slave trade laws throughout the 1850s prompted the British to add pressure on the United States, escalating tensions between the two nations throughout the 1850s. [10]

James Buchanan and the Slave Trade

James Buchanan became the 15^th president of the United States during a period of increased British activity against the international slave trade. In what American historian, Don Fehrenbacher, describes as the “Forgotten crisis of 1858,” tensions between the United States and Great Britain throughout spring 1858 when British warships increasingly searched and seized American trading vessels to search for illegal slave trading activity. [11] In May 1858, President James Buchanan received news of increased British search of American trading vessels from Secretary of State Lewis Cass, who reported of “the forcible detention and search of American vessels by British armed ships-of-war in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the adjacent seas.” [12] Amounting British pressure off the Cuba coast forced president Buchanan to act quickly, retaliating against British pressure by expanding American action against the slave trade; Buchanan’s swift action quelled British pressure and offset potential conflict.

In response to British search of American ships in Cuba, Buchanan and sent a fleet of four American warships to patrol the coast of Cuba, which remained there until the British eventually retreated in June of 1858. [13] Although Buchanan maintained the “established policy of apathy” before the crisis in Cuba, following the forgotten crises, Buchanan’s policy towards slave trade suppression became the most successful in American history. [14]

Sketch of the Wildfire, a slave ship captured by the American squadron off the coast of Cuba in 1860, courtesy of PBS.

Following the initial conflict in Cuba, President Buchanan successfully enacted a series of measures to limit the illegal slave trade. In 1858, Buchanan consolidated the enforcement of the slave trade to the Department of the Interior. In March 1859, Congress appropriated $75,000 to assist the suppression of the slave trade, $45,000 of which went to the meager American fleet patrolling for slave trade ships off the coast of Africa. [15] That same year, four ships were added African squadron [16] Before 1858, the African fleet generally consisted of “four vessels, three of which were usually second or third-class sloops.” [17] In July of 1859, African squadron’s base moved closer to slave trading activity, from Porto Praia to Sao Paulo de Loando. [18] Moreover, President Buchanan allocated four American steamers to patrol the waters off the coast of Cuba for slavers in 1859; before then, no American ships ordered to patrol for slave trading were allocated to Cuba [Davis 452] In November of 1859, President Buchanan allocated an additional ship to patrol the waters of the South, from the coast of Georgia to Florida coast. [19]

President Buchanan’s efforts to suppress the slave trade proved incredibly successful. Throughout the 1840s and early 1850s, few slavers were arrested. Officials failed to arrest a single slave ship in 1843, 1843, 1848, and 1849; officials arrested three slavers in 1850; ten slave vessels in 1852, 1853, 1854, and 1856; and no documentation of arrests exists for 1851 and 1855. [20] During Buchanan’s administration, 42 arrests were made between 1857 and 1860 [21] According to Ted Maris-Wolf, 75 percent of all Africans rescued from the slave trade in the 19th century occurred in 1860 alone. [22]

Why Did Buchanan Do This?

Buchanan’s unprecedented action against the slave trade demonstrates the 15th presidency’s pragmatic and ambitious approach to foreign policy. Confronted with British search and seizure of American ships in Cuba, Buchanan responded quickly, expanding American action to combat the slave trade. Once tensions deescalated, however, Buchanan utilized his successful campaign against the slave trade as leverage to pursue his own political interests. While Buchanan’s immediate retaliation against the British during the 1858 crisis in Cuba served to “vindicate American motives in the face of British criticism,” the “standoff with Britain proved especially useful to Buchanan, and he made the most of it.” [23]

Domestically, Buchanan’s action against the British search of American ships helped Buchanan appear moderate, countering “proslavery extremists and abolitionist critics at home by demonstrating America’s willingness to live up to its obligations as a moral world power.” [24] Scholar Don Fehrenbacher asserts this notion, saying that Buchanan sought to “distance himself from proslavery extremism in domestic politics” when retaliating against British search [25]. Public opinion regarded the Buchanan administration action against the British in the spring of 1858 highly. Moreover, Congress approved Buchanan’s actions in 1858 in an “uncharacteristic bipartisan unity.” [26] On June 29, 1859, the New York Times applauded Buchanan’s action in the Caribbean, saying “we regard this as a substantial and most important triumph of American diplomacy and American interests. It is a result of which the Administration of Mr. Buchanan may well be proud…for its action in this matter, it deserves and will receive the cordial approval of the American people.” [27]

The volatility of partisan politics, which threatened the unraveling of the Union greatly weighted on Buchanan’s presidency; combating the slave trade helped diffuse such divides. Scholar Ralph Davis even suggests Buchanan’s actions were in part, done to better the chances of the Democratic party in the nearing presidential election. [28] Throughout Buchanan’s presidency, Republicans attacked the president and Democrats for their inability to combat the slave trade. [27] Buchanan could potentially offset Republican attacks about the ineffectiveness of the Democrats by aggressively combating the slave trade.

Internationally, Buchanan’s posturing as a moral world power allowed him to advance his expansionist goals in Cuba. Well before his presidency, Buchanan attempted advocated for the annexation of Cuba. [28] Although it is clear that Buchanan first combated the slave trade in response to British pressure, Buchanan later used American action against the slave trade to argue for the annexation of Cuba. Scholar Ted Maris-Wolf argues that Buchanan gained the “moral justification… to make yet another monumental nineteenth-century land acquisition.” [29] It is clear Buchanan pursued Cuban annexation after his successful campaign against the slave trade. In President Buchanan’s 1858 State of the Union address, the president cited the United States’ moral obligation to end the slave trade, advocating for the annexation of Cuba: the last place on earth openly supportive of the slave trade. Buchanan’s message to Congress stated,

The truth is that Cuba… is the only spot in the civilized world where the African slave trade is tolerated… The late serious difficulties between the United States and Great Britain respecting the right of search, now so happily terminated, could never have arisen if Cuba had not afforded a market for slaves… It has been made known to the world by my predecessors that the United States have on several occasions endeavored to acquire Cuba from Spain by honorable negotiation. If this were accomplished, the last relic of the African slave trade would instantly disappear. [30]

Screen capture of Douglass' Monthly's commentary on President James Buchanan's 1858 State of the Union Address

“The President’s Message”,” Douglass’ Monthly, January 1859, courtesy of Accessible Archives.

Buchanan’s 1858 State of the Union address linked the abolition of the international slave trade with the acquisition of Cuba, implying that the slave trade could not end without the American annexation of Cuba [31] Buchanan’s expansionist interests when advocating for the annexation of Cuba, however, were not obscure; many newspapers addressed Bachchan’s expansionist interests. In January of 1859, the Douglass’ Monthly retorted, “He speaks of the island as an annoyance. It must be a very welcome and pleasing annoyance, indeed.” The article continued, “[President Buchanan’s] motto is, long live the domestic slave-trade, but the foreign must come to an end. His moral obfuscation is unpardonable.” [32] Commented on by Douglass’ Monthly, Buchanan’s rhetoric against the slave trade actively advocated for the annexation of Cuba, demonstrating Buchanan’s advantageous approach to diplomacy; confronted with the threat of British search and seizure in the spring of 1858, President Buchanan acted swiftly, deescalating tensions and using the international dynamics to benefit his political agenda.

Although James Buchanan never achieved his desires to acquire Cuba, the 15^th president of the United States launched an incredibly successful campaign against the slave trade. Moreover, Buchanan’s actions following the international endeavor demonstrated the ways in which Buchanan effectively created favorable circumstances for himself in times of crises. Pragmatic in his approach to diplomacy, Buchanan responded to British pressures in the Caribbean in 1858 and remedied American tensions with the British regarding the slave trade. Buchanan however, took advantage of what began as an effort to ease British pressures, using his administration’s suppression of the slave trade to quell sectional difference and advance his expansionist interests in Cuba. [33]

[1] John Bassett Moore, edited, The Works of James Buchanan, Vol. 10 (Philadelphia: Washington Square Press, 1910), 342-343. [ONLINE]

[2] Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 187. [EBOOK]

[3]Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 446-459. [JSTOR]

[4] John M. Belohlavek, “In Defense of Doughface Diplomacy,” Florida Scholarship Online, (2013): 118. [ONLINE]

[5] Randy J. Sparks, “Blind Justice: The United States’s Failure to Curb the Illegal Slave Trade,” Law and History Review 35, no.1 (2017): 61 and 79.

[6] Matthew Mason, “Keeping up Appearances: The International Politics of Slave Trade Abolition in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World,” The William and Mary Quarterly 66, no. 4 (2009): 811 [JSTOR]; Randy J. Sparks, “Blind Justice: The United States’s Failure to Curb the Illegal Slave Trade,” Law and History Review 35, no.1 (2017): 61.

[7] Matthew Mason, “Keeping up Appearances: The International Politics of Slave Trade Abolition in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World,” The William and Mary Quarterly 66, no. 4 (2009): 822.

[8]Randy J. Sparks, “Blind Justice: The United States’s Failure to Curb the Illegal Slave Trade,” Law and History Review 35, no.1 (2017): 61-62.

[9] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 448.

[10] Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 185.

[11] Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 185.;Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 58. [JSTOR]

[12] Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 59. Maris-Wolf 58-59

[13] Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 58-59. [PROJECTMUSE]

[14] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 441.

[15]Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 451.

[16] Karen Fisher Younger, “Liberia and the Last Slave Ships,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 432. [PROJECT MUSE]

[17] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 452.

[18] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 453.

[19] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 453.

[20] Karen Fisher Younger, “Liberia and the Last Slave Ships,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 431. ; Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 454.

[21] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 445. ; Karen Fisher Younger, “Liberia and the Last Slave Ships,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 433.

[22] Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 61.

[23] Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): 187; Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 58.

[24] Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 58.

[25] Karen Fisher Younger, “Liberia and the Last Slave Ships,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 431.

[26] Karen Fisher Younger, “Liberia and the Last Slave Ships,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 431.

[27] “The Right of Search and the Slave Trade,” The New York Times, June 29, 1858, ProQuest Historical Newspapers. [Online archive]

[28]Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 458-459

[29] Robert Ralph Davis Jr., James Buchanan and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1858-1861,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 33, no.4 (1966): 458-459

[30] “James Buchanan,” Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified 2019, https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-Buchanan-president-of-United-States#ref673275

[31] Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 60-61

[32] John Bassett Moore, edited, The Works of James Buchanan, Vol. 10 (Philadelphia: Washington Square Press, 1910), 251.

[33]Ted Maris-Wolf, “Of Blood and Treasure”: Recaptive Africans and the Politics of Slave Trade Suppression,” Journal of the Civil War Era 4, no. 1 (2014): 58.

[34]“The President’s Message” Douglass’ Monthly, January 1859, Accessible Archives.

[35] Karen Fisher Younger, “Liberia and the Last Slave Ships,” Civil War History 54, no. 4 (2008): 432

War of 1898

By Matthew Pinsker

On March 3, 2019

In Syllabus

“What was once called the Spanish-American War was the pivotal event of a pivotal decade, bringing the ‘large policy’ to fruition and marking the United States as a world power. Few events in U.S. history have been encrusted in myth and indeed trivialized. The very title is a misnomer, of course, since it omits Cuba and the Philippines, both key players in the conflict. Despite four decades of ‘revisionist’ scholarship, popular writing continues to attribute the war to a sensationalist ‘yellow press,’ which allegedly whipped into martial frenzy an ignorant public that in turn drove weak leaders into an unnecessary war. The war itself has been reduced to comic opera, its consequences dismissed as an aberration. Such treatment undermines the notion of war by design, allowing Americans to cling to the idea of their own noble purposes and sparing them responsibility for a war they came to see as unnecessary and imperialist results they came to regard as unsavory. Such interpretations also ignore the extent to which the war and its consequences represented a logical culmination of major trends in nineteenth-century U.S. foreign policy. It was less a case of the United States coming upon greatness almost inadvertently than of it pursuing its destiny deliberately and purposefully.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 399

Discussion Questions

Explain the origins of the “large policy” and identify some of the key figures in its formation.
Would you make any distinctions between the American “large policy” of the 1890s and European-style imperialism of that same era?

Can you identify these four advocates for a “large policy” in clockwise order?

Chinese Exclusion Act

By Matthew Pinsker

On March 3, 2019

In Syllabus

“Congress in 1879 passed a bill limiting the number of Chinese who could come into the country on any ship. As anti-Chinese as he was anti-British, then-Senator [James G.] Blaine defended the legislation as a blow for the ‘civilization of Christ’ against the ‘civilization of Confucius.’ Arguing that the bill violated U.S. treaty obligations, Hayes courageously vetoed it. Recognizing the political strength of the agitators, however, the government negotiated a new treaty with China permitting the United States to limit or suspend but not to ‘absolutely prohibit’ Chinese immigration. Congress immediately suspended immigration for twenty years, provoking an Arthur veto. The legislators responded with a new bill suspending Chinese immigration for ten years, the first such exclusion in U.S. history. More exclusionist laws followed. With no choice but to acquiesce, the Chinese in 1894 agreed to a new treaty that ‘absolutely prohibited’ the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years. Diplomatic relations worsened during the 1890s.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 283

Discussion Questions

The complex story that Herring relates over the evolution of Chinese exclusion policy suggests that it was not simply a matter of universal and immoveable white prejudice against Asians. How does he complicate the story?
Yet despite all of the necessary context and appreciation for complexity, the struggle over Chinese exclusion does ultimately come down to the power of popular prejudice. What does this episode (and others documented in this chapter) suggest about the relationship between the making of US foreign policy and domestic politics and attitudes?

Wong Kim Ark

Chinese Exclusion Act

First Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) (National Archives)
Background on Wong Kim Ark, litigant in Supreme Court case (1898)
Jonathan Katz, “Birth of a Birthright,” Politico (2018)

Mexican War

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 18, 2019

In Syllabus

“The Mexican-American War resulted from U.S. impatience and aggressiveness and Mexican weakness. Polk and many of his countrymen were determined to have Texas to the Rio Grande and all of California on their own terms. They might have waited for the apples to fall from the tree, to borrow John Quincy Adams’s Cuban metaphor, but patience was not among their virtues. Polk appears not to have set out to provoke Mexico into what could be used as a war of conquest. Rather, contemptuous of his presumably inferior adversaries, he assumed he could bully them into giving him what he wanted. Mexico’s weakness and internal divisions encouraged his aggressiveness. A stronger or more united Mexico might have deterred the United States or acquiesced in the annexation of Texas to avoid war, as the British minister and former Mexican foreign minister Lucas Alaman urged. By this time, however, Yankeephobia was rampant. Mexicans deeply resented the theft of Texas and obvious U.S. designs on California. They viewed the United States as the ‘Russian threat’ of the New World. Incensed by the racist views of their northern neighbors, they feared cultural extinction. Newspapers warned that if the North Americans were not stopped in Texas, Protestantism would be imposed on the Mexican people and they would be ‘sold as beasts.’ Fear, anger, and pride made it impossible to acquiesce in U.S. aggression. Mexico chose war over surrender.” –George Herring From Colony to Superpower (2008), p. 199-200

Discussion Questions

The way Herring characterizes the rush to war in 1846 suggests that he considers many of the key decisions to be irrational. Do you find this persuasive after learning more about the context of that crisis moment?
What were some of the unintended consequences of the US-Mexican War?

War map

Excerpt from the Diary of James K. Polk, May 13, 1846 (the day Congress declared war on Mexico)

“Mr. Buchanan said if my views were carried out, we would not settle the Oregon question and we would have war with England.”

Wednesday, 13th May, 1846

James K. Polk

…Most of the Cabinet were in attendance, though no Cabinet meeting had been called. A proclamation announcing the existence of the war was prepared and signed by me. This was done in pursuance of the precedent of Mr. Madison, in 1812…Mr. Buchanan read the draft of a despatch which he had prepared to our Ministers at London, Paris, and other foreign courts, announcing the declaration of war against Mexico, with a statement of the causes and objects of the war, with a view that they should communicate its substance to the respective governments to which they are accredited. Among other things Mr. Buchanan had stated that our object was not to dismember Mexico or to make conquests, and that the Del Norte was the boundary to which we claimed; or rather that in going to war we did not do so with a view to acquire either California or New Mexico or any other portion of the Mexican territory.

I told Mr. Buchanan that I thought such a declaration to foreign governments unnecessary and improper; that the causes of the war as set forth in my message to Congress and the accompanying documents were altogether satisfactory. I told him that though we had not gone to war for conquest, yet it was clear that in making peace we would if practicable obtain California and such other portion of the Mexican territory as would be sufficient to indemnify our claimants on Mexico, and to defray the expense of the war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries had forced us to wage. I told him it was well known that the Mexican Government had no other means of indemnifying us.

James Buchanan

Mr. Buchanan said if when Mr. McLane announced to Lord Aberdeen the existence of the war with Mexico the latter should demand of Mr. McLane to know if we intended to acquire California or any other part of the Mexican territory and no satisfactory answer was given, he thought it almost certain that both England and France would join with Mexico in the war against us. I told him that the war with Mexico was an affair with which neither England, France, nor any other power had any concern; that such an inquiry would be insulting to our government, and if made I would not answer it, even if the consequence should be a war with all of them. I told him I would not tie up my hands or make any pledge to any foreign power as to the terms on which I would ultimately make peace with Mexico. I told him no foreign power had any right to demand any such assurance, and that I would make none such let the consequences be what they might. Then, said Mr. Buchanan, you will have war with England as well as Mexico, and probably with France also, for neither of these powers will ever stand by and see California annexed to the United States.

I told him that before I would make the pledge which he proposed, I would meet the war which either England or France or all the Powers of Christendom might wage, and that I would stand and fight until the last man among us fell in the conflict. I told him that neither as a citizen nor as President would I permit or tolerate any intermeddling of any European Powers on this continent. Mr. Buchanan said if my views were carried out, we would not settle the Oregon question and we would have war with England. I told him there was no connection between the Oregon and Mexican questions, and that sooner than give the pledge he proposed that we would not if we could fairly and honorably acquire California or any other part of the Mexican Territory which we desired, I would let the war which he apprehended with England come and would take the whole responsibility. The Secretary of the Treasury engaged warmly and even in an excited manner against the proposition of Mr. Buchanan in his draft of his despatch. The Secretary of the Navy, the Attorney-General, and the Postmaster-General in succession expressed similar opinions. Mr. Buchanan stood alone in the Cabinet, but was very earnest in expressing his views and enforcing them.

Towards the close of the discussion, which lasted for more than two hours, I stepped to my table and wrote a paragraph to be substituted for all that part of Mr. Buchanan’s proposed despatch which spoke of dismembering Mexico, of acquiring California, or of the Del Norte as the ultimate boundary beyond which we would not claim or desire to go. I strongly expressed to Mr. Buchanan that these paragraphs in his despatch must be struck out. Mr. Buchanan made no reply, but before he left took up his own draft and the paragraphs which I had written and took them away with him. I was much astonished at the views expressed by Mr. Buchanan on the subject. The discussion tonight was one of the most earnest and interesting which has ever occurred in my Cabinet.

SOURCE: Allan Nevins, ed., Polk: The Diary of a President, 1845-1849 (London: Longmans, 1952), 89-91.

Additional Resources on the Mexican War

Web guide (Library of Congress)
Web guide (National Archives)
Mexican War (House Divided Project research engine)

Manifest Destiny

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 18, 2019

In Syllabus

“The catchphrase ‘Manifest Destiny’ summed up the expansionist thrust of the pre-Civil War era. Coined in 1845 by the Democratic Party journalist John L. O’Sullivan to justify annexation of Texas, Oregon, and California, the phrase meant, simply defined, that God had willed the expansion of the United States to the Pacific Ocean –or beyond. The concept expressed the exuberant nationalism and brash arrogance of the era. Divine sanction, in the eyes of many Americans, gave them a superior claim to any rival and lent an air of inevitability to their expansion. Manifest Destiny pulled together into a potent ideology notions dating to the origins of the republic with implications extending beyond the continent: that the American people and their institutions were uniquely virtuous, thus imposing on them a God-given mission to remake the world in their own image. Many Americans have accepted the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny at face value, seeing their nation’s continental expansion as inevitable and altruistic, a result of the irresistible force generated by a virtuous people. Once viewed as a great national movement, an expression of American optimism and idealism, and the driving force behind expansion in the 1840s. Manifest Destiny’s meaning and significance have been considerably qualified in recent years.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower (2008), p. 180

Discussion Questions

Herring labels “Manifest Destiny” (which he usually capitalizes) as both “a catch-phrase” and “a potent ideology.” But after reading his chapter, would you also label it as official US policy during the 1840s?
By the outbreak of Civil War in 1861, which side held the upper hand in the national debate: advocates for manifest destiny, or those who were more skeptical of territorial expansion?

Additional Resources

Origins of the term “manifest destiny” (1845)

On Texas (July 1845)

“…other nations have undertaken to intrude themselves into it, between us and the proper parties to the case, in a spirit of hostile interference against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”

–Excerpted from John L. O’Sullivan, “Annexation,” The United States Magazine and Democratic Review 17 (July 1845): 5–10

On Oregon (December 1845)

“…that claim is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty.”

–Excerpted from John L. O’Sullivan, New York Morning News, December 27, 1845 (see also Herring, 191)

Monroe Doctrine

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 10, 2019

In Syllabus

“The Monroe ‘doctrine’ was by no means a hollow statement. It neatly encapsulated and gave public expression to goals Monroe and Adams had pursued aggressively since 1817. That it was issued at all reflected America’s ambitions in the Pacific Northwest and its renewed concerns for its security. That it was done separately from Britain reflected the nation’s keen interest in acquiring Texas and Cuba and its commercial aspirations in Latin America. It expressed the spirit of the age and provided a ringing, if still premature, statement of U.S. preeminence in the hemisphere. It publicly reaffirmed the continental vision Adams had already privately shared with the British and Russians: ‘Keep what is yours but leave the rest of the continent to us.'” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 157

Discussion Questions

It was Secretary of State John Quincy Adams who played the critical role in formulating what is now known as the Monroe Doctrine. What were Adams’s key diplomatic and strategic goals while he served Monroe and then as he led the nation during his own one-term presidency that defined what Herring labels above as “the spirit of the age”? How central was the Monroe Doctrine to these goals?
Andrew Jackson succeeded Adams as president in 1829, but he been influential in shaping American strategic policy since 1814. Did the Jackson presidency thus simply continue the earlier expansionism of the Jeffersonians? How central was defending the Monroe Doctrine among the priorities of the Jackson administration?

Additional Resources

Monroe Doctrine (1823) (National Archives)

War of 1812

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 5, 2019

In Syllabus

“Madison accepted war in 1812 in the confidence that it would be relatively short, inexpensive, and bloodless –more talk than fight– and that the United States could achieve its objectives without great difficulty. In fact, the War of 1812 lasted two and a half years and cost more than two thousand American lives and $158 billion. For Britain, the war was a military and diplomatic sideshow to the main performance in Europe; for the United States, it became a struggle for survival.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 127

War of 1812 overview map (Courtesy of World Book)

Discussion Questions

How did Jefferson’s attempts to embargo Britain during his second term undermine his presidency and cloud his foreign policy legacy?
The War of 1812 is a misnomer in several ways. Not only was it a nearly three-year conflict, but also the war involved far more than just the US and British. What was the role of various Indian nations in this pivotal conflict? How did the outcome of the war reshape US-Native American relations after 1815?

Additional Resources

War of 1812 documents (Avalon Project)
Chapter on Early Republic (American Yawp, online textbook)
War of 1812: Perspectives (PBS)
Star Spangled Banner (CNN / annotated lyrics)

Louisiana Purchase

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 5, 2019

In Syllabus

“By any standard, the Louisiana Purchase was a monumental achievement. The nation acquired 287,000 acres, doubling its territory at a cost of roughly fifteen cents per acre, one of history’s greatest real estate steals. Control of the Mississippi would tie the West firmly to the Union, enhance U.S. security, and provide enormous commercial advantages. Napoleon’s sale of Louisiana all but eliminated a French return to North America, leaving the Floridas hopelessly vulnerable and Texas exposed. The United States’ acquisition of Louisiana established a precedent for expansion and empire and gave substance to the idea that would later be called Manifest Destiny.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 107

Discussion Questions

Herring describes Thomas Jefferson as a “practical idealist.” Does the story behind the Louisiana Purchase embody this description? What about afterwards, as President Jefferson pivoted toward the acquisition of Spanish Florida?
Jefferson’s approach to expansionism and other foreign policy matters represented something of a departure from his predecessors. How did he try to change both the nation’s diplomatic strategy and also diplomatic style as president?

LA purchase

Additional Resources

Summary & Context (Jefferson’s Monticello)
Robert Lee, “The True Cost of the Louisiana Purchase,” Slate, March 1, 2017

Alien & Sedition

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 3, 2019

In Syllabus

“Adams’s more belligerent advisers saw in the conflict with France a splendid opportunity to achieve larger objectives. The war scare provided a pretext for the standing army Federalists had long sought. In the summer of 1798, Congress authorized an army of fifty thousand men to be commanded by Washington in the event of hostilities. Federalists in the cabinet and Senate also sought to rid the nation of recent immigrants from France and other countries who were viewed as potential subversives –and even worse as Republican political fodder– enacting laws making it more difficult to acquire American citizenship and permitting the deportation of aliens deemed dangerous to public safety. Striking directly at the opposition, the Federalists passed several vaguely worded and blatantly repressive Sedition Acts that made it a federal crime to interfere with the operation of the government or publish any ‘false, scandalous and malicious writings’ against its officials.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 87

Discussion Questions

The late 1790s was a period of fierce partisan debate over immigration and its perceived threat to national security. What insights, if any, do you see in the story of the Alien & Sedition crisis for the politics of today?
President John Adams eventually defused the crisis over Alien & Sedition and the Quasi War with France by forging a compromise with Napoleon in 1800. He claimed this as perhaps his greatest legacy as a statesman. Does Herring seem to agree? What is your assessment of Adams during this period?

Additional Resources

Alien Enemies Act, Sedition Act with VA & KY Resolutions (Avalon Project)
Alien & Sedition Acts (page images) (National Archives)
Good summary of the four major 1798 laws: Alien Friends, Alien Enemies, Naturalization, and Sedition (Colonial Williamsburg)

Farewell Address

By Matthew Pinsker

On February 3, 2019

In Syllabus

“French meddling provoked a sharp presidential response in the form of Washington’s Farewell Address. Drafted partly by Hamilton, the president’s statement was at one level a highly partisan political document timed to promote the Federalist cause in the approaching election. Washington’s fervid warnings against the ‘insidious wiles of foreign influence,”and “passionate attachments” to “permanent alliances” with other nations unmistakably alluded to the French connection and Adet’s intrigues. They were designed, at least in part, to discredit the Republicans. At another level, the Farewell Address was a political testament, based on recent experience, in which the retiring president set forth principles to guide the nation in its formative years.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 83

Discussion Questions

In this paragraph, Herring is referring to French meddling in the 1796 election. What insights for the present day, if any, do you see in the story of French interference in American politics during the 1790s?
How would you assess the foreign policy accomplishments and setbacks of Washington’s two-term administration?

Additional Resources

Farewell Address (text) (Avalon Project)
Farewell Address (page images) National Archives)
Summary & Context (Mount Vernon)

“One Last Time” from musical “Hamilton”

Performed at the White House in 2016, a musical rendition of Washington’s Farewell Address