History 282 US Diplomatic History

Dickinson College Fall 2023

Paris 1783

The Gradual Process of Woodrow Wilson and the United States of America Joining World War I

Woodrow Wilson served as President of the United States from 1913 to 1921. Just after winning the election, he stated that, “It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs” (1). Wilson’s focus when entering office was on domestic matters, however, his presidency would be consumed by emphasis on foreign policy issues, particularly of World War I. Wilson and the majority of Americans were adamant in staying neutral throughout World War I (1914-1918). However, the United States would face countless problems and pressures, eventually pushing the nation into war. With the threat of Germany growing greater, especially through its use of unrestricted submarine warfare, the U.S. took numerous steps in avoiding direct conflict. However, Wilson and his administration would also take incremental steps in preparing the nation for the growing inevitability of war. This map provides place marks for some of the most significant events leading up to the U.S. joining World War I. The map not only provides the incidents that slowly pushed America closer to war, but also the actions Wilson’s administration took in preparing for the increasing likelihood of conflict.

Wilson declared a policy of neutrality with the emergence and development of war in Europe. Neutrality was not only widely accepted by the public, but it also provided the flourishing of American businesses through the demand of products for war (2). Furthermore, Wilson believed that the declaration of neutrality would protect American citizens and ships from attacks, however, he would be proven wrong as both Germany and Britain would repeatedly violate the neutrality rights of the U.S (3). Britain set up a blockade in order to prevent imports into Europe, and moreover to essentially, “strangle the enemy economically” (4). This led to the British violating U.S. neutrality as they would prevent the transportation of American goods to Germany (5). Wilson would not take strong action against the British, therefore as a result the, “Acceptance of the blockade tied the United States closer to the Allied cause” (6). On the other hand, Wilson and the American public would not concede so easily to Germany’s breaking of neutrality rights through the use of unrestricted submarine warfare.

The sinking of the British liner Lusitania in May of 1915, can be marked as a turning point in the change of attitude of the American public towards the war. The result of the attack led to the death of twelve hundred people, with one hundred twenty-eight of them being American citizens (7). The public turned strongly against Germany and moreover, Wilson was pressed to take a strong stance against the perpetrators. Notably and not surprisingly, Theodore Roosevelt pressed the Wilson administration to take action and enter the war (8). Wilson took cautious steps in the aftermath of the Lusitania attack. He gave a speech in Philadelphia in order restate the U.S. position of neutrality, however, his poor choice of the words “too proud to fight” lacked as a sufficient response to the assault (9). Wilson’s strictly pacifist message would not do enough to quell the anger of Americans. Consequently, he took a stronger stance by sending a note to Germany that demanded the change in unrestricted submarine warfare. His note suggested that another sinking, which resulted in American civilian casualties, could lead the United States to break diplomatic relations and even join the war (10). However, it was not until the sinking of the British Liner Arabic on August 19, 1915, in which two Americans were killed, did the German government officially and publicly announce the prohibiting of unrestricted submarine warfare (11).

Germany’s public pledge in the aftermath of the sinking of the Arabic would not do enough to fully suppress its ruthless tactics in its use of U-boats. In March of 1916, a German submarine sank another ship with Americans aboard, the Sussex (12). Although no Americans died, there were calls for the government to sever ties with Germany and furthermore even enter the war. Wilson was still determined to avoid war, and was successful in doing so by coercing the Germans to make the Sussex Pledge in early May. The Sussex Pledge stipulated that Germany would not undertake anymore surprise attacks against passenger liners (13). Although Wilson was able to keep the United States out of the conflict in Europe, it forced him into a corner. If Germany believed that preventing the U.S. from entering the war was not as crucial than resuming unrestricted U-boat warfare, then American neutrality would surely cease to exist (14). Wilson at best would have to break relations with Germany and at worst go to war against them.

In the aftermath of the Sussex Pledge, Wilson signed the National Defense Act and Naval Expansion Act in 1916. Not only was the National Guard strengthened, but also construction of battleships and cruisers were undertaken (15). Wilson understood how fragile the German pledge was and the potential implications of it being broken. Wilson took the necessary steps to insure America’s safety, while not overly pressing for war. This was not the first instance in which Wilson took progressive steps to assure U.S. safety. Although America was generally not enticed to join the war in the aftermath of the Lusitania sinking, Wilson’s administration sent forces to Nicaragua and Haiti in order to protect its overseas interests and influence in case of future outbreak (16). Germany could potentially take control of these nations and as a result pose a threat to America’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, the U.S. bought the Danish West Indies in August of 1914 in order to protect the Panama Canal. The administration was worried that Germany could build a base there and threaten to take control of the coveted passage (17).

The protection of overseas interests and bolstering of forces would pay off, as the Zimmermann Telegram confirmed the U.S. joining the war, if there was any doubt to begin with. In exchange for Mexico’s alliance, Germany would return its former territories currently presiding in the U.S (18). On April 2, 1917, Wilson presented Congress with a declaration of war against Germany. At this point the administration and the American public were in general decisively supportive of fighting in the war.

Negative public sentiment towards Germany increased starting with the sinking of the Lusitania. Want of joining the war only increased with the continuous use of German unrestricted U-boat warfare and moreover the sinking of other passenger vessels. Wilson tried his best to prevent the U.S. from fighting in Europe, however, he was also cautious of the threat Germany presented. Although reluctant to fight, he took steps to ensure the safety of the U.S. either through the protection of overseas interests or increasing of armed forces. Wilson and America’s joining of World War I was a gradual process that increasingly became inevitable.

(1) H. W. Brands, “Wilson at War Wilson in Love,” American History 48, no.2 (2013): 48.
(2) Brands, “Wilson at War Wilson in Love,” 50.
(3) Brands, “Wilson at War Wilson in Love,” 51.
(4) George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 401
(5) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 401
(6) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 402
(7) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 402
(8) Michael S. Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America’s Road to the Great War, 1914-1917,” Diplomatic History 38, no.4 (2014): 805
(9) Brands, “Wilson at War Wilson in Love,” 51
(10) Brands, “Wilson at War Wilson in Love,” 52
(11) Brands, “Wilson at War Wilson in Love,” 52-53 and Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 403
(12) Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open,” 809
(13) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 404
(14) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 404
(15) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 405
(16) Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open,” 806
(17) Neiberg, “Blinking Eyes Began to Open,” 808
(18) Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 410

Wild Attempts at Espionage: Wild Bill Donovan and the O.S.S.

Which diplomatic leaders have been the most significant in US history?  I think it is incredibly difficult to judge the significance of a diplomat.  Diplomatic leaders are called upon in times of crisis and so one must take into account the seriousness of the situation a diplomat is dealing with and the effectiveness of his or her diplomacy in diffusing that situation.  Creating a top ten list of the most successful American diplomatic leaders (1 being the most significant to 10 being the tenth least significant) is challenging due to the nearly three and a half centuries of US diplomacy and the changing historical contexts over the years.  My objective in this post is actually to discuss a very insignificant US diplomatic leader, which I will get to in a short while.  In the meantime, I’ll provide a short list of a few significant diplomats who found success in their diplomacy.

  1.  Benjamin Franklin.  How could I not include Ben Franklin, father of electricity? During the American Revolution Franklin served as a US ambassador to France.  During these years he balanced diplomatic relations with Britain and France, convincing the French to fight alongside the Americans while negotiating peace treaties with Britain.
  2. William Seward.  The American Civil War represented an incredibly significant threat to the existence of the United States.  Seward’s ability to keep Britain and France from recognizing the Confederacy as an autonomous state helped ensure Union victory and the existence of the United States as we know it.
  3. Ronald Reagan.  Diplomacy with any government representing a different ideology is always difficult.  US diplomacy with the Soviet Union is as difficult as it came.  Reagan found success in being flexible and being willing to compromise during his relations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

One of the least significant US diplomatic leaders in US history is William Donovan.

On July 11th, 1941 before the US entered the war, FDR appointed William Donovan as head of the newly created post Coordinator of Information.  The purpose of the C.O.I. was incredibly vague, giving Donovan the freedom to organize and run his intelligence agency as he pleased.  Donovan was a successful lawyer from Buffalo whose outlandish and unpredictable fighting style during the First World War earned him the nickname “Wild Bill” and a Medal of Honor.  He ran against FDR for lieutenant governor of New York on the Republican ticket and lost.  But FDR recognized Donovan’s ingenuity and fighting spirit and thought he would be a valuable member of his cabinet.

The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941 marked a very real and significant threat to the United States.  The attacks shifted the American mood from isolationism to interventionism. And so in 1942, FDR transformed the C.O.I. into the Office of Strategic Services placing it under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  With Donovan at the helm, nothing was off limits, from assassinating foreign leaders and engaging in ridiculous kinds of propaganda to conducting absurd covert operations like injecting Hitler’s food with female hormones so that Hitler would lose his mustache and masculine voice.  Donovan tried to win the war in a Hollywood style – single-handedly – and that was the kind of diplomacy that suited his style but the efforts of the O.S.S. with a few exceptions, amounted to little in the grand scheme of things.

There are a number of reasons for Donovan and the O.S.S.’s insignificance during World War II.  Donovan’s personality is one reason.  His fearlessness and recklessness were not traits best suited for a leader of an intelligence gathering agency.  Before the creation of the O.S.S. American intelligence agencies were scattered throughout branches of the army and federal government.  The US’s inexperience at having a centralized intelligence agency and FDR’s willingness to let Donovan run his own show is another reason.  On that same point, Donovan and the Allies’ enemies, the Nazis, Fascists, and Russians had been conducting espionage and cover warfare for decades.  They were able to handle the bulk of what the O.S.S. threw at them.  Wild Bill Donovan faced a significant task in being put in charge of the O.S.S. but unlike Ben Franklin, William Seward, and Ronald Reagan, he was unsuccessful in his duties as a diplomat.

Donovan never fulfilled his dream of heading a domestic centralized intelligence agency after the war.  Maybe it’s best he never did.

Toward an Imperial Presidency

White House foreign policy decision-making during the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon era took a decided turn toward centralization.  There had always been occasional tensions between presidents and their diplomats, but George Herring’s survey From Colony to Superpower demonstrates clearly that something intensified during that latter stages of the Cold War.  Students in History 282 who are interested in the executive decision-making process should read chapters 16-17 carefully and try listening to the audio recordings of the various administrations to discern for themselves what was occurring in the 1960s and 1970s.

 

Cuban Missile Crisis (ExComm)  (October 1962)

LBJ and Robert McNamara on Vietnam (March 1964)

LBJ and Sen. Richard Russell (May 1964)

Nixon and Kissinger 

A Warning from the Past: The Rosenberg Case

On June 19th 1953, Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Greenglass Rosenberg became the only American citizens to be executed under the Espionage Act. In a case fraught with government conspiracies, the Rosenberg case stimulated nationwide controversy, some of which still exists today.

In her documentary, Heir to an Execution, Ivy Meeropol, the granddaughter of the notorious Rosenbergs, attempts to shed some light on the plight of her grandparents.

As she struggles to understand the decisions of her grandparents, Ivy embarks on a heart wrenching journey through both sides of her family, the Greenglasses and the Rosenbergs, who later changed their name to Roberts as a result of the case. What she discovers is troubling; though Julius was proven to have traded secrets to the Soviet Union during World War II, there is little evidence that he gave them the secrets of the nuclear bomb. Worse yet, Ethel Rosenberg was executed alongside her husband despite the fact that she was only minimally involved in the espionage.

David Greenglass, the only real villain in Meeropol’s story, was responsible for the unjust death of his sister, Ethel. Pressured to testify against his sister and brother-in-law, Greenglass betrayed Ethel and condemned her to death. He originally stated that he had given information to Julius on a New York street corner, but at the behest of the prosecution, he altered his account. His new, embellished version stated that he had given Julius secret information in their apartment, incriminating Ethel as the typist for her husband. Greenglass later admitted to falsifying his testimony and explained that it was actually his own wife who had typed the secret documents. To save his wife from prosecution, Greenglass proved himself the “willing cooperator of the government’s machinations” and watched as his sister was wrongfully executed (quote from Michael Meeropol, Heir to an Execution).

(Ethel and her brother, David)

In post-World War II America, Communism played a polarizing role in society. Some, like the Rosenbergs and their accomplice, Morton Sobell, were drawn to the Popular Front after witnessing the crippling poverty and racism that continuously affected the United States. Others, like Senator Joseph McCarthy, saw Communism as a plague that needed to be eradicated in order for righteous democracy to survive. Ethel and, to a lesser extent, Julius were caught in this anti-Communist fervor and paid the ultimate price for their political beliefs. In the Rosenberg case, the American government acted out of fear and allowed political hatred to supersede justice.

Nearly sixty five years later, it is fairly clear that the government did “everything you’d expect a democracy not to engage in” by allowing Ethel Rosenberg to be executed (quote from Miriam Moskowitz, Heir to an Execution). After the public release of the Venona cables in 1995, it became obvious that Ethel was indicted with Julius only so that the government could use her life as leverage against Julius, forcing him to give up names of fellow traitors. Both Ethel and Julius, however, remained loyal to their cause, refusing to betray their comrades or each other. By refusing to testify against her husband, Ethel made the painful decision to abandon her sons, Michael and Robert, and die alongside her husband.

The Red Scare and the injustices of the 1950s may seem detached from modern American politics, but it has never been more relevant. As the Rosenbergs lived under the persecution of McCarthyism, we now live under the constant threat of the Patriot Act. Buzz words like “Communism” have been replaced by newer, scarier terms like “terrorism” and “Islamic-fundamentalism”. But the general idea is still the same; as long as the people are given something to fear, they will turn a blind eye at the injustices committed by their government for the sake of national security.

In fact, our situation can be considered more perilous than that of the 1950s. Our president can (and probably does) use executive authority to kill whoever he deems to be a threat to national security without a trial. We, as Americans, must demand more from our government. We must expect a greater amount of transparency from our government and take a warning from the past so that justice for all citizens can be ensured.

It is with this mentality that people such as Julian Assange need to be praised, not condemned as a “high-tech terrorist”. By exposing documents about American operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Assange gave Americans access to the information they have a right to know. Similarly, Edward Snowden should not be considered a traitor because he was able to display exactly how much the government does without our knowledge. Snowden has forced the question – exactly how much government secrecy and mass surveillance is necessary to protect national security?

http://www.noticiassin.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/assange-snowden.jpg
(Julian Assange and Edward Snowden)

 

With the militarization of police forces and the installment of innumerable public surveillance systems across the country, it seems like American civil liberties are lessening every day. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg suffered greatly from the political climate of 1950s America, as did their children and relatives. Now that we are dealing with problems similar to those of the 1950s, our nation stands on the brink of letting history repeat itself. We cannot allow public fear, whether of Communism or terrorism, to supersede justice once more.

 

Idealism in the Rosenberg Spy Case

In times of international crisis, the United States government often suspends domestic liberties in the name of national security. Practical sacrifices are made in response to foreign pressures. After World War II, the prevailing world system was turned upside down. The delicate balance of power in Europe collapsed leaving two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. George Herring explains that “[The Cold War] resembled traditional power struggles between nation-states, but it was also a fierce ideological contest between two nations with diametrically opposed world views” (Herring 2008, 651). Those caught between these powers suffered.

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the young New York couple accused of Soviet espionage, are renowned for the controversy surrounding their execution. Like the Cold War period itself, the Rosenberg case was laden with ideological rhetoric and exaggeration. In his sentencing statement, the presiding Judge Kaufman explained that “[the Rosenbergs’] conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price of [their] treason. Indeed, by [their] betrayal [they] undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country.” The steep claim made by Judge Kaufman at the end of the Rosenberg trial reveals a desire to establish a clear narrative of history complete with villains and victims. Idealism and rhetoric dominated the Rosenberg debate on both sides.

eeis_03_img0907

Image of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg courtesy of faqs.org

For decades after their 1953 executions, thousands advocated that Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were innocent. Building off the reality of McCarthyism, many came to the conclusion that the death of the Rosenbergs was part of a vast F.B.I plot. Others like Judge Kaufman contested that the couple was part of a large mission to peddle atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. The prosecutor in the Rosenberg case, Irving Saypol, depicted Julius Rosenberg as part of a complex conspiracy: “Imagine a wheel. In the center of the wheel, Rosenberg, reaching out like the tentacles of an octopus.” Like the Cold War, the rhetoric and exaggerations of the Rosenberg case do little to provide any clarity.

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Image of Cold War propaganda courtesy of gabriel-chetcuti.wordpress.com

Unlike earlier periods in American history, idealism had real and observable consequences during the Cold War. Herring explains that even “for Eisenhower, his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and other U.S. leaders, the Cold War was the equivalent of a holy war” (Herring 2008, 655). The Public Burning by Robert Coover satirizes the Cold War as a conflict between the demonic “Phantom” of Communism and Uncle Sam. Although a work of fiction, Coover’s novel describes the idealism that consumed and corrupted the Rosenberg case.

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg can be seen as martyrs willing to give their own lives for the sake of a cause. In The Rosenberg File: A Search for the Truth, Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton explain that “the Rosenbergs were thoroughgoing ideologues…for Julius and Ethel everything was grist for the dialectical struggle” (Radosh, Milton 1997, 339). In her 2004 film, Heir to an Execution, the granddaughter of the Rosenbergs, Ivy Meeropol, attempts to distance her ancestors from the narrative of the Cold War. She broadens the idealism of her grandparents, arguing that: “If they were ‘spying’ I believe they were doing it out of great love for humanity. There was nothing cynical, nothing motivated by self-interest…I wish I had some of their idealism.”(Meeropol 2004). Meeropol’s revisionist perspective exaggerates the Rosenbergs deeds in the other direction, elevating them to the level of saints.

Recent developments in the Rosenberg case have complicated the conflicting ideologies surrounding the execution. Although he did deliver information to the Soviet Union, Julius Rosenberg did not dramatically “[alter] the course of history to the disadvantage of our country” as Judge Kaufman put it. In the midst of ideological uproar, the claims against the Rosenbergs had been exaggerated. Molly Hite explains that: “The electrocution of the Rosenbergs was a stunning overreaction to a purported crime–passing the ‘secret’ of the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union…could have had little effect in any case, according to such nuclear physicists as Albert Einstein and Harold Urey, who maintained that there was no secret to the atom bomb and thus nothing of importance that a spy ring, even if one existed, could have passed on to the USSR” (Hite 1993, 85). Ethel Rosenberg’s execution remains controversial as ever. She was urged to put on the image of a traditional housewife, further ammunition in an ideological case.

Like the time in which it was set, the Rosenberg case was an ideological battleground.The Cold War was a time when idealism was a reality. The truth of the case became clouded as various causes adopted the Rosenberg executions to prove one conspiracy or another. Ivy Meeropol explained that she didn’t “think they died for communism, even necessarily to make some kind of statement. It was a simple equation: they couldn’t do anything else.’’ Meeropol’s description of Julius’ and Ethel’s decision-making characterizes the Cold War era: a conflict escalated because of contrasting ideologies.

 

References:

Edwards, Thomas R. 1977. “Real People, Mythic History”. The New York Times: Books. http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/09/27/specials/coover-burning.html

Herring, George. 2008. From Colony to Superpower. Oxford University Press.

Hite, Molly. 1993. “‘A Parody of Martyrdom’: The Rosenbergs, Cold War Theology, and Robert Coover’s ‘The Public Burning’.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction.  271 (1): 85-101. Web.

Meeropol, Ivy. 2004. Heir to an Execution. Blowback Productions. DVD.

Parrish, Michael E. 1977. “Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs.” The American Historical Review. 82 (4): 805-842. Web.

Pessen, Edward. 1984. “The Rosenberg Case Revisited: A Critical Essay on a Recent Scholarly Examination.” New York History. 65 (January): 82-102. Web.

Radosh, Ronald, and Joyce Milton. 1994.  The Rosenberg File: The Search for the Truth. Delran, NJ: Gryphon Editions

Roberts, Sam. 2004. “Capturing the Rosenbergs.” The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/13/movies/television-capturing-the-rosenbergs.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1

 

 

 

 

Fear in the Early Stages of the Cold War

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Image of Senator McCarthy courtesy of Politico

In From Colony to Superpower, George Herring describes the early stages of the Cold War as a turbulent time in United States (US) history. During this period, the government created policies, like containment, that would influence American foreign policy until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and American citizens began to determine their views on the threat of Communism within US borders (Herring 635-637).  In September 1949 after the Soviet Union successfully exploded an atomic bomb, the consequences of Soviet espionage within the United States became very real to many Americans.  With these events in the background, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy emerged as a leader among American politicians who were adamant about rounding up alleged Communists within the United States and reducing the threat to the country.  To accomplish this, McCarthy and his allies fomented and exploited the fear of Communism to promote their cause.  Herring summarizes this point in time by writing, “A Cold War culture of near hysterical fear, paranoiac suspiciousness, and stifling conformity began to take shape. Militant anti-communism increasingly poisoned the political atmosphere at home…”(Herring 637).  Herring’s quote highlights the power of political ideologies in the bipolar world and shows the fear and contempt many Americans felt about Communism.

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Image of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg with Morton Sobell courtesy of The FBI

In this climate, the case of alleged atomic spies, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, took center stage as an example of the threat Communists posed on American soil.  The Rosenberg trial provides a clear example of how the “near hysterical fear” of Communism motivated the prosecutors in the case and a large part of the American public to violate standards of legal and clear evidence in order to convict and execute the Rosenberg’s.  As members of the Communist Party, both Julius and Ethel were active politically in the years prior to their arrests in 1950.  In Heir to an Execution: A Granddaughter’s Story the codefendant in the Rosenberg case, Morton Sobell, describes Julius and Ethel as very politically active.  Sobell goes on to explain how Julius, himself, and their friends all believed that a Socialist world would be a better world and that the Soviet Union was the answer to bringing Socialism to America.  The Rosenberg’s political activity combined with Julius’ post at the War Department during WWII made him and his wife perfect suspects for the crime of passing atomic secrets to the Soviets.

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Image courtesy of The National Archives

Arrested on July 17,  1950, Julius Rosenberg was initially accused of passing atomic secrets to the Soviets and his wife Ethel was arrested as a co-conspirator on August 11, 1950.  Although both Julius and Ethel maintained their innocence throughout their trial, conviction, and up to the point of their execution, the two were in fact guilty of espionage.  What makes this case interesting is that although the Rosenberg’s were guilty, the way in which they were convicted and the evidence used against them reflects the fear that Herring describes as infecting the country in the early Cold War years.  For example, Ivy Meeropol describes in her documentary, Heir to an Execution that one of the pieces of evidence used against her grandparents, the Rosenberg’s, was a can found in their New York apartment with the label, “Save A Spanish Republican Child”.  The investigators in the case used this can to prove the Rosenberg’s connection to the Soviet Union. Another piece of evidence used against the Rosenberg’s was a Jell-O box described by another Soviet spy, Ethel’s brother, David Greenglass, as a way for the spies to confirm their identities when they passed along information meant for the Soviet Union.  A third piece of evidence, sited by Greenglass as a tool the Rosenberg’s used for espionage activities, was a small console in the family’s living room.  During the trial, the prosecutors questioned Julius and Ethel about the table, but the two maintained they bought it at Macy’s.  In the prosecution’s summation, prosecutor Irving Saypol suggested that the console was used for “microfilming” and therefore was a crucial part of the Rosenberg’s espionage activities.  Following the trial, the console was determined to be void of any hidden cameras, and just a normal table from Macy’s.

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Image of Judge Irving Kaufman courtesy of University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

All three of these pieces of evidence were used to connect the Rosenberg’s to the Soviet Union and accuse them as spies.  However, the determination of the prosecution’s crucial piece of evidence, the console, as irrelevant to the Rosenberg’s espionage activities calls into question the entire collection of evidence.  From this example, we can see a snapshot of how fear of Communism in the United States degraded the quality of evidence and overall integrity of the trial.  In conclusion, Judge Irving Kaufman’s sentencing statement, which concluded the Rosenberg trial, encapsulates America’s fear of Communism.  In the statement, Kaufman says, “I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate contemplated murder is dwarfed in magnitude by comparison with the crime you have committed. In committing the act of murder, the criminal kills only his victim…I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country.”  Kaufman’s quote which condemned Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to death emphasizes how frightening the idea of the Soviet’s having nuclear weapons and the Communist ideology both were for Americans in the early Cold War years.

Tracking Anti-Semitism: The Rise Of McCarthyism Following The Rosenberg Trial

By: Zach Kalman’17

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (Image Courtesy of Wikipedia)

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (Image Courtesy of Wikipedia)

Ivy Meeropol, granddaughter of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, directed and produced the documentary,  “Heir to an Execution” (2004). The documentary presents a first hand account of Ivy as she investigates what actually happened to her family back in 1953. She interviews members of her own family including her father, Michael Meeropol who is the son of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Ivy also interviews several friends of her grandparents colleagues including, Miriam Moskowitz and Morty Sorbell who both have a first hand account of the events surrounding what happened to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

The documentary strikingly makes evident the significance of the involvement of Jews in politics during this time period. As Ivy interviewed Morton Sobell he spoke about the feeling of having, “social responsibility” for others during the economic struggles surrounding WWII. He describes how Julius and Ethel, “dreamed of a socialist world, with no hunger, and that the Soviet Union was a model for that world.” When speaking to my grandfather Sheldon Lyons, who grew up during this time period in Brooklyn, he told me that one of the reasons so many Jews were involved in the communist movement was because they saw the effects socialism had on their homelands like Poland and Russia and were inspired by the results of this “collectivism” to help assist the poor. He also made a clear distinction that the wealthy, established Jews did not follow this rhetoric and there was a clear class distinction between those who supported socialism and those who did not.

This distinction between the two classes of Jews is evident in “Heir to an Execution” as well. Ivy makes a clear point to highlight the harsh decisions of Jewish lawyers and judges had in the trials of Julius and Ethel. In fact, Ivy makes a point of saying that a Catholic judge, responsible for giving custody of Ivy’s father and her brother to their grandmother, which was their “first victory in court.” This raises the question, why were some Jews so hard on Julius and Ethel? In response to this question, my grandfather said that when the verdict came out that the Rosenberg’s were Soviet spy’s, his father who had served in WWI for the Untied States felt that he was betrayed by the Rosenberg’s. He, like many others felt betrayed because he had supported the United States in war and at home but now people would associate him with traitors. All of a sudden, a new wave of anti-Semitism rose in the United States in which people blamed Jews for being socialists and aligning with the Soviets.

Sen. Joseph McCarthy (Image Courtesy of Wikipedia)

Sen. Joseph McCarthy (Image Courtesy of Wikipedia)

McCarthyism, which gets its name from Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, led an effort beginning in 1950 that accused many Americans of supporting communism and engaging in treason. McCarthy first unveiled this rhetoric in a speech in February of 1950 in which he stated he had a list of 205 known Communists who were, “working and shaping policy” (History.com) in the US State Department. McCarthyism was especially anti-Semitic in its treatment of the television industry and Hollywood, places that many Jews worked in. An example of this McCarthyism targeting the entertainment industry and thus targeting Jews can be seen in this anti-Communist poster from the 1950s below. McCarthy was also responsible what is known as the “Hollywood Blacklist” which was the denying of employment to screenwriters, actors, directors, musicians, and other U.S. entertainment professionals because of their suspected political beliefs or associations.

Example of McCarthyism literature specifically addressing the entertainment industry. (Courtesy of Wikipedia)

Example of McCarthyism literature specifically addressing the entertainment industry. (Courtesy of Wikipedia)

In his second term in as Senator McCarthy was put in charge of the Committee on Government Operations, “which allowed him to launch even more expansive investigations of the alleged communist infiltration of the federal government”(History.com). This once again turned into area of large anti-Semitism and a “blatant violation”(History.com) of civil rights. An example of this can be found in the treatment of Dr. Irving Peress, “a New York dentist who had been drafted into the Army and became the beneficiary of a seemingly routine promotion from captain to major” (Roberts). Peress’s promotion became anything but “routine,” it instead involved a televised congressional investigation all because McCarthy thought he was a Communist. Sam Roberts writes that, “McCarthy contended that Dr. Peress’s promotion had been directed by a ‘silent master who decreed special treatment for Communists.’ Dr. Peress, represented ‘the key to the deliberate Communist infiltration of our armed forces.’ McCarthy called him a ‘Fifth Amendment Communist’”(Roberts). This outlandish treatment by McCarthy during these trials ended up costing him his job in the Senate as, “a showdown with the White House and, later that year, censure by the Senate” (Roberts). Before all was set and done, McCarthy’s trial of Peress caused “several top Army officials, cost Dr. Peress much of his private dental practice in Queens and even drove his wife, Elaine, to resign”(Roberts).

Dr. Irving Peress at a Senate subcommittee hearing in 1954. (Image Courtesy of The New York Times)

Dr. Irving Peress at a Senate subcommittee hearing in 1954. (Image Courtesy of The New York Times)

It is clear that following the trial of the Rosenberg’s a new wave of anti-Semitism was brought about it the Untied States and McCarthyism had a lot to do with it. McCarthyism represented a total breach of civil liberties in which people like Dr. Peress were signaled out randomly based on McCarthy’s feelings at the time. Much of the time the left-of center Jews got the harshest of the blame whether that be in Congress or the entertainment industry. McCarthyism represents dark side of what happens when the government is given the power to investigate without oversight.

 

Citation:

Roberts, Sam “Dr. Irving Peress, Target of McCarthy Crusade, Dies at 97.” The New York Times,17 Nov. 2014.

Heir to an Execution. Dir. Ivy Meeropol. Blowback Productions, 2004. DVD.

“Joseph R. McCarthy.” History.com. A&E Television Networks, 2009. Web. 20 Nov. 2014.

 

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Brink of Catastrophe

In October of 1962, the world was brought to the brink of destruction by the two largest super powers at the time, The United States and The Soviet Union. With tensions rising since the end of World War II, the two nations had entered into a Cold War that lasted until the late 1980s. While the two powers never directly fought, the world came closest to nuclear war in the early 1960s. In the previous decade, conflict resulting from the Cold War had been overseas, with vast oceans on either side protected The US. Communism was mostly on the other side of the world and contained to the Eastern Hemisphere. This all changed on January 1, 1959. After 6 years of struggle and revolution, President Baptiste of Cuba was ousted and Fidel Castro was instated as Prime Minister, eventually taking the title of President.[1] With his rule came a communist form of government. Communism was not only close to home, but it was only 90 miles off of the coast of Florida.

In the years after the Cuban Revolution, the CIA, under the Eisenhower administration, planned an operation that would bring over one thousand Cuban exiles into the country in order to topple the communist government. The plan was still in the works when President Kennedy entered office and in early 1961, Kennedy approved of the plan. What has come to be known as the Bay of Pigs occurred in April of 1961 and was a complete failure.[2] Most of the Cuban exiles were either captured or killed and Castro stayed in power. This failure made Kennedy look weak and unprepared for the foreign policy challenges he would have to face in the future. Over all, this event was a complete embarrassment for the United States Government.

Over the next year, the Soviets continued to antagonize the United States through intimidation and strategic action. Two of the most notable events to occur in 1961 are the Berlin Crisis, which resulted in the building of the Berlin Wall and the testing of the Tsar Bomba, the largest manmade explosion ever to be detonated. In Kennedy’s first year of his presidency, he faced the division of Europe with a physical wall and the mounting perils of nuclear war. With all of this on his plate, and with lessons learned from the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy had no option but to make perfect maneuvers.

On October 15th, 1962, the President was informed that Soviet Nuclear Weapons had arrived in Cuba. For 13 days, the world watched as nuclear war was contemplated. Top officials essentially gave Kennedy two options, either immediately attack Cuba, or accept Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba.[3] Kennedy along with The ExComm, seeing neither of these as a viable option, decided to strike a balance between the two approaches. On October 22, Kennedy announced a U.S. naval blockade around Cuba.[4] At this moment, the world was at the closest to total destruction that it ever had been before and hopefully will ever be again. On television, Kennedy declared,

 

“To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers.”

-John F Kennedy, October 22, 1962[5]

 

Further more,

“It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”

-John F Kennedy, October 22, 1962[6]

 

After Days of the blockade and negotiations between Kennedy and Khrushchev, it was announced in October 28th that the Soviets would remove all of their nuclear weapons from Cuba if the US promised to not invade Cuba and end the quarantine. However, Kennedy also secretly negotiated the removal of US nuclear weapons from Turkey. This moment is Kennedy’s biggest foreign policy achievement. In the following year, both Kennedy and Khrushchev began working towards peace and were eventually able to agree on a Test Ban Treaty. Some even speculate that if Kennedy would have lived and under the right conditions, the Cold War could have ended in the 1960s.[7] While the crisis ended without the use of nuclear weapons, it tittered far too close to the edge.   This was one of the first true tests of collective security and luckily at that moment, level heads prevailed.

 

[1] Herring, George. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

[2] Herring, From Colony to Superpower.

[3] Graham, Allison. “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50.” Business Source Complete, Vol. 91, Is. 4. August, 2012.

[4] Graham, Allison. “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50.”

[5] JFKLibrary. “Cuban Missile Crisis,” Accessed November 12, 2014. < http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx>

[6] JFKLibrary. “Cuban Missile Crisis.”

[7] Graham, Allison. “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50.”

The USS Panay: An Incident Long in the Making


As 1937 came to an end, the bombardment and subsequent destruction of the USS Panay had the potential to at least demolish US-Japanese relations and at most draw the United States into an early engagement with the axis countries, a potentially history altering sequence of events. Less than fifteen minutes after spotting three Japanese bombers overhead,  at 1:38 PM on December 12th the destruction of the first American warship since WWI commenced (Jellison). Initially passed off as a freak accident rectified by the profuse apologies of both the Japanese people and their government, the destruction of the USS Panay and three Standard Oil tanker ships was over fifteen years in the making.

After having tumultuous interactions in 1919 with Woodrow Wilson over a racial equality clause, the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 was the first sign of life for US-Japanese relations (Lafeber 145). After finding themselves as signatories on all three naval agreements conceived at the conference (Dobbs), both nations left with a sense of reforged relations and the hopes of renewed cooperation and positive interaction between the two powers (Herring 467). Improving upon the good relations fostered during the Washington Conference was the United States’ aid of Japan in 1923 after a massive earthquake (Herring 467). The early part of the 1920s looked kindly upon US-Japanese relations, however in the midst of positive relationship building activity, bankers such as Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan and friends looked to make a financial killing and began to inadvertently fund a growing Japanese presence in Manchuria (Cohen 31). While these loans appeared fairly innocuous upon initial review, the United States government found itself stuck between regulating the Japanese presence in Manchuria and avoiding any action that could potentially offend the Tokyo government (Cohen 32).

Relations took a grave turn in 1924 with the introduction of the National Origins Act. This  legislation placed quotas on many prominent immigrant groups who had arrived over the past thirty years and effectively banned the immigration of Japanese citizens. A shocking development in light of the recent years of cooperation and positive interaction between the US and Japan, the bill is described by Walter LaFeber as having attracted a great deal of opposition, but unfortunately, none of this support came from within the Senate (LaFeber 145). After the passing of the bill, US-Japanese relations degenerated rapidly. The first palpable instance of the decay came on July 1st that very same year, as the new foreign minister Shidehara came to power, the public showed its discontent with US policy by ripping down American flags adorning the US embassy in Tokyo, and one citizen going as far as committing suicide on the steps leading to the embassy entrance (LaFeber 145-146). While Lamont and the efforts of his fellow bankers continued to launder money into Japan, the United States had become the main importer into China, and this relationship was not to be overlooked when relations between the Chinese and the Japanese started to turn dark. Six years after the Japanese invaded Manchuria, the United States ran aground in its navigation of the tensions between the Japanese and the Chinese. A few short months before the sinking of the Panay, President Roosevelt delivered what would become one of his most memorable speeches as he compared the lawlessness and savagery of the conflicts in China and throughout Europe as a disease in need of quarantining. While FDR spoke in a vague manner about taking action against the abject violence found throughout the world, the speech provided us with eerily accurate predictions of the times to come. Not two months later, the violence FDR had addressed in his Chicago speech reemerged in a much more personal way.

As mentioned earlier, the United States had entered China earlier in the decade. Even in the wake of the 1924 Exclusion Act, a venture down the Yangtze may not have merited a watery grave for US ships in the region. However an important factor in staving off a violent outburst towards the Americans was no longer present, Shidehara who had worked hard to pursue policies of cooperation had been replaced by the policies of the Kwantung Army which were of a violent, imperial nature (LaFeber 146). In 1937 during what would become infamously known as the Rape of Nanking, efforts to evacuate Standard Oil employees located outside of Nanking, the Japanese fired what can be seen now as a warning shot across the nose of the Americans. On the afternoon of December 12th, miles upstream of Nanking, the USS Panay and three tankers belonging to Standard Oil. The bombardment destroyed all four targeted ships, and the oil tankers sustained untold Chinese casualties (Jellison). Aboard the Panay, three had lost their lives in the chaos, two servicemen: Charles Ensminger and Edgar Hulsebus and Italian correspondent Sandro Sandri (Jellison). Given the live footage Eric Mayell and Norman Alley were able to record on that fateful day, there is  little doubt that the attack on the USS Panay was not the honest mistake the Japanese had attempted to portray it as (Jellison), but was something much more malicious.

In the days to come, sentiment reminiscent to “Remember the Maine” and the Lusitania could have created a great deal of outrage stateside, however the incident was all but forgiven. But why was it forgiven and seemingly forgotten in spite of the empirical evidence explained by Norman Alley’s film footage of the attacks? Where was the United States’ desire for retribution? While this could be tidily explained by FDR’s decision to edit the footage to soften the blow to US-Japanese relations (Sparks 9), it seems that subsequent similar US responses to neutral attacks indicated that FDR was truly a man with “determination to pursue a policy of peace”. Even less than two months before the events of Pearl Harbor, in the wake of a German U-Boat attack on the USS Kearny, FDR made a statement that would foreshadow the next four years for the United States “We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started.” (FDR, USS Kearny).

Sources Consulted

Norman Alley’s Bombing of the USS Panay. China: Universal Studios, 1938. Film.
Cohen, Warren I. Empire without Tears: America’s Foreign Relations, 1921-1933. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1987. Print.
Dobbs, Charles M. “Washington Naval Conference 1921-1922.” Encyclopedia of Chinese-American Relations. N.d. Credo Reference. Web. 14 Nov. 2014. <http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/mcfcham/washington_naval_conference_1921_1922/0?>.
Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Print.
Jellison, Charles A. “A Prelude to War.” American History 34.5 (1999): n. pag. Reader’s Guide to Full Text Mega. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.
“President Franklin Delano Roosevelt Address over the Radio on Navy Day concerning the Attack upon the Destroyer U. S. S. Kearny, October 27, 1941.” Franklin Delano Roosevelt Addresses the Attack upon the Destroyer USS Kearny. Radio. 27 Oct. 1941. US Merchant Marine at War. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.
Roosevelt, Franklin D. “Quarantine the Aggressors Speech.” Chicago. 5 Oct. 1937. Points of View Reference Center. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.
Spark, Nick T. “Suddenly and Deliberately Attacked! The Story of the USS Panay Incident.” USS Panay. N.p., 2007. Web. 14 Nov. 2014.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): Diplomacy Played as Poker


This thirteen-day crisis is remembered as the closest the world has ever come to a nuclear Armageddon. In the fifty-two years since the fall of 1962, the indispensable role diplomacy and restraint played in safely deescalating this confrontation is commonly forgotten. This diplomatic episode is unique in the sense that the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union – John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev – were at the center of the decision making process. President Kennedy, during a White House meeting, stated “It is insane that two men, sitting on opposite sides of the world, should be able to decide to bring an end to civilization”(1). Both Kennedy and Khrushchev were using diplomacy to play a game of high stakes poker with the fate of humanity in the balance with neither willing to back down until the last minute. This map focuses on the United States’ relations with Cuba before 1962, the thirteen-day nuclear crisis, and its resolution.

The list of major events on this map highlight two of the most historically important policies the United States pursued in international affairs — the policy of containment (1947) and the Monroe Doctrine (1823). In the years after the conclusion of World War II, the United States, led by President Harry S. Truman, adopted the policy of containment in an effort to curb Soviet expansion and the spread of communism. When the Cuban revolutionary, Fidel Castro, took power and declared the country communist in 1959, the United States adhered to their policy of containment and was committed to deposing Castro. The CIA and President Kennedy failed to accomplish this task by means of the covert invasion at the Bay of Pigs (2). With regards to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has long upheld keeping foreign influence from the Western hemisphere and would not stand for Soviet influence in Cuba.

This map depicts the military and political operations that took place before, during, and after the Cuban Missile crisis. Each of these events is denoted by a flag of the respective country associated with the military or political operation. More specifically, this map aims to accentuate the diplomatic correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the crisis. A black building with a flag next to it represents these points on the map. Lastly, the map portrays the role that international institutions played in resolving the crisis by generating global support. An orange flag characterizes these posts. These events are critical to understanding the causes, motivations, and the diplomatic solutions associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis.

This map is presented in chronological order of when each event occurred. Throughout the post-World War II era, the United States and Soviet Union were fighting to gain permanence on the world stage. This struggle most clearly manifested itself through a nuclear arms race. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the tipping point, in which the two super powers came closest to war (3). The causes and motivations that led to the delivery of Soviet nuclear weapons to Cuba were multifaceted. Khrushchev believed he could sneak the missiles into Cuba because he perceived Kennedy as young and ineffective after his failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs. When speaking about deployment of missiles, Khrushchev explicitly asked why we don’t throw “a hedgehog down Uncle Sam’s pants” (4). The Soviet leader was encouraged to do so due to a lagging missile gap with the United States, the need to defend his Cuban ally from invasion, and pressures to force concessions with the occupation of Western Germany. Khrushchev also made pushes to respond forcefully to American nuclear weapons in Turkey, to show strength, and to concede to domestic pressures at home (5). Khrushchev’s gamble would soon be exposed by American intelligence agencies and would spark the infamous thirteen-day nuclear crisis.

On October 13, 1962 a U-2 spy plane captured the first images of a Soviet nuclear build up in San Cristobal, Cuba. The photos were analyzed on October 14, sent to Washington D.C. on the 15th, and were given to President Kennedy the morning of Tuesday the 16th – officially marking the first day of the crisis. The President responded by calling together the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a team of expert advisors called ExComm. From the intelligence gathered, they concluded that if the Soviets could make these weapons operational, they could strike any where in the Western hemisphere with nuclear force. The meetings in the White House produced two possible courses of action – an air strike followed by an invasion or a naval quarantine with the threat of force (6). On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy informed the world on television of the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba and of his decision to enforce a naval quarantine on Soviet ships bound for the island.

This decision was a stroke of diplomatic genius, allowing Kennedy to buy time and petition support from the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN) (7). On October 24, Khrushchev responded to the naval quarantine by sending a letter that called the blockade an act of war and explaining his decision to order Soviet ships to continue their course towards Cuba. By this time, the United States had already gained a unanimous vote from the OAS supporting the quarantine and authorizing action to make sure the missiles would not threaten the Western hemisphere. The United States was also preparing to present its case to the UN on October 25 by sending representative, Adlai Stevenson, with photos of the missile sites (8). This international support and multilateralism allowed the United States to exert more diplomatic pressure on Khrushchev.

On October 26, 1962, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy presenting terms of a peace settlement. Before receiving a response, Khrushchev sent another letter on October 27 with a much harsher tone that demanded the removal of American nuclear weapons in Turkey. On the very same day, a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, effectively reigniting the crisis (9). Kennedy’s Joint Chiefs of Staff now pushed for war, but the President practiced restraint, agreeing to a peaceful settlement the next day, October 28. This peace agreement called for the removal of all nuclear weapons in Cuba and the dismantlement of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

The agreement immediately went into effect and the Soviets began deconstructing their missile sites in Cuba. On December 1, 1962, the last Soviet Missiles and warheads left the island. Shortly after, the Jupiter missiles were scrapped and their nuclear warheads were returned home in April of 1963 (10). This was not viewed as a strategic loss because the Jupiter missiles were due to come off line, because they were obsolete. In terms of leverage and diplomacy, the United States viewed the agreement as a victory, effectively negotiating the removal of nuclear weapons from Cuba without having to sacrifice anything of importance.

The Cuban Missile crisis was an event in which the world’s two most powerful nations at the time held the fate of the world in their hands. Without the use of shrewd diplomacy and restraint, this conflict could have very easily escalated into a full-out nuclear war. One mistake could have caused mutually assured destruction for the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies. The Cuban Missile Crisis had a lasting impact on the international system and allowed for the first steps towards dètente to be taken (11).

 

 

(1) It Is Insane That Two Men Sitting on opposite.” Presidential Libraries. Tumbler, 5 Aug. 2011. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

(2) Munton, Don. Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History. N.p.: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. pg. 14-20.

(3) Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Print. pg. 719.

(4) Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Print. pg. 720.

(5)  Munton, Don. Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History. N.p.: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. pg. 22-24.

(6) Cuban Missile Crisis – John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum.”Cuban Missile Crisis – John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

(7) Weaver, Michael E. “The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Diplomatic History38.1 (2014): 137-81. Print. (8) Munton, Don. Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History. N.p.: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. pg. 68-73.

(9) Cuban Missile Crisis – John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum.”Cuban Missile Crisis – John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

(10) Munton, Don. Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History. N.p.: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. pg. 92-93.

(11) Munton, Don. Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History. N.p.: Oxford UP, 2011. Print. pg. 94-95.

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