{"id":4337,"date":"2022-01-23T22:21:41","date_gmt":"2022-01-23T22:21:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/?page_id=4337"},"modified":"2022-03-31T12:45:06","modified_gmt":"2022-03-31T12:45:06","slug":"containment-diplomacy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/course-syllabus\/containment-diplomacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Containment Diplomacy"},"content":{"rendered":"<h3 class=\"pbTTYe-ibnC6b-Bz112c\"><strong>CHAPTER 14:\u00a0 \u201cA Novel Burden Far From Our Shores\u201d:\u00a0 Truman, the Cold War, and the Revolution in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1953<\/strong><\/h3>\n<div><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-large wp-image-4067\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-1024x571.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 940px) 100vw, 940px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-1024x571.png 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-300x167.png 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-768x429.png 768w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-1536x857.png 1536w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-2048x1143.png 2048w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-21-at-10.45.55-AM-500x279.png 500w\" alt=\"Airlift\" width=\"940\" height=\"524\" \/><\/div>\n<div class=\"HzV7m-pbTTYe-ibnC6b-V67aGc\">\n<div data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">\n<div id=\"attachment_2245\" style=\"width: 237px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/Marshall-George.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-2245\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-2245\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/Marshall-George-227x300.jpg\" alt=\"Marshall\" width=\"227\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/Marshall-George-227x300.jpg 227w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/Marshall-George.jpg 712w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-2245\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">George C. Marshall<\/p><\/div>\n<p><strong>Timeline of the Early Cold War<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1945 \/\/ Ministers Meeting<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1946 \/\/ Stalin\u2019s Election Speech<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1946 \/\/ Kennan\u2019s Long Telegram<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1946 \/\/ Iron Curtain Speech<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1946 \/\/ Philippine Independence<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1946 \/\/ Iranian Crisis<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1946 \/\/ Turkish Crisis<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1947 \/\/ Truman Doctrine<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1947 \/\/ National Security Act<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1948 \/\/ Berlin Airlift<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1948 \/\/ Marshall Plan<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1949 \/\/ NATO<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1949 \/\/ Communist China<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1950 \/\/ NSC-68<\/li>\n<li class=\"suEOdc\" data-tooltip=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\" aria-label=\"1945 Ministers Meeting\">1950-53 \/\/ Korean War<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<p>From Churchill\u2019s \u201cIron Curtain\u201d speech in Fulton, Missouri (1946)<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/lMt7zCaVOWU\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\" data-mce-fragment=\"1\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Churchill\u2019s stern 1946 warning about the Soviets highlighted a growing\u00a0tension\u00a0in superpower relations, a period that\u00a0columnist Walter Lippmann described memorably as\u00a0\u201cThe Cold War.\u201d \u00a0The US policy toward the Soviet Union which subsequently defined this Cold War period has come to be known as\u00a0<strong>containment.<\/strong>\u00a0 State Department official George Kennan helped develop this\u00a0containment doctrine, principally through\u00a0two powerful documents, the so-called\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www2.gwu.edu\/~nsarchiv\/coldwar\/documents\/episode-1\/kennan.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cLong Telegram,\u201d<\/a>\u00a0and an anonymous article for the journal\u00a0<em>Foreign Affairs,\u00a0<\/em>titled,\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/articles\/23331\/x\/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cThe Sources\u00a0of Soviet Conduct.\u201d<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0Here is an excerpt from the now-famous 1947 article:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents\u2026.In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<hr \/>\n<h3>KEY PLAYERS<\/h3>\n<h3>George Kennan (1904-2005)<\/h3>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-2241\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/Kennan-George.jpeg\" alt=\"\" width=\"220\" height=\"282\" \/>\u201cThe namesake of a distant relative who in the late nineteenth century had documented for enthralled US. audiences the horrors of the Siberian exile system, the younger [George] Kennan was one of a handful of men trained after World War I as experts on Bolshevik Russia. \u00a0Conservative in his tastes and politics and scholarly in demeanor, he developed a deep admiration for traditional Russian literature and culture and, from service in the Moscow embassy after 1933, an even deeper antipathy for the Soviet state. Frustrated during the war when the Roosevelt administration ignored his cautionary recommendations, he eagerly responded when Truman\u2019s State Department requested his views. \u00a0\u2018They had asked for it,\u2019 he later wrote. \u00a0\u2018Now, by God, they would get it.\u2019 \u00a0In highly alarmist tones, he delivered over the wires [in early 1946] a lecture on Soviet behavior that decisively influenced the origins and nature of the Cold War.\u201d (Herring, chap. 14, p. 604)<\/p>\n<h3><strong>VS.<\/strong><\/h3>\n<h3 style=\"text-align: left;\">Henry Wallace (1888-1965)<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2022\/01\/Screen-Shot-2022-01-23-at-1.39.43-PM.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-4305 alignleft\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2022\/01\/Screen-Shot-2022-01-23-at-1.39.43-PM-259x300.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 259px) 100vw, 259px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2022\/01\/Screen-Shot-2022-01-23-at-1.39.43-PM-259x300.png 259w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2022\/01\/Screen-Shot-2022-01-23-at-1.39.43-PM.png 720w\" alt=\"Wallace\" width=\"259\" height=\"300\" \/><\/a>\u201cThe firing of dissident Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace just two weeks before delivery of the Clifford-Elsey report solidified the Cold War consensus.\u00a0 For years Wallace had been the torchbearer for American liberals.\u00a0 After most other New Dealers had left office or jumped aboard the Cold War bandwagon, he kept the faith, privately and publicly pleading for cooperation with the Soviet Union and questioning the get-tough approach\u2026.Like Kennan, Wallace harked back to Russian history to explain Soviet insecurity, but he drew very different conclusions, warning of their sensitivity to U.S. moves they viewed as provocative.\u00a0 He sharply criticized U.S. atomic policy and the get-tough approach. \u201cThe tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get,\u201d he averred.\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/course-syllabus\/containment-diplomacy\/\">Herring, chap. 14, p. 610-11<\/a>)<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/henrywallace.weebly.com\/\">Student Hall of Fame entry by Charlotte Goodman<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<h3 class=\"HzV7m-pbTTYe-ibnC6b-V67aGc\"><strong>KEY TERMS:\u00a0 Long Telegram (1946) \/\/ Berlin Blockade (1948-49)<\/strong><\/h3>\n<h3><a href=\"https:\/\/digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org\/document\/116178.pdf\"><strong>Long Telegram (1946)<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n<p>\u201cLess than two weeks later [in February 1946], [George] Kennan unleashed on the State Department his famous and influential \u201cLong Telegram,\u201d an eight-thousand-word missive that assessed Soviet policies in the most gloomy and ominous fashion.\u00a0 The namesake of a distant relative who in the late nineteenth century had documented for enthralled U.S. audiences the horrors of the Siberian exile system, the younger Kennan was one of a handful of men trained after World War I as experts on Bolshevik Russia.\u00a0 Conservative in his tastes and politics and scholarly in demeanor, he developed a deep admiration for traditional Russian literature and culture and, from service in the Moscow embassy after 1933, an even deeper antipathy for the Soviet state.\u00a0 Frustrated during the war when the Roosevelt administration ignored his cautionary recommendations, he eagerly responded when Truman\u2019s State Department requested his views.\u00a0 \u2018They had asked for it,\u2019 he later wrote.\u00a0 \u2018Now, by God, they would get it.\u2019\u00a0 In highly alarmist tones, he delivered over the wires a lecture on Soviet behavior that decisively influenced the origin and nature of the Cold War.\u201d \u2013George Herring,\u00a0<em>From Colony to Superpower,\u00a0<\/em>p. 604<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Discussion Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>George Kennan was one of the most influential diplomats in American history and yet never rose above the status of senior staff at the State Department or later (briefly) as an ambassador overseas.\u00a0 How did Kennan make such an outsized impact on US policymaking?<\/li>\n<li>How would you describe the US policy of \u201ccontainment\u201d that emerged after Kennan\u2019s \u201cLong Telegram\u201d in a series of actions and strategic statements during 1946 and 1947?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<h3><strong>Berlin Blockade (1948-49)<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p>\u201cThe Berlin Blockade [of 1948] posed a major challenge for the United States and its allies.\u00a0 They correctly perceived that Stalin did not want war, but they also recognized that the blockade created a volatile situation in which the slightest misstep could provoke conflict.\u00a0 Certain that the Allied position in West Berlin was militarily indefensible, some U.S. officials pondered the possibility of withdrawal.\u00a0 Others insisted that the United States could not abandon Berlin without undermining the confidence of Western Europeans \u2013a \u2018Munich of 1948,\u2019 warned diplomat Robert Murphy.\u00a0 Previously more open to negotiations with the Soviets than Washington, [Gen. Lucius] Clay now urged sending an armed convoy through East Germany to West Berlin.\u00a0 Truman and Marshall chose a less risky course, \u2018unprovocative\u2019 but \u2018firm\u2019 in Marshall\u2019s words.\u00a0 Drawing on the Army Air Force experience carrying supplies over the Himalayas to China in World War II and a mini-airlift during a Soviet \u2018baby-blockade\u2019 of West Berlin just months before, they turned to air power to maintain the Western position in Berlin and sustain its beleaguered people.\u00a0 It was the sort of thing Americans do best, a stroke of genius.\u201d\u00a0 \u2013George Herring,\u00a0<em>From Colony to Superpower,\u00a0<\/em>p. 624<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Discussion Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>How was the US airlift response to the Berlin Blockade a classic illustration of containment doctrine as it was emerging in the late 1940s?<\/li>\n<li>What were some of the most significant consequences of the Berlin Blockade?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>CHAPTER 14:\u00a0 \u201cA Novel Burden Far From Our Shores\u201d:\u00a0 Truman, the Cold War, and the Revolution in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1945-1953 Timeline of the Early Cold War 1945 \/\/ Ministers Meeting 1946 \/\/ Stalin\u2019s Election Speech 1946 \/\/ Kennan\u2019s Long Telegram 1946 \/\/ Iron Curtain Speech 1946 \/\/ Philippine Independence 1946 \/\/ Iranian Crisis 1946 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":373,"featured_media":0,"parent":10,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4337","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4337","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/373"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4337"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4337\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/10"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4337"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}