{"id":4359,"date":"2022-01-24T01:59:07","date_gmt":"2022-01-24T01:59:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/?page_id=4359"},"modified":"2026-04-09T12:57:14","modified_gmt":"2026-04-09T12:57:14","slug":"vietnam-diplomacy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/course-syllabus\/vietnam-diplomacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Vietnam Diplomacy"},"content":{"rendered":"<h3><b>CHAPTER 16:\u00a0 Gulliver\u2019s Troubles: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Limits of Power, 1961-1968<\/b><\/h3>\n<p>&#8220;Vietnam was symptomatic of the larger foreign policy conundrum of an embattled presidency.\u00a0 Following long-established Cold War dictates, LBJ was committed to upholding a worldview status quo in a time of sweeping change and as U.S. power operated under growing constraints.\u00a0 When Thieu blocked the administration&#8217;s last-minute peace ploy in late 1968, Harry McPherson moaned that the &#8216;American Gulliver is tied down by the South Vietnamese Lilliputians.&#8217;\u00a0 In fact, during the Johnson years, &#8216;the American Gulliver&#8217; faced upstart Lilliputians all over the world.&#8221; (Herring, 759)<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h3><strong>KEY PLAYERS<\/strong><\/h3>\n<h3>Robert McNamara (1916-2009)<\/h3>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-medium wp-image-2251\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/McNamara-Robert-240x300.jpg\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 240px) 100vw, 240px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/McNamara-Robert-240x300.jpg 240w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2014\/12\/McNamara-Robert.jpg 440w\" alt=\"\" width=\"240\" height=\"300\" \/>\u201cThe [Vietnam] war\u2019s mounting costs were more important than the anti-war movement in generating public concern. \u00a0Growing casualties, indications that more troops might be required, and LBJ\u2019s belated request for a tax increase combined in late 1967 to produce unmistakable signs of war-weariness. \u00a0Polls showed a sharp decline in support for the war and the president\u2019s handling of it. \u00a0The press increasingly questioned U.S. goals and methods. \u00a0Members of Congress from both parties began to challenge LBJ\u2019s policies. \u00a0Doubts even arose among his inner circle. \u00a0The secretary of defense had been so closely identified with Vietnam that it had once been called \u2018McNamara\u2019s War.\u201d In 1967, a tormented McNamara unsuccessfully urged the president to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, put a ceiling on U.S. ground troops, scale back war aims, and seek a negotiated settlement. \u00a0By the end of the year, for many observers, the war become the most visible symbol of a malaise that afflicted American society.\u201d (Herring, chap. 16, p. 741)<\/p>\n<h3><strong>KEY TERMS:\u00a0 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962); Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964)<\/strong><\/h3>\n<div class=\"post-header\">\n<h2><a href=\"https:\/\/millercenter.org\/president\/john-f-kennedy\/key-events\">Timeline: JFK and Flexible Response<\/a><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>1961 (January) \/\/ JFK inaugurated<\/li>\n<li>1961 (March) \/\/ Peace Corps, Food for Peace, and Alliance for Progress<\/li>\n<li>1961 (April) \/\/ Bay of Pigs<\/li>\n<li>1961 (June) \/\/ Kennedy \u2013 Khrushchev summit in Vienna<\/li>\n<li>1961 (August) \/\/ Berlin Wall construction begins<\/li>\n<li>1962 (October) \/\/ Cuban Missile Crisis<\/li>\n<li>1963 (June) \/\/ JFK visits Berlin Wall<\/li>\n<li>1963 (August) \/\/ Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty<\/li>\n<li>1963 (November) \/\/ Assassination of Diem<\/li>\n<li>1963 (November) \/\/ JFK assassinated<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2 class=\"post-title\">Cuban Missile Crisis<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"post-content entry-content\">\n<p>\u201cThe [Cuban] missile crisis was the defining moment of the Kennedy presidency, and many observers have given him high marks.\u00a0 He was firm but restrained in responding to this most critical challenge, it is argued.\u00a0 He sought advice from different quarters.\u00a0 He left Khrushchev room for retreat.\u00a0 He did not gloat in the apparent U.S. victory.\u00a0 The October [1962] confrontation is also the most studied of Cold War crises, and as more has been learned, the praise for Kennedy has been tempered.\u00a0 To be sure, Khrushchev bears primary responsibility for the confrontation.\u00a0 He deluded himself into thinking he could get away with an incredibly rash move.\u00a0 But Kennedy\u2019s obsession with Cuba and hostile actions carried out in Mongoose provided the occasion and rationale for Khrushchev\u2019s actions, a connection totally lost on U.S. officials at the time.\u00a0 Even while he rejected the more risky alternatives, Kennedy\u2019s initial response pushed the two nations to the verge of war.\u00a0 He did hold the hawks at bay and displayed skill in crisis management.\u00a0 But he would have been the first to admit that luck and chance helped determine the outcome.\u00a0 The United States came within hours of an invasion that could have had horrific consequences.\u00a0 The number of Soviet troops in Cuba far exceeded U.S. estimates, and they were armed with tactical nuclear weapons. An invasion could have triggered nuclear war.\u201d\u00a0 \u2013George Herring,\u00a0<em>From Colony to Superpower,\u00a0<\/em>pp. 722-23<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Discussion Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>What were the key moments and turning points in the Cuban Missile Crisis?<\/li>\n<li>What insights should policymakers draw from this episode when preparing to face their own challenges in crisis management?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<p>Transcript excerpts from initial EXCOMM meeting at White House (courtesy of Avalon Project at Yale via FRUS) (full audio below)<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_409\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Missile-Crisis-Map.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-409\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Missile-Crisis-Map-246x300.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 246px) 100vw, 246px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Missile-Crisis-Map-246x300.png 246w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Missile-Crisis-Map.png 768w\" alt=\"\" width=\"246\" height=\"300\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-409\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-409\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">CIA map used during Oct. 16 briefing<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>DATELINE:\u00a0 Tuesday, October 16, 1962,<\/p>\n<p>[Following 7-1\/2 pages of the transcript, which narrate the analysis of the U-2 photographs.]<\/p>\n<p><strong>JFK:<\/strong>\u00a0Secretary Rusk?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Rusk:<\/strong>\u00a0Yes. [Well?], Mr. President, this is a, of course, a [widely?] serious development.\u00a0<em><strong>It\u2019s one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far.<\/strong>\u00a0<\/em>Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [in the same?] [words unintelligible] with a Soviet base, thus making it [essential to or essentially?] Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn\u2019t [word unintelligible] with it anyhow, so. . . . Now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don\u2019t think we [can?] sit still.\u00a0<em><strong>The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I\u2019m, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States.<\/strong>\u00a0<\/em>It\u2019s so [eminently or heavily?] involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Um, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we [make or think?], that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don\u2019t think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we\u2019re doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we\u2019re simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we\u2019re going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island.<\/p>\n<p>The other would be, if we have a few days\u2013from the military point of view, if we have the whole time\u2013uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Um, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated [and actually?] what acts should [we take or be taken?] in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. The OAS could constitute itself an organ of consultation promptly, although maybe, it may take two or three days to get, uh, instructions from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at any moment, uh, take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection, uh, team be permitted to come and, itself, look directly at these sites, provide assurance[s?] to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but it will be another step in building up the, uh, building a position.<\/p>\n<p>I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro [apart?] privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.\u00a0<em><strong>You saw the Times story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, \u201cWe\u2019ll trade Cuba for Berlin.\u201d This ought to be brought to Castro\u2019s attention\u2026.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p>[AUDIO FOR TRANSCRIPT BELOW]<\/p>\n<audio class=\"wp-audio-shortcode\" id=\"audio-4359-1\" preload=\"none\" style=\"width: 100%;\" controls=\"controls\"><source type=\"audio\/mpeg\" src=\"https:\/\/nsarchive2.gwu.edu\/nsa\/cuba_mis_cri\/cmc02.mp3?_=1\" \/><a href=\"https:\/\/nsarchive2.gwu.edu\/nsa\/cuba_mis_cri\/cmc02.mp3\">https:\/\/nsarchive2.gwu.edu\/nsa\/cuba_mis_cri\/cmc02.mp3<\/a><\/audio>\n<p><strong>McNamara:<\/strong>\u00a0Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.<\/p>\n<p>But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking.<em>\u00a0<strong>My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational.<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0I\u2019m not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they\u2019re launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba\u2026.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Taylor:<\/strong>\u00a0<em><strong>Uh, we\u2019re impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise,<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0uh, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we\u2019ll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. What we\u2019d like to do is to look at this new photography, I think\u2013and take any additional\u2013and try to get the, the layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible, and then take \u2019em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don\u2019t think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things you\u2019ve been talking about. It\u2019s a little hard to say in terms of time how much I\u2019m discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I\u2019m having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr. President, at four o\u2019clock, to talk this out with \u2019em and get their best judgment\u2026.<\/p>\n<p><strong>JFK:<\/strong>\u00a0What is the, uh, advant- . . . . Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a . . . . Must be that they\u2019re not satisfied with their ICBMs.\u00a0<em><strong>What\u2019d be the reason that they would, uh . . . .<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>Taylor:<\/strong>\u00a0What it\u2019d give \u2019em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [deceptive?] ICBM system, for example. There\u2019s one reason\u2026<\/p>\n<p><strong>Rusk:<\/strong>\u00a0Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, um,\u00a0<em><strong>Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don\u2019t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours.<\/strong>\u00a0<\/em>Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Um.<\/p>\n<p><strong>JFK:<\/strong>\u00a0<em><strong>How many weapons do we have in Turkey?<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>Taylor?:<\/strong>\u00a0We have Jupiter missiles . . .<\/p>\n<p><strong>Bundy?:<\/strong>\u00a0Yeah. We have how many?<\/p>\n<p><strong>McNamara?:<\/strong>\u00a0About fifteen, I believe it is.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Bundy?:<\/strong>\u00a0I think that\u2019s right. I think that\u2019s right\u2026<\/p>\n<p><strong>Rusk:<\/strong>\u00a0Um, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it\u2019s important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he\u2019s doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological [plank?].\u00a0<em><strong>I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Um, for the first time, I\u2019m beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin.<\/strong>\u00a0<\/em>We\u2019ve [hardly?] talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else.\u00a0<em><strong>But, uh, I must say I don\u2019t really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p>\u201cThirteen Days\u201d (2001)<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/yt8SBlx9P9I\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\" data-origwidth=\"560\" data-origheight=\"315\" data-mce-fragment=\"1\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_3610\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/Screen-Shot-2019-04-16-at-8.32.29-AM.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-3610\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/Screen-Shot-2019-04-16-at-8.32.29-AM.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 644px) 100vw, 644px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/Screen-Shot-2019-04-16-at-8.32.29-AM.png 644w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/Screen-Shot-2019-04-16-at-8.32.29-AM-196x300.png 196w\" alt=\"Marker\" width=\"644\" height=\"988\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-3610\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-3610\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Cuban marker commemorating 1962 crisis (Courtesy of Bob Rains)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"attachment_3608\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/20190315_150615.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-large wp-image-3608\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/20190315_150615-1024x498.jpg\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 940px) 100vw, 940px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/20190315_150615-1024x498.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/20190315_150615-300x146.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/20190315_150615-768x373.jpg 768w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2019\/04\/20190315_150615-500x243.jpg 500w\" alt=\"Remains\" width=\"940\" height=\"457\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-3608\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-3608\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Remains of downed U2 plane (courtesy of Bob Rains)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>Vietnam Timeline<\/strong><\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>1963 \/\/ Assassination of Diem<\/li>\n<li>1964 \/\/ Gulf of Tonkin Resolution<\/li>\n<li>1965-68 \/\/ Escalation (<a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/2017\/11\/01\/vietnam-war-3\/\">A<\/a>\u00a0\/\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/2018\/04\/02\/nsa-secrets-of-the-vietnam-war\/\">B<\/a>\u00a0\/\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/2016\/05\/06\/the-vietnam-war-protests-and-the-commencement-of-a-new-movement\/\">C<\/a>)<\/li>\n<li>1968 \/\/ Tet Offensive<\/li>\n<li>1970 \/\/ Invasion of Cambodia and Kent State protests (<a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/2016\/05\/06\/a-new-campus-culture-anti-war-movement-and-education-reform-at-dickinson-college\/\">A<\/a>\u00a0\/\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-118pinsker\/2015\/05\/21\/the-impact-and-irrelevance-of-the-vietnam-war-protests\/\">B<\/a>)<\/li>\n<li>1971 \/\/ Pentagon Papers &amp;\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/mylaimassacre3161968.weebly.com\/\">trial of Lt. William Calley (My Lai)<\/a><\/li>\n<li>1972 \/\/ China opening, Easter offensive, Detente (SALT \/ ABM)<\/li>\n<li>1973 \/\/ Paris peace accords\u00a0 (Vietnam agreement)<\/li>\n<li>1975 \/\/ Fall of Saigon<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Perhaps the most famous (or infamous) ad in the history of modern presidential campaigns appeared as a paid advertisement on TV only once \u2013the so-called \u201cDaisy ad\u201d from 1964. Students should be able to explain what this ad was about, and why it was so powerful and controversial.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.livingroomcandidate.org\/commercials\/1964\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-419\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/04\/Screen-Shot-2024-04-01-at-12.35.38-PM.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 880px) 100vw, 880px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/04\/Screen-Shot-2024-04-01-at-12.35.38-PM.png 880w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/04\/Screen-Shot-2024-04-01-at-12.35.38-PM-300x272.png 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/04\/Screen-Shot-2024-04-01-at-12.35.38-PM-768x696.png 768w\" alt=\"1964 ad\" width=\"880\" height=\"798\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/politics\/2014\/09\/07\/daisy-girl-political-ad-still-haunting-50-years-later\/15246667\/\">Find out more about the \u201cDaisy Girl,\u201d (<strong>Monique Corzilius)<\/strong><\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/video\/2016\/10\/clinton-ad-daisy-061108\">See Hilary Clinton\u2019s 2016 update of the Daisy Girl ad<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2><\/h2>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: left;\">Recalling the Turning Point:\u00a0 Tet Offensive (1968)<\/h2>\n<p>Here are video clips of Walter Cronkite&#8217;s original February 27, 1968 CBS Evening News Broadcast on the Tet Offensive, illustrating a turning point in the &#8220;living room war.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/Dn2RjahTi3M\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\" data-mce-fragment=\"1\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>CHAPTER 16:\u00a0 Gulliver\u2019s Troubles: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Limits of Power, 1961-1968 &#8220;Vietnam was symptomatic of the larger foreign policy conundrum of an embattled presidency.\u00a0 Following long-established Cold War dictates, LBJ was committed to upholding a worldview status quo in a time of sweeping change and as U.S. power operated under growing constraints.\u00a0 When Thieu [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":373,"featured_media":0,"parent":10,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4359","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4359","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/373"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4359"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4359\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4830,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/4359\/revisions\/4830"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/10"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4359"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}