{"id":4366,"date":"2022-01-24T02:09:45","date_gmt":"2022-01-24T02:09:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/?page_id=4366"},"modified":"2022-04-21T11:34:34","modified_gmt":"2022-04-21T11:34:34","slug":"human-rights-diplomacy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/course-syllabus\/human-rights-diplomacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Human Rights Diplomacy"},"content":{"rendered":"

CHAPTER 18:\u00a0 Foreign Policy in an Age of Dissonance, 1974-1981<\/strong><\/h3>\n

“Carter has been much maligned over the years for his handling of U.S. foreign policy.\u00a0 Conservative publicists have made him, along with 1972 presidential candidate George McGovern, into living symbols of the Democratic Party’s alleged weakness on national security issues, an image that has dogged the party at election time for more than thirty years.” (Herring, 860)<\/p>\n

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KEY PLAYERS<\/h3>\n

Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928 \u2013 2017)<\/h3>\n

\"\"\u201cA Columbia University professor and prolific writer on international relations, Zbig, as he was known, brought to the position a resume much like Kissinger\u2019s, although he lacked his predecessor\u2019s nimble mind, trademark wit, and ability to charm the media. \u00a0Born in Poland, the son of a diplomat, he boasted, so the joke went, of being \u2018the first Pole in 300 years in a position to really stick it to the Russians.\u2019 \u00a0His butch haircut in an age of floppy hairstyles and sharp features gave physical evidence of the aggressive posture toward the Kremlin he would relentlessly push. \u00a0Prickly and arrogant, he scorned [Cyrus] Vance\u2019s \u2018gentlemanly approach to the world.\u2019 \u00a0He advocated \u2018architecture\u2019 in foreign policy, by which he meant clarity and certitude , as opposed to Kissinger\u2019s \u2018acrobatics.’\u201d (Herring, chap. 18, p. 832)<\/p>\n

VS.<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Andrew Young (1932-)<\/h3>\n

\"\"\u201cCarter\u2019s ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, and First Lady Rosalynn Carter deserve special mention. \u00a0A youthful and prominent civil rights leader and follower of the late Martin Luther King Jr., Young was among the first African Americans to hold a top-level diplomatic position, an appointment of great symbolic importance for people of color at home and abroad. \u00a0Like many other African American leaders, he linked the struggle for freedom in the United States with the fight against colonialism abroad, especially in Africa, and he was one of the first U.S. diplomats to disentangle southern African issues from the Cold War. \u00a0Often far out in front of Carter and the diplomatic establishment, outspoken and at times quite undiplomatic in demeanor, Young sometimes got his boss in trouble with his candor. \u00a0His unconventional behavior ultimately forced his resignation. \u00a0While in office, however, he helped to improve U.S. relations with the Third World and to engineer a major shift in policies toward Africa.\u201d (Herring, chap. 18, p. 833)<\/p>\n

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KEY TERMS:\u00a0 Helsinki Accords (1975) \/\/ Iran Hostage Crisis (1979-80)<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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Helsinki Accords (1975)<\/strong><\/h3>\n

\u201cThe Helsinki summit of July 30-August 1, 1975, is a classic example of a pivotal event whose short- and long-term consequences were strikingly different, even contradictory.\u00a0 Although it would eventually play a crucial role in ending the Cold War, its immediate effects were to further weaken detente and damage Ford at home.\u00a0 One of the largest such meetings ever, the conference included representatives from thirty-five nations and ratified the results of almost three years of intensive negotiations.\u00a0 Through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Soviet Union sought recognition of its position in Eastern Europe.\u00a0 The Western Europeans hoped to advance the relative stability that had grown out of detente.\u00a0 With the United States, they also pushed for human rights and a freer flow of ideas, people, and information.\u00a0 Out of this melange of often conflicting aspirations emerged by 1975 three sets of agreements, in diplomatic parlance, \u2018baskets.\u2019\u00a0 A security basket included agreements to uphold basic human rights and \u2018refrain from assaulting\u2019 the European boundaries established after World War II, a tacit concession to the Soviet position that stopped short of recognition.\u00a0 An economic basket provided for breaking down inter-European barriers by tourism, expanded trade, and scientific and technical exchange.\u00a0 A \u2018Humanitarian and Other Fields\u2019 basket called for the freer flow of information, ideas, and people through travel, better access to media information, and reunification of families separated by the Cold War.\u00a0 A \u2018Final Act\u2019 provided for monitoring observance of the agreements.\u00a0 The Soviet Union, Western Europeans, and the United States were unhappy with some of the provisions but accepted the entire package to secure those items they considered most important.\u201d \u2013George Herring,\u00a0From Colony to Superpower,\u00a0<\/em>p. 826-27<\/p>\n

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Discussion Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  • Describe what Herring means above when he calls the short- and long-term consequences of the Helsinki accords as being \u201ccontradictory.\u201d<\/li>\n
  • How did Helsinki inaugurate a new era of human rights-focused diplomacy and how did such an emphasis further undermine detente?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
    \n

    Iran Hostage Crisis (1979-80)<\/strong><\/h3>\n

    \u201cThe [Iranian] revolution abruptly changed from a serious problem for the United States to an all-out crisis on November 4, 1979, when young radicals stormed the U.S. embassy \u2013the \u2018Den of Spies\u2019\u2013 and took hostage the sixty-six Americans still residing there.\u00a0 The immediate provocation was Carter\u2019s decision to allow the shah into the United States, but the hostage takers also feared a CIA plot to restore him to power, suspicions encouraged by Jackson\u2019s statement and the Algiers meeting.\u00a0 Some former hostage-takers now admit, moreover, their real purpose was to push the Bazargan government in more radical directions.\u00a0 They had no idea the takeover would lead to a prolonged crisis; some now concede it to have been a mistake.\u00a0 Khomeni at first opposed the takeover, but when he recognized its popularity he exploited it to get rid of Bazargan and solidify his own power.\u201d\u00a0 \u2013George Herring,\u00a0From Colony to Superpower,\u00a0<\/em>p. 850<\/p>\n

    \n

    Discussion Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
    • How did historic US ties to the Shah of Iran limit its ability to negotiate a solution to the Iranian hostage crisis?<\/li>\n
    • Assess President Carter\u2019s failed efforts to end the crisis with Iran in the context of other elements of his foreign policy legacy.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n