{"id":2262,"date":"2017-01-20T20:56:47","date_gmt":"2017-01-20T20:56:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/?p=2262"},"modified":"2022-01-21T18:45:58","modified_gmt":"2022-01-21T18:45:58","slug":"treaty-of-paris-1783","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/2017\/01\/20\/treaty-of-paris-1783\/","title":{"rendered":"Treaty of Paris (1783)"},"content":{"rendered":"

“The American negotiators have often been given credit for this favorable outcome [in the terms of the 1783 treaty].\u00a0 They shrewdly played the Europeans against each other, it has been argued, exploiting their rivalries, wisely breaking congressional instructions, and properly deserting an unreliable France to defend their nation’s interests and maximize its gains.\u00a0 Such an interpretation is open to question.\u00a0 The Americans, probably from their own insecurities, were anxiety-ridden in dealing with ally and enemy alike.\u00a0 Jay’s excessive nervousness about England and then his separate approach to that country not only broke faith with a supportive if not entirely reliable ally but also delayed negotiations for several months.\u00a0 It eased pressure on Shelburne to make concessions and left the United States vulnerable to a possible Shelburne-Vergennes deal at its expense.\u00a0 Jay and Adams had reason to question Vergenne’s trustworthiness, but they should have informed him of the terms before springing the signed treaty upon him. Ultimately, the favorable settlement owed much less to America’s military prowess and diplomatic skills than to luck and change:\u00a0 Shelburne’s desperate need for peace to salvage his deteriorating political position and his determination to settle quickly with the United States and seek reconciliation through generosity.”\u00a0 –George Herring,\u00a0From Colony to Superpower,\u00a0<\/em>pp. 32-3<\/p>\n

\n

Discussion Questions<\/strong><\/p>\n