{"id":505,"date":"2015-03-04T20:33:19","date_gmt":"2015-03-04T20:33:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/?page_id=505"},"modified":"2020-03-25T14:01:42","modified_gmt":"2020-03-25T14:01:42","slug":"close-reading-letter-to-george-mcclellan","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/close-readings\/close-reading-letter-to-george-mcclellan\/","title":{"rendered":"Close Reading &#8211;Letter to George McClellan"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/NzBXLax4NDo\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p><strong>By <a href=\"http:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\/?s=Susan+Segal&amp;submit=Go\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Susan Segal<\/a>, Understanding Lincoln, Summer 2013<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Over the course of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln had many challenges as Commander-in-Chief.\u00a0 General McClellan was one of them.\u00a0 Quite simply, McClellan, who was well trained and skilled at preparing for battle, seemed unable to put the army into action in a strategic and timely fashion.\u00a0 An example is how he lost a tremendous advantage in the days before Antietam.\u00a0 Another is McClellan&#8217;s continued unwillingness to move the troops into Virginia, across the Potomac, and on to Richmond ahead of the enemy.\u00a0 His reluctance ultimately led to his removal General of the Army of the Potomac in late 1862.<\/p>\n<p>On September 17, 1862, the Union and the Confederate Armies fought the \u201cbloodiest single day\u2019s battle of the war . . .\u00a0 at Antietam Creek\u201d (Burlingame 2008, 2: 382).\u00a0 Two days before the battle, General McClellan had fortuitously obtained General Lee\u2019s orders and had the advantage of knowing Lee\u2019s plans ahead of time\u2014a distinct advantage . Yet, he procrastinated and the Confederate army ended up uniting its forces and preparing for battle at Antietam Creek.<\/p>\n<p>Lee ended up retreating from the battlefield first and, for that reason, the Union was able to claim victory at Antietam.\u00a0 However, the battle was \u201cin effect a draw, with neither side clearly victorious\u201d (Burlingame 2008, 2: 382).\u00a0 Lee and his Confederate troops were able to retreat safely back into Virginia.<\/p>\n<p>Lincoln was clearly upset that McClellan had failed to pursue Lee, as he believed that McClellan missed a golden opportunity to strike a decisive blow to Lee\u2019s army had he aggressively followed Lee across the Potomac and attacked.\u00a0 After the battle, Lincoln met with McClellan at Antietam and offered candid criticism of McClellan\u2019s tactics.\u00a0 Despite McClellan\u2019s boasts after the battle, Lincoln considered McClellan to have failed in his mission.\u00a0 Lincoln then \u201cinstructed McClellan to advance within two weeks\u201d (Burlingame 2008, 2: 426). General Halleck followed up with an order to cross the Potomac and pursue the enemy.\u00a0 McClellan continued to procrastinate and offer reasons why the Army was not ready.\u00a0 Later, the <i>New York Times<\/i> characterized this behavior as \u201cdisobedience\u201d and noted that McClellan\u2019s reasons for not crossing the Potomac were \u201cutterly without foundation\u201d (\u201cThe Removal of Gen. McClellan\u201d 1862).<\/p>\n<div><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"landscape qtext_image zoomable_in zoomable_in_feed\" src=\"http:\/\/qph.is.quoracdn.net\/main-qimg-90568c10ba8c0470b8ebc23f46b0b0b5?convert_to_webp=true\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<p>On October 13, 1862, Lincoln wrote the following letter, in which he once again prods General McClellan to move across the Potomac and proceed to Richmond.\u00a0 This letter was \u201cone final and carefully crafted effort to reach his general and make him see reason\u201d (Sears 1994, 48).\u00a0 The letter starts out as follows:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>My dear Sir<br \/>\nYou remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you can not do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The term \u201cover cautious,\u201d is just one way that Lincoln described McClellan\u2019s recalcitrance.\u00a0 He reportedly told McClellan on his visit to Antietam a little over a week before that McClellan had a \u201cfault\u201d in his character in these.\u00a0 His strong words should have left no question in McClellan&#8217;s mind that Lincoln was displeased:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>I wish to call your attention to a fault in your character\u2014 a fault which is the sum of my observations of you, in connection with this war. You merely get yourself ready to do a good thing\u2014 no man can do that better\u2014 you make all the necessary sacrifices of blood and time, and treasure, to secure a victory, but whether from timidity, self-distrust, or some other motive inexplicable to me, you always stop short just on this side of results. (Burlingame 2008, 2:426).[1]<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>In the second part of the first paragraph of the October 13 letter, Lincoln expresses his confidence in the \u201cprowess\u201d of the Union army.\u00a0 Lincoln is stating \u201csomething he felt deeply about\u2014his belief that northerners were as good soldiers as those of the enemy, that they were just as capable of doing \u201cwhat the enemy is constantly doing\u201d (Sears 1994, 48).\u00a0\u00a0 By pointing out that the &#8220;prowess&#8221; of the Union army should be at least equal to that of the Confederacy, Lincoln is also telling McClellan that his hesitation and concerns are unwarranted.<\/p>\n<p>Lincoln then continues to compare the two armies in terms of their respective resources, strategic advantage, location, and capabilities in the next paragraph:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>As I understand, you telegraph Gen. Halleck that you can not subsist your army at Winchester unless the Railroad from Harper&#8217;s Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper C.H. which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper&#8217;s Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the Railroad from Harper&#8217;s Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you; and, in fact ignores the question of time, which can not, and must not be ignored.\u00a0 (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The last sentence refers to the fact that it was already the middle of October and winter would soon be setting in.\u00a0 General Halleck later reported that he warned McClellan of the \u201cdisadvantages of delaying till the Autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads\u201d (\u201cGeneral McClellan, Letter from Gen. Halleck to the Secretary of War Concerning Gen. McClellan&#8217;s Complaints of Lack of Supplies\u201d 1862).\u00a0 Yet, McClellan stayed put in Antietam for most of October, wasting precious time.<\/p>\n<p>Lincoln was also reminding McClellan in this paragraph that that time was of the essence in getting to Richmond before the enemy did. In fact, it was not until October 27, 1862, that McClellan finally started to cross the Potomac.\u00a0 However, before the Union army did so, Confederate troops under Jeb Stuart had \u201cagain rode a circle around the Army of the Potomac\u201d (Burlingame 2008, 2:428).\u00a0 While this action turned out to be of no military consequence, it no doubt made the Union army look weak and impotent.<\/p>\n<p>In the next paragraph, Lincoln addresses McClellan\u2019s proffered excuse that moving toward Richmond would allow the enemy to go into Pennsylvania.\u00a0 Lincoln dismisses McClellan\u2019s apprehension and points out that such a move by the enemy toward Pennsylvania could instead result in a strategic advantage for the Union army:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is &#8220;to operate upon the enemy&#8217;s communications as much as possible without exposing your own.&#8221; You seem to act as if this applies against you, but can not apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twentyfour hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow, and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon, and beat what is left behind all the easier. (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Lincoln then points out that McClellan is closer to Richmond that the enemy and could get there before the enemy.\u00a0 He also describes the advantage that the Union army has in terms of the route to Richmond.\u00a0 In the following arc versus chord description, Lincoln\u2019s \u201cimage of the two armies advancing through Virginia . . . is remarkably apt\u201d (Sears 1994, 48).<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can, and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march. His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.\u00a0 (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>In the next paragraph, Lincoln implores\u2014almost begs&#8211;McClellan to at the very least \u201c`try&#8221;; if we never try, we shall never succeed\u201d to get to Richmond before the enemy (Lincoln 1862a). He explains that even if the enemy travels northward to Winchester, Virginia, McClellan\u2019s army will still have an advantage:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below, instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemies&#8217; communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move Northward I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and, at least, try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say &#8220;try&#8221;; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither North or South, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we can not beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Lincoln continues in this paragraph to note the advantage of making the enemy come to fight the Union army away from Richmond.\u00a0 He also points out the difficulty of defeating the enemy once it is entrenched in Richmond.\u00a0 To this point, he states:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away.\u00a0 As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us, than far away. If we can not beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the entrenchments of Richmond (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>In my opinion, the following last paragraph of this letter shows Lincoln at his best as a military strategist.\u00a0 Although hesitant at the beginning of the war to overrule his generals, knowing he was unschooled in military strategy, by October of 1862, Lincoln had become skilled and knowledgeable in military tactics and principles of warfare.\u00a0 He &#8220;enunciated a clear national policy, and through trial and error evolved national and military strategies to achieve it\u201d (McPherson 2008a).\u00a0\u00a0 Just as any skilled army commander would do, in this last paragraph, Lincoln outlines, in detail, how McClellan should proceed.<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable&#8212;as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim&#8212;and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Hay-Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how turn-pikes, railroads, and finally, the Potomac by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper&#8217;s Ferry, to wit: Vestal&#8217;s five miles; Gregorie&#8217;s, thirteen, Snicker&#8217;s eighteen, Ashby&#8217;s, twenty-eight, Mannassas, thirty-eight, Chester fortyfive, and Thornton&#8217;s fiftythree. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together, for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way, you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way; if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. (Lincoln 1862a).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Lincoln, in essence, draws McClellan a verbal \u201chow to\u201d map, using terms such as \u201cdifferent spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim,\u201d\u00a0 \u201cmove directly by the chord, or on the inside, arc, and \u201chugging the Blue Ridge more closely\u201d (Lincoln 1862a).\u00a0 He gives him distances between gaps.\u00a0 He lays out a plan of action that is very clear.\u00a0 He anticipates the enemy&#8217;s reaction.\u00a0 Of course, it goes without saying that Lincoln should not have had to go to this extent in giving directions to one of his generals who had excellent credentials and training.\u00a0 However, given McClellan\u2019s history of finding reasons why not to advance toward Richmond, his procrastination, and his outright obstinacy, Lincoln obviously felt that such detailed instructions were necessary at this point.<\/p>\n<p>Then, Lincoln ends this paragraph with a parting shot that is obviously meant to bring McClellan to his senses&#8211;a verbal \u201cslap in the face\u201d&#8211; by implicating McClellan\u2019s manhood, stating, \u201cIt is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy; and it<b> is unmanly to say they can not do it<\/b> (Lincoln 1862a).\u00a0 Finally, as he had done in the past, Lincoln closes the letter with the statement that it \u201cis in no sense an order.\u201d\u00a0 However, we know that, while this may have not been an order, to do otherwise than instructed was foolish for any general and particularly for McClellan whose relationship with Lincoln was very stormy by this time.<span class=\"qlink_container\">[2]<\/span><\/p>\n<div><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"landscape qtext_image zoomable_in zoomable_in_feed\" src=\"http:\/\/qph.is.quoracdn.net\/main-qimg-5e4cb76696f52b4d55c49fdbee5e3a91?convert_to_webp=true\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<p>Two days after this letter was written, a <i>New York Times<\/i> editorial criticized McClellan\u2019s delay.\u00a0 With a headline that asked \u201cWhy Should There be Delay?,\u201d the editorial strongly urged the Army of the Potomac to get on the move.\u00a0 Addressing what was perceived to be McClellan\u2019s hesitation for fear he would carry out a less than perfect campaign with \u201cconsummate military strategy\u201d and \u201cideal warfare,\u201d the author said the following:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>[T]here are now no possible reasons for delay, except such as impugn the motives, the capacity or the courage of our leaders. It is too late for the public to accept any theories of consummate military strategy, or to put any faith in that ideal warfare supposed to be carried on without loss of life, in which the weapons are spades; too late to believe any magnificent prophecies whatever, while our forces lie immobile &#8212; wary, but not hold, too cautious to strike, timorously prudent in the face of an enemy less in numbers, ragged, half-fed and worn down by constant marching and fighting.\u00a0 (\u201cWhy Should There be Delay?\u201d 1862).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Once McClellan commenced moving the troops across the Potomac into Virginia, it took twelve days to even get to Warrenton, Virginia, which was still about one hundred miles away from Richmond.\u00a0 In comparison to the movement of Lee\u2019s troops, this was incredibly slow. As McPherson (2008b) notes:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>[I]t took the army six days to get across a river that Lee\u2019s forces had crossed in one night after Antietam. And the lumbering Army of the Potomac required another six days to move south forty miles to the vicinity of Warrenton. During those twelve days Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet\u2019s corps marched almost twice as far to take up a blocking position to the south, while Jackson\u2019s corps remained in place to threaten the Union flank. (141).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>By early November, Lincoln had had enough and decided to fire McClellan.\u00a0 When Francis\u00a0 Preston Blair, a powerful ally and friend of Lincoln tried to talk him out of replacing McClellan, Lincoln told Blair that \u201c[h]e had \u2018tried long enough to bore with an auger too dull to take hold\u2019 . . .\u00a0 He has got the \u2018slows,\u2019 Mr. Blair.\u2019\u201d (McPherson 2008b, 141).\u00a0 McClellan was relieved of his command on November 5, 1862, and replaced by General Ambrose Burnside. Whatever it was that caused McClellan\u2019s recalcitrance and hesitation, it was a fatal flaw.\u00a0 In retrospect, \u201cLincoln could do everything for [McClellan] but make him fight\u2014and in the end, that is the measure of the general. George McClellan was simply in the wrong profession\u201d (Sears1994, 50).<\/p>\n<p>On November 10, 1862, the <i>New York Times <\/i>wrote an extensive article on Lincoln\u2019s action removing McClellan, which is nothing short of a powerful condemnation of General McClellan\u2019s military performance.[3]\u00a0 The article also criticizes Lincoln (the \u201cAdministration\u201d) for not removing McClellan earlier.\u00a0 It sums up McClellan\u2019s record as follows<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>It is pretty generally understood that [McClellan\u2019s removal] is only the culmination of a systematic disregard of orders, of a steady and obstinate tardiness in the conduct of the campaign against the rebels, and of a consequent inefficiency in command, which would long ago have secured his dismissal under any Administration less timid than that which has now possession of power. The fifteen months during which he has had virtual control of the war have been utterly barren of results to the cause he has professed to serve. Few commanders in history have had such splendid opportunities, and fewer still have so ostentatiously thrown them away . . . [H]e has accomplished absolutely nothing but successful retreats from inferior forces, and the defence of the Capital at Washington, which he should have left no foe capable of menacing. The rebel armies have grown up in his presence, and by his toleration. (\u201cThe Removal of Gen. McClellan 1862).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>We will never know for sure what would have happened if McClellan had acted sooner and not dawdled in Maryland after the Battle of Antietam.\u00a0 We don\u2019t know whether the war would have ended more quickly\u00a0 and with fewer casualties.\u00a0 Professor Pinsker has pointed out in our course that he believes that Lincoln did act fairly swiftly in removing McClelland.\u00a0 In retrospect, I think I agree.\u00a0 However, at the time, McClellan\u2019s command probably seemed like a very long time to the general public and possibly some of the troops who had high hopes for his leadership in the beginning but were sorely disappointed in the end.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>[1] Lincoln\u2019s belief that McClellan excelled at preparation, but was short on follow through was shared by Lincoln\u2019s secretary, John Hay, who wrote in September of 1862 that McClellan had \u201can inherent vice of mind, often in the accompaniment of great organizing power, which makes him never ready to act.\u00a0 The whole power and energy of his nature seems to be devoted to making armies, not using them\u201d (Hay 1862, 316).\u00a0 This piece appeared in \u201can unsigned newspaper article that anonymously but intentionally expressed Lincoln\u2019s sentiments on the subject\u201d (McPherson 2008b, 139).<\/p>\n<p>[2] McClellan got another nasty letter from Lincoln on October 24, 1862, after McClellan had complained that his horses were fatigued.\u00a0 Lincoln says in that letter that he had \u201cjust read your despatch about sore tongued and fatiegued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?\u201d\u00a0 (Lincoln 1862b). Although Lincoln later apologized for this comment, I think the letter aptly conveys his mounting sentiment of anger, despair, and frustration at McClellan\u2019s inaction.<\/p>\n<p>[3] In the same edition, the paper also published General Halleck\u2019s damning report to Secretary of War Stanton, in which Halleck advised Stanton that McClellan\u2019s complaints about the lack of supplies were groundless and should not have prevented McClellan from crossing the Potomac.\u00a0 Whether this report was deliberately published at the same time as the story about McClellan\u2019s removal as a preemptive strike to mute those who supported McClellan is up for speculation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Burlingame, Michael.\u00a0 2008.\u00a0 <i>Abraham Lincoln: A Life<\/i>.\u00a0 Vol. 2. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cGeneral McClellan, Letter from Gen. Halleck to the Secretary of War Concerning Gen. McClellan&#8217;s Complaints of Lack of Supplies.\u201d\u00a0 October 28, 1862.\u00a0 <i>New York Times, <\/i>November 10, 1862.\u00a0 Accessed September, 2013.\u00a0<span class=\"qlink_container\"><a class=\"external_link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/1862\/11\/10\/news\/general-mcclellan-letter-gen-halleck-secretary-war-concerning-gen-mcclellan-s.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/18<wbr \/>62\/11\/1&#8230;<\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n<p>Hay, John.\u00a0 1862. \u201cWashington Correspondence, September 30, 1862.\u201d\u00a0 In<i>Lincoln\u2019s Journalist: John Hay\u2019s Anonymous Writings for the Press, 1860-1864, <\/i>edited by Michael Burlingame, 314-316.\u00a0 Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.\u00a0 1998.<\/p>\n<p><i>&#8212;. <\/i>1862a<i>. \u201c<\/i>Abraham Lincoln to George Brinton McClellan, October 13, 1862.\u201d\u00a0<i>Lincoln\u2019s Writings, <\/i><span class=\"qlink_container\"><a class=\"external_link\" href=\"http:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener noreferrer\"><i><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">The Multi-Media Edition<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/span><i>.<\/i><\/p>\n<p>&#8212;.\u00a0 1862b. \u201cAbraham Lincoln to George McClellan, October 24 [25], 1862.\u201d\u00a0<i>Lincoln\u2019s Writings, <\/i><span class=\"qlink_container\"><a class=\"external_link\" href=\"http:\/\/housedivided.dickinson.edu\/sites\/lincoln\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener noreferrer\"><i><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">The Multi-Media Edition<\/span><\/i><\/a><\/span><i>.<\/i><br \/>\n<i><\/i><br \/>\nMcPherson, James.\u00a0 2008a. \u201cLincoln as Commander in Chief.\u201d\u00a0 Lecture presented at Abraham Lincoln in His Time and Ours: A Symposium, Columbia University.\u00a0 November 22, 2008.\u00a0 <i>Gilder Lehrman Institute.<\/i><span class=\"qlink_container\"><a class=\"external_link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.gilderlehrman.org\/multimedia#3275\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/www.gilderlehrman.<wbr \/>org\/mul&#8230;<\/a><\/span>.<br \/>\nMcPherson, James.\u00a0 2008b. <i>Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief. <\/i>New York: Penguin Books.<\/p>\n<p>Sears, Stephen.\u00a0 \u201cLincoln and McClellan.\u201d\u00a0 In <i>Lincoln\u2019s Generals<\/i>, edited by Gabor Boritt, 2-50.\u00a0 Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.\u00a0 1994.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe Removal of Gen. McClellan.\u201d\u00a0 1862.\u00a0 <i>New York Times<\/i>. November 10, 1862.\u00a0 Accessed September 28, 2013.\u00a0 <span class=\"qlink_container\"><a class=\"external_link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/1862\/11\/10\/news\/the-removal-of-gen-mcclellan.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/18<wbr \/>62\/11\/1&#8230;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhy Should There be Delay?\u201d\u00a0 1862.\u00a0 <i>New York Times<\/i>.\u00a0 October 19, 1862.\u00a0 Accessed September 2, 2013.<br \/>\n<span class=\"qlink_container\"><a class=\"external_link\" href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/1862\/10\/19\/news\/why-should-there-be-delay.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/18<wbr \/>62\/10\/1&#8230;<\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Susan Segal, Understanding Lincoln, Summer 2013 Over the course of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln had many challenges as Commander-in-Chief.\u00a0 General McClellan was one of them.\u00a0 Quite simply, McClellan, who was well trained and skilled at preparing for battle, seemed unable to put the army into action in a strategic and timely fashion.\u00a0 An [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":373,"featured_media":0,"parent":440,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-505","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/505","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/373"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=505"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/505\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/440"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=505"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}