{"id":540,"date":"2015-04-28T11:21:44","date_gmt":"2015-04-28T11:21:44","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/?p=540"},"modified":"2020-03-25T13:57:02","modified_gmt":"2020-03-25T13:57:02","slug":"lincolns-response-for-sewards-consideration","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/2015\/04\/28\/lincolns-response-for-sewards-consideration\/","title":{"rendered":"Lincoln&#8217;s Response for Seward&#8217;s Consideration"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/-rre51iDUyA\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_541\" style=\"width: 160px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/12241\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-541\" class=\"wp-image-541 size-thumbnail\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_sewardWH-150x150.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-541\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of William Henry Seward courtesy of the House Divided Project<\/p><\/div>\n<p><strong>By Moyra Schauffler<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>No Secretary of State, or cabinet member, <em>had<\/em> ever or <em>has<\/em> ever submitted a document quite like <a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/6557\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">William Henry Seward&#8217;s<\/a> <a href=\"http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/r?ammem\/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d0866000))\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">April Fool&#8217;s Day Memorandum<\/a>\u00a0entitled &#8220;Some thoughts for the President&#8217;s consideration&#8221;. [1] \u00a0The document was both critical and presumptuous with its assessment of Abraham Lincoln&#8217;s first month in office and its list of recommendations that Seward believed would better serve the country in the midst of the\u00a0secession crisis. \u00a0However, the seemingly void-of-potential President, successfully shut down Seward&#8217;s propositions on the same day he received the letter, with an eloquent but firm <a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/40441\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">response<\/a> that provides a snapshot of Lincoln&#8217;s firm grasp of his role as president. \u00a0Although Lincoln wrote his response to Seward, he in fact read it aloud, which surely gave clear emphasis on Lincoln&#8217;s assertion that <em>he<\/em> alone made the policy of the United States and that if <em>he<\/em> felt the need to do so, could seek the advice of the cabinet, but that the cabinet could not do this job for him. [2]<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_592\" style=\"width: 208px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><a href=\"http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/ampage?collId=mal&amp;fileName=mal1\/086\/0866000\/malpage.db&amp;recNum=0&amp;tempFile=.\/temp\/~ammem_v0Oy&amp;filecode=mal&amp;next_filecode=mal&amp;prev_filecode=mal&amp;itemnum=6&amp;ndocs=100\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-592\" class=\"wp-image-592 size-medium\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/001-1-198x300.gif\" alt=\"\" width=\"198\" height=\"300\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-592\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of Seward&#8217;s memo courtesy of The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress<\/p><\/div>\n<p>At this point in the build-up to the Civil War, Seward was dissatisfied by the trajectory &#8211; or lack thereof &#8211; of the President&#8217;s domestic and foreign policies. Seward&#8217;s frustration primarily lay in the fact that he\u00a0maintained a deep belief that he would have been a better president than Lincoln. [3] \u00a0However, he also had &#8220;dominated the Republicans&#8217; response to the [secession] crisis&#8230;&#8221; and now, &#8220;suddenly found himself left in the&#8230;impossible position of advocating&#8230;a minority view [within the cabinet].&#8221; [4] Seward&#8217;s recommendations throughout the memo provide insight on his personal opinion and frustration with the President&#8217;s first month in office. He concluded\u00a0the memo by stating\u00a0the importance of asserting these policies,\u00a0and that the President should either pursue these changes on his own, or bestow the responsibility to one of his cabinet members. [5]<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_593\" style=\"width: 266px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/P?mal:4:.\/temp\/~ammem_Mxu8::\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-593\" class=\"wp-image-593 size-medium\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/001-256x300.gif\" alt=\"\" width=\"256\" height=\"300\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-593\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of Lincoln&#8217;s response courtesy of The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress<\/p><\/div>\n<p>Throughout his response, Lincoln methodically picked\u00a0apart each of Seward&#8217;s complaints and recommendations. He did\u00a0this by quoting\u00a0Seward&#8217;s original letter and then offering a rebuttal to the Secretary of State&#8217;s proposition. \u00a0For example, Lincoln wrote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The first proposition in <em>[your memorandum]<\/em> is, &#8220;1st. We are at the end of a month&#8217;s administration, and yet without policy, either domestic or foreign.&#8221; <em>[6]<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div id=\"attachment_637\" style=\"width: 160px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/35115\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-637\" class=\"wp-image-637 size-thumbnail\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_FortSumterApril1861nara.preview-150x150.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-637\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of Fort Sumter in April 1861 courtesy of The House Divided Project<\/p><\/div>\n<p>He then asserted that throughout the first month of the administration, that he created policies, which he believed\u00a0Seward approved. In this section the domestic policy described by Lincoln and Seward is the controversial issue of Federal forts\u00a0in Southern territory. \u00a0Leading up to April 1861, both <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nps.gov\/fosu\/index.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Fort Sumter<\/a> in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nps.gov\/guis\/planyourvisit\/fort-pickens.htm\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Fort Pickens<\/a> on Santa Rosa Island, Florida occupied the leaders&#8217; attention. \u00a0Although Seward and Lincoln\u00a0agreed that a civil war should be avoided, the two did not agree on the course of action regarding Federal control of the forts. \u00a0In his memo, Seward stated that he wanted to transfer control of Sumter to South Carolina\u00a0in order to appease the Carolinians and change the focus of the rapidly approaching war from a question of slavery and party politics to a question of &#8220;Union or Disunion&#8221;. Seward then wrote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and reinforce all Forts in the Gulf, and have the Navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade&#8230;I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div id=\"attachment_638\" style=\"width: 160px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/35315\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-638\" class=\"wp-image-638 size-thumbnail\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_FortPickens1861.preview-150x150.jpg\" alt=\"HD_FortPickens1861.preview\" width=\"150\" height=\"150\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-638\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of Fort Pickens courtesy of The House Divided Project<\/p><\/div>\n<p>Lincoln did not agree with\u00a0Seward&#8217;s hypocritical policy of giving up one fort but keeping control of the rest. \u00a0Lincoln believed that refusing to give <em>all<\/em>\u00a0Federal forts in Southern territory to the belligerents and\u00a0then reinforcing them with adequate supplies was the best course of action. \u00a0In his letter to Seward, Lincoln recalled his <a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/40350\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">inaugural speech<\/a>\u00a0on March 4th, in which he stated he would, &#8220;&#8230;hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government&#8230;&#8221; He then wrote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8230;I do not perceive how the re-inforcement of Fort Sumpter would be done on a slavery, or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national, and patriotic one.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In the end, Lincoln employed both secret and public efforts\u00a0to re-supply Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens in order to maintain Federal control and keep the Confederates at bay. \u00a0According to James McPherson, Seward&#8217;s efforts prior to his April 1st letter, such as diverting, &#8220;the strongest available warship from the Sumter expedition&#8221; were unsuccessful in fulfilling his desire to prevent war by appeasing the belligerents. [7] \u00a0Ultimately the North was unable to hold Fort Sumter and\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/4986\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Major General Robert Anderson<\/a> surrendered the fort on April 14th, 1861 after thirty-three hours of Confederate shelling. [8] The second section of the memo complemented Seward&#8217;s goals to prevent civil war through appeasement by starting war with Europe as a way to unite the country under one flag.<\/p>\n<p>Seward&#8217;s original letter to Lincoln begins the section regarding foreign policy with the title &#8220;For Foreign Nations&#8221;. \u00a0Throughout this portion, Seward named several different ways he wished to prevent a war between the states and instead, start a war with the major European powers. \u00a0Seward wrote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I would demand explanations from Spain and France&#8230;I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America, to rouse vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. And if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, Would convene Congress and declare war against them.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div id=\"attachment_710\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignleft\"><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/30017\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-710\" class=\"wp-image-710 size-medium\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_WestIndies1857z.preview-300x197.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"197\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_WestIndies1857z.preview-300x197.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_WestIndies1857z.preview.jpg 640w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-710\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of the West Indies circa 1857 courtesy of The House Divided Project<\/p><\/div>\n<p>This list of Seward&#8217;s policy recommendations surrounds the Spanish annexation of <a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/41705\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Santo Domingo<\/a> &#8211; modern day Dominican Republic &#8211; that occurred on March 18, 1861. \u00a0Walter\u00a0Stahr offers helpful explanations for why Seward named the European powers he did, and why they might have been a target for a war with the United States. \u00a0According to Stahr, Seward was apprehensive\u00a0of the annexation because Spain directly violated the 1823\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/history.state.gov\/milestones\/1801-1829\/monroe\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Monroe Doctrine<\/a>, and the United States needed to respond accordingly in order to protect hemispheric security. \u00a0In the case of France, Seward likely referred to\u00a0French interest in Mexico or a plan to annex Haiti, which would have been another violation of the Monroe Doctrine. [9] \u00a0Stahr speculates that the animosity towards Britain may be connected to the &#8220;possibility&#8221;\u00a0that the country would admit the sovereignty of the Confederacy to ensure continued cotton imports. [10] \u00a0Finally, Stahr explains that the reason behind Seward&#8217;s call to &#8220;seek explanations&#8221; from Russia is largely unknown. \u00a0One story is that, according to his son, <a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/6555\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Frederick Seward<\/a>, his father\u00a0referred\u00a0to the possibility of Russia recognizing the Confederacy, but there are no primary source documents that attest to this theory. [11]<\/p>\n<p>Lincoln&#8217;s response to Seward&#8217;s demands to start war with Europe in order to unite the country speaks for itself. \u00a0The president completely ignored the suggestions to &#8220;seek explanations&#8221; from Spain, France, Britain, and Russia, and did not authorize agents to go to Canada, Mexico, and Central America for the purpose of rousing &#8220;vigorous continental spirit&#8221;. \u00a0Instead, all Lincoln wrote in his response was:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo, certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to this point we have been preparing circulars, and instructions to ministers, and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In this section, Lincoln explained to Seward\u00a0that he had not had the time to come up with a specific foreign policy for the ongoing crisis in Santo Domingo. He also emphasized that\u00a0throughout the month when he and the Secretary of State discussed similar policy matters and &#8220;gave instructions to ministers&#8221;, there was no sign that Seward believed the administration &#8220;had no foreign policy&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>The most significant aspect of Abraham Lincoln&#8217;s response to\u00a0William Seward&#8217;s memo\u00a0lies at the end of the document when Lincoln affirms his role as Commander and Chief. \u00a0Following the rebuttal to the accusation that the administration lacked a coherent foreign policy, the President quoted the last portion of Seward&#8217;s memo:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Whatever foreign policy we adopt there must be energetic prosecution of it. For this purpose it must be somebody&#8217;s business to pursue and direct it incessantly. Either the President must do it himself&#8230;or Devolve it on some member of his cabinet.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Lincoln&#8217;s negative response to the\u00a0suggestion of a cabinet member taking control of creating American domestic and foreign policy showed the President&#8217;s opinion of\u00a0his role and the role of his cabinet. He wrote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress, I wish, and supposed I am entitled to have the advice of all the cabinet.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div id=\"attachment_712\" style=\"width: 310px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/32709\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-712\" class=\"wp-image-712 size-medium\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_LincolnCabinet1861.preview-300x223.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"223\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_LincolnCabinet1861.preview-300x223.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/files\/2015\/03\/HD_LincolnCabinet1861.preview.jpg 640w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-712\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Image of Lincoln and his cabinet with General Scott in 1861 courtesy of The House Divided Project<\/p><\/div>\n<p>The emphasis on Lincoln&#8217;s responsibility to authorize\u00a0the domestic and foreign policy of the United States is the most important part of his response. \u00a0After a hectic few weeks in office during which the President exhibited a certain lack of &#8220;executive abilities&#8221;, Lincoln successfully asserted himself within his own administration and set the tone for the remainder of his time in office. [12]<\/p>\n<p>Scholars ultimately disagree over the importance of Lincoln&#8217;s response to Seward&#8217;s, &#8220;Some thoughts for the President&#8217;s consideration&#8221;. \u00a0According to Adam Goodheart, the letter to Seward on April 1st constituted a significant\u00a0turning point in the beginning of Lincoln&#8217;s time in office. \u00a0Goodheart writes that although Seward&#8217;s memo was &#8220;insulting&#8221;, it lifted the President out of the &#8220;funk&#8221; he was trapped in during\u00a0the days prior to April 1st. \u00a0The author goes on to emphasize how important that, &#8220;the upstart lawyer from Illinois, had now bid defiance to&#8230;the nation&#8217;s most powerful&#8230;politician&#8221; was. [13] \u00a0Finally, Goodheart argues that the\u00a0response was a turning point because Lincoln realized that his cabinet was unable to provide the right answers to the biggest questions that faced his administration, and that although they were available to help, &#8220;The path ahead would be his alone.&#8221; [14]<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, Michael Burlingame describes the exchange in his work\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.knox.edu\/about-knox\/lincoln-studies-center\/burlingame-abraham-lincoln-a-life\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"><em>Abraham Lincoln: A Life<\/em><\/a> as just one of many examples of Seward&#8217;s attempts to strong-arm the President. \u00a0Burlingame cites actions by Seward after his conversation on April 1st that demonstrate how Lincoln&#8217;s words failed to change the Secretary of State&#8217;s ambitions. [15] \u00a0For example, Burlingame explains that two days after Lincoln refused to accept his policy recommendations, Seward &#8211; clearly peeved\u00a0that the administration had not changed its domestic and foreign policies &#8211; informed\u00a0<em>The New York\u00a0Times\u00a0<\/em>about his recommendations, and the newspaper ran an editorial entitled <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/1861\/04\/03\/news\/wanted-a-policy.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">&#8220;Wanted &#8211; A Policy&#8221;<\/a>. [16] \u00a0The editorial reinforces Seward&#8217;s criticisms of Lincoln&#8217;s approach to policy making and demonstrates the Secretary of State&#8217;s opinions remained unchanged after the April 1st meeting. \u00a0Ultimately, by continuing to try to undermine the President through public printing of policy recommendations and accusations, Seward demonstrated he had learned little from Lincoln&#8217;s firm response to the April 1st memorandum. This viewpoint\u00a0on the importance of the exchange between Seward and Lincoln outlines the complexity of the relationship between the two, but also bolsters\u00a0the importance of both documents as a snapshot of the mechanics\u00a0of the\u00a0Lincoln administration&#8217;s first month in office.<\/p>\n<p>There is no documentation that describes Seward&#8217;s reaction to Lincoln&#8217;s oral response to the\u00a0memorandum. [17] \u00a0Seward was likely shocked because he had been so sure of the Lincoln&#8217;s approval of his suggestions that he called\u00a0<em>The New York Times<\/em>&#8216; editor-in-chief, <a href=\"http:\/\/hd.housedivided.dickinson.edu\/node\/20575\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Henry Jarvis Raymond<\/a>, to Washington to be able to immediately telegraph the news of Lincoln&#8217;s approval of Seward&#8217;s policies. [18] \u00a0Unfortunately for Seward &#8211; and Raymond, who had no big story to report &#8211; the President refused his policy recommendations and assured the Secretary of State that he could handle the policy-making. On April 1, 1861,\u00a0Lincoln clearly made his point because Seward eventually backed down. \u00a0Although\u00a0the President and the Secretary of State maintained their own strong opinions,\u00a0throughout their time in office, they were able to work closely together and had a strong trust in one another that allowed them to successfully maneuver the country through the Civil War.<\/p>\n<p>Works Cited<\/p>\n<p>[1] Lawrence M. Denton,\u00a0<em>William Henry Seward and the Secession Crisis<\/em>, North Carolina: McFarland and Company (2009), 140.<\/p>\n<p>[2] Geoffrey Perret,\u00a0<em>Lincoln&#8217;s War<\/em>, New York: Random House (2004), 23-24.<\/p>\n<p>[3] Perret,\u00a0<em>Lincoln&#8217;s War<\/em>, 13.<\/p>\n<p>[4] Adam Goodheart,\u00a0<em>1861<\/em>, New York: Alfred A. Knope\u00a0(2011), 158.<\/p>\n<p>[5] William Henry Seward, &#8220;Some thoughts for the President&#8217;s consideration,&#8221; The Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, April 1, 1861,\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/r?ammem\/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d0866000))\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/r?ammem\/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d0866000))<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>[6] Abraham Lincoln to William Seward, The Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, April 1, 1861,\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/r?ammem\/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d0860800))\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/memory.loc.gov\/cgi-bin\/query\/r?ammem\/mal:@field(DOCID+@lit(d0860800))<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>[7] James McPherson,\u00a0<em>Battle Cry of Freedom<\/em>, New York: Oxford (1998), 270.<\/p>\n<p>[8] McPherson,\u00a0<em>Battle Cry of Freedom,\u00a0<\/em>270.<\/p>\n<p>[9] Walter Stahr,\u00a0<em>Seward<\/em>, New York: Simon &amp; Schuster (2012), 271.<\/p>\n<p>[10] Stahr,\u00a0<em>Seward<\/em>, 271.<\/p>\n<p>[11] Stahr,\u00a0<em>Seward<\/em>, 272.<\/p>\n<p>[12] Stahr,\u00a0<em>Seward<\/em>, 272.<\/p>\n<p>[13] Goodheart,\u00a0<em>1861<\/em>, 159.<\/p>\n<p>[14] Goodheart,\u00a0<em>1861<\/em>, 159.<\/p>\n<p>[15] Burlingame, Michael,\u00a0<em>Abraham Lincoln: A Life<\/em>, Johns Hopkins University Press (2008),\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.knox.edu\/about-knox\/lincoln-studies-center\/burlingame-abraham-lincoln-a-life\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">http:\/\/www.knox.edu\/about-knox\/lincoln-studies-center\/burlingame-abraham-lincoln-a-life<\/a>, 2376.<\/p>\n<p>[16] Burlingame, <i>Abraham Lincoln: A Life<\/i>, 2380-2381.<\/p>\n<p>[17] Stahr,\u00a0<em>Seward<\/em>, 273.<\/p>\n<p>[18] Goodheart,\u00a0<em>1861<\/em>, 158.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Moyra Schauffler No Secretary of State, or cabinet member, had ever or has ever submitted a document quite like William Henry Seward&#8217;s April Fool&#8217;s Day Memorandum\u00a0entitled &#8220;Some thoughts for the President&#8217;s consideration&#8221;. [1] \u00a0The document was both critical and presumptuous with its assessment of Abraham Lincoln&#8217;s first month in office and its list of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1427,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-540","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/540","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1427"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=540"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/540\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=540"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=540"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-288pinsker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=540"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}