{"id":135,"date":"2024-01-19T22:26:33","date_gmt":"2024-01-19T22:26:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/?page_id=135"},"modified":"2024-03-19T14:20:49","modified_gmt":"2024-03-19T14:20:49","slug":"new-look","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/course-syllabus\/new-look\/","title":{"rendered":"New Look"},"content":{"rendered":"<blockquote>\n<h2>How did the Eisenhower-Dulles &#8220;New Look&#8221; policy change the US approach to the Cold War?<\/h2>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Chapter outline<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I.\u00a0 Eisenhower&#8217;s perspective<\/p>\n<p>II.\u00a0 Dulles&#8217;s perspective<\/p>\n<p>III.\u00a0 The New Look (1953-61)<\/p>\n<p>IV.\u00a0 Communication Problems<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>The GOP Foreign Policy Landscape<\/h2>\n<div id=\"attachment_369\" style=\"width: 639px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-369\" class=\"size-large wp-image-369\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-1024x425.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"629\" height=\"261\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-1024x425.png 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-300x125.png 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-768x319.png 768w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-1536x638.png 1536w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-900x374.png 900w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM-1280x532.png 1280w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/files\/2024\/03\/Screen-Shot-2024-03-19-at-10.19.23-AM.png 1594w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 629px) 100vw, 629px\" \/><\/a><p id=\"caption-attachment-369\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">L to R: Eisenhower, Dulles, Taft<\/p><\/div>\n<ul>\n<li>President Dwight Eisenhower<\/li>\n<li>Secretary of State John Foster Dulles<\/li>\n<li>Senator Robert Taft<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Defining the New Look (1953-61)<\/h2>\n<p><em>Operation Solarium (1953) and move from symmetry to asymmetry<\/em><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Nuclear deterrence\n<ul>\n<li>&#8220;Massive retaliation&#8221; and &#8220;brinkmanship&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>Conventional vs. nuclear weapons<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Alliances\n<ul>\n<li>Multilateralism and unilateralism<\/li>\n<li>NATO (1949-55), SEATO (1954), CENTO (1955)<\/li>\n<li>Neutrality or non-aligned nations (Bandung Conference, 1955)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Psychological warfare\n<ul>\n<li>&#8220;Liberation&#8221; and &#8220;rollback&#8221; and &#8220;Open Skies&#8221;<\/li>\n<li>Propaganda (Voice of America)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Covert operations\n<ul>\n<li>Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954)<\/li>\n<li>Other CIA actions<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Negotiations\n<ul>\n<li>Death of Stalin (1953) and return of summit diplomacy<\/li>\n<li>Geneva (1955), Camp David (1959), Paris (1960)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Debating Eisenhower&#8217;s Legacy<\/h2>\n<p>How should historians interpret President Dwight Eisenhower&#8217;s now-famous farewell address (January 1961), which invoked a warning about the rising &#8220;military-industrial complex&#8221;?<\/p>\n<p><strong>From National Archives:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/Gg-jvHynP9Y\" width=\"420\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p><strong>From New York Times:<\/strong><br \/>\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/9QXjBVC233s?si=MFrfS2VljNSa5HTv\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>How did the Eisenhower-Dulles &#8220;New Look&#8221; policy change the US approach to the Cold War? Chapter outline I.\u00a0 Eisenhower&#8217;s perspective II.\u00a0 Dulles&#8217;s perspective III.\u00a0 The New Look (1953-61) IV.\u00a0 Communication Problems The GOP Foreign Policy Landscape President Dwight Eisenhower Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Senator Robert Taft Defining the New Look (1953-61) Operation Solarium [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":373,"featured_media":0,"parent":21,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-135","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/135","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/373"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=135"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/135\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/21"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=135"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}