{"id":86,"date":"2024-01-19T16:32:22","date_gmt":"2024-01-19T16:32:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/?page_id=86"},"modified":"2024-02-07T15:54:08","modified_gmt":"2024-02-07T15:54:08","slug":"origins-of-containment","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/course-syllabus\/origins-of-containment\/","title":{"rendered":"Origins of Containment"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Gaddis, Chapter 1:\u00a0 Containment Before Kennan, in <em>Strategies of Containment\u00a0<\/em>(1982)<\/strong><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>What Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and their advisers sought was a way to win the war without compromising the objectives for which it was being fought.\u00a0 It was out of their successive failures to square that circle that Kennan&#8217;s concept of &#8216;containment&#8217; eventually emerged. (p. 4)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Chapter outline<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I.\u00a0 Containment by exhaustion?<\/p>\n<p>II.\u00a0 Containment by integration?<\/p>\n<p>III.\u00a0 Containment by bargaining (quid pro quo)?<\/p>\n<p>IV.\u00a0 Kennan&#8217;s answer: Long Telegram<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Directory of American WWII Statesmen<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>William Bullitt &#8211;former ambassador to USSR<\/li>\n<li>James Byrnes. &#8211;Secretary of State (1945-47)<\/li>\n<li>John Deane &#8211;US general in Moscow<\/li>\n<li>Averell Harriman &#8211;US ambassador in Moscow<\/li>\n<li>Harry Hopkins &#8211;advisor to FDR<\/li>\n<li>George Marshall &#8211;US general, chief of staff<\/li>\n<li><strong>Franklin Delano Roosevelt<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>Henry Stimson &#8211;Secretary of War<\/li>\n<li><strong>Harry Truman<\/strong><\/li>\n<li>Henry Wallace &#8211;Vice President (1941-45)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<p><strong>Glossary of WWII Statecraft<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Arsenal of Democracy<\/li>\n<li>Atlantic Charter<\/li>\n<li>Collective security<\/li>\n<li>Faustian bargain<\/li>\n<li>Four policemen<\/li>\n<li>Lend Lease<\/li>\n<li>Linkage<\/li>\n<li>Quid pro quo<\/li>\n<li>Red Army<\/li>\n<li>Spheres of influence<\/li>\n<li>Summit diplomacy<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr \/>\n<h2><strong>CASE\u00a0 STUDY:\u00a0 Yalta<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-large wp-image-4046\" src=\"http:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM-1024x774.png\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 940px) 100vw, 940px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM-1024x774.png 1024w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM-300x227.png 300w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM-768x580.png 768w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM-1536x1160.png 1536w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM-397x300.png 397w, https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-282pinsker\/files\/2020\/10\/Screen-Shot-2020-10-15-at-8.48.57-AM.png 2044w\" alt=\"FDR Yalta\" width=\"940\" height=\"711\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Discussion Question<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>How might different schools of historical interpretation (traditional, revisionist, or post-revisionist) disagree over how to characterize American strategy at Yalta?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\u201c<strong>At Tehran in 1943,<\/strong>\u00a0Roosevelt and Churchill convinced Stalin to send a Soviet delegation to a conference at Dumbarton Oaks, in the Georgetown neighborhood of Washington, D.C., in August 1944, where they agreed on the basic structure of the new organization. It would have a Security Council\u2014the original Four Policemen, plus France\u2014which would consult on how best to keep the peace and when to deploy the military power of the assembled nations. According to one historian, the organization demonstrated an understanding that \u201conly the Great Powers, working together, could provide real security.\u201d But the plan was a kind of hybrid between Roosevelt\u2019s policemen idea and a global organization of equal representation. There would also be a General Assembly, made up of all nations; an International Court of Justice; and a council for economic and social matters. Dumbarton Oaks was a mixed success\u2014the Soviets especially expressed concern over how the Security Council would work\u2014but the powers agreed to meet again in San Francisco between April and June 1945 for further negotiations. There, on June 26, 1945, fifty nations signed the UN charter\u2026. German counterattacks in the east failed to dislodge the Soviet advance, destroying any last chance Germany might have had to regain the initiative. 1945 dawned with the end of European war in sight.\u00a0<strong>The Big Three met again at Yalta<\/strong>\u00a0[in February 1945] in the Soviet Union, where they reaffirmed the demand for Hitler\u2019s unconditional surrender and began to plan for postwar Europe. The Soviet Union reached Germany in January, and the Americans crossed the Rhine in March. In late April American and Soviet troops met at the Elbe while the Soviets pushed relentlessly by Stalin to reach Berlin first and took the capital city in May, days after Hitler and his high command had died by suicide in a city bunker. Germany was conquered. The European war was over.\u00a0<strong>Allied leaders met again, this time at Potsdam, Germany,<\/strong>\u00a0[in July 1945] where it was decided that Germany would be divided into pieces according to current Allied occupation, with Berlin likewise divided, pending future elections. Stalin also agreed to join the fight against Japan in approximately three months.\u201d \u2013<a href=\"https:\/\/www.americanyawp.com\/text\/24-world-war-ii\/\">American Yawp<\/a><\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/v3m4SU4APCM\" width=\"560\" height=\"315\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\" data-origwidth=\"560\" data-origheight=\"315\" data-mce-fragment=\"1\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Gaddis, Chapter 1:\u00a0 Containment Before Kennan, in Strategies of Containment\u00a0(1982) What Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and their advisers sought was a way to win the war without compromising the objectives for which it was being fought.\u00a0 It was out of their successive failures to square that circle that Kennan&#8217;s concept of &#8216;containment&#8217; eventually emerged. (p. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":373,"featured_media":0,"parent":21,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-86","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/86","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/373"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=86"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/86\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/21"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.dickinson.edu\/hist-coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=86"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}