

INDIA

MILITARY SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA

[Effected by exchange of notes signed March 30, May 25, July 3, and September 30, 1942. For texts of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 308, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1912.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA REGARDING JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY MEM- BERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN INDIA

[Effected by exchange of notes signed September 29 and October 10, 1942. For texts of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 392, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1199.]

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE SITUATION IN INDIA¹

I. Decision To Send American Technical Mission to India; Appointment of Colonel Louis Johnson as Personal Representative of the President

845.00/1263½

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to
the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1941.

MR. SECRETARY: The Diplomatic Agent of the Indian Empire² has taken up with me the Report on India's War Effort, recently issued by the Indian Government.

This report traces the steps taken by India to increase her fighting forces and her services of supply; but it forecasts steps needed to increase still further and in greater volume her actual ability to resist the enemy and to supply forces for fighting the common enemy in the Near Eastern and Far Eastern areas.

The report makes it plain that any considerable increase of India's war effort is dependent in considerable degree upon the United States;

¹ For previous correspondence concerning India, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 170 ff.

² Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Agent General for India.

and the object of Sir Girja in taking it up was to ascertain whether the Government of the United States could be of active assistance in developing the added fighting resources of India.

The report says, among other things, that "she (India) relies and will continue to rely upon the United Kingdom and the United States of America for some key items of supply, but she has modernized and expanded her ordnance factories."

It is also stated "she (India) looks first and always to her sisters of the eastern group—South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the smaller countries of the group, but they too are, for the main part, countries in which industrial enterprise is still young, and the whole group must go further afield for many of its needs. There is now a steady flow of the more modern types of equipment from the United Kingdom, but the releases have never been and cannot be equalled to India's needs; which can, in fact, only be met by participation in the generous flow of help from the United States of America."

The program set out in the report contemplates raising 124 Indian infantry battalions, raising the total strength of the Indian Army to approximately one and one-half million men. It is suggested that this might be increased. The potential effect of an army of that size in the Far East is obvious; and the value of Indian fighting troops is attested both by the history of the last war, and by the very great part which Indian troops have played in the fighting in the Middle East in the present war.

The limiting factors are stated as being:

- (1) A shortage of officer material—which is, of course, a strictly Indian and British problem;
- (2) A shortage of medical officers—and the report adds that it is very doubtful whether this shortage can be made up from the United Kingdom or British Empire resources;
- (3) A shortage of matériel listed in Appendix III of the report;
- (4) A shortage of instructional staff and trainer equipment for the air force; and
- (5) Shortages of non-ferrous metals, notably, tin, lead, zinc, tungsten and of aluminum manufactures.

She likewise needs certain general engineering stores, notably, generating sets and motors and machine tools. Her motor vehicles have been procured entirely from the United States.

It seems obvious that for a considerable period of time transport from the United States to the Far East will be limited, difficult and dangerous. Anything which can be produced in the Far East is, therefore, far more advantageous to the common effort than material manufactured here which must abide the hazards of transport.

If, by technical assistance in India, plus limited quantities of machine tools and parts, the strength of the Indian Army can be con-

siderably increased, we will effect a considerable economy in the war effort, will make more effective use of Indian man power, and will be building up a defensive and offensive striking power in a region where it is vitally necessary.

I propose accordingly:

(1) That we send a capable representative to India, preferably someone chosen by OPM^a and Lend Lease, qualified to make a rapid survey of the possibility of increasing Indian supply along the lines indicated in the report on India's War Effort;

(2) That he be directed to report by cable through our diplomatic agent as to the type of assistance which would best contribute to India's ability to equip herself and the best method of localizing and planning the work;

(3) That through OPM, Lend Lease and ourselves we thereupon facilitate the execution of any plan agreed on between the British and ourselves as a result of the survey.

It would be advisable to take the matter up in London prior to attempting any steps in this direction.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

845.24/314

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1942.

While calling on another matter, the Agent General of India, inquired whether any further thought had been given to the informal proposal that a small American mission consisting of two or three experts be sent to India to investigate and report on the economic situation and India's part in the war. I said that there had been some informal discussions of the matter in the Department and that these discussions were still going forward although no definite decision had been reached.

The Agent General said that he would like to point out certain aspects of the situation in India and the Far East which he thought merited the most serious consideration at this time. He stated that China had undoubtedly put up splendid resistance to Japanese aggression and that the Chinese soldiers were brave and effective fighters as individuals. It was obvious, however, that they were not well equipped and that with communications as they were at present it would be very difficult if not impossible to furnish them with equipment which would enable them to cope with the Japanese menace. In this connection he wished to stress particularly the lack of outside

^a Office of Production Management.

communications with China and the poorly developed system of communications within the country.

On the other hand, the Agent General said he wished to stress the accessibility of India as compared to China and the highly developed system of communications within the country. I believe he mentioned that India had approximately 64,000 miles of railways. He said that at the present time India had under arms approximately one million men of whom a quarter were serving outside the borders of India, in Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Malay. It was his definite feeling that there was almost unlimited manpower in India which could be used provided proper equipment was forthcoming. At this point he mentioned that he had just had a communication from his old friend Sir Claude Auchinleck⁴ stating that in the recent Libyan campaign Indian troops had done splendid work in the tank corps. The Agent General cited this as a proof of the ability of the Indians to handle the modern weapons.

Sir Girja Shankar said that he thought it impossible to overestimate the importance of the attempt being made to develop the military power of India. Obviously in existing circumstances such assistance as could be given would have to come in large part from the United States. He explained that India already has a steel production well over a million tons a year and that this could be considerably increased. Of the 60,000 items required in modern warfare India itself was now producing 85 percent of the individual items. What they lacked was production in the heavier armament such as tanks and airplanes. They could pretty well take care of themselves in small arms, machine-guns and small arms ammunition.

In these circumstances Sir Girja Shankar urged the desirability of sending a small mission to India to investigate and report upon the possibility of American help being given toward increasing and strengthening Indian armed forces. He said that he had already discussed the matter quite informally at a meeting of the British Supply Council here in Washington and that he had had no unfavorable reaction although he could not go so far as to say that the proposal met with the approval of the British. However, he could not see why the British would object as long as such proposal, if adopted, could only strengthen their position in the Far East.

Sir Girja Shankar also said that he had sounded out informally the head of the Department concerned in the Indian Government and he could assure us of the approval of that official although that did not of course indicate final approval by the Indian Government.

The Agent General went on to say that he had observed in this morning's newspaper that a Dutch representative had recently been

⁴ British Commander in Chief in the Middle East.

appointed to the Eastern Group Supply Council. This Council, whose seat was in New Delhi (and during the summer months at Simla) had formerly been composed only of representatives from British territories in the Pacific area. Sir Girja Shankar thought that one of the possibilities which any American mission to India might explore would be the possibility of having an American representative sit on the Eastern Group Supply Council. I asked the Agent General what he had in mind as to the composition of such a mission as he had suggested. Did he have in mind as the head of such a mission some person of economic and foreign experience, such, for example, as Mr. Henry Grady? ⁵ He said that he knew Mr. Grady, who had recently visited India, and that he was certainly the type of person whom he would have in mind to head such a mission. He thought, however, that Mr. Grady should be assisted by an Army officer and by one Air Force officer.

I told the Agent General that I would be very glad to bring his observations to the attention of the interested officials in the Department. On his part he said he would be happy to furnish any additional information which we might require.

845.24/18

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary
of State (Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1942.

The Indian Diplomatic Agent came in to see me today at his request. He made three observations, all of them of considerable interest.

(1) He adverted to the formation of the British-American Materials Supply Boards and noted that Clive Baillieu was chairman of one of them. Sir Girja suggested that Clive Baillieu might not be able to act as the sole channel of communication with all the material producing agencies and presumably would want a consultative committee of some kind which would include a competent Indian representative. Since the United States was largely involved as supplier, he had rather assumed the United States would want reciprocal treatment from the British material producing agencies, including India.

I said that naturally we did not intervene in the British side of the organization but I noted his suggestion, which was interesting.

(2) He said that he considered that the entire problem of the Indian supply organization ought now to come to the fore with very great speed. Confidentially, the Chinese had already been inquiring of him whether an alternative route could not be worked out through Calcutta or elsewhere now that Rangoon was closed—the closing, he said, had occurred two days ago through the operation of enemy sub-

⁵ President of American President Lines; former Assistant Secretary of State.

marines. He had pointed out that if Burma was in danger Calcutta was too, and that probably the only way to work this out would be through Bombay or Madras. He pointed out that the British were under considerable pressure. The Australians had been saying in no uncertain tones that they were being betrayed; that their troops were defending other posts and were not defending those posts which made for the defense of Australia. He said he stated this personally because there was no point in increasing the area of the discussions; but it was said that there would be a very great push for greater regional representation in respect of economic and military operations arrangements out of those regions.

He observed that it was obvious even from a casual scrutiny of the matter, that India was squarely in line as a crucial region and he personally had been urging that they get to work on it. In this respect he said that he had written the Viceroy saying he thought that an American mission there would be very useful, though he had had no reply.

I said that I had noted his earlier suggestion looking towards this which was made to Mr. Wallace Murray;⁶ and that while I could not speak for the Government, my personal view was that some such measure might be of considerable use. I said I would look about a little and see what could be done if the Government were to take up his suggestion; we had some men here, like Henry Grady, who were more or less familiar with the subject matter. Naturally, I could not say what the Government would ultimately do.

(3) Sir Girja then said that there had been consideration of military matters. He fully approved of the principle of the single high command. But he thought such a command would have to maintain the closest contact with the representatives of all regions, especially those providing and equipping military contingents so as to get the maximum effect. For this reason he had written recommending that a high military officer be sent to Washington, attached to his mission, available to give and to obtain technical information, and generally to represent the Indian point of view. He said that this, of course, was primarily an internal matter for India to determine but he thought we might be interested. I confined myself to saying I thought this might prove useful.

Sir Girja concluded by pushing his idea of an American mission to assist Indian production.

I said that particularly in view of the Report of India's War Effort which he had been good enough to leave with me, it seemed to me there were distinct possibilities in the idea.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

⁶ Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

845.24/18

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to
President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1942.

MR. PRESIDENT: The attached memorandum of conversation⁷ may interest you. Provided the British were willing, I think an American production mission in India might prove of considerable usefulness.⁸ The Indian plan was to have a million men in the field by the latter part of 1942; they have upwards of 275,000 men and perhaps, should things go badly in Singapore and Burma, completion of this plan might be of crucial importance.

ADOLF BERLE

845.24/41½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. Leonard Parker of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1942.

Participants: Mr. Milo Perkins, Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare
Mr. William T. Stone, Chief, British Empire Division,
Board of Economic Warfare
Louis H. Bean, British Empire Division, Board of
Economic Warfare
Mr. Finletter⁹
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling
Mr. Parker

In accordance with a directive of the President dated February 2, 1942, a meeting was held in the office of Mr. Milo Perkins, Executive Director of the Board of Economic Warfare, to consider what steps might be taken to send an American production mission to India to ascertain in what way India's war production might be stimulated and to find out what is needed to enable India to attain self-sufficiency in the production of war materials.

⁷ *Supra.*

⁸ On February 2, 1942, President Roosevelt sent the following memorandum to Mr. Berle: "I think this worthy of pursuing. Please do so and take up also with the Vice President's economic committee". (845.24/41½)

⁹ Thomas K. Finletter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Acting Chief of the Division of Defense Materials.

Mr. Murray commenced the discussion by referring to the recent exchange of representatives between this Government and the Government of India. He stated that, from time to time, the Indian Agent General in Washington had furnished the Department with information regarding India's war effort and deficiencies. He referred to a conversation with Mr. Berle, who had discussed with the President the matter of production in India in its relation to American production and shipping space on American ships. The point was made that, with sufficient equipment and materials, India could equip the manpower which it has and which is sorely needed. Mr. Murray gave Mr. Perkins copies of the file on the subject, which were left with him for examination there. Mr. Murray mentioned Mr. Henry Grady as a possible choice to head such a mission and stated that Mr. Grady had indicated that he would be available for this kind of a mission. There are impressive figures, Mr. Murray continued, given in statistics about Indian production. Apparently India is doing more than is realized. However, out of approximately 60,000 articles of use in the war, India can manufacture 85%. It would be desirable to find out a way to assist India in equipping itself to manufacture the remaining 15%. Mr. Murray stated that, of course, it may not be easy to convince the British Government that India should be made self-sufficient in war production because of British fears of losing Indian markets after the war. However, the Department is going to endeavor to convince the British authorities.

Mr. Perkins inquired whether the Agent General has indicated the kind of help that India wants. Mr. Alling replied that the Agent General has stated that the chief need is for heavy machinery and machine tools.

Mr. Murray pointed out that making India self-sufficient would result in conservation of shipping space in that it would no longer be necessary to import raw materials from the Orient, process them in the United States and then re-export them to the Orient.

Mr. Perkins stated that he is sympathetic with the proposition. However, he was somewhat doubtful that it will be possible to accomplish all that has been suggested because the two big bottlenecks are machine tools and ships. He pointed out that when ships are launched they are not completed and ready for service. He continued by stating that we ought to get some more information from the Agent General and should (1) find out just exactly what India wants and needs, and (2) the extent of cooperation an American mission would receive from the authorities in India.

Mr. Finletter suggested that we should look into the shipping situation and eliminate duplication in the carriage of goods. This study should be concerned with the relation of raw materials to

finished materials. Mr. Perkins replied that such a study would appear to be one for his own organization.

Mr. Perkins pointed out that the United States needs all the machinery it can get in order to produce in accordance with the schedule recently announced by the President. In planning for such production, it must be considered whether this is going to be a long war or a short war, in order to determine whether to plan for long-range production or short-range production. This involves, of course, the use to which available equipment is to be put in the near future.

Mr. Alling suggested that the United States could assist by sending experts out to India to increase Indian efficiency in producing what India is already able to produce. In this connection, Mr. Perkins referred to gold mining in South Africa and said a comparable situation existed out there, where it would be desirable to switch from gold mining to the mining of copper and other metals essential to war production. The Indian situation, therefore, is just a part of the larger question. Mr. Perkins repeated that we should get more detailed information from the Agent General and he stated again that he is interested in the proposition of aiding India.

Mr. Perkins suggested that the technical side of the matter might be discussed with Mr. Alex Taub,¹⁰ who is chief engineer of the consulting organization of the Economic War Planning Board (Telephone: Commerce (87), Extension 2248).

845.00/1274

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Murray) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1942.

MR. WELLES: Reference is made to telegrams nos. 1, 6, and 13 from New Delhi¹¹ concerning recent political developments in India and attitudes adopted by nationalist groups. Before discussing the information reported in these telegrams, however, it may prove helpful to consider briefly the political background of these recent political developments.

It may be recalled that Gandhi¹² broke with the Congress shortly after the fall of France, when the Congress offered to cooperate with the Government in the defense of India, provided its demands were met for a responsible government at New Delhi. Gandhi's attitude

¹⁰ A conference on technical aspects of aid to India was held on February 6 in the Department of State, attended by the Indian Agent General, A. C. B. Symon of the Indian Purchasing Commission, Mr. Taub, and Mr. Alling and Mr. Parker of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. Memorandum of conversation not printed.

¹¹ None printed.

¹² Mohandas K. Gandhi, leader of civil disobedience movement in India.

was that such cooperation would involve being a party to violence in the conduct of the war. The Government rejected these demands for a responsible government. Then, in a meeting at Bombay in September 1940, the Congress Working Committee passed the "Bombay Resolution" withdrawing the Poona Offer. As a result, Congress found itself in the dilemma of not being able to go forward or backward and turned to Gandhi for help. Gandhi then organized the individual non-violence movement, whereby individuals selected by him made anti-war speeches and were promptly jailed by the Government. Shortly before Christmas, 1941, these prisoners were released by the Government of India.

On December 30, 1941, the Congress Working Committee, in the Bardoli resolution referred to in New Delhi's telegram no. 1 of January 2, 4 p. m., signified its willingness to cooperate in the prosecution of the war, provided the British Government makes some concessions in return. Early in January 1942, the All-India Congress Committee ratified the Bardoli resolution.

Gandhi endorsed the Bardoli resolution but at the same time asked to be relieved of Congress leadership. For quite some time prior to the adoption of the resolution there had been considerable dissatisfaction within the party regarding *satyagraha* (the individual non-violence movement). Many party members considered the movement unrealistic and ineffective, and opposition to it was growing. Furthermore, Gandhi found that he was receiving only half-hearted cooperation from some of those he had selected to participate in the movement. Apparently, he realized that he could not prevent the adoption of the resolution but felt that his non-violent principles would not permit him to participate in a policy of cooperation with the war effort. He therefore renounced his active leadership in the party but, in endorsing it, Gandhi retains a nominal leadership and was able to nominate Nehru as his "legal heir".

Mr. Wilson¹³ points out that it is difficult, at this early date, to interpret the full meaning of the Bardoli resolution or to gauge its significance accurately.

WALLACE MURRAY

845.00/1288%

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1942.

Mr. WELLES: It seems to me that the State Department must immediately get to work on the changed situation in the Far East arising

¹³ Thomas M. Wilson, American Commissioner at New Delhi.

ing out of the fall of Singapore. The first item on the list ought to be to tackle the Indian problem in a large way.

Pursuant to the President's directive there is now being organized an economic and war supply mission to India. Tentatively, it is contemplated that this will be composed of Henry Grady, Louis Johnson and two other men to be selected by the War Production Board. It is contemplated this mission will get under way at once and will endeavor to step up the very considerable production which now exists, looking towards completion of the Indian program to put a million men into the field by the end of 1942.

But, under existing conditions, any such program is not likely to get very far unless the political situation is handled with extreme vigor.

Secretary Hull has twice taken up with the British Government the possibility of a prompt recognition of India's aspiration to a freer existence and a full membership in the British family of nations.¹⁴ The President has indicated his sympathy with this general line. Winant has indicated there is wide division in the British Cabinet and has urged that we lend assistance. The Near Eastern Division is in full accord, and so am I.

I suggest, accordingly, that we once more take up with the British, preferably through Winant in London, the necessity of making a statement of policy with respect to India; and I suggest that the United States associate herself with Great Britain in stating that policy. It would seem that the logical thing to do was to have Churchill¹⁵ announce in London that the British plans contemplated the introduction of India as a full partner in the United Nations, and that by prearrangement, the United States—perhaps through the President—promptly and vigorously welcome the step.

As an immediate implementation of this policy, India should grant to the United States full recognition of our Diplomatic Agent there in a raised diplomatic status, preferably that of ambassador, though I suppose we could compromise on minister, if need be. Equally, the Indian Agent General here should be similarly raised to equivalent rank.

At the same time, the Viceroy¹⁶ could be directed to hold a constitutional conference of some kind in New Delhi looking towards the evolution of ways and means of recognizing the growing political importance of Indian sentiment as such.

¹⁴ For one of these approaches to the British Government, see memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, May 7, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, p. 178. There is no indication in the Department's files of a second approach to the British Government on this subject.

¹⁵ Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister.

¹⁶ Marquess of Linlithgow.

I do not have any confidence as to the immediate ability of the Indian Congress group to do much except talk at this stage of the game, but I believe the nature of their talk probably will determine whether there is a general acquiescence and cooperation in war organization in India, or whether there is a more or less passive resistance, which will be exploited by the Japanese to the limit. We should have to put up the methods, for the time being, to the British—our own rôle at this stage would have to be as observers and potential suppliers.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], Jr.

740.0011 Pacific War/1976a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1942—midnight.

843. For the Ambassador from the President. "As you may guess, I am somewhat concerned over the situation in India, especially in view of the possibility of the necessity of a slow retirement through Burma into India itself. From all I can gather the British defense will not have sufficiently enthusiastic support from the people of India themselves.

In the greatest confidence could you or Harriman¹⁷ or both let me have a slant on what the Prime Minister thinks about new relationships between Britain and India? I hesitate to send him a direct message because, in a strict sense, it is not our business. It is, however, of great interest to us from the point of view of the conduct of the war. (Signed) Roosevelt."

WELLES

*The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Soong) to President Roosevelt*¹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: General Chiang Kai-shek has sent me a message from Kunming which he asked me to deliver to you in person, and which I am enclosing herewith. As you have been so generous to me in giving me your time in the past, I forbear to impose myself further on you unless you desire to discuss the message with me.

¹⁷ W. Averell Harriman, the President's Special Representative in London, with the rank of Minister, to deal with all matters relating to Lend-Lease for the British Empire.

¹⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

The Canadian Government is making arrangements for me to make a short visit to Canada, leaving tomorrow afternoon at 3 p. m. and returning in about three days. If necessary, however, I would of course postpone my departure.

With high regard, I am,

Yours sincerely,

TSE-VEN SOONG

[Enclosure]

TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO DR. T. V. SOONG,
DATED KUNMING, FEBRUARY 24TH

'I have conveyed to Wellington Koo¹⁹ the following instructions:

"I presume you have seen my farewell message to India.²⁰ Please take this opportunity to tell Churchill that I am personally shocked by the Indian military and political situation which are in such a state that I could never conceive of before I arrived in India. I am afraid Churchill himself does not know the real situation. It may be best to talk to Cripps²¹ first and for him to inform Churchill.

"I have tried to view the colonial problem most objectively. I could not but speak frankly of what I thought. But I feel strongly that if the Indian political problem is not immediately and urgently solved, the danger will be daily increasing. If the British Government should wait until Japanese planes begin to bomb India and the Indian morale collapses, it would already be too late. If the solution is postponed until after the Japanese armies enter India, then it will be certainly too late. If the Japanese should know of the real situation and attack India, they would be virtually unopposed.

"If the political situation in India were to change for the better, this may prevent the enemy from having any ambitions to enter India.

"Please convey the above to Cripps. Also point out that, in my opinion, if the British Government should voluntarily give the Indians real power and do not allow different parties in India to cause confusion, the Indians would change their attitude toward England, forget their hard feelings and become loyal to the British Empire. Only such a policy could halt the Indian trend to part from the British Empire and make it obvious that it is unpolitic and disadvantageous to secede from the Empire."

Please convey my views to the President. In a word the danger is extreme. If the British Government does not fundamentally change their policy toward India, it would be like presenting India to the

¹⁹ Chinese Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

²⁰ This was issued through the Associated Press, following a visit to India in February by Generalissimo and Madame Chiang. Reports on this visit from the Commissioner in India (Wilson) not printed. In telegram No. 51, February 25, 1 p. m. (740.0011 European War/19723), Commissioner Wilson reported: "Nothing of value has yet been disclosed of Chiang's intimate talks with the prominent leaders."

²¹ Sir Stafford Cripps, British Lord Privy Seal, about to head a mission to India in an effort to arrange a settlement of issues.

enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy India. When I think of it I am both worried and alarmed. Besides deluding themselves and deluding the people with the belief that there is no immediate danger, there is no realization that war is on and there is no determined spirit to fight. The defeat in Malaya was so rapid, probably for similar reasons, and as for military preparations, the present Indian military preparedness is very much behind even of that the British had in Malaya.'

845.00/12884%

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1942.

MR. WELLES: At the Foreign Relations Committee this morning there appeared a serious undercurrent of anti-British feeling, though it was not so labelled and possibly would not be so admitted by the Senators concerned.

The Far East was in the forefront of their thoughts. The manpower of China and of India as sources of military strength were the bases on which the arguments rested. To use them as soldiers it was necessary to get them equipment at great cost of money and of life. But even if they had equipment in their hands and capable American officers to direct them, the Indians would not have the desire to fight just in order to prolong England's mastery over them. The Chinese should be encouraged by renunciation of extraterritorial privileges on the part of the United States and England.

Concerning India, the argument was that we are participating on such a large scale and had done so much for England in Lend-Lease that we had now arrived at a position of importance to justify our participation in Empire councils and such as to authorize us to require England to make adjustments of a political nature within the framework of her Empire. We should demand that India be given a status of autonomy. The only way to get the people of India to fight was to get them to fight for India. Gandhi's leadership in India became part of America's military equipment and it was necessary for the United States to participate in guiding the British Empire in such a way as would result in the realization to the Allied cause of the manpower of India, which could only be obtained by accepting the thesis of Gandhi's political objective. They ascribed to the authority and position of the United States a power to dictate to England what she should do in arranging her Empire not only in India but in Australia and in New Zealand, coupled with the statements to the effect that otherwise the United States would be just fighting to

preserve the British Empire and that the American people would expect this Government to do everything within its power to obtain military participation by India and to the fullest extent by China, as well as from Australia, even though we had to go to the extent of dictating to England what she should do with regards to India and Australia and directing her policies as regards her political rights in China.

This unusual manifestation of submerged opposition to England was not confined to any category or group of members of the Committee. Senators Connally, Vandenberg, Green, White and La Follette were particularly outspoken but other members of the Committee all seemed to be of the same frame of mind. The basis upon which it was all laid was the interest of the United States; its worldwide military and naval participation; the necessity of gathering strength wherever we should. Consequently the basis of it is patriotic. However the immediate consequence of it became a prospective interference in the internal affairs of the British Empire and there were occasional interjections which indicated an anti-British attitude, highly critical in nature and liable to become explosive if the manpower and wealth of the Empire in the Far East was not made tangible and given expression in the form of large-scale military activity.

The unanimity of opinion among the members of the Committee present and the length to which their arguments led them is a matter which might well be taken note of because it looks as if it might flare up and be used by some members of the Committee not as an attack against Great Britain but as an attack against the administration for its alleged failure to take advantage of the position of power in which it finds itself and for having failed to use the force of its authority in arranging for large-scale military support of the manpower which the United States is now putting into the Far East.

On my side, I was very guarded in my remarks and said very little. In response to pointed questions as to the attitude of the Department of State and as to what the Department was doing in conversations with Great Britain to implement the interest the United States had in the coordination of the British colonies to the war effort, I was very reserved. My only response was to point to the newspaper accounts of the meeting in India between Gandhi and Chiang Kai-shek and to the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps to the British cabinet, and mentioning his reported friendship and personal contact with those two leaders in India and China.

I think the practically unanimous voice of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in this matter might well be taken note of.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

845.00/1290 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 26, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received February 26—5:45 p. m.]

919. Personal for the President from Harriman. As your cable number 843 of February 25, 12 midnight²² inquiring about India came in just before Gil's²³ departure he had no opportunity to deal with it.

I have seen the Prime Minister this morning. He told me of the status of the political discussions now going on in London and in India for immediate action and for the future. He showed every desire to keep you informed but thought it would be better to wait a day or two, expecting that the picture would then be clarified and more definite. It will be discussed at the Cabinet today and additional advice will be obtained from India. He intends to cable you himself, probably over the week-end.

In the meantime you may be interested to have the following information which he gave me.

1. Approximately 75% of the Indian troops and volunteers are Moslems. Of the balance less than half, or perhaps only 12% of the total are sympathetic with the Congress group.

The Moslem population exceeds 100 millions. The fighting people of India are from the northern provinces largely antagonistic to the Congress movement. The big populations of the low-lying center and south have not the vigor to fight anybody. The Prime Minister will not therefore take any political step which would alienate the Moslems.

2. There is ample manpower in India willing to fight. The problem is training and equipping.

3. He told me he had explained to you his appraisal of the background of the political situation in India while he was in Washington and therefore I will not attempt to repeat it.

4. It is not known whether it is the Japanese ultimate objective to attempt to drive north into China or west into India.

5. Just what happened at Singapore is still obscure.

6. Now that the political scene is quieted the Prime Minister is turning his energies to the new problems arising from the unexpected strength of the Japs.

[Harriman]

MATTHEWS

²² Not printed.

²³ John Gilbert Winant.

845.24/324

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1942.

The Agent General for India came in to see me at his request.

He stated that he had received a telegram from Delhi regarding the proposed economic and production mission to India. The Government of India would, he said, enthusiastically welcome such a mission; and further, that it wished the mission, while in India, would be guests of the Indian Government. This meant that the Indian Government would assume the expense of transportation and accommodations while the mission was in India. He said he was particularly gratified with the prompt response since not more than 72 hours had elapsed between the time when Clive Baillieu made his recommendation to London and the acquiescence both of the British and Indian authorities.

He then said that his Government hoped announcement of the mission could be made very soon. It was thought that this might be of assistance in the general political atmosphere prevailing in India. He therefore hoped that on Monday he could submit to us a draft communiqué, and might make arrangements for simultaneous release in the United States and India.

He then went on to express the hope that the head of the mission would be "a man of the world". He said that the mission would arrive at a time of constitutional development in India and that it might very well be that the head of the mission could be of some assistance in appraising the various elements involved.

I thanked him. I said that we had not considered the mission as having any political objectives; in fact, while we followed the constitutional developments in regard to India with great interest and sympathy, this Government could not possibly consider interfering in a development which was primarily of concern to India and to Great Britain.

Sir Girja then brought up another matter which he said was somewhat allied. He said that the question of his own status had been under some discussion between himself and Lord Halifax. He held a commission from the King, making him virtually plenipotentiary. Despite this, he was listed here as one of the staff of the British Embassy. He wondered what opinion we had of his actual status. He pointed out that by virtue of his powers and his functions, he was plainly in a quite different category say from Sir Ronald Campbell,

who spoke merely as an officer of the Embassy and looked to Lord Halifax for his instructions, whereas Sir Girja acted on instructions from the Indian Government.

I said that I could understand his point of view perfectly. We had not entered into the determination of his status on the Embassy list though we had, in practice, dealt with Sir Girja as the representative of India and not as representative of the British Ambassador. Sir Girja had in fact signed the Declaration by United Nations²⁴ as the representative of India. But I thought that the clarification of his status was a matter between him and the British Government. I was very sure that this Government would be glad to recognize any status which they worked out between them. Again, we did not wish, in the time of Britain's trial, to seem to be interfering in constitutional changes occurring within the Empire. Meantime, and quite irrespective of protocol, the fact that Sir Girja represented the Indian Government had been, to my mind, thoroughly established by his appearing as a signatory of the Declaration by United Nations.

Sir Girja thanked me.

He then reviewed briefly the constitutional changes taking place in India; he said that they were still expecting a statement from the British Government, which was under debate. He had telegraphed the Viceroy a summary of American opinion, saying that there was very considerable increase of American interest in India; that part of it came from partisans who wished to criticize the British, but another and very considerable part came from people who were thoroughly friendly to Britain but entirely friendly to the cause of Indian development. He had reported the interest shown by the Senate committee, pointing out that this represented an outside opinion rather than the sentiment of the Government which had thus far scrupulously declined to intervene.

I gathered that he had implied that American public opinion would welcome a lifting of Indian status. He said that if he were advising the British Government, he would suggest that they turn over the remaining posts in the Viceroy's Council to Indians, except that the commander-in-chief would, of course, remain possibly with an associate; and that having announced this, he would suggest calling in the Mohammedan and Hindu political parties, asking them to agree on the division of the Cabinet posts, the understanding being that if they were unable to agree upon the division, then the Viceroy would choose as best he could.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], Jr.

²⁴ *Ante*, p. 25.

845.24/327

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1942.

The British Minister ²⁵ came in to see me at my request.

I asked him if he would be courteous enough to inform the British Embassy of the status of the proposed Indian Supply Mission. I said that the matter had been first raised informally by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai; that we had considered the matter and brought it to the point where the proposal seemed to be in order; that we had then taken the matter up with the Supply Council, headed by Sir Clive Baillieu and Mr. Batt; that Sir Clive Baillieu had cabled to London; and that the answer had come to us in the form of a message from the Government of India to Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, formally inviting this Government to send such a mission. It had thus apparently been fully discussed in London, and I gathered that no further formalization was needed. Indeed, I said, I presumed that Sir Girja had probably kept Lord Halifax fully informed.

The Minister said that he was not sure on the point but he assumed that this had been done. He seemed to think it was an excellent idea to have taken it up through Sir Clive Baillieu. He said that, in any case, Sir Girja was of course a Minister on the staff of the British Ambassador, and therefore when he spoke he spoke for the Ambassador.

I said that as to this last, I hoped the Minister would guide me in the complexities of the British constitution. We were, frankly, a little unclear on the point. Sir Girja had come here with letters accrediting him to this Government, directly from the King. When he spoke to us he spoke by instructions of the Government of India, apparently transmitted through the Viceroy. Further, he had signed the Declaration by United Nations as a representative of India and under instructions of that Government. This appeared to be a line of authority extending, of course, from the British Empire, but distinct from the line of authority of the British Embassy.

I said we had not the slightest desire to enter into a matter which was plainly an internal British matter; but it was obvious that a constitutional development in India was now going forward with some rapidity, and I should be glad to have some guidance on the subject from the British Minister.

Mr. Hall said that, speaking frankly, he was not too clear about the

²⁵ Noel Hall.

situation himself. They had a kind of compromise arrangement by which despatches in respect of India came to Sir Girja, but he understood that they came to Lord Halifax for the guidance of Sir Girja. He said the status of India was obviously changing pretty rapidly and that the present arrangement was one of those compromises which settled nothing but which worked for the time being.

I said that Sir Girja had raised the question, which, of course, we were unable to answer. In practice, we were dealing with Sir Girja on Indian affairs much as we should deal with a representative of any of the dominions, and on the same basis as that maintained between our own diplomatic agent and the authorities in India. Mr. Hall said that was entirely right and proper.

I asked whether the newspaper accounts of possible clarification of the status of India were accurate, and he said that they were in the sense that some step clarifying the situation was expected. He seemed entirely sympathetic to a liberalization of the position of India.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], Jr.

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*²⁶

XXXC Number 13 March 4, 1942.²⁷ From Former Naval Person^{27a} to the President. Number 34.

We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion status after the war carrying with it if desired the right to secede should be made at this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the Moslems who represent a hundred million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards 30 to 40 million untouchables and our treaties with the princes states of India, perhaps 80 millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the eve of invasion.

2. Meanwhile I send you in my immediately following telegram two representative messages I have received and a summary of a memorandum by the Military Secretary, India office.²⁸

3. I will keep you informed.

PRIME

²⁶ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

²⁷ Cablegram from London received at the War Department Message Center, March 4, 1942, 7:08 a. m.

^{27a} Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

²⁸ See Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, pp. 209-211.

845.24/25

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, March 6, 1942

The military situation in southeastern Asia emphasizes the need to develop fully, and as rapidly as feasible, the industrial resources of India as a supply base for the armed forces of the United Nations in the Near East and the Far East. The Government of the United States, accordingly, inquired whether the Government of India would agree to the despatch to India of a technical mission which could examine and report on the possibilities of American assistance in such development. The Government of India has expressed its readiness to receive such a mission and has invited it to be its guests during the mission's stay in India. Accordingly it has been decided that the mission should proceed to India as soon as possible.

It is hoped to announce the personnel of the mission shortly. The Government of the United States and the Government of India earnestly hope that this step in American-Indian collaboration may serve to make an effective contribution to the success of the United Nations in the war against aggression.

845.24/36

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, March 9, 1942

The Department of State announced today the personnel of the Advisory Mission of the United States to assist the war effort in India. The personnel of the mission is as follows:

- Chairman, Colonel Louis Johnson, former Assistant Secretary of War
- Honorable Henry Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State—General economic surveys
- Honorable Arthur W. Herrington, President, Society of Automotive Engineers—production of armored vehicles and automotive equipment
- Honorable Harry E. Beyster, President, Beyster Engineering Company—organization of plants for production
- Honorable Dirk Dekker, Director of Personnel and Training, Illinois Steel Corporation—specialist in training unskilled workers into semi- and skilled workers

It is understood that, should it appear advantageous, additional members may be added to the Commission to assist in solving specific technical problems.

740.0011 Pacific War/2101: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, March 10, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 8:11 p. m.]

211. Reference my 144, February 23 [22], 1 p.m.²⁹ In an informal conversation last evening with the Generalissimo³⁰ I inquired whether he could tell me anything of his estimate of the situation as he found it in India. He replied in effect that he is greatly worried over that situation, that the British Government is blind to the realities, and that he feels that the outcome may be serious for Britain in India and at the same time for China. He added later that a radical change of British policy toward India might possibly solve the situation but repeated that the British Government is blind to the seriousness of the situation. He commented that it was significant that the last remark made by former Ambassador Clark Kerr as Chiang left Delhi was: "Do you think we are about to collapse" (in India). Without saying so, Chiang inferred to me that he fears a collapse. Chiang says he intends to write to the President on the India situation. He asked that what he had told me be considered strictly confidential and not be made known to others. I so request. He said that he had not realized the true situation in India before his visit there.

Earlier in the evening he made two remarks with a considerable show of irritation: (1) The British do not inform their allies when they withdraw or surrender, and (2) the British will not receive his Chinese staff officers. I do not fully understand the last remark unless it relates to Burma where Chinese forces have been sent to co-operate with the British. Madame Chiang in translating made the remark that British strategy is always "super secret."

I have never previously seen the Generalissimo as depressed as I found him last evening.

During conversation with Madame Chiang who freely discussed her impressions of the visit to India she made the remark that the Indians would not be satisfied with dominion status, that unlike other dominions the Indians have no feeling of racial affinity or common destiny with respect to the English and that although realizing that perhaps independence cannot come immediately they seek and should be given real political power and responsibility. She stated her opin-

²⁹ Not printed.

³⁰ Chiang Kai-shek.

ion that the Indians are prepared to discharge such responsibility to the benefit of the United Nation[s] Front.

There is open anger owing [*in?*] criticism of Britain in Chinese official and other circles here.

GAUSS

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*²¹

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1942.

No. 116. I have given much thought to the problem of India and I am grateful that you have kept me in touch with it.

As you can well realize, I have felt much diffidence in making any suggestions, and it is a subject which, of course, all of you good people know far more about than I do.

I have tried to approach the problem from the point of view of history and with a hope that the injection of a new thought to be used in India might be of assistance to you.

That is why I go back to the inception of the Government of the United States. During the Revolution, from 1775 to 1783, the British Colonies set themselves up as Thirteen States, each one under a different form of government, although each one assumed individual sovereignty. While the war lasted there was great confusion between these separate sovereignties, and the only two connecting links were the Continental Congress (a body of ill-defined powers and large inefficiencies) and second the Continental Army which was rather badly maintained by the Thirteen States. In 1783, at the end of the war, it was clear that the new responsibilities of the thirteen sovereignties could not be welded into a Federal Union because the experiment was still in the making and any effort to arrive at a final framework would have come to naught.

Therefore, the thirteen sovereignties joined in the Articles of Confederation, an obvious stop-gap government, to remain in effect only until such time as experience and trial and error could bring about a permanent union. The thirteen sovereignties, from 1783 to 1789, proved, through lack of a Federal power, that they would soon fly apart into separate nations. In 1787 a Constitutional Convention was held with only twenty-five or thirty active participants, representing all of the States. They met, not as a Parliament, but as a small group

²¹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

of sincere patriots, with the sole objective of establishing a Federal Government. The discussion was recorded but the meetings were not held before an audience. The present Constitution of the United States resulted and soon received the assent of two-thirds of the States.

It is merely a thought of mine to suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India, headed by a small representative group, covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies—this group to be recognized as a temporary Dominion Government. It would, of course, represent existing governments of the British Provinces and would also represent the Council of Princes.

But my principal thought is that it would be charged with setting up a body to consider a more permanent government for the whole country—this consideration to be extended over a period of five or six years or at least until a year after the end of the war.

I suppose that this Central Temporary governing group, speaking for the new Dominion, would have certain executive and administrative powers over public services, such as finances, railways, telegraphs and other things which we call public services.

Perhaps the analogy of some such method to the travails and problems of the United States from 1783 to 1789 might give a new slant in India itself, and it might cause the people there to forget hard feelings, to become more loyal to the British Empire, and to stress the danger of Japanese domination, together with the advantage of peaceful evolution as against chaotic revolution.

Such a move is strictly in line with the world changes of the past half century and with the democratic processes of all who are fighting Nazism.

I hope that whatever you do the move will be made from London and that there should be no criticism in India that it is being made grudgingly or by compulsion.

For the love of Heaven don't bring me into this, though I do want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business, except insofar as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are making.

ROOSEVELT

123 Johnson, Louis A./1

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Shaw) of a
Conversation With Colonel Louis A. Johnson*

[WASHINGTON,] March 11, 1942.

We discussed various aspects of his mission to India. The first and most important thing that developed was a very strong objection

on his part to the title of "Commissioner". He said that he was head of the largest law office south of Philadelphia and that in both of the Virginias the title "Commissioner" meant one thing and one thing only: a conspicuously unsuccessful lawyer. Such being the case he could under no circumstances accept a position with the title of "Commissioner" attached to it. I suggested that we might use the title of Special Representative of the President. This, he said, would be altogether agreeable to him. He thought it would be a good plan for there to be a certain amount of overlapping between himself and Mr. Wilson. He said that he was prepared to leave at any time after the expiration of ten days and that he wanted at least to cross the Atlantic on a Pan American Clipper. I told him that I understood he would assume his duties as Special Representative at New Delhi immediately upon his arrival and that this would take precedence over his work as Chairman of the Mission. He said this was the first precise information he had had on this point. He asked me whether I thought he could do much with the Nationalists in India. I said I thought that in view of the present situation in India he probably could but that it must be done with the utmost care. He seemed to feel that he had not been given any very positive information about anything.

In the afternoon, after consulting with Mr. Welles, I telephoned Colonel Johnson and asked him whether the title of Personal Representative of the President would fill the bill so far as he was concerned. He said it most certainly would.³²

G. HOWLAND SHAW

123 Johnson, Louis A./1: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner at New Delhi
(Wilson)*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1942—6 p. m.

49. In view of the radically changed conditions in the Middle East and particularly in India brought about by the war, the President feels that it is essential to have in India one who has had close recent contact with military affairs and who is well known to the leaders of our Armed forces. Without in any way therefore bringing into question the value of the services which you have rendered both in Cal-

³² In a Department press release of March 24 it was stated: "In view of the appointment of Col. Louis Johnson as Personal Representative of the President in India it will be necessary for him to devote his full time to his duties near the Government of India at New Delhi. It has therefore been decided that Dr. Henry F. Grady, former Assistant Secretary of State and a member of the Advisory Mission to India, will assume the active chairmanship of that Mission." (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1942, p. 260.)

cutta and New Delhi and while fully realizing the inconveniences to which you will be put, he is appointing the Honorable Louis A. Johnson, formerly Assistant Secretary of War, to be his Personal Representative at New Delhi with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. Notification of Colonel Johnson's appointment is being effected through the British Ambassador in Washington today. Colonel Johnson will reach India in about 3 weeks' time. You are instructed to report to the Department en route to a new post and you should depart as soon as you conveniently can after Colonel Johnson's arrival. Inasmuch as you will not return to New Delhi, you are authorized to pack and ship your effects to the nearest United States port. Traveling expenses and per diem are authorized subject to the travel regulations. Travel by air authorized. Report date of departure.

WELLES

124.45/48

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at my request.

The Ambassador left with me a memorandum concerning the mission of Colonel Louis Johnson to India, which reads as follows:

"On March 16th the Acting Secretary of State informed Sir Ronald Campbell that the President had decided to send Col. Louis Johnson to India as his personal representative. Mr. Welles explained that Mr. Wilson, the present U.S. Commissioner in India, was to be transferred and that the office of Commissioner would remain in abeyance as long as Col. Johnson was in India. Mr. Welles asked that his statement to Sir Ronald Campbell should be regarded as the official intimation of the President's wishes and enquired whether any further formal steps, such as an application for an *agrément*, would be necessary. Sir Ronald Campbell promised to make enquiries on this point.

"The British Embassy has now been instructed to inform the State Department that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India will be glad to receive Colonel Louis Johnson as the personal representative of the President of the United States in India with the personal rank of Minister. They note that it is intended that the post of Commissioner shall remain in abeyance as long as Colonel Johnson remains in India.

"It is understood that Col. Johnson will not present any actual Letters of Credence but that—as was done when Mr. Wilson was appointed Commissioner—he will be furnished with an informal letter of introduction to the Viceroy from the President. In this connection the State Department will be aware that the present constitutional position of India makes it impossible for direct diplomatic relations between India and other countries to be established."

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

II. Efforts by the United States To Prevent Failure of the Cripps Mission to India; Return of Colonel Johnson and American Technical Mission to the United States

845.01/126a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Commissioner at New Delhi (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1942—9 p. m.

52. The Department is of course extremely interested in the purpose of Sir Stafford Cripps' proposed visit to India³³ and in the reception accorded his offer. You are requested therefore to transmit by telegraph with the least possible delay all information which you may be in a position to obtain regarding the proposed formula and the Hindu and Moslem reaction thereto.

WELLES

845.01/127 : Telegram

The Commissioner at New Delhi (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, March 17, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received March 18—4:09 p. m.]

90. Reference Department's number 52 of March 14, 9 p. m.

1. During the past 2 weeks office has been called upon to function almost exclusively as a transmitter of lengthy messages in our own secret cipher to the State Department for transmission in turn to the War Department on matters dealing with the war effort which I felt had to be given priority because of their stated urgency and because political matters are being fairly well carried by the press and will be of small value or interest if the war is lost. Unless and until my own staff receives the promised increase in clerical help or General Brereton³⁴ in his turn receives cipher in which he has more confidence than the one now at his disposal, it is going to be a physical impossibility to send timely reports of the nature I know is desired.

2. If further justification of my decision to give priority to war effort messages is desired it is to be found in the fact that absolutely nothing is being let out as to any proposal "formula" which Cripps is working to [apparent omission]. Nothing concrete along these lines may be expected until he arrives, the date for which is tentatively given as early next week. I am told that not even members

³³ On March 11, 1942, Prime Minister Churchill made a statement in the House of Commons announcing that Sir Stafford Cripps would go to India. See British Cmd. 6350: *India (Lord Privy Seal's Mission)* . . . April, 1942, p. 3.

³⁴ Brig. Gen. Lewis Brereton, in command of U. S. Air Forces in India.

of the Viceroy's ³⁵ Executive Council on enquiring have succeeded in learning from the Viceroy what these proposals consist of. So far as known no invitations have been sent to political leaders to meet Cripps, indicating that he will be allowed perhaps to set his own pace and make his own plans.

3. The only reason why Mr. Churchill's announcement on India was not met with very serious criticism may be found in the selection of Cripps as the one to bring proposals to India. Certain it is that feelings of keen disappointment were general because of further delay. There was some divergence of view between British and Indian press opinion regarding Government's decision not to publish the proposals immediately; but there was no divergence of opinion on the appointment of Cripps and satisfaction expressed over his selection has in some measure tempered the disappointment felt at first and the tone of the opposition press appeals to await patiently the arrival of Cripps come from nearly every section of both the Hindu and the Muslim worlds together even with efforts made by some leaders here and there to bring about closer agreement between the two but with both Jinnah ³⁶ and Gandhi ³⁷ saying little.

4. The Muslim position put in a few words is that their leaders say that they can afford to wait. *Dawn*, the publication of the Muslim League, stated recently that the League will accept an interim arrangement providing nothing is done to "torpedo or prejudice the Muslim claim for a national homeland" and that regardless of numbers the major political parties are given equal say in the government of the country. All of which in my personal view is . . . put forward for trading purposes.

5. The annual two-day meeting of the Chamber of Princes was opened yesterday by the Viceroy. Archaic and innocuous better describe these performances than any other terms. I know although it will undoubtedly receive a full share of publicity in the American press. The points covered by the Viceroy in his speech relate naturally to the India of the Princes which although it contrasts strangely with present-day realism has substantial values of contributions to the war fund both in money and in men, in both of which there is small reason to doubt Britain will receive from the Princes what she asks for and can equip. Requests for reform and the relinquishment of privileges and princely prerogatives will not be welcomed and will not receive the same generous response from the Princes. In his address to the Princes the Viceroy made a short reference to the visit of Cripps and described him as a "trusted friend" and a "statesman" on which the country can rely. The *Hin-*

³⁵ Marquess of Linlithgow.

³⁶ Mohamed Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League.

³⁷ Mohandas K. Gandhi, leader of civil disobedience movement in India.

dustan Times of today regards this reference as "greatly appreciated as showing identity of purpose" whatever that may mean.

6. As time goes on some impatience is discernible which may be expected to increase until the arrival of Cripps the success or failure of whose mission definitely depends upon: (1) the nature of the proposals themselves and, (2) the speed with which they are taken up and placed before the country. Proposals which do not give to India the complete freedom she asks within a stated time coupled with effective guarantees for their fulfillment will certainly not have anything but the most deleterious effect now.

WILSON

845.01/128 : Telegram

The Commissioner at New Delhi (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, March 20, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received 5:14 p. m.]

97. Reference paragraph 2, section 1 of my 90, March 17, 6 p. m. According to press reports His Excellency the Viceroy has, at the request of Sir Stafford Cripps, issued invitation to various Indian political leaders to meet Sir Stafford in New Delhi on or about March 26. Among those who are reported to have received invitations thus far are representatives of the Congress, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sapru group, the Azad Muslim conference, and the depressed classes. Unconfirmed reports here suggest that Gandhi may arrive in New Delhi about March 24.

I am told that the invitation received by the Congress was addressed to Maulana Azad as its President and that of the Muslim League was addressed to Mr. Jinnah in a like capacity. The Congress and the League were each requested to nominate not less than 4 nor more than 6 representatives. Both Azad and Jinnah are reported to have accepted the invitations on the condition that they first be acquainted with the Cripps' proposals after which it would then be ascertained whether the nomination of representatives would be worth while.

WILSON

845.01/145

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1942.

MY DEAR WELLES: On instructions from London I send you herewith a copy of the text of the British Government's proposals regard-

ing India.³⁸ These proposals are to be published simultaneously in India and in London at 3 a. m. British Summer Time on Monday, March 30th, and arrangements are being made by the British Information Services for its simultaneous release in this country.

Please treat these proposals as confidential until such time as they are published.

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

P. S. I enclose an additional copy and if you can get it, or the gist of it, to the President before publication, I would be grateful if you would. H.

845.01/138: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Haselton) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, March 31, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 5:22 p. m.]

129. Reference my 124, March 28, 1 p. m.³⁹ It is presumed that the Department now in receipt through London of the full text of Cripps' proposals. In a broadcast from New Delhi last night, Sir Stafford explained the proposals to the country and appealed for their acceptance. The following is a résumé of his broadcast:

He began by explaining that the object of the proposals was "to make it quite clear and beyond any possibility of doubt or question that the British Government and the British people desire the Indian peoples to have full self-government with a constitution as free in every respect as our own in Great Britain or of any of the great Dominion members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". In explaining the interim arrangement, Sir Stafford stated that clause E lays down the broad outline and that "the Governor General whose task it is to form the Central Government of India has done his utmost to assist me with my mission and I am certain that the Indian leaders can rely on him to find the best way in consultation with them for carrying out the general principle laid down" in clause E. He went on to say that His Majesty's Government must take full responsibility for the conduct of the defense of India as part of the World War effort and that the direction of that defense must rest in the hands of the Commander in Chief under the War Cabinet. The

³⁸ For text, see British Cmd. 6350: *India (Lord Privy Seal's Mission)* . . . April, 1942, p. 4.

³⁹ Not printed.

Commander in Chief he said must retain his position as a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. He claimed, however, that India would have full opportunity of sharing in the control of strategy by accepting the invitation to appoint a representative Indian to the War Cabinet and the Pacific Council of the United Nations. In discussing the principal postwar provisions, Sir Stafford justified provincial option (I) on the principle of self-determination and carefully avoided using the term Pakistan. He expressed the conviction that the Constituent Assembly would make just provision for the minorities. However, "in view of the undertakings given to these the minorities by His Majesty's Government in the past, we propose that in the treaty which under the draft declaration will be concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Constitution-making body, the new Indian Union should undertake to protect the rights of these the minorities". Sir Stafford concluded with an appeal to the Indian people to bury the past and march side by side with Britain to a new era of liberty for all peoples.

HASELTON

845.01/161

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at my request.

I asked the Ambassador if he had any information today from India. He said that he had no direct word but that the situation seemed to be turning out about as he had envisaged it. He said that it had seemed inconceivable to him that the Congress would accept any plan, since the Congress was perfectly well aware that they could not, themselves, reach any direct agreement with the Moslem League, and that they thus avoided the responsibility for failure which otherwise would certainly have been placed upon them. They reasoned, he believed, that if the worst came to the worst the present plan would merely be placed upon the shelf and would be available later if nothing better transpired in the meantime.

I asked the Ambassador what he thought would happen, now that this negotiation had broken down. His reply was, "Nothing." He said he did not anticipate any major disorders, and that the general situation would remain tranquil on account of the favorable economic situation in India and the realization of the Japanese menace.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.01/143 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 2, 1942—noon.

[Received 4:26 p. m.]

132. Reference this office's 130, March 31, 2 p. m.⁴⁰ It is reported that the Congress Working Committee reached a unanimous decision on the Cripps proposal yesterday afternoon. The decision is now being drafted in the form of a memorandum which it is believed will be presented to Cripps by Maulana Azad at an interview arranged for 4:30 this afternoon. Objection to the scheme will it is reported rest principally on nontransfer of defense to an Indian defense member and Cripps' intransigence on this point has caused even Rajagopalachari⁴¹ to fall in line with the majority view. An unconfirmed rumor suggests that Cripps has telegraphed Churchill for authorization to compromise on defense issue. It is also reported that the Congress will oppose the scheme on the ground that it unnecessarily presupposes vivisection of the country whereas the first part of the declaration should only promise dominion status and a Constituent Assembly after the war leaving details to be worked out by the Indian leaders themselves.

The Muslim Malapert [*League?*] which in effect means Mister Jinnah has remained very quiet of late. This may mean that he anticipates Congress rejection of the scheme in which event he would be in a position to say that the question of the League defining its attitude to the proposals does not arise.

The Hindu Mahasabha in an official memorandum has definitely rejected the proposals, chiefly because of the Pakistan provision.

Even Sapru⁴² is dissatisfied with the defense provision. In a joint statement issued yesterday, Sapru and Jayakar⁴³ stated that "we regret that more emphasis has been laid on the constitution of the future than on the immediate needs. We think therefore that if a satisfactory formula could be devised in respect of the defense portfolio, the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps might still succeed. It is not probably realized in England and Allied countries that Indian opinion cannot look upon any transfer of power as real unless the Government of India is so constituted as to give an effective share

⁴⁰ Not printed.

⁴¹ Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, former Premier of Madras and a leading Indian Nationalist but who favored active resistance to the Japanese and a settlement with the Muslim League.

⁴² Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, President of the Non-Party Conference.

⁴³ Mu Kund Ramrao Jayakar, Member of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

to the country in the management of its defence. We would therefore urge you that immediate attention be concentrated on this question".

MERRELL

845.01/147 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Haselton) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 3, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 2:46 p. m.]

140. Reference my 141, noon.⁴⁴ I am reliably informed that General Wavell⁴⁵ and Nehru⁴⁶ will meet tomorrow or Sunday for the purpose of discussing and arriving at a clear division between the spheres of activity of an Indian defence member and the Commander in Chief. The chances of them reaching a satisfactory solution are considered good in informed quarters. It is also reported that should a solution be reached Nehru will be defence member.

There is a persistent rumor in informed quarters that behind the Congress objections to the proposals there lurks a fundamental distrust of any promise that Britain may make for a post-war arrangement. It is thought quite probable therefore that Congress has or will request Cripps to obtain a guarantee of fulfillment from some third power preferably the United States.

HASELTON

845.01/148 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 3, 1942—noon.

[Received 11:51 p. m.]

141. Reference my 132, April 2, noon. The Congress reply to the proposals was officially handed to Cripps yesterday afternoon by Azad and Nehru. The question of publication of the Congress resolution will be decided by Congress Working Committee in consultation with Cripps. The reply, however, is believed to be substantially that forecast in my telegram referred to above with the addition of an

⁴⁴ *Infra.*

⁴⁵ Gen. Sir Archibald P. Wavell, British Commander in Chief in India.

⁴⁶ Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress Party leader; associated with Gandhi in opposition to British rule in India.

expression of dissatisfaction with the provision for appointment instead of the election of delegates from Indian States to Constituent Assembly. The situation is more hopeful today in view of reliable reports that British are prepared to compromise on defense issue (reference my No. 140, April 3, 11 a. m.).

MERRELL

845.01/149 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 4, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received April 4—7:44 p. m.]

145. For the President and Acting Secretary. I have had two long sessions with Stafford Cripps today. He is advising London that the hour has arrived for a final effort to settle the differences here.

1. Despite Nehru's insistence Cripps is unwilling to modify the provision in the draft declaration regarding non-acceding provinces. Situation in Muslim Provinces, particularly Bengal, appears to justify Cripps in this position.

2. Cripps recognizes principle of self-determination generally but in states where succession to rulership is guaranteed by treaty he insists that in the first instance treaty rights must be respected and negotiations carried on through treaty recognized rulers. Nehru as president of the All India States Peoples Conference is desperately insistent that treaties be disregarded and peoples, not rulers, be represented in Constituent Assembly.

3. Muslims and Sikhs fear that any outright agreement to give India Defense Minister as demanded by Congress would result in a Hindu Minister of Defense. Cripps and Wavell (with whom I have also conferred today) believe that the appointment of an Indian Minister of Defense would lead to chaos and loss of all army morale.

Cripps has already offered India a seat in the War Cabinet and in the Pacific War Council and has promised a place at the Peace Conference. He regards himself solely as a mediator to set up a plan whereby Indians may solve their problems after the British withdraw so that one group may not play the British against others.

Cripps is today advising the Prime Minister that the final decision must be based on one of three possible courses: (a) No further changes or concessions; (b) modify draft declaration by granting India Defense Minister if protected by agreement in writing that the Minister could take no action contrary to Empire war policy as exercised by the Commander-in-Chief who would remain; (c) convert

the present Defense Ministry into War Ministry which would be left under the Commander in Chief and then create a new office of Minister of Coordinator of Defense placing in it relatively innocuous matters such as defense, public relations and appointing an Indian thereto.

Cripps violently opposes (a), prefers (b) but believes that War Cabinet, Commander in Chief, and Viceroy will all oppose both (b) and (c). Unless the President feels that he can intercede with Churchill, it would seem that Cripps' efforts are doomed to failure. Cripps so believes too. Such failure will adversely affect war effort. I respectfully urge therefore that the President, without disclosing he is advised of Cripps' cable, consider further effort with Churchill.

There is a small group in Congress which is pro-Japanese. The majority is anti-British and will not support the present draft declaration or any scheme that does not avoid placing Indians in the position of being mercenaries of the British. Nehru sought and had a conference with General Brereton before my arrival and expressed the view that there can be no improvement in essential production as long as production is regarded as for the British. Nehru felt that improvement could only be accomplished if requested by the United States for the United States, China, and India.

Industrial, military and political situation here much more serious than I was advised before arrival. Calcutta being partially evacuated and this has occasioned fear and large scale immigration by necessary industrial labor. The Advisory Mission already here is devoting its efforts to establishing necessary priority suggestions to be forwarded in next few days. Long term planning and studies must give way to urgencies [apparent omission] sought without more planes immediately but that somehow he⁴⁷ will get through. We shall probably forward in next few days a direct appeal from him to the President for planes he regards as required immediately.⁴⁸

JOHNSON

845.01/149 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi
(Merrell)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1942—1 p. m.

101. Personal for the President's personal representative. I have discussed personally with the President your telegram no. 145, April 4, 8 p. m.

⁴⁷ Apparently General Wavell.

⁴⁸ General Wavell's letter was transmitted by Colonel Johnson to the Department for the President and the Acting Secretary in telegram No. 155, April 6, 5 p. m., not printed (841.248/1199).

The information you send is particularly interesting.

The President asked me to let you know, however, that he does not consider it desirable or expedient for him, at least at this juncture, to undertake any further personal participation in the discussion. You know how earnestly the President has already tried to be of help. It is feared that if at this moment he interposed his own views, the result would complicate further an already overcomplicated situation.

In view of the already increasingly critical military situation, do you not believe that there is increasing likelihood of the responsible leaders adopting a more constructive attitude? Please continue to telegraph fully all developments.

WELLES

841.248/12014: Telegram

*The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, April 7, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received April 7—10:06 a. m.]

156. For the President and Acting Secretary. Sir Stafford Cripps tells me that last night the Japanese Navy consisting of three battle-ships and supporting elements sank all shipping between Madras and Calcutta and in the harbors thereof, estimated at 100,000 tons; that the Japanese Fleet is between the inferior British Fleet and its base, and that in a few hours engagement is certain with British in most critical situation. He adds that in his opinion there will then be nothing left to protect route from Persia to India. Requisition for heavy bombers has been made on our own Air Force, which according to Sir Stafford has replied that men we have here are insufficiently trained to make day time attack on Japanese Fleet. Sir Stafford says "if we had 30 heavy bombers in Ceylon the British Fleet could be saved. Nothing else can save it. The bombers are not available."

Sir Stafford says there is only one bomber in the Near East which could fly to Tripoli; that heavy bombers in unjustified numbers are being held in England; that his efforts with Churchill to have some of the "surplus" bombers sent to the Far East have been unavailing but he is today strenuously renewing his efforts. Sir Stafford further says we have reached the military crisis here and implores our aid in getting heavy bombers from England to this area without delay.

At request of Cripps and of Nehru, both absolutely on their own initiative, I have been acting as go-between since last Sunday. Sir Stafford indicates this morning as did Nehru yesterday that the fact that they have not already failed has been due to the efforts of your

personal representative. After long session with Nehru last night, the fourth of the day, and a conference with Sir Stafford from which I have just returned, I am for the first time hopeful that negotiations will not be a complete washout providing the military situation does not overwhelm us.

Sir Stafford is presenting the final proposals at 10 a. m. today. They are based substantially on proposal (c) in my 145 of April 4, 8 p. m. I have commitments of Nehru and President of Congress not to throw them out completely until after a half day has been reserved for discussion between Nehru and myself.

Further cables follow.

JOHNSON

845.01/158 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 9, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received April 9—2:30 p. m.]

1721. Personal for the President from Hopkins.⁴⁹ There is an unfortunate impression here that Louis Johnson is acting as your personal representative and under your instructions mediating between the British and the Indian Congress. Within the past few hours Cripps apparently in cooperation with Johnson has submitted a new proposal relative to the control of defenses in India. This proposal was made to the Indian Congress without consultation with the Governor General or with Wavell and with no knowledge of the British Government here. I have a feeling that Cripps very naturally is using Johnson who in turn uses your name very freely. I have told the Prime Minister and Eden⁵⁰ that Johnson is not acting as a mediator on your behalf but whatever he is doing he is doing at the specific request of Cripps.

The Governor General of India has the distinct feeling that all of Johnson's moves are being directed by you. I believe it important that Johnson's part in this be played down because of the danger of a proposal being made to the British Government which they might reject and which the public might think comes from you. I lunched with Eden today and he is not too encouraged about the outcome in India but it may break favorably before the day is over. I am seeing the Prime Minister again at 6 o'clock and will cable you the latest

⁴⁹ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President, on special mission at this time in the United Kingdom.

⁵⁰ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

news at once. I have found Eden and Lyttelton ⁵¹ very sympathetic today to our main proposal. [Hopkins.]

MATTHEWS

845.01/153 : Telegram

*The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, April 9, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received April 9—1:09 p. m.]

168. Congress decided unanimously Tuesday ⁵² to reject Cripps' proposals. Keeping his promise to me Nehru advised me of result and I asked the promised time and secrecy before he and Congress President advised Cripps (reference my 156, April 7, 11 a. m.). After conference with Cripps and with his approval, if not quite at his suggestion, I went alone to see Wavell who with Viceroy had blocked Churchill approval of (b) in my 145, April 4, 8 p. m. Wavell at first arbitrarily refused to consider any change in Cripps' amended proposal, in my opinion because he is tired, discouraged and depressed and hates and distrusts Nehru. With the greatest simplicity and, I hope with tact, I explained setup of our own defense establishment of today and convinced him that His Majesty's Government had nothing to lose by reversing form of approach. After he got off his high horse Wavell's approval and cooperation were complete. He phoned Viceroy for appointment and went with me to see him. On Wavell's recommendation, Viceroy approved and sent for Cripps. Cripps met with three of us and of course heartily approved.

At 7:20 a. m. Tuesday I presented to Nehru personally and not officially my proposed substitute amendment. Later conferred with Congress President. Congress Working Committee has been in almost continuous session since and Wednesday afternoon Nehru wrote and brought to me a letter suggesting a slight rewrite. Cripps made minor suggestions and I presented them to Nehru last night. At Nehru's request I have asked Cripps to call the Congress President and the engagement is now set for 5:30 today. Both Nehru and Cripps have expressed their appreciation for the revival of the negotiations.

The magic name over here is Roosevelt; the land, the people would follow and love, America.

JOHNSON

⁵¹ Sir Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production.

⁵² April 7.

845.01/163 : Telegram

*The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, April 11, 1942—9 a. m.

[Received April 11—7:10 a. m.]

170. For the President and Acting Secretary. The Congress delivered its rejection of Cripps' proposals at 7:00 o'clock Friday night, Nehru sending me a copy. The rejection is a masterpiece and will appeal to free men everywhere.

My substitute defense amendment was informally agreed to at conference between Cripps, Nehru, and Congress President Thursday night but then after they disagreed on giving any authority to new Nationalist Government proposed by Cripps, Cripps said my formula meant same thing as his original amendment which was quite untrue and denied his earlier press remarks that Nationalist Government any more real self government now.

Cripps is sincere, knows this matter should be solved. He and Nehru could solve it in 5 minutes if Cripps had any freedom or authority. To my amazement when satisfactory solution seemed certain, with unimportant concession, Cripps with embarrassment told me that he could not change original draft declaration without Churchill's approval and that Churchill has cabled him that he will give no approval unless Wavell and Viceroy separately send their own code cables unqualifiedly endorsing any change Cripps wants.

I never lost confidence until then. London wanted a Congress refusal. Why? Cripps' original offer contained little more than the unkept promise of the First World War. Does England prefer to lose India to enemy retaining claim of title at peace table rather than lose it by giving freedom now? I have my own opinion about it.

The Indian Ocean is controlled by enemy; British shipping from India has been suspended; according to plan determined many days ago, British are retiring from Burma going north while fighting Chinese go south; Wavell is worn out and defeated; the hour has arrived when we should consider a replottting of our policy in this section of the world. Association with British here is bound to adversely affect morale of our own officers. Only the best should be sent and those who have failed elsewhere should not be dumped here as many have been in recent past. . . .

Nehru has been magnificent in his cooperation with me. The President would like him and on most things they agree. I have his personal promise to proceed to Calcutta immediately in effort to allay fear, settle General Motors and steel strikes, and keep industry operating there. I shall have his complete help; he is our hope here. I trust him.

Of the 1,350,000 kilowatts of installed electric generator capacity in all India, 1,100,000 kilowatts is located east of the line Bombay-Cawnpore. In the area west of this line, the only area in which additional industrial capacity may be located with reasonable safety, electric power supply is limited to 250,000 kilowatts of which no surplus is available. Therefore landing or bombing in present industrial area will mean the end of India's ability to aid herself materially industrialwise. America's effort therefore must be toward direct aid. There is little opportunity for India to aid herself—particularly since Cripps, through no fault of his own, has failed.

Halifax's speech⁵³ added the finishing touch to the sabotaging of Cripps. It is believed here it was so intended and timed and I am told pleased Wavell and the Viceroy greatly.

JOHNSON

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵⁴

No. XXXC 48, April 11, 1942.⁵⁵ To President personal No. 67. Have just received following from Cripps:

I have tonight received long letter from Congress President stating that Congress is unable to accept proposals. Rejection on widest grounds and not solely on defense issue although it indicates that while Congress would agree that Commander-in-Chief should have freedom to control conduct of the war and connected activities as Commander-in-Chief and war member proposed formula left functions of defense member unduly restricted. Main ground of rejection is however that in the view of Congress there should be immediately a national government and that without constitutional changes there should be "definite assurances in conventions which would indicate that new government would function as a free government and members of which would act as members of a Cabinet in a constitutional government." Letter also states that picture of proposed immediate arrangements is not essentially different from old ones "the whole object which we have in view that is to create a new psychological approach to the people to make them feel that their own national freedom had come, that they were defending their new won freedom, would be completely frustrated when they saw this old picture again which is such that Congress cannot fit into it."

There is clearly no hope of agreement and I shall start home on Sunday.

⁵³ Apparently a reference to Lord Halifax's radio address before Town Hall in New York on April 7; text printed in *New York Times*, April 8, 1942, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁵⁵ Cablegram from London received at the War Department Message Center, April 10, 1942, 9:28 p. m.

He is broadcasting at 2030 I. S. T. today Saturday. I feel absolutely satisfied we have done our utmost and have sent Cripps the following telegram:

You have done everything in human power and your tenacity, perseverance and resourcefulness have proved how great was the British desire to reach a settlement. You must not feel unduly discouraged or disappointed by the results. The effect throughout Britain and in the United States has been wholly beneficial. The fact that the break comes on the broadest issues and not on tangled formulas about defense is a great advantage. I am very glad you are coming home at once, where a most cordial welcome awaits you. Even though your hopes have not been fulfilled, you have rendered a very important service to the common cause and the foundations have been laid for the future progress of the peoples of India.

From Former Naval Person ⁵⁶ No. 67.

PRIME

740.0011 PW/2313a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1942—2 p. m.

1528. For Harry Hopkins from the President. Please give immediately the following message to the former naval person. We must make every effort to prevent a breakdown.

"I most earnestly hope that you may find it possible to postpone Cripps's departure from India until one more final effort has been made to prevent a breakdown in the negotiations.

I am sorry to say that I cannot agree with the point of view set forth in your message to me that public opinion in the United States believes that the negotiations have failed on broad general issues. The general impression here is quite the contrary. The feeling is almost universally held that the deadlock has been caused by the unwillingness of the British Government to concede to the Indians the right of self-government, notwithstanding the willingness of the Indians to entrust technical, military and naval defense control to the competent British authorities. American public opinion cannot understand why, if the British Government is willing to permit the component parts of India to secede from the British Empire after the war, it is not willing to permit them to enjoy what is tantamount to self-government during the war.

I feel I must place this issue before you very frankly and I know you will understand my reasons for so doing. If the present negotiations are allowed to collapse because of the issues as presented to

⁵⁶ Code name for Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

the American people and India should subsequently be successfully invaded by Japan with attendant serious military or naval defeats for our side, the prejudicial reaction on American public opinion can hardly be over-estimated.

Consequently, would it not be possible for you to have Cripps postpone his departure on the ground that you personally have sent him instructions to make a final effort to find a common ground of understanding. I read that an agreement seemed very near last Thursday night.⁵⁷ If he could be authorized by you to state that he was empowered by you personally to resume negotiations as at that point with the understanding that minor concessions would be made by both sides, it seems to me that an agreement might yet be found.

I still feel, as I expressed to you in an earlier message,⁵⁸ that if the component groups in India could now be given the opportunity to set up a nationalist government similar in essence to our own form of government under the Articles of Confederation with the understanding that upon the termination of a period of trial and error they would then be enabled to determine upon their own form of constitution and, as you have already promised them, to determine their future relationship with the British Empire, a solution could probably be found. If you made such an effort and Cripps were then still unable to find an agreement, you would at least on that issue have public opinion in the United States satisfied that a real offer and a fair offer had been made by the British Government to the peoples of India and that the responsibility for such failure must clearly be placed upon the Indian people and not upon the British Government."

Roosevelt
WELLES

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵⁹

No. 50, April 12th, 1942.⁶⁰ Former Naval Person to President personal No. 68. I have read with earnest attention your masterly document about future of the war and the great operations proposed. I am in entire agreement in principle with all you propose, and so are the Chiefs of Staff. We must of course meet day to day emergencies in the East and Far East while preparing for the main stroke. All the details are being rapidly examined and preparations where action is clear have already begun. The whole matter will be discussed on evening of Tuesday, the 14th, by Defense Committee, to which Harry⁶¹ and Marshall⁶² are coming, and I have no doubt that I shall be able to send you our complete agreement.

⁵⁷ April 9.

⁵⁸ Dated March 10, p. 615.

⁵⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁶⁰ Cablegram from London received at the War Department Message Center, April 12, 1942, 10:17 a. m.

⁶¹ Harry L. Hopkins.

⁶² Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

I may say that I thought the proposals made for an interim operation in certain contingencies this year met the difficulties and uncertainties in an absolutely sound manner. If, as our experts believe, we can carry this whole plan through successfully, it will be one of the grand events in all the history of war.

About 3 AM this morning, the 12th, when contrary to your instructions Harry and I were still talking, the text of your message to me about India came through from London. I could not decide such a matter without convening the Cabinet, which was not physically possible till Monday. Meanwhile Cripps had already left and all the explanations have been published by both sides. In these circumstances, Harry undertook to telephone to you explaining the position, but owing to atmospherics he could not get through. He is going to telephone you this afternoon and also cable you a report.

You know the weight which I attach to everything you say to me, but I did not feel I could take responsibility for the defence of India if everything has again to be thrown into the melting pot at this critical juncture. That I am sure would be the view of Cabinet and of Parliament. As your telegram was addressed to Former Naval Person I am keeping it as purely private, and I do not propose to bring it before the Cabinet officially unless you tell me you wish this done. Anything like a serious difference between you and me would break my heart and surely deeply injure both our countries at the height of this terrible struggle.

PRIME

845.01/163½ : Telegram

*The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, April 13, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

180. For the President and Acting Secretary Welles. The following is the text of a letter dated New Delhi, April 12, 1942, addressed to the President by Jawaharlal Nehru:

“Dear Mr. President, I am venturing to write to you as I know that you are deeply interested in the Indian situation today and its reactions on the war. The failure of Sir Stafford Cripps’ mission to bring about a settlement between the British Government and the Indian people must have distressed you, as it has distressed us. As you know we have struggled for long years for the independence of India, but the peril of today made us desire above everything else that an opportunity should be given to us to organize a real national and popular

resistance to the aggressor and invader. We were convinced that the right way to do this would have been to give freedom and independence to our people and ask them to defend it. That would have lighted a spark in millions of hearts which would have developed into a blazing fire of resistance which no aggressor could have faced successfully.

If that was not to be as we wished it and considered necessary for the purposes of the war, the least that we considered essential was the formation of a truly national government today with power and responsibility to organize resistance on a popular basis. Unfortunately even that was not considered feasible or desirable by the British Government. I do not wish to trouble you with the details of what took place during the negotiations that have unfortunately failed for the present. You have no doubt been kept informed about them by your representatives here. I only wish to say how anxious and eager we were, and still are, to do our utmost for the defence of India and to associate ourselves with the larger causes of freedom and democracy. To us it is a tragedy that we cannot do so in the way and in the measure we would like to. We would have liked to stake everything in the defence of our country, to fight with all the strength and vitality that we possess, to count no cost and no sacrifice as too great for repelling the invader and securing freedom and independence for our country.

Our present resources may be limited for the industrialization of our country has been hindered by the policy pursued in the past by the British Government in India. We are an unarmed people. But our war potential is very great, our man power vast and our great spaces as in China would have helped us. Our production can be speeded up greatly with the cooperation of capital and labor. But all this war potential can only be utilized fully when the government of the country is intimately associated with and representative of the people. A government divorced from the people cannot get a popular response which is so essential; much less can a foreign government which is inevitably disliked and distrusted do so.

Danger and peril envelop United States [*us*] and the immediate future is darkened by the shadows of possible invasion and the horrors that would follow, as they have followed Japanese aggression in China. The failure of Sir Stafford Cripps' mission has added to the difficulties of the situation and reacted unfavorably on our people. But whatever the difficulties we shall face them with all our courage and will to resist. Though the way of our choice may be closed to us, and we are unable to associate ourselves with the activities of the British authorities in India, still we shall do our utmost not to submit to Japanese or any other aggression and invasion. We, who have struggled for so long for freedom and against an old aggression, would prefer to perish rather than submit to a new invader.

Our sympathies, as we have so often declared, are with the forces fighting against fascism and for democracy and freedom. With freedom in our own country those sympathies could have been translated into dynamic action.

To your great country, of which you are the honored head, we send greetings and good wishes for success. And to you, Mr. President, on whom so many all over the world look for leadership in the cause of

freedom we would add our assurances of our high regard and esteem. Sincerely yours (signed) Jawaharlal Nehru.[""]

JOHNSON

845.01/163½ : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1942—9 p. m.

124. Your 180, April 13, 6 p. m. Please communicate to Pandit Nehru the substance of the following message from the President:

"The President greatly appreciates your letter dated April 12 which he has received through Colonel Johnson. He has been deeply gratified by the message which it contains. He feels sure that all of the people of India will make every possible effective effort to resist Japanese aggression in every part of India. To the utmost extent of its ability the Government of the United States will contribute towards that common cause."

WELLES

845.01/167a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1942—11 p. m.

125. Personal for Colonel Johnson. I think you should know that prior to Cripps' departure and up to the last moment, the President made every possible personal effort with the British Prime Minister to prevent the breakdown of negotiations and to have delayed for that purpose the departure of Cripps.

WELLES

841.248/1201¾ : Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson), to the Acting Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 17, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received April 18—8:53 a. m.]

190. For the President and Acting Secretary. I summarize a two and a half hour conference with General Wavell today as follows:

1. All the troops are in the northeast of India and must be used "for a card of reentry into Burma whenever we are able to make an offensive."

2. "Calcutta can be defended only through adequate bomber and fighting plane force." Please see my 155 April 6, 5 p. m.,⁶³ to which as optimistic and definite an answer as possible ought to be given at the earliest possible day. Presence large number planes Calcutta area probably steady population and enable continuation industrial operations now severely curtailed. Estimate 700,000 people already evacuated Calcutta. If Calcutta goes, India goes.

3. Wavell asked that preceding a radio talk seeking to allay fear to be made by him middle of next week, I hold press conference asserting confidence that India will not fall and our cause will prevail. Have refused to communicate with press since arrival, but because of this request am arranging to meet with the press Tuesday, April 28, at 4:30 p. m. Will quote figures given by President at opening session of Congress⁶⁴ and would appreciate any further messages or suggestions.

Understand that Welles made a statement to people of India. It has not been released or published here, nor has it been received by us. Censorship terrible and certainly not pro-American or pro-United Nations.

JOHNSON

841.248/1201¼ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1942—11 p. m.

139. Your 190, April 17, 8 p. m. The Under Secretary has not issued any statement to the people of India. In addition to information contained in the President's message to Congress it is suggested that you may find some useful material in recent issues of the Radio Bulletin, particularly a statement made a few days ago by Mr. Donald Nelson.⁶⁵

HULL

845.01/170 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 21, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received April 22—2:32 a. m.]

208. For the President and Secretary of State. All India Congress meets Allahabad on April 28. Nehru probably make strong bid to

⁶³ Not printed; but see last paragraph of telegram No. 145, April 4, 8 p. m., from the Personal Representative of the President in India, p. 626, and footnote 48, p. 627.

⁶⁴ Address delivered before a joint session, January 6, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 10, 1942, p. 39.

⁶⁵ Director, Priorities Division, Office of Production Management.

capture party outright on defense issue, driving Gandhist non-resisters out of picture. Nehru's hand would be immensely strengthened if Britain, China and United States could issue joint statement Pacific war aims, specifically including freedom, self-determination for India and resolution defend India at all costs. Absolutely necessary to add weight of America, China to British promises to overcome Indian distrust of British which even stronger since Cripps' failure. If to be done should just precede opening Congress.

JOHNSON

740.0011 Pacific War/2461

*Madame Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt*⁶⁶

[CHUNGKING,] April 23, 1942.

Some British newspapers are conveying the impression that the Cripps mission did not fail but rather prepared the ground for better relations in the future. This view is not shared by the Indian leaders. According to information received from Nehru the mission's failure has resulted in a deterioration of the position and increased Indian hostile feeling toward Britain. This hostility has been further increased by the inconsiderate handling of Indian refugees in Burma and Malaya. Further, according to Nehru, no real shift in authority was offered and no possibility existed for the establishment of a people's army for defense purposes. Therefore, there was no basis for compromise. Defense to be truly effective requires the closest relations between the government and its citizens and this is feasible only when there is a real identity between the state and the people. However, real efforts are being made to arouse a fighting spirit to meet the probable attack. Too much cannot be expected of this, however, without the government's support.

845.00/1341

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations
(Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1942.

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Indian Agent General, called on me this morning and said that he had purposely refrained from visiting the Department during the period of Sir Stafford Cripps' negotiations in

⁶⁶ Copy forwarded on April 24 by Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, to the Under Secretary of State (Welles).

India in order to avoid any possible impression that he was endeavoring to influence in any way the course of those negotiations.

To my question as to whether he believed the full reasons had been set forth by the various Indian groups for their rejection of the British offer, Sir Girja replied most emphatically in the negative. He said that he felt the reasons given were "complete window-dressing" and that the real reasons were unstated. He had no doubt that Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajagopalachari, former Premier of Madras and an outstanding Rightist Congress leader, had every desire to negotiate a successful settlement with Sir Stafford. The working committee of the Congress Party, however, had other ideas and successfully blocked the negotiations with that Party. Once the Congress Party was unwilling to fall in line, it was a foregone conclusion that the proposals would be turned down by the other parties.

I asked the Agent General frankly whether he thought it was a case of "cold feet" on the part of the Indian negotiators and he replied that, while Gandhi could undoubtedly be classed in that category, he felt sure that such was not the case with either Nehru or Rajagopalachari, both of whom had courage and realized that India must resist aggression by force and not by passive resistance.

As for the Congress Party's working committee which finally defeated the negotiations, he said he was certain that the idea in the back of their minds was the following: With the Cripps proposals on record, they can never be withdrawn by the British Government. Therefore, why accept them now in the present grave situation of India and run the risk of failure which ought to rest on the shoulders of the British rulers. If Britain wins, the offer can always be taken up and tried out, with better chances of success. Sir Girja said he was sorry to say that some members of the Party reasoned that if Britain loses and the Japanese succeed in occupying India the Indians would be in a better position to negotiate a satisfactory settlement with the Japanese than they would have been if they had fallen in with the British proposals.

Sir Girja went on to say that he was not one of those who regarded India under British rule as the best of possible worlds. In this he differed sharply from Lord Halifax and had been responsible for the omission of a number of passages from Lord Halifax' radio address on April 7 before the Town Hall in New York. He informed me incidentally that Halifax had communicated directly with Cripps before deciding to deliver his address on India and had requested directives from Cripps, particularly as to what he should not say. In his reply, which was sent four days before the breakdown of negotiations, Sir Stafford already at that time expressed his pessimism over the outcome and stated that if his efforts were unsuccessful it would be on account of the defense problem and the question of appointed representation by the Princes to any Constituent Assembly.

Sir Girja also attributed part of the responsibility for the failure of Sir Stafford's mission to the Indian industrialists. This group, so he said, was extremely reactionary and self-seeking and it was they who had spread the first rumors designed to discredit our technical mission before its arrival in India. They expressed the view that American imperialism was endeavoring to replace British imperialism in India and that as far as they were concerned one was just as bad as the other. These industrialists, while realizing that the economic policies of the Congress Party are contrary to their interests, have nevertheless supported the Party in the hope that, in case it came to power, they would be better able to influence it to maintain if not to increase the protective tariff in India.

In answer to the question "What now in India?", Sir Girja said he felt very definitely that there could be no complete return to the *status ante quo*. The proposal once made had set up such a fermentation in India that further efforts must necessarily be made to pick up the negotiations where Sir Stafford Cripps had left off and bring them to a successful conclusion. Of this he did not despair and he felt particularly gratified, so he said, that this Government had a representative at New Delhi in times like these and in a position to encourage a satisfactory settlement between the British and the Indians. He said it was not for him to judge whether any particular American representative was fully qualified to deal with the complexities and difficulties of the Indian problem but that the mere fact that a personal representative of the President has been sent to India and is in a position to come in direct contact with Indian leaders is of enormous importance. At this point I asked him what he thought might be the reason for certain critical comments of the Indian Press regarding American "intervention" in the Cripps negotiations. He said he felt sure that was merely internal politics and that while undoubtedly Nehru and other Congress leaders welcomed the presence and assistance of Colonel Johnson during the negotiations, they nevertheless would be careful to avoid any charge by the Opposition that the course of the negotiations was being dictated or even influenced by this Government or its local representative. It was for that reason that Nehru could never have considered requesting American "mediation" between the Indians and the British.

I asked Sir Girja whether he thought any of the groups who finally rejected the British proposal did so on the grounds that their acceptance would have entailed grave military responsibilities with inadequate means of defense at their disposal. Or, in other words, would they be inclined to argue that Great Britain should long ago have taken adequate steps to build up and equip the Indian Army and prepare it for such a task as it now faces? Sir Girja replied that the Indian political parties, while they might be tempted to take such a line, could not consistently do so for the reason that they have for

years been criticizing the Government for spending so large a portion of the exchequer on the defense forces of India based largely on the Northwest Frontier. Furthermore, any complaints about excessive military expenditures are no longer valid since the visit to India in 1938 of the Expert Committee on Indian Defense under Admiral Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. As a result of the investigations of the Chatfield Committee, India was relieved entirely of her contributions to naval protection and was relieved of three-fourths of the expenditure for equipment of the Indian Army used for internal defense of the country. Also, the British Government undertook to meet the entire expense of the Indian Army when serving abroad. Sir Girja observed in this connection that India had sent more troops abroad than all the other parts of the British Empire put together.

845.01/171 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, April 25, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received April 25—10:55 a. m.]

219. For the President and the Secretary. For some days I have been negotiating to get a formula within the scope of convictions Cripps expressed to me which would be acceptable to the Congress. I expect to have this formula in the shape of a Declaration of Policy which the Congress would approve back to me from Nehru Monday morning. It will be cabled so as to be in Washington at an early hour Monday. I have not dealt with Moslem League represented by Jinnah because I know from Cripps' talk and actions and otherwise that the Moslem League has been used by the British as a counter force to the Congress and that approval or rejection of any program along this line by Jinnah will be as desired by His Majesty's Government. If the President can get Churchill to agree to this new Declaration, there should also be an understanding that the first advice to the Congress must be through me to Nehru to avoid embarrassment to Nehru. In other words, in the first instance the Viceroy should not make the sole announcement in India.

I am confident that the final draft approved by Nehru will be such that Cripps will support it and that the best interests of America will be served by insisting upon its acceptance by the British. It should be taken up with Churchill Monday before debate begins in Parliament Tuesday or else debate should be postponed.

JOHNSON

845.24/55 : Telegram

*The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to
the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, April 25, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received April 26—9:30 a. m.]

224. To the President and the Secretary. For 2 weeks have been having conferences with leading industrialists in India and representatives of the Government. Fully convinced India war production can be increased $2\frac{1}{2}$ times provided war production board can be established here. Indian Civil Service absolutely dead and supply member of Executive Council does not favor any change from present peace time production. General Hu, Ordnance Chief of Production, China, is now here desiring to place orders in India for millions of dollars of supplies for China, which would serve to build up Indian industrial production and tremendously aid China defense. Indian Civil Service not interested in accepting these orders.

Am sending Herrington and Griffith ⁶⁷ to Chungking with Shaughnessy of China Supply Corporation and General Hu's aide to verify on the ground the contribution General Hu says can be made by Indian industry. This group will return to Delhi next Thursday. We should be in a position to place China's orders if you can persuade London to order Government of India to cooperate, accept and expedite. There will be no increased war production in India unless a war production board fashioned after the American board is established here with its personnel fairly representing the industrialists (who are now in America's corner and are strongest personal supporters), English industrialists, and without domination by Indian Civil Service or His Majesty's Government here.

I suggest and urge without delay you secure direction from England to the Government of India that a production board of this type be set up with an Indian chairman subject to the general direction of either the Pacific War Council or the British Supply Director in England. If power of veto is left in India, production will remain static. Those charged with the responsibility in the Indian Government and the Indian Civil Service lack imagination and are dominated by the 10 or 12 companies in England which dominate Indian Government. Only direction from England can accomplish this purpose. If you will get this directive from England then, as a result of conferences just concluded here between Indian Chamber of Commerce representatives and the leading industrialists of Indian corporations, ship space can be saved and a grand job can be done for China and for India.

⁶⁷ Arthur W. Herrington and Lt. Col. Paul H. Griffith of the American Technical Mission.

I think it vital because of distrust of English here that the board must be established after conferences with myself, Indian Government and the leading Indian industrialists. I cannot express it too strongly that the press conference and the radio speech have brought these industrialists, and even today Pandit Nehru's paper, the *National Herald*, into America's corner and the establishment of a board without my participation therein will meet with the same distrust and lack of support, but if done by the Government of India with American participation and participation by the industrialists, the results we can report to America will astound you.

Herrington and Beyster, the industrialists of the American Technical Mission, have been through these discussions and were here this morning in consultation with the President of the Indian Chamber of Commerce and the Tatarian representatives, and they all agree that this is the only possible program for India and a necessary and urgently vital program to aid China.

I urge earliest possible action in support of this program. I repeat, it cannot be accomplished here without direction from London.

The establishment of such a board will give confidence to those whose support we must have both industrialwise and politicalwise if the people of India are to resist the Japanese.

JOHNSON

841.248/1201½ : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1942—11 p. m.

161. With reference to your no. 190, April 17, 8 p. m. The President desires that the following message from him be conveyed to Colonel Johnson:

"General Brereton has been fully informed of the reinforcements in airplanes he is to expect in the near future and has been directed to operate under the operational control of the appropriate British commander operating in defense of the eastern coast of India. Roosevelt."

HULL

845.01/170: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1942—9 p. m.

162. Your no. 208, April 21, 6 p. m. Aside from the time element involved in consulting with the British and Chinese Governments, a

joint statement of Pacific war aims at this time would raise a number of complex problems relating to the future of many Oriental peoples. Such problems, of course, would require the careful consideration of all the United Nations with interests in the Pacific area and a mutual understanding among them as to the solution of these problems.

There is, furthermore, inherent danger in the adoption by this Government of measures which might appear to favor unduly a particular faction in India. It is our view that this Government will continue to retain the confidence of all Indian groups only if it continues to adhere to a policy of strict impartiality among them.

In this connection you will, of course, wish to be careful not to identify yourself too closely with any particular group or groups in Indian national life.

HULL

845.01/173 : Telegram

*The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW DELHI, April 28, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received April 29—8:25 a. m.]

239. For the President and the Secretary. Formula referred to in my 219 of April 25, 11 a. m. not yet received. Cripps' London press comments as reported here have decreased chances for formula for the moment and the action of the Government of India herein below reported has further greatly complicated matters.

Government has just prohibited by Executive decree the printing or publishing of the following resolution passed today by the Congress Working Committee and recommended by it to All India Congress Committee.

"The Committee has noted the recent extraordinary happenings in Lower Burma and notably in the city of Rangoon, when though actual military operations were still some distance away, the whole civil administration suddenly collapsed and those in charge of it sought their own safety and abandoned their posts just when their presence was most needed. Private motor cars were commandeered for the evacuation of high officials and Europeans, leaving their owners stranded and unprovided for. The police force discharged or withdrawn to other places, habitual and other criminals were released from prisons, and the lunatics allowed to go out of their asylums. The city of Rangoon was thus left not only without any civil administration but at the mercy of lunatics, hardened criminals, and other anti-social elements. Even previously at the time of the air raids, it had been evident that the ARP organization did not function and no thought had been given to the problem of organized evacuation, food supply or shelter. A situation was thus created which involved the citizens of

Rangoon in utmost misery and desolation, and which was discreditable in the extreme to the Government and its high officials.

As war approaches India, the lessons of Rangoon and Lower Burma are full of meaning for this country, for the same type of official wilds authority here and the recent astonishing exhibition of panic and incompetence in Madras demonstrates the dangers arising from inefficient and irresponsible officials who have in addition no contacts with the people of the country. Recent orders passed and circulars issued on behalf of various provincial governments indicate that they are obsessed with making provision for the safety of the higher civil officials and their removal from places of immediate danger. Little thought appears to have been given to the drawing up of well prepared schemes for possible evacuation of a particular area and the arrangement of transport, housing and food supply in a time of emergency. It is the misfortune of India at this crisis in her history not only to have a foreign government, but a government which is incompetent and incapable of organizing her defence properly or of providing for the safety and essential needs of her people.

As no reliance can be placed on the central or provincial government's functioning in India now to act effectively and intelligently in times of emergency, it becomes the especial duty of the people to rely upon and organize themselves for this purpose. The Congress programme of self-sufficiency and self-protection is the essential foundation for self-reliance and the avoidance as far as possible of many of the evils that follow in the train of war. On this programme, therefore, the people must concentrate themselves. In the larger cities where special problems arise, schemes should be worked out with the help of experts in regard to food supply and the other measures that may be necessary in time of emergency. In particular all panic should be avoided even though those in authority give way to it."

Of course, prohibiting publication will cause it to have widest underground circulation. Tension will increase by the hour particularly if Government bans other Congress resolutions. When news of Japanese continuing successes in Burma as reported to the War Department from here today (but not told India) reaches public, we will be sitting on the powder keg.

JOHNSON

845.01/172: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 28, 1942.

[Received April 28—12:30 p. m.]

2217. Speaking before a house which was between three-quarters and one-half full, Cripps opened the debate in the Commons today with a speech lasting a little over one hour. The Prime Minister did not attend the session. The speech was delivered without any personal ostentation or animus and seemed to make a good impression on the

House. Cripps described at length the various stages through which his negotiations with the Indians passed and made the following reference to the part played by Colonel Johnson :

"There is perhaps one other person to whom I should make reference so as to avoid any misunderstanding since his name has been bandied about in the press. It so happens by coincidence that, while I was in New Delhi, an economic mission arrived from the United States of America headed by Colonel Louis Johnson, representing directly in that matter the President. He was entertained by the Viceroy at his house on his first arrival, and, while he was there, one of the Congress leaders asked to see him. After consulting the Viceroy and in accordance with the latter's advice he saw the Pandit Nehru, and in a most helpful conversation ascertained what at that time seemed to be the difficulties in the way of a settlement. I also called upon Colonel Louis Johnson by way of courtesy on his arrival and gave him as accurate a picture of the situation as I could. Thereafter at my suggestion and in accordance with his own personal desire to be of any assistance that he could, he had other interviews which were a great help in clarifying the situation. At no time did he act otherwise than in a purely personal capacity and he, like two or three of my Indian friends, merely did his best to give what help he could to the parties. I am personally most grateful to him, and I am sure the leaders of Congress are similarly so, but I wish to make it abundantly clear that there was no question of any American intervention but only the personal help of a very able and pleasant American citizen."

In outlining the reasons for the break-down of the negotiations, Cripps' speech seemed to add little to what has already been made public or to the information presumably received by the Department direct from our representatives in India, and consequently it will be reported on by mail.

MATTHEWS

845.24/57 : Telegram

The Consul General at Calcutta (Schnare) to the Secretary of State

CALCUTTA, April 30, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

311. Number 1 from Grady: "Mission arrived Calcutta April 29 after 10 days' conference, investigation and study at New Delhi. Will remain here till May 9 thence week in Bombay following same procedure and in addition visiting and studying war industries both cities and environs. Will wire from here and Bombay series of recommendations involving immediate action. Expect return New Delhi May 17 whence will wire recommendations involving longer term action. Will leave New Delhi for Washington about June 1. Herrington has rejoined Mission but will depart for home May 15. Understand Johnson also plans to return about June 1. Mission getting

full cooperation India Government and Indian industrialists. Advise our families."

SCHNARE

845.24/55 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1942—9 p. m.

173. Your no. 224, April 25, 5 p. m. In giving consideration to questions involved in taking action you propose in connection with the suggested creation of a war production board in India, it would prove extremely helpful if the Department might be furnished with more detailed factual information regarding conditions which appear to necessitate the creation of such a board. It is suggested, therefore, that you request Dr. Grady, in his capacity as Chairman of the Advisory Mission, to undertake an investigation of this subject and to submit a preliminary telegraphic report thereon to the Department as soon as practicable.

HULL

845.01/176 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, May 4, 1942—8 p. m.

[Received May 4—6: 09 p. m.]

263. For the President and Secretary. Congress resolutions followed Gandhi lead of non-resistance even to Japs. Defense of India will be most difficult, if not impossible, unless there is some agreement between Nehru elements in Congress, Jinnah of Muslim League and Rajagopalachari who resigned from Congress Working Committee but who favors resisting Japs. Rajagopalachari and Nehru really feel very much the same although Nehru remains in Congress to fight from within. I feel strongly that in our own interests one more effort should be made.

The following program would fit into Cripps' remarks to me and come within the scope of his broadcasts:

The Congress has not accepted the view that major changes in the constitution are not possible during the war. Nevertheless in order to facilitate a settlement, it is prepared to agree to a declaration by the British Cabinet on the following lines:

Indian leaders attach the greatest importance to arrangements for the administration of India in the immediate future. The British Cabinet is willing to go to the farthest limits possible within the framework of the existing constitution to convert the Executive Council into a national government in practice.

For this purpose, the Viceroy is being authorized to invite small number of representative leaders to examine the constitution from this standpoint. The Cabinet accepts the view that minor changes in the act, alterations in the methods of functioning of the Executive Council and in the central legislature by resort to rule making powers, and the establishment of suitable conventions are permissible within the meaning of the formula contained in the last paragraph.

The Cabinet will accept the decisions of such a body and ask the Viceroy to proceed to the formation of a national government to replace the present Executive Council. He will discuss with that body the composition and personnel of the National Government which must necessarily include in adequate proportions representatives of the two main political organizations, namely the Congress and the Muslim League.

There have been apprehensions expressed in India about the Viceroy's powers of veto. Under the constitution, he is bound by the decisions of the majority of the Executive Council, unless the adoption of such a course is likely, in his opinion, to imperil the safety or tranquillity of India or any part of India.

It is inconceivable that the Viceroy, to borrow the language in which he conveyed a similar assurance to the Congress Party in 1937, before it agreed to take office in the provinces, "will act against the advice of the Executive Council, until he has exhausted all methods of convincing the Council that his decision is the right one". He will "do his utmost, before taking a final decision, to persuade his Council of the soundness of the reasons for which he is unable to accept its view".

In the sphere of defence, it has already been agreed that the Indian defence member will take over all such functions as are not assigned to the Commander in Chief who as war member will continue to be a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. There will naturally be the closest consultation and collaboration between the two. Moreover, the Commander in Chief as a member of the Executive Council will be responsible to the Executive Council for all measures and policies originating from his department. The precise allocation of subjects for administration by the defence and war members respectively will also be left to the Viceroy and the conference of leaders for settlement with the Commander in Chief invited to take part in the discussions. In the event of disagreement, the matter will be referred to the War Cabinet in London, whose decision will be final.

If Churchill and Cripps would approve above generally, then through Viceroy, at London's direction, Nehru, Jinnah, and Rajago-

palachari could be brought together here and if necessary taken to London for final agreement. I can persuade Nehru and Rajagopalachari to attend meeting. Viceroy can get Jinnah. Before meeting I would have G. D. Birla, most prominent industrialist and backer of Gandhi, talk with Gandhi.

Both Congress and Cripps have stated there will be no further approach by either; therefore outside move must be made if India is to defend herself and not be another France. At this distance, I believe no one but President can move successfully. Nehru writes me today of "fierce feeling against Britain". America alone can save India for the United Nations cause and my suggestion ought not be disposed of on basis of meddling in internal affairs of a subject nation. I respectfully urge that saving India concerns America as much as Great Britain. The effort can not harm. It may be the miracle. I urge immediate consideration and being on the ground, pray for President's aid. Time of essence.

JOHNSON

845.01/186a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1942—4 p. m.

186. Your 263, May 4, 8 p. m. From the President for Colonel Johnson: "I want you to know how much I appreciate your efforts to solve the difficult problems involved in the Indian situation. The position in India today is largely military. Therefore any proposal for settlement has to be weighed from the viewpoint whether if successful, it would aid the military effort to an important extent and whether, if unsuccessful, it is likely to hamper that effort. As far as we can judge there is little chance that the formula which you propose would be acceptable to an important element in the Congress Party, even if it were accepted by some elements in the party, by other Indian groups and by the British. An unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem along the lines which you suggest would, if we are to judge by the results of the Cripps mission, further alienate the Indian leaders and parties from the British and possibly cause disturbances among the various communities. On balance, therefore, I incline to the view that at the present moment the risks involved in an unsuccessful effort to solve the problem outweigh the advantages that might be obtained if a satisfactory solution could be found."

HULL

845.01/187: Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, May 9, 1942—9 p. m.

[Received May 10—1: 25 a. m.]

276. For the President and Secretary. Department's 186, May 8, 4 p. m., received today. Nehru visited me at Irwin Hospital yesterday and again today and will continue his efforts to calm Indians, speed production and make them hate Japs.

Suffering nasal dust infection 2 weeks. Irwin Hospital last 4 days, minor operation. Sulfanilamide. Doctors insist must take at least month rest away from India dust. Plan to take first stratoliner home after I am able to travel. Please arrange top priority Ferry Command next stratoliner. Will leave Merrell in charge.

JOHNSON

845.01/189

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling)

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1942.

I had a lengthy conversation today with Mr. Graham Spry, who acted as Special Assistant to Sir Stafford Cripps on the latter's mission to India. Mr. Spry, who is well known to Mr. Max Thornburg,⁶⁸ is a Canadian national and, as I understand it, was associated with Sir Stafford for only a short period before the latter's trip to India.

Mr. Spry corrected several stories which have been current regarding Sir Stafford's relationship with Mr. Churchill. He said that both men had been unanimous in their opposition to Mr. Chamberlain and that, although they approached problems from a different point of view, he did not feel that there were any fundamental differences between them. Moreover, they had long been close, personal friends. Accordingly, he was quite sure that there was nothing in the story that Mr. Churchill had sent Sir Stafford to India in the hope of terminating the latter's political career. On the contrary, Mr. Spry said that he knew definitely that Sir Stafford had volunteered for this mission, which was very close to his heart.

From the beginning Sir Stafford Cripps had felt that there were only three chances out of seven of a successful outcome of his mission. Although he was naturally disappointed at the unsuccessful outcome, he was not greatly surprised. I asked Mr. Spry to what he attributed the failure of the mission. He replied that it was almost entirely

⁶⁸ Petroleum Adviser.

due to the efforts of Mr. Gandhi and four or five members of the Congress Working Committee who, although not particularly sympathetic with Gandhi, were quite willing to go along with him in their opposition to the Cripps plan since it coincided with their own narrow political views. Mr. Spry said that, surprising as it might seem, he was convinced that Gandhi had been successful in opposing a plan which would have gone far toward uniting the peoples of India with those of China and the United Nations. I asked him why this small group of four or five Indians on the Congress Working Committee was willing to go along with Gandhi, and he replied that it was entirely due to their unwillingness to accept political responsibility during wartime. These men reasoned that the British Government had got India into the war and that there was no political gain for the Indians to take over at this time. In other words, their ends were entirely selfish. Mr. Spry felt that Nehru, if he had had sole control, could have been dealt with without undue difficulty.

I asked Mr. Spry why Mr. Jinnah, head of the Moslem League, had disagreed to the Cripps proposal since it seemed to me that the proposal would have been quite acceptable to him and his associates. He said that as a matter of fact the plan was acceptable to Jinnah and the Moslem League and that Sir Stafford Cripps had had informal assurances from them on that point. However, the Moslem League did not wish to take a public stand in the matter until the All-India Congress had made a decision. Once that decision was unfavorable the Moslem League felt that for political reasons it, too, had to turn down the plan. Mr. Spry went on to say that at the time Sir Stafford Cripps left India he felt there was still a good chance of coming to some working arrangement with the Indian leaders. At the present time, however, in view of the attitude of the All-India Congress, which had now by a large vote adopted Mr. Gandhi's viewpoint of non-violent resistance, Mr. Spry felt there was little likelihood or possibility of a solution in the near future. I asked Mr. Spry whether he felt that if the Indian leaders had accepted Sir Stafford's proposal it would have contributed greatly toward the defense of India. He was not inclined to believe that the question of Indian independence had much to do with the defense of India, which was largely, if not entirely, a military matter. He went on to say that most people fail to realize that the recent Congress declaration was not entirely negative so far as the British were concerned. After all, Congress leaders do not propose to use non-violent resistance as against the British but only as against the Japanese. In other words, the Indian leaders did not propose to hamper the British war effort in India. Perhaps that was all that could be expected of them. In any case, volunteers were coming forward in India at the satisfactory rate of 50,000 a

month, and that number was all that could be equipped with India's present production.

Mr. Spry volunteered the information that Colonel Johnson had been helpful in many ways, that he and Sir Stafford Cripps had got along famously, and that, although Colonel Johnson was something of an enigma to the old-time Indian civil servants, he believed that Colonel Johnson's activities had been advantageous to all concerned. Mr. Spry did not seem to feel that there were any further steps that could be taken either here in Washington or in India that would be helpful to the existing situation.

In closing the conversation Mr. Spry referred to the influence of the Indian industrialists who apparently had influence not only with Mr. Gandhi and the Congress Party but also with the Hindu Mahasabha, both of which organizations these industrialists apparently helped support. Apparently the sole aim of these industrialists was to continue to make profits and for that reason they strongly disapproved of the scorched earth policy. They also endeavored through their influence with the Congress Party and other political organizations to feather their own nests by advocating higher protective tariffs for their products.

Mr. Spry impressed me as a very intelligent and liberal minded person who, as a Canadian national, saw both the British and the American point of view and who wished to do all he could to be helpful in making the views of each understood by the other. I gained the very definite impression, however, that he felt that for the time being at any rate the best way to handle the Indian problem was to let well enough alone.

123 Johnson, Louis A./33 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1942—3 p. m.

197. Personal for Colonel Johnson. Your 276, May 9, 9 p. m. The President, who has been consulted regarding your proposed return to the United States, did not recall that such a time table had been agreed upon. The President feels that your return to this country at the time proposed would be subject to misinterpretation both here and abroad and he hopes your plans can be adjusted accordingly.

I am sorry to learn of your illness and I hope you are now well on the road to recovery.

HULL

123 Johnson, Louis A./32 : Telegram

The Personal Representative of the President in India (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, May 14, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received May 14—4:30 a. m.]

282. For the President and Secretary. Operated on at Irwin Hospital last Monday and physical condition causes English, Indian, and American Army doctors all [to] agree highly imperative I should leave India at once for urgent additional medical attention in United States. Papers here have given report of operation and indicated I would return to America temporarily. Will issue statement saying I am returning for consultations and I am sure there will be no misinterpretation here (Department's 197, May 13, 3 p. m.). I am personally convinced that results may be fatal if after this illness I do not follow uniform medical advice and get away from the dust and to American hospital at earliest date. This is more imperative than first cable would indicate. Have tentative arrangement transportation tomorrow Friday and will appreciate confirming cable in light of the above explanation.

JOHNSON

123 Johnson, Louis A./35 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, May 16, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 1:23 p. m.]

293. For the President and Secretary from Colonel Johnson: "Leaving Karachi for Cairo today. Saw Foreign Secretary Thursday who assures my going will not be misinterpreted and who recommends seek further medical treatment immediately."

MERRELL

845.24/98 : Telegram

The Consul at Bombay (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

BOMBAY, May 20, 1942.

[Received May 21—8:45 a. m.]

385. Following is text of press release to be released in India morning of May 22 by American Technical Mission:

"The American Technical Mission spent about 5 weeks in India investigating India's war production and has visited representative plants in and around Calcutta, Jamshedpur, and Bombay that are producing munitions and equipment for the armed force. It has also had many conferences in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Jamshedpur, and

Bombay with Indian Government officials, and industrialists. On the basis of its investigation and studies, the Mission has prepared a preliminary report which it submitted today to His Excellency the Viceroy.

The Mission on its return to the United States will confer with the President, the Department of State, and the Board of Economic Warfare and give a report of its survey and the recommendations it has made to the Government of India. It will have a number of recommendations to make to the United States Government in addition to the 35 specific recommendations which it cabled from Calcutta and Bombay.⁶⁹ The Mission will then promptly prepare a comprehensive report of its work in India for the Government of India and the Government of the United States.

The function of the Mission was to make recommendations after investigation concerning ways and means by which the United States Government could assist in augmenting India's war production. The work of the Mission, therefore, has been directly related to the common war effort of the United Nations and has been in no way connected with the postwar industrial and commercial problems of India.

In transmitting the preliminary report of the Mission to His Excellency the Viceroy, the Chairman, Doctor Henry Grady, stated that the Government of India would probably not wish to publish the preliminary or final report for general distribution because it contains a great deal of confidential information which should not be made available to the enemy. The Mission would have felt very much more restricted in its statements with regard to war needs if it had believed that the report would be published. In his letter of transmittal Doctor Grady added that if His Excellency the Viceroy wished to publish a summary of the report, this might not be undesirable if confidential information pertaining to the war effort was not included.

The preliminary report which the Mission has submitted to His Excellency the Viceroy covers 25 pages of typed material and contains a number of recommendations. The recommendations made to the Government of India are based on a sympathetic and constructive approach to India's war production problems. War production has a fairly good start in India but must be developed very much further if India is to become the arsenal of the Middle and Near East.

The Mission's recommendations cover the problem of establishing a governmental and industrial organization for war, adequate to secure the effective coordination of India's production. Various suggestions have been made by the Mission as to how India might adapt its governmental organization to effect the purpose of maximizing war output. The Mission recommends no particular organization, but gives to the Government of India the various suggestions which have been made to it in this regard.

With the strengthening of the Government organization and the mobilization of industry so that the full conversion of peace time production to war time production may be brought about with the shipment of the tools and materials which the Mission has requested by cable, and with the improvement of transport communications and the handling of cargo at ports, the groundwork will be laid for national war production on a considerably augmented scale. The Mission is

⁶⁹ The extensive correspondence of the American Technical Mission concerning specific items is not printed.

asking the Government of India to review the plans of the military authorities with regard to quantities and types of war production in this area, not only for India, but also for the other United Nations in this sector of the war front.

With the determination of objectives based on current military planning the Mission will then recommend to the United States Government the sending of equipment for plant extensions and for the establishment of such new plants as the carrying out of the program will require.

The Mission will maintain for the time being its organization in Washington in order to carry on there its work of securing for India those things needed to make the country increasingly effective in producing materials essential to the winning of the war. There will also be sent to India on the basis of the Mission's recommendations a number of technicians and production executives who under the direction of the Government of India will work in the various plants, and thus assist in achieving those objectives for which the Mission was sent to India.

The Mission has received the fullest cooperation from the Government and industrialists of India. It has received many courtesies from the people of India and is deeply grateful for these manifestations of genuine friendliness. The Mission's purpose has been to attempt to inaugurate a period of closer collaboration between India and the United States in their common aim to destroy the aggressors. The Mission feels that, in general, it has been able to accomplish the things for which it came. [Apparent omission] the Government and industrialists of India, the Mission believes that its efforts will bear genuine fruit."

DONOVAN

845.24/99: Telegram

The Consul at Bombay (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

BOMBAY, May 21, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received May 21—2 p. m.]

387. Grady's 35. "Mission is flying to Karachi today and will leave there for Cairo May 22. Expect to arrive Washington about June 1st and to have available shortly thereafter preliminary report covering points raised by Economic Warfare as basis for early conference. Complete detailed report will become available after Mission's return. Mission greatly appreciates McCabe's ⁷⁰ prompt action on recommendation covering ferro molybdenum. His cable ⁷¹ was most helpful here as evidence of governmental support.

During Mission's stay in India it conferred with interested Government departments including Supply, Commerce, Communications and Defense in Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay. It met with country's leading businessmen especially those engaged in production and transportation and visited representative plants of concerns working on war orders. Cabled recommendations deal chiefly with materials and per-

⁷⁰ Thomas McCabe, Deputy Administrator, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

⁷¹ Telegram No. 230, May 12, 4 p. m., not printed.

sonnel immediately and urgently required to assist in Indian war effort. Some orders for materials supported by Mission were made prior to its arrival but were reendorsed after careful investigation because of special importance to essential production. Other orders originated in my Mission conference with Government officials and business leaders. When satisfied that materials would substantially assist war effort Mission support was given to orders placed by Supply Department. In many instances investigation included special visit to plants where materials were to be used.

Mission's recommendations are divided into two general categories: Those designed immediately to assist the war effort and those requiring a longer time to become effective. Cabled recommendations covering materials and personnel are of first type and have been specific. Long term recommendations have necessarily been more general in as much future requirements of army, navy and air force are not available. Marked expansion in production of munitions and other war materials can be accomplished only by detailed planning because of close inter-relationship between such production and steel, railway power and port capacities now fully employed and availability of essential raw materials. Shipping and the utilization of productive capacities in the United States and the United Kingdom are also factors. The Mission has recommended to Indian Government that detailed plans be made as soon as possible providing for coordinated expansion of productive facilities. Such plans can best be studied and approved in Washington or London as a part of broader problem of Allied strategy.

Cabling *en clair* Mission's press release⁷² issued today giving summary of recommendations contained in preliminary report to Indian Government.

Should Department wish to send cables in reply to those sent by Mission, please address Merrell, New Delhi."

DONOVAN

845.00/1351

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1942.

Participants: Colonel Johnson
Colonel Herrington
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling
Mr. Oakes
Mr. Parker

⁷² See telegram *supra*.

This memorandum may be prefaced by Colonel Johnson's remark that in his opinion the situation in India has deteriorated in the last two months to such an extent that unless the United States Government is prepared to send in the near future to India several divisions and 500 airplanes the Government would be wise to withdraw entirely from that theater of operations and to consider the country lost.

According to both Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington, distrust and dislike of the British has increased to such an extent that many Indians there view the Japanese in a friendly light. In this connection Colonel Johnson stated that the Inspector General of Police at Calcutta had informed him that in his opinion should the Japanese attempt to enter Calcutta they would be received with garlands by the civilian population, and that in fact many of the native policemen would assist in the welcome. The Inspector General was further of the opinion that at such time a massacre of the Europeans might easily take place, and it was that official's opinion that all Americans would be well advised to leave while an opportunity existed.

Colonel Herrington stated that 800,000 Indians had already left Calcutta and that the remainder of the population is ready to flee. It was said that the British have a considerable concentration of troops some miles up the only road leading to or from Calcutta with a view to rushing them into the city should an attack take place. That this road would at such a time become blocked with refugees appears certain, but Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington stated that the British military authorities were apparently untroubled by this problem.

Nehru, Rajagopalachari and others could at one time have formed a coalition which would have been able to act as a bulwark to the British in the present crisis had the necessary concessions been made. Jinnah and the industrialists were then prepared to cooperate with such a nationalist government as the British might have been able to create. In so far as Jinnah and the Moslem League are concerned, Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington think that their support for the British or for any scheme propounded by the British is pretty well assured under almost any circumstances. The industrialists, however, are becoming less amenable to British persuasion, and Birla—who is politically the most influential of the industrialists—had, in a conversation with Colonel Johnson, shortly before the latter's departure, definitely indicated that he was in growing agreement with Gandhi's contention that the British must go. On every side the feeling is increasing that the British must be gotten out of the country at all costs. Whether any solution is now possible is therefore problematical.

The Viceroy and others in authority were determined at the time of the Cripps Mission that necessary concessions should not be made and are still of the same opinion. In this connection Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington both expressed the firm conviction that the British are prepared to lose India, as they lost Burma, rather than make any concessions to the Indians in the belief that India will be returned to them after the war with the *status quo ante* prevailing. Colonel Johnson stated further that he had been reliably informed that the authorities did not propose to attempt any serious defense of India in the event of Japanese attack, and that he had so stated to Cripps. Cripps naturally refused to believe this, but was prevailed upon by Colonel Johnson to confront General Wavell with the allegation. Cripps is reported to have told Colonel Johnson later that Wavell had admitted that this was the case. It is Colonel Johnson's opinion that with the exception of such components of the Indian Army as may have been able to withdraw from Burma, there are only about 50,000 properly equipped soldiers of the Indian Army in India at the present time, and these badly trained. The size of the British garrison is said to be very small.

Lack of troops is aggravated by the poor quality of the British officer in India, and Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington stated that it was obvious that India had been used as a dumping ground for the least capable of the officer personnel. Wavell himself, however excellent a general he may once have been, is viewed as exhausted physically and nervously, and is considered to be not only incompetent himself but to possess an incompetent staff. In this connection it was stated that Wavell and the latter's G-2 had insisted that Lashio was still being held several days after it had fallen. Their knowledge even of the terrain in Assam is said to be faulty. Further incompetence is indicated by the wasteful manner in which American Lend-Lease material is being handled, sufficient storage space never having been provided, and inefficient disposal being made of the material upon its arrival. Complete indifference appears to prevail regarding the resultant deterioration of the material.

The seriousness of the political situation in India is further aggravated by the lack of means of defense in Ceylon. While the English were successful in beating off the first Japanese attack, they lost all but about 50 of their planes. The planes lost have never been replaced; the naval base at Trincomalee has been abandoned; and the ground forces are inadequate. It is Colonel Johnson's and Colonel Herrington's opinion that should the Japanese make another attack on Ceylon there is at the present time nothing to prevent them from occupying the island.

845.01/206

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1942.

Participants: Colonel Johnson
Colonel Herrington
Mr. Murray
Mr. Alling
Mr. Parker
Mr. Oakes

In the course of their conversation today in Mr. Murray's office, Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington both reported, without using the word, that in their opinion the British Government had deliberately sabotaged the Cripps Mission and indicated that likewise in their opinion the Government in London had never desired that the Mission be other than a failure. It appears to be their firm conviction that, had it not been for certain actions of the British Government, Cripps would have secured a settlement.

There follows the recountal given by Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington.

Upon Cripps' arrival in India, he set forth orally four points by which agreement on the part of the Congress and the Moslem League would have been assured. These four points were: 1. the India Office would be abolished; 2. the Viceroy's veto power would be rescinded; 3. dominion status would be granted immediately after the war; 4. the Indians would have immediate participation in the Government of India. According to Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington, the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League were prepared to accept the proposals on these grounds and had so stated, whereby collaboration with the British, in so far as the war effort is concerned, would have been assured. Settlement of differences of opinion regarding the manner in which the long-range provisions of the proposals were to be implemented would take place after the war.

That the essential political parties in India were prepared to come to an agreement was published in India and abroad. The Viceroy and/or Wavell apparently immediately notified London of the terms advanced by Cripps and warned London that agreement could be expected. London was likewise informed through press reports. London is then reported to have cabled Cripps that he had no authority to go beyond the draft proposals as prepared in London. Cripps was then obliged to inform Nehru that his offer could not vary from the written text. Nehru then came in great despair to see Colonel Johnson, explaining that no agreement was possible unless Cripps was

empowered to amplify the written proposals in the manner previously indicated. Colonel Johnson immediately called upon Cripps, pointing out that Nehru had informed him that he, Cripps, had withdrawn his previous terms, and asked for an explanation. Cripps is reported to have been extremely embarrassed and after some hesitation to have admitted that he had that afternoon received cabled instructions from London rescinding the authority which he had believed himself to possess.

Mr. Murray asked whether Cripps had willfully exceeded his authority in the first instance or, if not, what had occasioned the contretemps. Colonel Johnson replied that Cripps had been misled by a speech made by Churchill while Cripps was en route to India, in which the British Prime Minister expressed great hope for a successful settlement and intimated, in Cripps' opinion, that he, Cripps, could make such concessions as might in his discretion be necessary in order to effect a settlement.

Colonel Johnson continued that the British Government desired that the world believe that the proposals had failed of acceptance on the question of defense. This, according to Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington, is not the case. Colonel Johnson had advanced a plan whereby the Commander in Chief would have a position similar to that of General Marshall⁷⁸ in the United States with the added safeguard that no restrictions should be placed on the Commander in Chief's decisions in matters which he considered essential for the defense of the country. To satisfy the Indian demand for a voice in defense matters, there would be created a Defense Minister corresponding somewhat to our Secretary of War. Colonel Johnson had eventually convinced General Wavell that this was a satisfactory solution; the solution was satisfactory to the Congress and to Cripps; and hence agreement on this point was actually reached.

Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington both maintained that in their opinion neither Churchill, the Viceroy nor Wavell desired that the Cripps Mission be a success and that in fact they were determined that it should not be. They stated that they believed the telegraphic instructions previously mentioned to have been sent solely to prevent the success which Cripps was on the point of attaining. Cripps is said to have admitted that he considered it possible that Churchill had sent him to India with the deliberate intention of destroying his political future.

Colonel Johnson emphasized that he had injected himself into the discussions at the written request of Sir Stafford. This he said had never been made clear despite Sir Stafford's promise that it would be.

⁷⁸ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

Colonel Johnson's and Colonel Herrington's remarks as set forth above have explained the statement previously heard from several sources that the British wilfully sabotaged the Cripps proposals. It is not thought, however, that this claim has been proved. With regard to the four points made orally by Sir Stafford, the latter two as listed earlier in this memorandum are contained in the draft proposals. Abolition of the India Office would appear to have only administrative significance in so far as London is concerned and as a factor in the outcome of the discussions may be disregarded. However, the remaining point, namely, agreement to rescind the veto power of the Viceroy, is of supreme importance, and is probably the point on which the discussions collapsed. Unwillingness on the part of the British Government in London to make any such concession, or insistence on the part of the Viceroy and Wavell that no such concession should be made, does not in itself indicate that Churchill, the Viceroy or Wavell were in any way intent upon "sabotaging" the proposals. To have deprived the Viceroy of this power would have been to make supreme for the duration of the war the majority group in the Viceroy's Executive Council. This group would have been responsible to no authority or to no person other than themselves. The Congress, as the leading party in India, would presumably have had a definite majority in the Executive Council, and the Hindus certainly would have had one. Thus there would have been established for the duration of the war an irresponsible Congress-Hindu Government and this the British have always insisted could not be permitted. Sir Stafford himself, in discussing the failure of the Mission, is reported repeatedly in the press to have maintained that an Executive Council responsible to nothing but itself was unthinkable if any consideration was to be given to fairness and justice. The question arises in this connection as to whether Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington are correct in believing that Jinnah was willing to acquiesce to any such arrangement. If, for reasons best known to himself, he did not protest publicly, it would appear that he could not have failed to protest privately to the Viceroy. Both Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington dismiss Jinnah and the Moslem League as creatures of the British. While the latter have unquestionably used both for their own ends, it is felt that the Moslem League is a force in India which the British can by no means ignore. It happens often to be in their own interests not to ignore it, but that does not signify that the force is fictitious.

While Colonel Johnson and Colonel Herrington may be correct in believing that Churchill, the Viceroy and Wavell were pleased to see the Cripps Mission result in failure, it is not considered that a sound basis has been set forth for the belief that Cripps was denied necessary discretionary powers in order that the Mission should fail.

III. Concern of the United States Regarding the Threat of a Civil Disobedience Campaign in India Against the British

845.01/191 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, May 21, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received May 21—2 : 45 p. m.]

304. For the President, Secretary and Colonel Louis Johnson.⁷⁴ Information received from extremely reliable private sources in Bombay and Wardha is to the effect that Gandhi ⁷⁵ is planning to launch mass civil disobedience in near future in contrast to his Satyagraha Program instituted 2 years ago which was civil disobedience only by selected individuals. Gandhi went to Bombay last week to consult with his most trusted lieutenants and the latter (Patel, Prasad, and Gopich and among others) are now touring the provinces to ascertain what measure of support mass civil disobedience would receive. Gandhi has been warned that such a program would result in civil war in this country, cause absolute chaos, and make India an easy prey for the Japanese. He is reliably reported to be unmoved by such warnings.

It is anticipated that the movement, aside from the usual disobedience of the law, will take the form of agitation against recruitment, war production and the general war effort. It is estimated that Gandhi will require from 4 to 6 weeks to organize the movement properly. I am firmly convinced that if this program is launched India is lost as far as being of any further use to the United Nations is concerned.

Recent developments indicate that the Gandhi element in the Congress is now in the saddle.

The only possible means of thwarting Gandhi's new move would appear to be an agreement by Nehru,⁷⁶ Rajagopalachari ⁷⁷ and Jinnah ⁷⁸ to form a National Government at the center. Gandhi could then hardly launch civil disobedience against his own people.

As far as I can ascertain, Gandhi has not consulted Nehru and it is almost certain that he has not consulted Rajagopalachari.

⁷⁴ Personal Representative of the President in India ; at this time in the United States.

⁷⁵ Mohandas K. Gandhi, leader of civil disobedience movement in India.

⁷⁶ Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress Party leader ; associated with Gandhi in opposition to British rule in India.

⁷⁷ C. Rajagopalachari, former Premier of Madras ; Nationalist leader.

⁷⁸ Mohamed Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League.

Nehru returns to Delhi from a brief holiday on Saturday morning and Berry ⁷⁹ proposes to see him soon after his arrival. A report of the interview will be telegraphed to you.

MERRELL

845.01/192 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, May 25, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 1:51 p. m.]

312. For the President, Secretary and Colonel Louis Johnson. Berry saw Nehru yesterday morning shortly after the latter's arrival from Lahore. The following is Berry's summary of the interview:

"I informed Nehru that I was very much disturbed by a report received by me from what I considered an unimpeachable source to the effect that Gandhi was planning to launch mass civil disobedience in the near future (reference this office's 304, May 21, 4 p. m.). I pointed out that my Government would naturally be intensely interested in knowing his reaction to such a program. He replied that he had been away at an isolated place and consequently out of touch with developments for several days. He accordingly found it very difficult to give me his reaction without first having an opportunity of 'ascertaining Mr. Gandhi's present position'. This was precisely the non-committal type of reply that I had anticipated and I proceeded to give him details of the form which Gandhi's program would take as reported to me in order to give him another opportunity of stating his reaction. He was not to be drawn, however, and replied that while he had, of course, heard various rumors he had not before been supplied with such detail. I explained my own views of the very serious consequences that might be expected of a mass civil disobedience program and suggested that perhaps I was exaggerating the seriousness of such a movement. He answered in a flash that 'No, the result of such a program might be very serious indeed'. He stated that he had proposed to go to Allahabad Sunday night but that on the basis of our interview he would now proceed to Wardha. He promised that, after learning Gandhi's position, he would, if at all possible, let me have a preliminary statement of his own position."

The fact that Nehru finds himself unable or unwilling to state his position on a question likely to have such catastrophic consequences as mass civil disobedience without consultation with Gandhi, leads me to suspect that he is veering to his master's point of view. This suspicion is supported by Nehru's statement in a speech at Lahore on Thursday night that the Congress could never accept coalition ministries (with the Moslem League) in the provinces because to do so would mean that Congress accepted a compromise with the British.

⁷⁹ James Lampton Berry, Secretary of the American Mission at New Delhi.

This is only another way of saying what Gandhi has been writing in his weekly paper, namely, that the British must withdraw from India at once. Nehru also stated at a press conference in Lahore on Friday that Hindu-Moslem unity could not be secured as long as the British are in India. This is precisely Gandhi's own view.

Since this message was begun Nehru has handed Berry the following message with the request that it be cabled to Colonel Johnson:

"On my return after 10 days' absence in the mountains, I find considerable deterioration in situation and events seem to be marching towards internal crisis. The Government of India's attitude and policies as well as London pronouncements on India exceedingly irritating to Indians. Gandhi's recent writings betray great bitterness and do something to put an end to intolerable situation in which Indians treated contemptuously as pawns. He feels unable to remain passive spectator and demands British withdrawal from India. In effect this means recognition of Indian independence. While Congress demand same, it is uncertain what attitude Congress will take up in regard to any new action suggested by Gandhi. But Gandhi by himself can powerfully affect mass opinion and any step he may take will have far-reaching consequences, though it may be limited in scope and area to begin with. For him at this age, it is his final struggle for Indian freedom and he is bent on carrying it to end. While declaring his desire to resist Japanese aggression in India, he emphasizes that present government in India is not only a continuing insult to Indians but is also incapable of defending India effectively and every risk should be taken to end it. While there is widespread sympathy with this nationalist approach, there is also among many an apprehension that this may have adverse reactions on international and war situations. No clear programme outlined so far or decisions taken, but Gandhi appears resolved to persevere. Congress executive will meet soon to consider situation. I am much perturbed at some of these developments and am proceeding immediately to Wardha to see Gandhi for personal talks to clarify situation."

Nehru has now definitely promised to furnish Berry with a statement of his position after seeing Gandhi.

MERRELL

845.01/193 : Telegram

The Consul at Bombay (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

BOMBAY, May 29, 1942—1 p. m.
[Received May 29—6:02 a. m.]

400. The Maharaja of Indore has addressed in the form of an open letter to President Roosevelt a strongly worded appeal for the direct intervention of the United States in the present impasse between India and Great Britain. This letter was delivered to Reuter's and appeared in the Indian press today and it has probably had publicity in the

United States. Does the Department wish me to telegraph either a summary or the full text?

My comments on this letter are as follows: It is my opinion that the Maharaja's attitude as expressed in this telegram has very little support among other ruling Princes. It is also my opinion that the Maharaja's letter to the President has been prompted by his very real concern over the critical political situation now developing in India which some experienced observers believe may result in mass civil disobedience within the next few months. See my despatch number 517, May 19.⁸⁰

The Maharaja of Indore has an American wife now in the United States. See my telegram number 319.⁸¹

DONOVAN

845.01/199

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1942.

Sir Ronald Campbell⁸² called this afternoon to see me in the absence from Washington of Lord Halifax.⁸³

The Minister handed me a message from his Foreign Office which was to the following effect. The Maharajah Holkar of Indore has addressed a letter to the President urging intervention by the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in order that these three powers might undertake the immediate arbitration of the disputes between India and Great Britain. The message further stated that the United States Consul in Bombay had handed a copy of this letter to Reuters press agency and that consequently at least a portion of the communication has been published in the press. The message continued by stating that the Maharanee of Indore, who is an American woman, is on her way to the United States with the original letter addressed to the President.

The British Government complained that this action on the part of the Maharajah was a violation of his treaty obligations, and stated that the Maharajah was a psychopathic case to whom no importance should be attributed. The British Government consequently requested that in the event that the President thought it necessary to send any reply to such a communication when he received it, the reply be limited to a curt acknowledgment "to be sent through official channels".

⁸⁰ Not printed.

⁸¹ Dated May 5, 6 p. m., not printed.

⁸² British Minister.

⁸³ British Ambassador.

I asked the Minister if he would let me know what "official channels" the British Government had in mind. Did it refer to the Indian Agent General in Washington or to the British Ambassador? Sir Ronald replied that in this case the British Ambassador was intended. I also inquired why the United States Consul in Bombay should have intervened in this question in the manner indicated. Sir Ronald Campbell said he had no information on that point.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.0011 Pacific War/2513

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at my request. I said that, while I would not undertake to go into the problems of India and other countries, including Great Britain, during the past twenty-four hours I had received disquieting news from both China and India in regard to the possibility of a slowing up of Chinese resistance arising out of a spirit of discouragement on the part of Chiang Kai-shek. Furthermore, my reports referred to possible explosive conditions making their appearance in India during coming weeks and months. I added that I had nothing to offer in any way, but merely desired to make inquiry of the Ambassador regarding the above after bringing this information to his attention. The Ambassador said he knew very little about the situation. He then asked if, in my opinion, an impartial commission should be sent to India to investigate and report on conditions. I replied that I was not sufficiently informed about all of the complex problems and conditions in the Indian situation to enable me to discuss the matter fully or definitely with him. The Ambassador knew nothing in particular about the Chinese situation but said that he was interested in getting the information which had come to me regarding both China and India.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

845.01/196 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

NEW DELHI, June 4, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received June 5—9:42 a. m.]

333. For the President, Secretary, and Colonel Louis Johnson. Berry has just received from Nehru the following message with the request that it be telegraphed to Colonel Johnson. Nehru also requests that Colonel Johnson kindly acknowledge receipt of the message (reference last paragraph of my 312, May 25, 10 a. m.).

"I have visited Mr. Gandhi and discussed the situation with him and have also had occasion to judge public feeling at an important meeting of the Congressmen of our Province (the United Provinces) which is a key Province in India. I propose to return to Gandhi soon for fuller conversations.

Gandhi has no desire to precipitate matters or to embarrass present war effort. He is also firm in his decision that Japanese aggression in India must be resisted. He warmly repudiated suggestion that his recent writings encouraged Japanese. But he was definite that recognition independence India essential now from every point of view, including that of defence, and no problem can be solved except on that basis. Every attempt to postpone this worsens situation and every possible risk involved in independence preferable and safer than certain deterioration otherwise. Present defense artificial and isolated from people and British policy antagonizing every group including Indian officers and army. Only on basis of independence can reality and firmness be introduced in defense and other matters, otherwise likelihood of cracking up as in Burma. Gandhi prepared that India should treat this matter on equal basis as ally of Britain and others but not as a subordinate in any shape. No arrangement possible on basis of India's subordination or subjection.

Gandhi also agitated both that growing repressive policy of Government and continuing differential treatment of Indian evacuees from Burma and [apparent omission] in India. Official policy greatly resented all over country and adding to bitterness. My closest colleague in my province, well known anti-fascist, recently interned without trial and my request for jail interview with him rejected. Newspapers being suppressed. Large populations in rural areas suddenly ordered leave homes without adequate notice or compensation or provision for transport, housing or land. Gandhi feels that where patently unreasonable and unjust orders passed they may have to be disobeyed by people concerned.

In both these matters public opinion is strongly with Gandhi and Congress supports him. Rajagopalachari likely to make no difference except to stiffen Congress attitude which is one of extreme sentiment against British policy. Future developments uncertain but continuing governmental repression may lead to relatively small local conflicts. Gandhi does not intend starting any big movement unless he is forced to do so by British policy. He feels he cannot remain passive spectator of what is happening and any risks preferable to submission to repression of people and consequent spiritual degradation. While both Gandhi and Congress declared inability to associate themselves with British war effort in present circumstances no intention of impeding military operations in any way. But popular feeling against British Government and policy undoubtedly isolates that effort. Congress' advice to civil population which is unarmed and untrained is to non cooperate with aggressor in every way and obstruct him. No other method of resistance open to them. This does not refer to military defense which will continue.

Gandhi anxious to help China but says British Government and policy stand in way of effective help given by Indian people. With freedom India will do her utmost to help. Gandhi also anxious that American opinion should not misunderstand him. He has emphasized Indian independence as this is only way both for India and for progressive nations to utilize India's great resources in cause of world

freedom. And he cannot submit to treatment of India as a chattel by others. This treatment demonstrates that Britain determined to obstruct Indian and Asiatic freedom. The larger cause demands completely new outlook towards Asiatic nations and as evidence of this recognition of India's independence.

My greetings and good wishes to Colonel Johnson. I hope he is rapidly recovering from his illness."

MERRELL

845.01/193 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Bombay (Donovan)

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1942—6 p. m.

216. Your 400, May 29, 1 p. m. For your strictly confidential information, representations regarding your office have been made to the Department by the British Government in connection with the letter to the President from the Maharaja of Indore. It is requested, therefore, that you inform the Department telegraphically of the manner in which the letter in question came to your attention, stating whether there was direct correspondence between your office and the Maharaja of Indore or his government on the subject and whether your office was in any way instrumental in delivering the letter or a copy thereof to the press.

HULL

845.01/198 : Telegram

The Consul at Bombay (Donovan) to the Secretary of State

BOMBAY, June 8, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received June 8—2:26 p. m.]

424. This office had no correspondence whatever either direct or indirect with the Maharaja of Indore on this subject. Your 216.⁸⁵ Neither I nor any member of my staff were associated in any way with the preparation of this letter.

At the request of a friend who is a press correspondent, I delivered to Reuters a sealed cover which unknown to me contained text of Maharaja's letter. I did this as a personal favor to save time for my friend since I happened to be passing by Reuters office. Later that day I was informed by my friend of contents of cover. See my airmail despatch 567, June 3.⁸⁶ This despatch and my 400⁸⁷ were written after full text of letter had appeared Bombay *Times of India* May 29.

DONOVAN

⁸⁵ *Supra.*

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ Telegram dated May 29, 1 p. m., p. 665.

845.24/117: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, June 10, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received June 11—3: 54 a. m.]

354. The following self explanatory announcement was made this afternoon:

"The Governor General in Council has considered the report of the American Technical Mission and has decided to implement its recommendations to the maximum extent possible. In pursuance of one of the most important of these recommendations a committee of the Executive Council has been set up to deal with and coordinate problems of war production, transportation, communications, finance, rationing of goods and materials, and all connected matters. This committee will be known as the 'War Resources Committee of Council' and will consist of His Excellency the Governor General, President, His Excellency the Defence Member, the Supply Member, Vice President and the Finance, Commerce and Communications Members.

The committee will have a whole time secretary. It will meet from day to day and one of its first tasks will be to push on with the action already taken on the report. The committee will when necessary coopt other [apparent omission] of India and its decisions will be binding on all authorities in India."

There is no news as to changes in the composition of the Council.

It is also separately announced that a new office has been created under the Supply Department to be known as the Directors General of Ship Repairs and Ship Construction. This office is apparently to coordinate efforts of existing agencies and will be responsible to the Government of India and in appropriate cases through the Government of India to His Majesty's Government.

MERRELL

845.00/1363

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1942.

The Agent General for India, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, called at his request. I inquired about the general trend of world affairs as they affected his country. He replied that the United States' victories in the Coral Sea and at Midway had very much heartened the people of his country and that the morale had definitely improved. I then proceeded to make several inquiries of him. First, I asked him the size of the Indian Army. He replied that there were 750,000 men in the Army, of which 250,000 were well trained and good fighting troops. He added that they were without airplanes and sufficient

tanks, et cetera, et cetera, leaving the impression that they were not in a state of military preparedness to fight effectively. I then inquired as to how soon they could get ready to make a real fight if they were so disposed. He parried the question by falling back on the 250,000 men who he said could fight almost any time and by referring also to the fact that his country had sent some twenty odd divisions abroad to fight in Africa, Syria, Iran, Iraq and one division to defend Singapore.

I asked him pointblank as to what were the real points on which Cripps and the Indian officials and leaders clashed with the resultant collapse of the Mission.⁸⁸ He said that one point was that political leaders said that since Great Britain had assumed responsibility for the protection of India and since they were looking forward to freedom at no distant date, they felt that it was Britain's responsibility to furnish protection. The second point that governed the situation was that the British, while proposing at the end of the war to place India on all fours with other self-governing dominions in the British Empire, insisted that all treaties existing between States in India and the Central Government should not be breached unilaterally. This was understood to be in deference to the Indian Princes who had supported the British Government in carrying on the war. He said this latter was the biggest cause of the breakdown of the Cripps Mission. I inquired whether a difference of opinion about who should dominate the military operations of India against the Axis nations was not another controlling factor. He replied that in his judgment it was not; that the British agreed that the Indian officials could have complete control of all military forces and supplies, et cetera, so far as the internal situation was concerned, but that when it came to directing military forces externally against the Axis powers the British were to have supreme command in the person of General Wavell. To the objection of the Indian leaders that India should have a greater voice in the conduct of the war the British reply was that an Indian official was on their Supreme War Council exactly as were an Australian, a Canadian and a South African official.

I inquired about the future situation and stated that Gandhi is evidently doing all in his power to play into the hands of the Japanese by preaching non-resistance and that no practical steps of resistance were being advocated by the other leaders, including Nehru. He said that the first step would be to supply India with tanks and airplanes and that this would take care of the situation against a possible Japanese attack which he did not anticipate within the next few months. I inquired as to what strength and influence Gandhi is ex-

⁸⁸ For correspondence on the Cripps Mission to India, see pp. 619 ff.

exercising to lead the Indian people on the wrong course at this stage. He said that Gandhi did not have great influence in spreading his doctrines but it was only when he would go to a given city, such as Calcutta, and Bombay, and call on the people to adopt his policy of non-resistance that his influence would be heavy. To this I replied that he could within a short time go to the center of many of the most populous areas and get in deadly results by his preachments. To this nothing was said in reply.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

845.01/203 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, June 15, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received June 15—4: 08 p. m.]

374. Conversations between Gandhi, Nehru and Azad^{88a} at Wardha are drawing to a close. The impression given by Gandhi's statements in *Harijan* and to American correspondents is that he had definitely decided to launch a movement designed to implement his recommendation that the British withdraw from India but what form the movement would take is not made clear and may not yet have been defined. In June 7 *Harijan* Gandhi wrote "I feel that I cannot afford to wait, I have decided that even at certain risks which are obviously involved I must ask the people to resist;" to the Associated Press correspondent, he stated that he was going to start a movement which would be felt all over the world and that it would occupy British attention. He would not or could not tell the American journalists what specific action he was planning.

The telegram which follows quotes excerpts from the June 14 *Harijan* on this subject.

Nehru . . . seems . . . to act somewhat as a moderating influence on Gandhi notwithstanding his endorsement of Gandhi's demand for British withdrawal and the statement attributed to him that "we would not like the American Army landing in India and overrunning this country". It may be significant that since talking with Nehru the Mahatma has several times protested that (his) program did not constitute a virtual invitation to the Japanese to enter India.

MERRELL

^{88a} Maulana Azad, President of the Congress Party.

845.00/1359a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell)

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1942—3 p. m.

279. It is imperative that the Department be kept as fully informed as possible regarding all factors affecting the internal security situation in India. A telegraphic report outlining the situation as perceived at present by you should be submitted. Your appraisal of the situation should be cabled at weekly intervals thereafter, with particular reference to such developments as may be occurring in connection with Gandhi's threatened mass civil disobedience. Any information of special significance should of course be reported immediately.

HULL

845.01/211

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request.

I inquired as to just what he had meant some days ago in his conversation with me⁸⁹ when he raised the question of whether an impartial mission to India might be feasible and advisable. The Ambassador replied that after my mention of India in our conversation and his mention of a possible mission, he had communicated with the Secretary of State for India^{89a} and asked his opinion. The Ambassador said that that official had replied that a mission of one or more individuals sent by some American university to India to investigate and report on India's constitutional future, with suggestions as to a solution, might be beneficial in an educational way to America and might also have some advantageous effect on the Indian situation.

In any event, the Ambassador said that such a proposed mission could have no effect on the immediate situation in India, especially since Gandhi is almost daily threatening some new and far-reaching development. The Ambassador did not undertake to minimize these possibilities of trouble which Gandhi is threatening to create. Instead he seemed to prefer just to say nothing on the question. The Ambassador, in answer to a question as to what Gandhi's methods and purposes primarily would be, said that he supposed they would be to have the people disregard the law and to refuse any cooperation with the military forces and authorities.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁸⁹ See memorandum of conversation, June 3, p. 667.

^{89a} Leopold S. Amery.

845.01/196: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell)

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1942—6 p. m.

286. Your 333, June 4, 7 p. m. Mr. Nehru's message was communicated to Colonel Johnson who is still at the Mayo Clinic, but expected to return to Washington next week since he is showing improvement. Colonel Johnson has requested by telephone that a message in the following sense be given to Mr. Nehru from him:

"I have the greatest sympathy for you in your position. I am very happy over the speeches that you have made advocating continued opposition to Japanese aggression. I want you to know that I have in no way changed my personal opinion and I shall act in accordance therewith on my return to Washington.

I believe you should know that Mr. Gandhi's statements are being misunderstood in the United States and are being construed as opposing our war aims. I hope you have seen Mr. Welles' recent speech.⁹⁰ If you have not you can obtain a copy from Berry.

My warmest regards."

HULL

845.01/210: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, June 21, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 1: 20 p. m.]

405. Following is full text which will not be published of Gandhi letter to Chiang Kai-shek as requested in your number 292 of June 19, 6 p. m.⁹¹

"Sevagram, Wardha C. P. June 14, 1942.

Dear Generalissimo, I can never forget the 5 hours' close contact I had with you and your noble wife in Calcutta. I had always felt drawn towards you in your fight for freedom, and that contact and our conversation brought China and her problems still nearer to me. Long ago, between 1905 and 1913, when I was in South Africa, I was in constant touch with the small Chinese colony in Johannesburg. I knew them first as clients and then as comrades in the Indian passive resistance struggle in South Africa. I came in touch with them in Mauritius also. I learnt then to admire their thrift, industry, resourcefulness and internal unity. Later in India I had a very fine Chinese friend living with me for a few years and we all learnt to like him.

I have thus felt greatly attracted towards your great country and, in common with my countrymen, our sympathy has gone out to you

⁹⁰ Presumably Mr. Welles' address of June 18, 1942, Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1942, p. 548.

⁹¹ Not printed.

in your terrible struggle. Our mutual friend Jawaharlal Nehru, whose love of China is only excelled if at all by his love of his own country, has kept us in intimate touch with the developments of the Chinese struggle.

Because of this feeling I have towards China and my earnest desire that our two great countries should come closer to one another and cooperate to their mutual advantage, I am anxious to explain to you that my appeal to the British power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape or form to weaken India's defence against the Japanese or embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country's freedom. That problem does not arise before me as I am clear that India cannot gain her freedom in this way, and a Japanese domination of either India or China would be equally injurious to the other country and to world peace. That domination must therefore be prevented and I should like India to play her natural and rightful part in this.

I feel India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India has been a helpless witness of the withdrawals from Malay, Singapore and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a repetition of what befell these unfortunate countries. But unless we are free, we can do nothing to prevent it, and the same process might well occur again, crippling India and China disastrously. I do not want a repetition of this tragic tale of woe.

Our proffered help has repeatedly been rejected by the British Government and the recent failure of the Cripps Mission has left a deep wound which is still running. Out of that anguish has come the cry for immediate withdrawal of British power so that India can look after herself and help China to the best of her ability.

I have told you of my faith in non-violence and of my belief in the effectiveness of this method if the whole nation could turn to it. That faith in it is as firm as ever. But I realize that India today as a whole has not that faith and belief, and the Government in Free India would be formed from the various elements composing the nation.

Today the whole of India is impotent and feels frustrated (the Indian Army consists largely of people who have joined up because of economic pressure). They have no feeling of a cause to fight for, and in no sense are they a national army. Those of us who would fight for a cause, for India and China, with armed forces or with non-violence, cannot, under the foreign heel, function as they want to. And yet our people know for certain that India free can play even a decisive part not only on her own behalf, but also on behalf of China and world peace. Many, like me, feel that it is not proper or manly to remain in this helpless state and allow events to overwhelm us when a way to effective action can be opened to us. They feel, therefore, that every possible effort should be made to ensure independence and that freedom of action which is so urgently needed. This is the origin of my appeal to the British power to end immediately the unnatural connection between Britain and India.

Unless we make that effort there is grave danger of public feeling in India going into wrong and harmful channels. There is every

likelihood of subterranean sympathy for Japan growing simply in order to weaken and oust British authority in India. This feeling may take the place of robust confidence in our ability never to look to outsiders for help in winning our freedom. We have to learn self-reliance and develop the strength to work out our own salvation. This is only possible if we make a determined effort to free ourselves from bondage. That freedom has become a present necessity to enable us to take our due place among the free nations of the world.

To make it perfectly clear that we want to prevent in every way Japanese aggression, I would personally agree, and I am sure the Government of Free India would agree, that the Allied powers might, under treaty with us, keep their armed forces in India and use the country as a base for operations against the threatened Japanese attack.

I need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author of the new move in India, I shall take no hasty action. And whatever action I may recommend will be governed by the consideration that it should not injure China, or encourage Japanese aggression in India or China. I am trying to enlist world opinion in favor of a proposition which to me appears self-proved and which must lead to the strengthening of India's and China's defence. I am also educating public opinion in India and conferring with my colleagues. Needless to say any movement against the British Government with which I may be connected will be essentially non-violent. I am straining every nerve to avoid a conflict with British authority. But if in the vindication of the freedom which has become an immediate desideratum, this becomes inevitable, I shall not hesitate to run any risk however great.

Very soon you will have completed 5 years of war against Japanese aggression and invasion and all the sorrow and misery that these have brought to China. My heart goes out to the people of China in deep sympathy and in admiration for their heroic struggle and endless sacrifices in the cause of their country's freedom and integrity against tremendous odds. I am convinced that this heroism and sacrifice cannot be in vain; they must bear fruit. To you, to Madam Chiang and to the great people of China, I send my earnest and sincere wishes for your success. I look forward to the day when a free India and a free China will cooperate together in friendship and brotherhood for their own good and for the good of Asia and the world.

In anticipation of your permission, I am taking the liberty of publishing this letter in *Harijan*.

Yours sincerely, M. K. Gandhi."

MERRELL

845.24/168b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi
(Merrell)

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1942—11 p. m.

299. Please convey to Sir Homi Mody ⁹² the following message from Dr. Grady: ⁹³

⁹² Supply member of the Viceroy's Executive Council.

⁹³ Henry F. Grady, Chairman of American Technical Mission to India.

"Congratulations on the establishment of the War Resources Committee of Council. I believe this to be a long step forward in your program for the intensification of industrial production. In as much as this program is to be based in part on the procurement of Lend-Lease material from the United States and upon the advice of American technicians, whose services have been requested by your Government, it seems desirable to me that an American representative be appointed to coordinate and direct these efforts to assist the Government of India, and I am so recommending to the Department of State. It has further occurred to me that, although the members of the War Resources Committee are undoubtedly the appropriate officials to consider questions of major policies, their other duties may preclude them from devoting their full time and energy to the important task with which they are faced. May I be bold enough to suggest, therefore, that, to perform the actual administrative work involved, a subcommittee be formed to consist of the Secretaries of the five governmental departments represented on your Committee, and that a man be selected as Chairman of that subcommittee who has marked executive ability and broad economic experience such as Jenkins. May I further suggest that if a representative of the United States (as mentioned above) is appointed, he also be made a member of this subcommittee so that the work of the two Governments might be fully coordinated. If you think well of this suggestion, I shall do all that I can to implement it here."

HULL

*Mr. Mohandas K. Gandhi to President Roosevelt*⁹⁴

SEVAGRAM, VIA WARDHA (India),
1 July, 1942.

DEAR FRIEND: I twice missed coming to your great country. I have the privilege of having numerous friends there both known and unknown to me. Many of my countrymen have received and are still receiving higher education in America. I know too that several have taken shelter there. I have profited greatly by the writings of Thoreau and Emerson. I say this to tell you how much I am connected with your country. Of Great Britain I need say nothing beyond mentioning that in spite of my intense dislike of British Rule, I have numerous personal friends in England whom I love as dearly as my own people. I had my legal education there. I have therefore nothing but good wishes for your country and Great Britain. You will therefore accept my word that my present proposal, that the British should unreservedly and without reference to the wishes of the people of India immediately withdraw their rule, is prompted by the friendliest intention. I would like to turn into

⁹⁴ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
430627—60—44

good will the ill will which, whatever may be said to the contrary, exists in India towards Great Britain and thus enable the millions of India to play their part in the present war.

My personal position is clear. I hate all war. If, therefore, I could persuade my countrymen, they would make a most effective and decisive contribution in favour of an honourable peace. But I know that all of us have not a living faith in non-violence. Under foreign rule however we can make no effective contribution of any kind in this war, except as helots.

The policy of the Indian National Congress, largely guided by me, has been one of non-embarrassment to Britain, consistently with the honourable working of the Congress, admittedly the largest political organisation, of the longest standing in India. The British policy as exposed by the Cripps mission and rejected by almost all parties has opened our eyes and has driven me to the proposal I have made. I hold that the full acceptance of my proposal and that alone can put the Allied cause on an unassailable basis. I venture to think that the Allied declaration that the Allies are fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the individual and for democracy sounds hollow, so long as India and, for that matter, Africa are exploited by Great Britain, and America has the Negro problem in her own home. But in order to avoid all complications, in my proposal I have confined myself only to India. If India becomes free, the rest must follow, if it does not happen simultaneously.

In order to make my proposal fool-proof I have suggested that, if the Allies think it necessary, they may keep their troops, at their own expense in India, not for keeping internal order but for preventing Japanese aggression and defending China. So far as India is concerned, she must become free even as America and Great Britain are. The Allied troops will remain in India during the war under treaty with the Free India Government that may be formed by the people of India without any outside interference, direct or indirect.

It is on behalf of this proposal that I write this to enlist your active sympathy.

I hope that it would commend itself to you.

Mr. Louis Fischer is carrying this letter to you.

If there is any obscurity in my letter, you have but to send me word and I shall try to clear it.

I hope finally that you will not resent this letter as an intrusion but take it as an approach from a friend and well wisher of the Allies.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

845.00/1593

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1942.

Sir Girja Bajpai came in to see me, at his request.

He said he wanted to review certain matters which had gone on regarding the possible change in status of India. He then gave me a verbal summary of the documents which he had already presented to Wallace Murray.⁹⁵

The gist of this was that Lord Halifax had been working on a possible plan for India. He had submitted this plan (it is indicated in the memorandum handed by Sir Girja to Mr. Murray⁹⁶) to Sir Girja, who had told him, rather bluntly, that he did not think it would work. Being asked for an alternative plan, Sir Girja had said that he thought that the only way now of handling matters was to announce to India that she would be given independence on a date certain; that if by that time, they had achieved a full unity of the Empire, independence would be substantially complete, subject to the Empire's joining whatever cooperative international organization was then operative; but if unity had not been achieved, then the British Empire, or a cooperative group of nations, as the case might be, would undertake the defense of the Indian Empire, and the component parts of it would be allowed to maintain forces for police purposes only. He said Lord Halifax had agreed to consider the matter further and talk about it in London.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

845.00/1378 : Telegram

*The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary
of State*

NEW DELHI, July 14, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received July 15—7:31 a. m.]

489. The resolution of the Working Committee⁹⁷ (reference my 488, July 14, 3 p. m.⁹⁸) is considered comparatively moderate and bears witness to the efforts of Nehru and Azad (reference my 476, July 9, 7 p. m. and 484, July 11, 2 p. m.).⁹⁹ It will be apparent to the Department that the resolution is remarkably similar, in some

⁹⁵ Adviser on Political Relations.

⁹⁶ Dated July 3, not printed.

⁹⁷ For text, see British Cmd. 6430: *India, Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's responsibility for the Disturbances in India, 1942-43*, p. 42.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

⁹⁹ Neither printed.

places the wording is identical, to Gandhi's letter to Chiang Kai-shek (the really pertinent parts of which bear the indelible imprint of Nehru's style rather than Gandhi's) and to Nehru's various messages to Colonel Johnson which were telegraphed to Department by this office. It will be noted that resolution abandons Gandhi's untenable position that Allied forces could remain in India for sole purpose of resisting Japanese aggression (reference my 480, July 10, 3 p. m.¹).

While the resolution states Congress' grievances and demand for complete transfer of power in no uncertain terms, it is nonetheless replete with conciliatory passages and gestures. That Government was surprised by relative mildness of resolution is evidenced by fact that home member has canceled press conference he planned to hold immediately after release of resolution (reference my 484, July 11, 2 p. m.) and that Government is permitting publication of full text of resolution. It is accordingly unlikely that Government will take action against Congress unless latter launches movement after meeting on August 7 of All India Congress Committee to which resolution has been referred (reference section 2 of 476, July 9, 7 p. m.). In addition, Gandhi, if he follows his past practise will, after approval by All India Congress Committee, formally refer resolution to Viceroy with request that it be forwarded to London. This will further delay matters and no important developments are therefore anticipated until latter half of August.

Reference is made to that part of the resolution which provides for the convening of a constituent assembly "in order to prepare a constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people". This is interpreted by a Congressman very close to Gandhi and Nehru as a veiled gesture to Muslim League since by implication it recognizes the right of self-determination of the Muslims should the new constitution prove unacceptable to them.

It is anticipated that overwhelming majority of press opinion will approve of substantive parts of resolutions but there will be opposition, even among sections of nationalist press, to launching civil disobedience at this time. Some Congress minded papers notably the *Bombay Chronicle* and the *Lahore Tribune*, have already in recent weeks expressed opposition to Gandhi's threatened campaign.

In a statement to the press this afternoon Gandhi said: "There is no room left, in the proposal for withdrawal, for negotiation; either they recognize India's independence or they don't". I interpret this as pure bombast as I am convinced Congress would accept compromise in line with its demands during Cripps' negotiations and form national gov-

¹ Not printed.

ernment under present constitution provided certain conventions were agreed upon.

Nehru is passing through Delhi Thursday and Berry is dining with him that evening. Any significant statements made by Nehru will be cabled to Department immediately.

Reactions to and developments in connection with resolution will be telegraphed as they occur.

MERRELL

845.01/220: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received July 17—5:19 a. m.]

492. In the *Harizan* of July 12 Gandhi answers a question which he says has been put to him by numerous Muslim correspondents, namely, how he can contemplate a mass movement for liberation without first reaching a settlement with Muslims. He replies that he at one time also considered settlement with Muslims a prerequisite to freedom. "But I see that for the moment I cannot reach the Muslim mind. The Muslim League blocks my way. In their opinion I am thoroughly untrustworthy. I do not know how to get rid of the distrust." To the Muslim answer, "Give Pakistan" he replies, "It is not in my giving". He goes on to say that "If I felt convinced of the rightness of the demand, I should certainly work for it side by side with the League. But I do not. I would like to be convinced. Nobody has yet told me all its implications. Only the protagonists know what they want and mean. I plead for such an exposition. Surely Pakistanis want to convert the opposition, not to force them? Has an attempt been ever made to meet the opposition in a friendly manner and to convert them? I am sure the Congress is willing to be converted, let alone one." It may be pointed out parenthetically that Gandhi himself in another place in this same issue broadly defines Pakistan as "a demand for carving out of India a portion to be treated as a wholly independent sovereign state".

Gandhi then asks, "But what am I to do meanwhile". He answers the question by stating that "now is the time for India to play an effective part in the fortunes of the war, if she becomes free of British servitude". In other words, there can be no Congress-Muslim League Settlement as long as ruling power is here to keep them apart and he must act now without waiting longer for a pretext agreeable to Pakistan.

He states that the conception of his movement "is not that of a settlement with the British Government. That could happen only

if there is a settlement between the principal parties, and as a preliminary the Congress and the League. But that so far as I can see is not to be. Therefore the only settlement with the British Government can be that their rule should end leaving India to her fate." What would happen after complete transfer of power to India? "Militarily the most powerful party may set up its rule and impose it on India, if the people submit. Muslims may declare Pakistan and nobody may resist them. Hindus may do likewise, Sikhs may set up their rule in territories inhabited by them. There is no end to the possibilities. And to all this idle speculation let me suggest one more addition. The Congress and the League being best organized parties in the country may come to terms and set up a provisional government acceptable to all."

Gandhi concludes the article by declaring that "the movement has only one aim—that is of displacing the British power. Why should not Muslims who believe in Pakistan but also believe in independent India join such a struggle? If on the other hand they believe in Pakistan through British aid and under British aegis, it is a different story. I have no place in it."

Jinnah in a statement to the press on July 14 brands Gandhi's claim that he and the Congress are open to conversion on Pakistan issue as the Mahatma's "latest bait". In support of his charge he refers to April resolution of All India Congress Committee at Allahabad condemning Pakistan and to Gandhi's characterization of Pakistan provision of Cripps' proposals as "wicked". He also refers to Gandhi's statement in *Harijan*, in discussing Rajagopalachari's campaign, to the effect that Pakistan is a sin (Gandhi's actual words in *Harijan* of May 24 were that "I consider the vivisection of India to be a sin"). Jinnah further points out that Rajagopalachari has been virtually expelled from the Congress for his unreasonable terms to accept principle of Pakistan in order to reach settlement with Muslim League (referring to section 3 my 480, July 10, 3 p. m.³). As for Gandhi's request for exposition of Pakistan, Jinnah says that "surely Mr. Gandhi does not need a better exposition than his own. He has himself put the Moslem demand in a nut-shell" (reference first paragraph of section 1 of this message).

Jinnah has following to say in connection with possibilities envisaged by Gandhi after withdrawal of British power prior to agreement between major parties: "The picture that he draws of the result of his movement, his one aim and object being to remove British power from India, means, on his own showing, that there will ensue a rule of the jungle. But he knows that he does not mean that. It is merely a ruse to coerce and embarrass the British Government to surrender

³ Not printed.

to the establishment of Hindu Raj in this sub continent. I suppose he means to set up Hindudom."

Replying to Gandhi's question as to why Muslims do not join his struggle, Jinnah says "Mr. Gandhi's conception of 'independent India' is basically different from ours. What we want is the independence of Hindus and Moslems and others. Mr. Gandhi by independence means Congress Raj. We do not believe in Pakistan through Britannia aid or under the British aegis. Pakistan is an article of faith with Moslem India and we depend upon nobody except ourselves for the achievement of our goal and Moslem India is ready and willing to face from whatever quarter the opposition and obstacles that may concert."

Jinnah concludes by asking Gandhi "to give up the game of fooling the Moslems by insinuating that we depend upon the British for the achievement of our goal of Pakistan and as one of the foremost leaders of Hindu India and as a realist to show his sincerity and frankness for an honorable settlement".

MERRELL

845.01/221 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 16, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received July 17—7:18 a. m.]

494. The statements of Gandhi and Jinnah are significant in that they are the latest authoritative manifestation of the cleavage that exists between Congress and League (reference my 492, July 16, 11 a. m.). Gandhi's claim that League has neither disclosed implications of Pakistan nor made attempt to convert Congress to it is quite correct. Congress could scarcely be expected to give blanket endorsement to a vague scheme pregnant with so many possibilities without first knowing details. Jinnah's facetious reply that Gandhi has himself defined the scheme in a nutshell is no answer at all but pure sophistry. There is, however, no mystery behind Jinnah's reticence. Pakistan is the greatest, if not the only, bargaining point the League has and Jinnah refuses to elucidate until time comes for him to throw it on bargaining counter, probably bristling with exaggerated claims in order to extract greatest possible concessions from Congress. To define now would be to limit and Jinnah declines to be drawn. To do so would immediately attract a barrage of criticism from Congressmen and others who would not find it difficult to point out the innumerable impracticalities which the scheme must of necessity contain. In addition, I suggest Jinnah knows that many of his own followers who are fascinated by rosy prospect of "a national home" would be less

enamored of Pakistan were the economic difficulties to be encountered after its establishment made known. In addition, there are members of his own working committee who do not believe in scheme. The Pakistan areas of Sind, northwest frontier province, and Baluchistan have between them an annual deficit of $3\frac{1}{2}$ crores of rupees which is at present made up by central government. The railways operating in these areas do so under a deficit of $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores of rupees annually which is likewise supplied by central government. The Punjab, another Pakistan area, benefits to the extent of 30 crores of rupees annually because of presence of great military establishments there and payment of military salaries and pensions. Is it to be supposed that, after withdrawal of British power, Hindu India would continue to maintain military establishments and do its recruiting in Pakistan? Who will supply these deficits after establishment of Pakistan? Jinnah says in private that Pakistan will benefit enormously by customs duties levied on goods imported through Pakistan ports of Calcutta and Karachi and destined for Hindu India. A more reasonable assumption is that Hindu India would, from spite if nothing else, import its goods through its own ports of Bombay, Madras, and Vizagapatam. The foregoing are only a few of the reasons which make Jinnah disinclined to define his scheme at this time and thus subject it to a plethora of criticism which would produce defections in his own ranks. It will be produced in all its glory when the time is ripe for extracting all the traffic will bear.

Gandhi for more than 20 years held view that a Hindu-Muslim settlement was an essential preliminary to independence. Unity, he said, must precede freedom. However, he is now "firmly of opinion that there is no unity whilst the third party is there to prevent it. It created the artificial division and it keeps it up. In its presence both Hindus and Muslims will look to it for support and will get it." Let British power be withdrawn and "then the whole unreality disappears like mist before the morning sun".

Gandhi holds Muslims to be a minority in ordinary sense of the word; Jinnah denies this, claiming that Muslims are a nation and entitled to self-determination. Being a separate nation with a religion, culture, social system, et cetera, different from the Hindus, there can never, according to Jinnah, be unity between Hindus and Muslims in a United India. Jinnah desires independence no less strongly than Gandhi but the former demands it for two separate States Pakistan and Hindustan, while the latter demands it for a United India which does not exist. This is significance of Jinnah's statement that Gandhi's conception of independence is different from his. Jinnah will not join hands with Congress in demanding complete withdrawal of British power such as envisaged by Gandhi in *Harijan* unless Congress first

comes terms with him on question of Pakistan and recognition of Muslim League as only organization entitled to speak for Muslim India. He believes, possibly quite rightly, that complete withdrawal of British power prior to a settlement between him and Congress would result in the Muslims being crushed under heel of Hindu majority. This significance of Jinnah's request to Gandhi to show his sincerity by seeking an honorable settlement.

Jinnah would be willing to form interim national Government with Congress for duration of war under present constitution without conditions mentioned above but he is absolutely opposed to final settlement and withdrawal of British power without prior agreement on those points.

It is significant that nowhere in his statement mentioned in my 492, July 16, 11 a. m. does Jinnah oppose complete transfer of power. He has stated repeatedly that he bows to no one in the demand for withdrawal of British power but he believes that in the interest of his own people he must lay down the conditions outlined above.

It will be seen that the Congress demands contained in recent resolution of Working Committee (reference my 488, July 14, 3 p. m.⁴), quite aside from the utter impossibility of their being granted by Great Britain in midst of greatest war world has ever seen, will be wholly unacceptable to Muslim League, based as they are on complete withdrawal of British power without prior agreement between communities.

MERRELL

845.00/1381 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 17, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received July 18—1:15 a. m.]

495. Nehru held a press conference here yesterday afternoon but as everything he said there, plus additional details, was [repeated?] during Berry's visit with him last night this message will be confined to the latter (reference section 3⁵ my 489, July 14, 11 p. m.). The following is Berry's summary of interview:

"The only guests beside myself were the Chinese Commissioner and the Chinese Minister Designate to Panama. This was not the most satisfactory setting for developing the points I wished to raise with Nehru and the disinclination of the Chinese Commissioner, who despite the good contact of his office appears to know practically nothing about political situation here, to discuss anything except the difference

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Third paragraph and remainder of telegram.

between Buddhism and Hinduism did nothing to help matters. Nehru was obviously in a mood to discuss the resolution and my first question was whether the resolution ruled out negotiations based on a formula providing for something less than absolute independence now. He replied that there could be no further negotiations except on basis of immediate independence to India, that is, negotiation to arrange details of transfer of complete power to Indian hands now. I inquired whether acceptance by British of Congress demands put forward during Cripps' Mission would prove acceptable as an interim arrangement. His reply was an unqualified 'no'. He explained that during Cripps' negotiations invasion by Japanese appeared imminent and Congress lowered its demands in order to meet danger with a National Government; that at best the Congress formula provided only a makeshift arrangement involving a divided responsibility which was never successful. I then inquired whether he considered the danger of invasion any less now than in April to which he replied 'Probably not but the restlessness and anti-British feeling of Indian people is immeasurably greater.'

He went on to say that two results followed from failure of Cripps' Mission: (1) A greater conviction that it is quite impossible to carry on Government in cooperation with the British Government, and (2) there was a very big reaction of relief that the negotiations did not succeed on the basis offered as the people felt that the terms which the Congress had proposed were not good enough. He declared that even had Cripps agreed to the Congress demands, it would have been extremely difficult for it to have 'delivered the goods' under such a scheme; to do so now would be 'quite impossible'. He concluded this part of the discussion by saying that British acceptance of Congress demands made to Cripps coupled with absolute promise of independence on cessation of hostilities and unqualified by any mention of Pakistan would likewise be unsatisfactory at this stage. The Indian people he said are now intensely anti-British and cannot trust any promise of British Government. The underwriting of such a British promise by United Nations or by President Roosevelt might do some good in helping to reassure Indian people but 'it is not enough'. I returned again and again during the discussion to the possibility of compromise on a formula such as that mentioned above in an attempt to find some loophole or hint in his replies that such a possibility exists. I found none. For one now to believe that a compromise is possible on any formula short of the Wardha resolution, he must also subscribe to one of the two following possibilities: (a) Nehru was lying to me last night. I dismiss this possibility because if a compromise is possible Nehru would hope to obtain assistance from United States in bringing it about to advantage of Indian people. For him categorically to deny possibility of such a compromise, knowing full well that we would communicate such denials to Washington and thus possibly rule out American assistance, seems to me untenable; or (b) he was unwilling to talk to me in presence of others as frankly as he otherwise might have done. I propose to put this possibility to test tomorrow morning when Nehru returns to Delhi. I expect to see him privately and, remote as I now think the chances are, I shall not be wholly convinced that the Congress has shut its doors to compromise until Nehru persists in his intransigent attitude if [*in*] private.

Having disposed of question of compromise, I then asked Nehru what chance he thought there was for British acceptance of Congress demand. He replied 'very little at present but perhaps later they will recognize desirability of it'. I interpret that to mean that Japanese infiltration into eastern sections of India, followed by breakdown of civil administration, passive acceptance of and even co-operation with Japanese by Indian population in those areas, may convince British that Congress demand must be met in order to imbue civilian population with spirit of resistance and prevent spread of pro-Japanese feeling, thus avoiding Burma experience. I inquired why, if he did not expect Congress demands to be met, he felt it necessary, while repeatedly professing in resolution disinclination to interfere with war effort, to launch a movement which must inevitably hinder that effort. He said that he had been watching the growth of a spirit of passivity and bitter anti-British feeling among Indian people for several months; that he was firmly convinced this spirit likely to develop rapidly into pro-Japanese feeling, not from any love of Japanese but because of intense hatred of British; that he as a patriot refused to stand idly by and watch this development without making an effort, remote though its chances of success were, to supply the only antidote (Indian freedom); and that nothing could be more repugnant to him than to see his country become another Burma. He added that any interference with war effort would be as brief as movement itself would be short, thus implying that he expects Government to jail important Congress leaders and ban Congress organization.

Nehru declared that under Wardha resolution Viceroy would be expected to depart immediately. I asked who would assume British obligations to Indian States. He replied that Government of Free India would undertake these obligations, thus subscribing to a unilateral theory of transference of treaty rights and duties quite unknown, so far as I am aware, to international practice. He added that while the States would be invited to accede to the Government of Free India, no immediate attempt would be made to force them to do so. He claimed that the fire of freedom which would spread through India would so imbue peoples of most India States with like feeling their rulers would be forced to come into the union. He explained that resolution does not contemplate immediate removal of all British officials but would at first only involve removal of a comparatively few 'useless individuals' at the top. The remainder would be permitted to remain, if they so desired, until arrangements could be made, by process of negotiation with British, for their disposition. They could not, however, expect to receive 'the fat salaries' to which they have been accustomed at the expense of the Indian people. The governors of the provinces would, like the Viceroy, have to go at once as there would be no place for them in Free India. The slow removal of lower British officials would avoid the confusion and delay to war effort which might otherwise be caused by complete independence now.

I inquired Nehru was absolutely convinced that Jinnah and Congress could come to terms immediately upon withdrawal of British

power. His answer was a categorical affirmative. He repeated the well known argument that there can be no settlement between League and Congress as long as British are here to keep them apart and outbid either party. He claimed that once full responsibility is entrusted to Indian leaders, with no third party from whom they may expect bargains, they will reach an honorable settlement at once. Nehru stated that Congress and League were on verge of a settlement just prior to visit of Cripps. But Cripps' proposals showed that British were prepared to grant Pakistan so that, from Jinnah's point of view, further negotiation with Congress was without purpose (in connection with this paragraph, reference my 492, July 16, 11 a. m. and 494, July 16, 3 p. m.).

While supplying answers to many questions, the interview, due to lack of time and the necessity of covering such a wide field, left others untouched. In addition, some of the replies could not be pursued for the purpose of developing their full implications. I hope to fill in at least some of these gaps when I see Nehru again tomorrow morning. ["]

MERRELL

845.00/1382 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 18, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 7:34 p. m.]

497. The following is a summary of Berry's interview with Nehru this morning (reference my 495, July 17, 10 a. m.) :

"I saw Nehru this morning for just over one hour. The main purpose of this interview was to ascertain, if I could, that there was really no basis of negotiation with the British Government under the Wardha resolution. After among series of questions Nehru finally stated that negotiations could be opened along the following lines. Let the British Government make a declaration acknowledging the independence of India here and now and requesting all the various parties in India to get together and form a Provisional Government. This Provisional Government would for practical reasons involve only the immediate displacement of high British officials at the top. The Provisional Government after its formation would then negotiate with the British Government in the best of good will as to how together they could best organize and promote the war effort to the greatest possible extent. Nehru emphasized that the proposed declaration should be brief and in general terms suggested above in order that the chances of its success should not be jeopardized by details at the very beginning. He added that the declaration should not concern itself with communal questions as these by their very nature must of necessity be settled by the Indian leaders themselves. I inquired whether he thought such a declaration would be acceptable to Jinnah. He replied that Jinnah's interests were fully protected in the proposed declaration inasmuch as if the Indian leaders themselves failed to

form a Provisional Government to take over from the British that would be an end of the matter. Accordingly if Jinnah were not satisfied he could decline to join such a government and the British would then be fully justified in saying that the Indian leaders themselves could not agree on a government to displace the present one. Nehru informed me in the most earnest and categorical manner imaginable that the Congress could come to terms with Jinnah within 2 days after the promulgation of the declaration mentioned above provided the British Government kept hands off.

It went without saying, Nehru said, that the United Nations would receive the very fullest cooperation from the Provisional Government and that the Commander-in-Chief would be left full discretion as to military strategy and dispositions. The Commander-in-Chief according to Nehru would be surprised at the complete support he would receive. From my two recent interviews with Nehru it would appear, if he is to be believed, that the foregoing is the minimum formula under which a settlement with the Congress can be effected and civil disobedience movement thwarted.

I reopened the question of the anticipated briefness of the movement (reference my telegram referred to above) and learned that I was wrong in my inference that Nehru foresaw a brief movement because of his expectation that the Congress leaders would be jailed immediately. He said that the movement would go on no matter how many leaders were placed under arrest. He pointed out that it would only take a short time to tell whether the movement was meeting with success. If events showed that it was not attracting sufficient popular support it would of course be abandoned; if it attracted mass support but did not accomplish its purpose, it would likewise be abandoned. He added that in case of Japanese invasion of India or immediate threat of invasion before or during movement it would of course be necessary for the Congress to reconsider its position. He considers the movement has a fair chance of success.

I then questioned him as to the form the movement would take. He said that he could not say as this was entirely up to Gandhi and that the movement might and probably would take different forms as it progressed depending upon developments and British representative [*repressive?*] measures. He pointed out, however, that since the movement would be based upon non-recognition of British authority in India it would probably take the form of ignoring all British laws and orders.

He confirmed that Gandhi, after meeting of All India Congress Committee, would probably follow his practice of forwarding resolution to Viceroy for submission to London. It was also quite likely he said that further time would be consumed by waiting for provincial Congress Committees to confirm action of All India Congress Committee."

Viceroy's Executive Council has decided to do nothing until after meeting of All India Congress Committees. I am also reliably informed that Viceroy "has passed the buck" to London.

MERRELL

845.00/1383 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 21, 1942—10 a. m.

[Received 10:10 a. m.]

500. The following is the report of an interview which took place yesterday afternoon between Maulana Azad and a well-known Indian journalist:

"Question: Colonel, is there any basis for the impression prevailing in certain quarters, after the statements made by Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Nehru, that there is hardly any room left for negotiation with the Congress?"

"Answer: If this refers to India's right of independence, it is certainly not a matter for negotiation. It is a fundamental principle which must be recognized by the United Nations. But if the question refers to arrangements for the duration of the war, there is a clear procedure envisaged in the resolution of the Working Committee itself, and there is no reason to suggest and there is no room for negotiation. It is quite obvious to my mind that matters of this nature can only be settled by negotiation."

"Question: Suppose there is a declaration on behalf of the United Nations guaranteeing India's independence, will it satisfy what you regard as a fundamental principle?"

"Answer: It will depend entirely on the form and content of the declaration and, in any case, I can assure you that there is no reason why the Congress should not give the fullest consideration to any declaration of the kind you have mentioned."

MERRELL

845.00/1385 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 21, 1942—noon.

[Received July 22—8:17 a. m.]

501. The press interview with Maulana Azad yesterday afternoon further emphasizes the lack of unanimity in the Congress Working Committee (reference my 500, 21, 10 a. m.; and first paragraph of my 487, July 14, 1 p. m.⁷). The Indian journalist who interviewed Azad is a good friend of the Mission and at Mission's request posed the question as to possibility of negotiation. While the Maulana's published reply is significant, his reply "off the record" is even more so. Azad proposed the following: (1) Let Britain make absolute promise of independence after war and let United Nations or President Roose-

⁷ Latter not printed.

velt alone guarantee fulfillment of this promise, and (2) let United Nations or President Roosevelt alone offer to arbitrate question of interim settlement and he (Azad) guarantees that he will get Congress to accept offer and agree beforehand to accept whatever interim plan is submitted by United Nations or President Roosevelt alone. The Mission feels that such a declaration if drafted with great care, has more than a fair chance of acceptance by principal groups. The following draft has been drawn up with view to avoiding words or implications which would be likely to antagonize any of major parties and is submitted for possible assistance to Department :

"Realizing as I do the intense desire of all principal political groups in India for a settlement that will enable them to assume a real share in the defense of the country and at the same time to aid and assist the United Nations to the fullest possible extent, I as President of the United States, would be prepared to guarantee the fulfillment of the promise of independence to India, without prejudice to the principal elements in the national life of the country, immediately after the cessation of hostilities which will be given by His Majesty's Government.

Furthermore, in order to give immediate effect to the desires referred to above, which have been notably reiterated in the Wardha resolution of the Congress Party of July 14 and the recent statement in Bombay of the President of the All-India Muslim League, I am willing to submit an arrangement for an interim government, which I believe should prove reasonable to all sections of political thought in India and which should enable the country to play a real part in its own defense and to render immeasurable assistance to those powers who are fighting against the forces of wanton aggression and barbarism. I submit the foregoing suggestion in all good faith as the most feasible plan in present circumstances to give effect to the publicly pronounced desires of all the principal political groups in India and earnestly appeal for its acceptance. Upon receipt of the assent of these groups and their agreement to abide by my decision, I will submit an interim plan and pledge its immediate implementation."

Should constitutional or political objections possibly be perceived to the phrase "as President of the United States", it is suggested that the word "personally" might be substituted therefor although such substitution might detract from strength of declaration. The Mission would recommend declaration by President rather than United Nations because (a) there is not sufficient time to get latter to agree on form of declaration. If move is to be made it must be done before meeting of Working Committee at Bombay on August 4 or at least before meeting of Indian Congress Committee on August 7; and (b) President is trusted by and enjoys great prestige among Indian leaders and declaration by him would lodge responsibility in one place.

The question of course arises: Will Azad be able "to deliver the goods"? In the first place, I still believe that statements of Gandhi

and Nehru that there is no more room for negotiation constitute a mere "front" which has been adopted until they see what offer will be forthcoming from British. In addition, they could say that acceptance of President's declaration was not negotiation with British of whom they are sick and tired, but acceptance of guarantee of independence and friendly offer of arbitration by a third power in the fairness of whose chief they have confidence. It is believed that President's declaration would be all but irresistible. In addition, Azad holds a very strong hand. The Congress has always held itself out to be not a communal but a national party which represents all sections of the country including Muslims. Should it refuse to accept a declaration such as that submitted above (which Azad has already agreed to accept), Azad could and, in my opinion, would threaten to walk out of Congress accompanied by every Muslim member of Committee except one nonentity. I am convinced that Azad and his Muslim colleagues would actually quit the Congress in case of refusal of declaration. This is one of last things on earth that Gandhi and Nehru wish to contemplate as such a development would leave the Congress naked before the world as a strictly Hindu body, exactly what Jinnah has always said it was. The gloating and derisive laughter of Jinnah and his Muslim League would resound throughout India. That a declaration in the form suggested above would prove acceptable to Jinnah is hardly open to question. In a recent statement in Bombay he used the following words:

"Soon after India was declared a belligerent I stated that in our own interest and to defend our homes and hearths we should assist England in the prosecution of the war, provided Great Britain accepted our hand as a confident friend and as an equal partner to face the peril and provided real share in the authority of the Government at the center and in the provinces was given to us within the framework of the present constitution."

As late as July 12 the Secretary of the All-India Muslim League stated that the League's Nagpur resolution of December 1941 still represents its present position. The following is an extract from that resolution:

"The Working Committee once more declare that they are ready and willing as before to shoulder the burden of the defense of the country, singly or in cooperation with other parties on the basis that real share and responsibility is given in the authority of the Government at the center and the provinces within the framework of the present constitution, but without prejudice to the major political issue involved in the framing of the future constitution."

If such a declaration is to be made it should be quite unheralded. It would, in my opinion, be highly inadvisable to submit it to India leaders beforehand as to do so would bring about endless haggling as to

wording which they love so much. It should be released for acceptance as it is or not at all.

As to actual plan to be submitted should declaration be accepted, I strongly recommend that formula follow closely that submitted in this office's 263, May 4, 8 p. m.⁸ Azad is familiar with that formula and it is acceptable to him. In fact, he says that he submitted almost an identical plan to Cripps who informed him that he (Azad) would have to take it up with the Viceroy. Azad declined to do anything of the kind, stating that he was negotiating with Cripps, not Linlithgow. Nehru in May saw the formula referred to in the telegram last mentioned above. While he did not commit himself to it, he raised no objection but merely contented himself with saying that he could say nothing without referring it to Working Committee and, as plan had not been officially proposed, he saw no object in doing so.

With reference to problem of distributing seats in Cabinet, I suggest following as fair solution: 1 European (the Commander in Chief); 6 Hindus (4 Congress, 1 Labor (no Joshi), and 1 Hindu Mahasabha); 5 Muslims (4 Muslim League and 1 non-Muslim League); 1 depressed classes; 1 Parsi; and 1 Sikh.

I feel strongly that Congress is not likely to negotiate further with British on anything short of independence now unless a gesture and guarantee is forthcoming from a friendly third power which enjoys great prestige and in which Congress leaders have shown confidence. Without actually being on the ground here, it is difficult if not impossible to appreciate how distrust and hatred of the British has developed even during the last 3 months. As it is hardly likely that British will grant demands of Wardha resolution, I firmly believe that entirely new approach such as that suggested in this message must be made if serious consequences of civil disobedience campaign are to be avoided and India placed on full war footing. The President's declaration, if made, would be free from the objection raised in Department's 186, May 8, 4 p. m.⁹ since if it were unacceptable to Indian parties it would simply remain a friendly gesture without, in my judgment, causing any ill feeling or disturbances whatever here. The objection that the formula would be unacceptable, to an important element in the Congress Party is presumed to refer to the Ghandtan [*Gandhian*], non-resistance group. This objection would theoretically apply to any formula providing for active assistance in war effort. The same objection could have been urged against making the innocuous Cripps proposals. Despite internal differences of opinion, the decisions of the Working Committee are unanimous (reference the Bardoli resolution) and a united front is presented to public. It must also be remembered that it was the

⁸ Ante, p. 648.

⁹ Ante, p. 650.

Ghandian [*Gandhian*] group itself which fathered the Wardha resolution with all its avowals of a desire to assist China, Russia and the United Nations in general, in spite of the cult of non-violence. If it is said that these avowals were predicated on the grant of freedom now, my answer is that the new approach recommended above would create an entirely new situation. I am convinced that formula would be acceptable to other Indian parties referred to in Department's telegram. If it is unacceptable to the British at this stage of the proceedings, then they are more diehard, obtuse and reactionary than even the Congress leaders suspect. If the British are agreeable (and I hardly see how they can be otherwise), I strongly urge making declaration as there is, in my opinion, everything to be gained and nothing to be lost by doing so.

MERRELL

845.00/1386 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 22, 1942—1 p. m.

[Received 5:40 p.m.]

506. An Indian member of Viceroy's Executive Council stated to Berry last night that declaration by President Roosevelt would create entirely different atmosphere here. He added that Azad was absolutely opposed to civil disobedience program and pointed out that he was in strong position for reason mentioned in my 501, July 21, noon. These statements were quite unsolicited by Berry. There is also further evidence that a gesture from President would be welcomed in high official quarters here.

MERRELL

845.00/1384 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 22, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received July 22—9:54 a. m.]

505. I am of course entirely ignorant as to the plans for a Chief of Mission here. In the event however that Colonel Johnson is not returning to India I venture to recommend that if the United States is to participate in the settlement of this problem the extreme importance and delicacy of the undertaking would warrant the appointment of a trained diplomat of great distinction and prestige. (Reference is made to my 501, July 21, noon, and previous telegrams on the same subject).

As viewed from here the appointment of Ambassador Phillips¹⁰ would seem so ideal that I cannot refrain from suggesting his name.

MERRELL

845.00/1390 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, July 23, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 9 : 26 p. m.]

508. The Government of India has lifted its ban against the Communist Party. This is in line with Government's policy of encouraging the Leftists mentioned in my 412 June 23, noon.¹¹

MERRELL

*Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt*¹²

CHUNGKING, July 25, 1942.

With both sides remaining adamant in their views, the Indian situation has reached an extremely tense and critical stage. Its development in fact constitutes the most important factor in determining the outcome of the United Nations War and especially the war in the East. The war aims which the anti-aggression nations have proclaimed to the world are twofold, first to crush brute force and second to secure freedom for all mankind. If India should start a movement against Britain or against the United Nations, this will cause deterioration in the Indian situation from which the Axis powers will surely reap benefit. Such an eventuality will seriously affect the whole course of the war and at the same time the world might entertain doubts as to the sincerity of the lofty war aims of the United Nations. This will not only prove a great disadvantage to Britain but will also reflect discredit to the democratic front.

At this juncture the United Nations should do their best, when there is yet time, to prevent the occurrence of such an unfortunate state of affairs. Your country is the leader in this war of right against might and Your Excellency's views have always received serious attention in Britain. Furthermore for a long time the Indian people have been expecting the United States to come out and take a stand

¹⁰ William Phillips, former Ambassador in Italy; at this time Director of the London office of the Office of Strategic Services.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

on the side of justice and equality. I therefore venture to lay before you my personal views on this question.

Inevitably Britain will regard the Indian National Congress' recent demand as an attempt to take advantage of her present predicament. The step contemplated by the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, however, still leaves sufficient time and opportunity for the reaching of an agreement. During my recent visit to India, I earnestly advised the Indian people to consider their primary duty to join the anti-aggression front in a common struggle for mankind.

From the point of view of the Indian people, their consistent purpose is to secure national freedom. With this object in view the Indian National Congress, in seeking national independence, is dominated by sentiment rather than by reason. Consequently I believe attempts at repression in the form of either public censure or force, whether military or police with a view to compelling the Indian people to capitulate, will have the opposite result.

From the psychological point of view of the Indian, he considers that India before attaining her national freedom is not the master of her own vast territory and abundant resources. Just because he owns nothing, he has nothing to be afraid of. Moreover beyond national independence and freedom he demands nothing of the world. Likewise the Indian people as a whole only desire freedom for their country and their only expectation is that the United Nations would sympathize with them in their aspiration.

The Indian people are by nature of a passive disposition but are apt to go to extremes. I think that in launching its freedom movement today when Axis aggression is a pressing reality, the Indian Congress must have felt in their hearts a certain amount of anguish. If however the United Nations should show them no sympathy and pursue a laissez-faire policy and thereby cause them to despair, I greatly fear that following the National Congress meeting in August there is danger of the situation getting out of control. In case an anti-British movement or some other unfortunate incident occurs in India, the United Nations war in the East will be adversely affected immediately. For the sake of our common victory the United Nations must seek to stabilize the Indian situation and to secure the Indian people's participation in the joint war effort.

The United Nations depend upon India for her to contribute to the war whereas the Indian people have little need to depend upon the outside world. From their own point of view their movement for independence and freedom is not something new that has come into existence after the outbreak of war. Hence they do not stop to think whether their movement will have any harmful effect on the world situation. This being the case they have no hesitation in taking what-

ever steps they may think necessary in furtherance of their national movement. Whether they are right or wrong is immaterial. The fact remains they have now already become irresponsive to even well-considered public opinion or a realistic analysis of India's real interests. Once they abandon hope of an amicable settlement, they are liable to take any risk without hesitation even to the extent of sacrificing themselves and others.

The only way to make them reconsider their course of action is for the United Nations, and especially the United States which they have always admired, to come forth as third parties and to offer them sympathy and consolation. This will help them to regain their sense of proportion and strengthen their faith that there is justice in this world. Once the situation is eased it can be stabilized and the Indian people, grateful to the United Nations for what they have done, will willingly participate in the war. Otherwise the Indian people in despair will have the same feeling towards other members of the United Nations as towards Britain and when this comes to pass it will be the world's greatest tragedy in which Britain is not the only loser.

So far as Britain is concerned she is a great country and in recent years she has been pursuing an enlightened policy towards her colonial possessions. She is one of the principals in this war against aggression. On the other hand India is a weak country. With this unprecedentedly extensive war in progress, naturally things cannot be handled in the ordinary manner. It is my opinion that in order to uphold the British Empire's prestige and safeguard her real interests, the British should unhesitatingly show extraordinary courage, forbearance, farsightedness and resolution by removing the causes which tend to aggravate the situation. In this way the deceptive Axis propagandists will have no occasion to take advantage of these causes.

Should however the situation be allowed to drift until an anti-British movement breaks out in India, any attempt on the part of the British to cope with the crisis by enforcing existing colonial laws or by resorting to military and police force, will only help to spread disturbances and turmoil. The greater the oppression, the greater the reaction. Even if such measures should prove effective in curbing the non-violence movement, the spiritual loss and blow to the United Nations will far exceed that resulting from any reverse in the field. Such a situation will particularly be detrimental to Britain's interests.

There is no doubt a section of the Indian people which, having lost their sense of proportion, is asking if India will never attain freedom, what choice does she have between Britain and Axis Powers. This mistaken idea the United Nations should of course do everything possible to correct. On the other hand the wisest and most

enlightened policy for Britain to pursue would be to restore to India her complete freedom and thus to prevent Axis troops from setting foot on Indian soil. If Britain would reorientate her present attitude and spirit, I firmly believe that not only will Indian sentiment towards Britain undergo a radical change for the better but Britain's action will have an ameliorating effect on the whole situation. Therefore I earnestly hope that the United States would advise both Britain and India in the name of justice and righteousness to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution, for this affects vitally the welfare of mankind and has a direct bearing on the good faith and good name of the United Nations. The United States as the acknowledged leader of democracy has a natural and vital role to play in bringing about a successful solution of the problem.

In saying so I have not the slightest intention to arouse attention by exaggerated statements. The war aims of the United Nations and our common interests at stake make it impossible for me to remain silent. An ancient Chinese proverb says: "Good medicine, though bitter, cures one's illness; words of sincere advice, though unpleasant, should guide one's conduct." I sincerely hope that Britain will magnanimously and resolutely accept my words of disinterested advice, however unpleasant they may be, and believe that they are voiced in the common interests of the United Nations.

In view of the critical situation and in view of China's responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, I have ventured to offer you my views. This despatch is strictly confidential. It is only for Your Excellency's personal reference. I hope Your Excellency will give the minutest consideration to such practical measures as will break the existing deadlock and avert a crisis. I shall persevere in my efforts. My only feeling is that the United Nations should lose no time in adopting a correct policy towards the Indian situation and in striving for its realization, so that our entire war effort will not suffer a major setback. I ardently hope Your Excellency will favor me with your sound judgment.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

845.00/2206

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1942.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Minister left with me an urgent message addressed by Chiang Kai-shek to the President, of which a copy is attached herewith.¹³

¹³ *Supra.*

Dr. Soong asked me to read the message since he said he wished to make some oral comments with regard thereto after I had familiarized myself with the contents of the message.

Dr. Soong then stressed the following points:

1. Chiang Kai-shek believes the situation in India is unquestionably going to blow up after the meeting of the Indian Congress unless some outside help is given;

2. He believes that the Indians anticipate a further extension of their movement by the Japanese towards India as soon as the monsoon is over, which would be in the relatively near future;

3. He believes the British are completely blind to the two facts set forth above;

4. He feels that the Indian Congress actually represents the desire of the Indian people and can be compared in its importance and representative capacity to the Chinese National Revolutionary Committee of some years ago;

5. He is convinced that the question of India is regarded by all of the people of Asia as a test case in ascertaining the sincerity of the United Nations;

6. He believes that the Indian National Congress will accept much less than they are asking, but solely provided that the Chinese Government and the United States Government participate in negotiations between the representatives of the Indian National Congress and the British Government as friends of both sides and provided that both China and the United States underwrite the carrying out of the terms of any agreement reached;

7. Chiang Kai-shek believes that this question is of the utmost urgency and that the outcome of this question may in very great part determine the outcome of the war in the Far East.

I told the Minister that I would immediately submit this message to the President and that it might be that the President would be able to give him at least his preliminary reactions after the meeting of the Pacific War Council tomorrow, Wednesday.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.00/1542c

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with the wishes you expressed to me on the telephone this morning, I am sending you herewith the telegram for you to send to Mr. Churchill with regard to Chiang Kai-shek's message.¹⁴ I presume that you will wish to have this message sent by Captain McCrea¹⁵ through the Navy Code.

¹⁴ Dated July 25, p. 695.

¹⁵ Capt. John McCrea, U. S. N., Naval Aide to President Roosevelt.

I think I should add, however, that I do not believe the message as now drafted will be productive of any useful results. All of the information we have in the Department of State confirms the views expressed by Chiang Kai-shek that a desperately serious situation is going to break out in India after the meeting of the Indian National Congress on August 6. This is a question of vital concern to our own military and naval interests in the Far East. It would seem to me that the services of representatives of the American Government and of the Chinese Government as friendly intermediaries between the Indian National Congress and the British Government might serve in bringing about some satisfactory arrangement which would hold during the war period and could in any event, in view of the critical nature of the situation now existing, do no harm.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

Draft Telegram From President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1942.

For the Former Naval Person¹⁶ from the President. I have today received a long and urgent message from Chiang Kai-shek. He asks me to regard this message as strictly confidential, but in view of its nature I naturally wish to inform you immediately of its contents.

The following is the text of this message:

[Here follows text printed on page 695.]

I shall have to give a reply to Chiang Kai-shek in the near future and I shall be grateful if you will let me have as soon as possible your thoughts and any suggestions you may wish to offer with regard to the nature of the reply I should make to him.¹⁷

845.01/225: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 30, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 5:59 p. m.]

4248. Late yesterday afternoon at Mr. Amery's¹⁸ request I called on him at the India Office. He said he wanted to explain to me the

¹⁶ Code name for Winston Churchill.

¹⁷ Comment by Prime Minister Churchill regarding views of Chiang Kai-shek forwarded by President Roosevelt to him is contained in his book *The Second World War*, vol. iv, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), pp. 507-508.

¹⁸ Leopold S. Amery, British Secretary of State for India and Burma.

present British position with regard to India. His interviews with me on the Indian situation are not very different in their approach from the interviews our friends have with De Valera.¹⁹ They always begin with the historical background. His account dealt with the last 80 years of Great Britain's service to India. His emphasis is always on the divisions in India, both religious and political, underlining the minority problem. He told me that some half a dozen years ago when the British Parliament was attempting to accept the responsibility of adjudicating these difficulties he was able to persuade the Government with considerable difficulty that that was primarily an Indian problem and that it was the Indians' responsibility to reconcile these differences and present a constructive program for the future evolution of India. In our conversation he stated that during the last year he had made it clear to the Indian Congress that they would not be the sole body with which England would ultimately treat when the future political status of India was to be settled. I asked him if the English were not largely responsible for the development of the Congress and I felt his reluctance when he admitted that they were. He told me that the Viceroy now had an Advisory Council of 15, 11 of whom are Indians. I asked him if any of them were representatives of the Congress. He answered no. He told me that Cripps' Mission broke on the insistence of the Congress under Gandhi's influence that the Viceroy's position be made to correspond to that of the King under the English Parliamentary system. He further told me that Gandhi realized that it was impossible to reconcile the minority elements under the Indian proposals without a continuance of Great Britain's stabilizing influence. Amery explained to me that half the British fighting forces were recruited from Punjab and that under any loose arrangements prescribed by the Congress that state would undoubtedly establish an independent jurisdiction. He felt the same would be true of the more powerful Indian principalities. He said that the refusal of the Indians to reach agreement with Cripps was supported neither in nor out of India, that Gandhi, recognizing this, retreated from a position of reason to one of emotion and that his present mood was to return to his old technique of non-cooperation in the hope that untoward incidents which might be exaggerated to political advantage might reestablish his position of authority. Amery said that the Viceroy had wisely adopted a conciliatory course waiting for the reconvening of the Congress on August 7, in the hope that they still might adopt a more cooperative attitude. If at that time, however, adjudication continued, the British Government would take a strong position and arrest Gandhi and other political leaders. He told me that if similar interferences with the war effort were attempted

¹⁹ Eamon de Valera, Irish Prime Minister.

in England they would not be tolerated and that they were only allowed in India because of the complex situation there. He assured me that whatever action is taken by the British Government there would be no real change in India's contribution to the war and that recruiting and production would continue without slackening. During the conversation I asked him why Burma and India had been excluded from the Atlantic Charter. He at first argued that this had not been done and then said the situation had been restored by a later statement of his to the Parliament which reinstated Great Britain's promises to India of 1940.

He explained to me that he had to leave for a Cabinet meeting and I thanked him for his statement of the British position.

WINANT

845.01/227 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 5, 1942—11 p. m.

[Received August 6—9:18 a. m.]

566. Following telegram has been received from the Consulate at Bombay:

"August 5, 5 p. m. According to British newspaper reporter for *News Chronicle* who interviewed Nehru yesterday the latter was in a 'white hot rage' and 'bitter' about the action of the British authorities in authorizing the publication of the secret minutes of Congress Working Committee.²⁰ Nehru reported to look upon this British action as convincing proof that British have no desire to make a settlement and that there is, therefore, no alternative but to proceed with extreme plans for civil disobedience campaign. In short British inspired revelations are said to have put Congress leaders in such a frame of mind that they will reject any compromise which might be offered. If Nehru's previously enunciated good will has really been alienated by this action the general outlook insofar as internal political developments in India are concerned is indeed dark."

MERRELL

845.01/230a

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell)

No. 38

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1942.

The Secretary of State transmits herewith a letter, with enclosure, addressed by the President to Mr. M. K. Gandhi, Sevagram Via

²⁰ For texts, see British Cmd. 6430: *India, Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's responsibility for the Disturbances in India, 1942-43*, pp. 34 ff.

Wardha, Central Provinces, India, which the officer in charge of the American Mission is directed to have delivered, by the most appropriate means, to the addressee.

[Enclosure]

President Roosevelt to Mr. Mohandas K. Gandhi

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. GANDHI: I have received your letter of July 1, 1942, which you have thoughtfully sent me in order that I may better understand your plans, which I well know may have far-reaching effect upon developments important to your country and to mine.

I am sure that you will agree that the United States has consistently striven for and supported policies of fair dealing, of fair play, and of all related principles looking towards the creation of harmonious relations between nations. Nevertheless, now that war has come as a result of Axis dreams of world conquest, we, together with many other nations, are making a supreme effort to defeat those who would deny forever all hope of freedom throughout the world. I am enclosing a copy of an address of July 23 by the Secretary of State,²¹ made with my complete approval, which illustrates the attitude of this Government.

I shall hope that our common interest in democracy and righteousness will enable your countrymen and mine to make common cause against a common enemy.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

845.01/231

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*²²

[WASHINGTON, August 7, 1942.]

MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MR. ATTLEE²³

My colleagues and I would have wished that you should have known in advance the Government of India's decision, only communicated to us at the last moment, to publish on August 5th the documents relating to the Congress Party Working Committee's discussions on Congress Party's resolution of May 1st. These papers, with their damaging revelations of the defeatist outlook of the Congress Party

²¹ Radio broadcast, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 25, 1942, p. 639.

²² Apparently this copy was sent to the Secretary of State by the British Minister (Campbell) on August 7, 1942; the original was sent to the White House.

²³ Clement Attlee, British Deputy Prime Minister.

leaders and particularly of Gandhi, had been in Government of India's hands for some time but they forbore from disclosing them or from placing any restraint upon Congress leaders in hope that counsels of moderation and especially the opinions expressed in the United States might avert any extreme decision. Unfortunately this hope has gradually diminished and after much searching of heart the Government of India decided almost at the last moment on publication which they felt might help to check waverers in the Party by showing up its leaders in their true light.

2. In considering now how best to deal with the situation created by the Congress Party's threat of a mass-movement to enforce their demand for a British withdrawal, Government of India have been guided by available indications of the extent to which movement may interfere or be intended to interfere with conduct of the war on Indian soil. The indications are unfortunately grave. More than one leader has threatened that movement would be short and swift, and the declared intention of Congress is to throw into it all non-violent strength accumulated in the past twenty years. Detailed information has been derived from a circular issued locally by the Andhra provincial Congress Committee in Madras indicating that programme is designed to effect pressure on Government officers to resign, organization of labour strikes, interference with railway transport (though without danger to life) and with telegraphs and telephones and picketing of troops. The crippling effect on the war effort of such activities carried out on a widespread scale is manifest.

3. For these reasons Government of India with approval of His Majesty's Government have decided that most vigorous steps must be taken to suppress the movement at the outset. It is noteworthy that this is a decision of Governor General in Council and that this Council is now comprised of eleven prominent non-official Indians and, counting the Viceroy himself and the Commander-in-Chief, only five Europeans, one of whom is at present out of India.

4. It is the intention of the Government of India, as soon as the All-India Congress Committee pass or endorse a resolution containing threat of mass civil disobedience, promptly to order the detention of leaders, that is, of Gandhi and members of the Working Committee under the Defence of India Rules and it is possible that the more prominent of them will be deported from India. The Working Committee, the All-India Congress Committee and each provincial Committee, but not the Indian National Congress Party as a whole, will be declared to be unlawful associations, their offices and funds seized, and all individuals arrested who are considered competent and likely to attempt to organize and launch a mass movement. The main object of this action will be to render the movement abortive by removing and detaining its leaders. All possible precautionary

measures will be taken in consultation where necessary with military authorities to deal with danger of widespread demonstrations and disorders. If hope of paralysing movement at outset by above methods should not succeed it will be necessary to introduce stronger measures against Congress Party as a whole. These intentions are of course strictly secret for the time being.

5. His Majesty's Government feel confident that you will share their view that no other choice is open to them than to restrain with whatever means may be necessary the activities of politicians who are bent on pursuing a course which His Majesty's Government sincerely believe would not only hamper and frustrate the war effort of the United Nations but would shatter indefinitely all hope of peace and orderly political advance in India itself.²⁴

845.00/15428

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek*²⁵

I have been giving, as you will of course realize, the utmost consideration and thought to your message regarding the Indian situation,²⁶ which reached me through Dr. T. V. Soong on July 29.

I fully share the opinion you express that for the sake of our common victory the Indian situation should be stabilized and the participation of the Indian people should be secured in the joint war effort. I likewise agree that only the Axis powers would reap benefit if India should start a movement against Britain or against the United Nations and that such an eventuality would seriously affect the whole course of the war.

I know, however, that you will understand the difficulty which is presented to me in your suggestion that this Government should advise both the British Government and the people of India "to seek a reasonable and satisfactory solution". The British Government believes that proposals which it has proffered to the peoples of India should permit of an adjustment fair to both sides, which should result in more active participation by India in the war effort in support of the United Nations, postponing until victory comes any final steps to be taken to meet the desires for independence of the Indian people.

²⁴ On August 13, President Roosevelt sent the following memorandum to the Secretary of State: "This came in five days ago from Attlee in the absence of his chief.

"Frankly, I think it is best not to reply to it.

"What is your view? F. D. R." For the Secretary of State's reply, see his memorandum of August 15, p. 721.

²⁵ By direction of the President, the Under Secretary of State (Welles) handed this message to Dr. T. V. Soong on the afternoon of August 8. There is no date on the file copy.

²⁶ Dated July 25, p. 695.

Furthermore, the British Government feels that suggestions coming at this moment from other members of the United Nations would undermine the authority of the only existing government in India and would tend to create that very crisis in India which it is your hope and my hope may yet be averted.

Under these circumstances, I feel that it would be wiser for you and for myself to refrain from taking action of the kind which you had in mind for the time being. This does not preclude further consideration at a moment's notice of some of the steps which you have suggested, should the course of events in India in the next week or two reach a more serious stage. You may be certain that I will have all of your suggestions fully in mind and that I deeply appreciate the constructive and frank communication which you have made to me. Please continue to communicate with me at any moment with regard to any of the matters affecting the common cause to which our two countries are dedicated.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

845.01/231

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1942.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell, called at his request and handed me a document (copy attached)²⁷ relative to the situation in India, which is self-explanatory. I expressed my appreciation and said that I would bring it to the attention of my associates, and that, of course, I myself would give it special attention.

I specifically and rather emphatically inquired of the Minister whether his Government had prepared a succinct statement of the essential conditions and preparations that would be necessary to enable India to set up the complete plans and structure of a free and independent government, if independence should be granted at once to India by Great Britain, and also showing equally clearly the difficulties the Indians would experience in an attempt immediately to establish and carry into successful operation a structure of entirely independent government, if not the impossibility of their doing so. The Minister said he was not aware of any such statement except the statements made by the Cripps mission. I said that I did not recall whether such a comprehensive statement had been prepared by the British, together

²⁷ Not printed.

with their formula pertaining to ultimate independence, if any, including a reference to the attitude of encouragement and aid on the part of the British Government while preparations and qualifications were thus being effected. I said I was not speaking officially in any sense, but merely asking these questions individually. I concluded by saying that I was speaking in strict confidence and off the record, and that the President would speak for this Government, if and when anything is to be said. The Minister seemed very much interested in the point I had raised and especially its psychological aspect, both in the Empire and in other parts of the world as well.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

845.00/1417 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 8, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 9:03 p. m.]

578. If Government hoped that publication of Congress documents would produce in this country a typhoon of indignation against the Congress, it must be highly chagrined to find that it has only succeeded in producing a boomerang and in lowering itself still further in Indian public esteem at a moment when constructive statesmanship is the crying need of the hour.

The following is an extract from telegram received from the Consul at Bombay:

"Reports continue to reach me of the intensity of anti-British feeling throughout Bombay area. Shortages and high prices of food-stuffs and kerosene are contributing factors to this anti-British sentiment. If a civil disobedience campaign develops, these unfortunate economic factors will make start much worse. I must again point out that depth and intensity of anti-British feeling in western India can scarcely be overemphasized." (Reference my 523, July 28, noon,²⁸ for situation in Bengal.)

Please telegraph whether recent statements of Gandhi and Nehru on publication of Congress documents and their speeches yesterday to All India Congress Committee have been published in American press. There is reason to think that some of the statements are being shortcircuited in London.

MERRELL

²⁸ Not printed.

845.00/1414: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 8, 1942—7 p. m.

[Received August 8—4:29 p. m.]

580. The Viceroy's Executive Council is now in session and it is reliably reported that a communiqué will be issued tonight giving Government's reaction to Congress resolutions. It is also reported that arrest of Congress leaders may begin tonight or tomorrow morning without waiting for Gandhi's letter to Viceroy which former stated yesterday he would send "not as an ultimatum but as an earnest plea to avoid conflict". Gandhi also said that if he received a favorable response, then his letter could be the basis for negotiations. It is difficult to believe that the Government of India will make precipitate arrests without waiting for Gandhi's usual letter when men like Sapru,²⁹ Rajagopalachari and others are still bending every effort to avoid a struggle. It is believed that such headlong action would further deeply antagonize people of this country and possibly discredit Government even among moderates.

The only explanation is that the Government feels that plans (instructions to district committees) for launching the movement which have reportedly been confiscated will be put into effect before there has been time to consider Gandhi's letter.

MERRELL

845.00/1534

Memorandum by Mr. Calvin H. Oakes of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1942.

The recent action of the Government of India in lifting the ban against the Communist Party is of some interest as indicating certain complexities of the political situation as it exists today in India.

Communism in India is said to date from 1918 when Moscow first began to take an interest in that country. For some years the Communist Party of India, which had become well organized in 1928, was financed from Russia and took its orders direct from that country. Later, however, the Party came under the guidance of the Communist Party of Great Britain and Party Organizers from England visited India in order to assist in building up the Party there.

In 1934 the Government of India considered it necessary to declare the Communist Party in India an illegal organization, and its

²⁹ Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, President of the Non-Party Conference.

leaders were subsequently put in prison. This incarceration of its leaders and lack of funds from abroad has greatly hampered the Party's work and its members are believed to number only a few hundred. The strength of the Party lies, however, in the many persons not party members who, communists at heart, are influential in such movements as that of the Kisan Sabhas (peasants' organizations), and who act as directed by Communist-inspired propaganda.

The objective of the Communist Party in India has been a revolution of peasants and workers in which it is hoped that the Indian Army will participate. The Government of India having been overthrown, it is then planned to establish an Indian Soviet Republic. The strategy of the Party has been to capture political power through control of the Indian National Congress, and with this in view the Indian Communist Party, along with various other left wing parties, became an integral part of the Indian National Congress. It will be recalled that several years ago the political reports from India dealt largely with the contest then occurring between the right and left wings of the Congress. As is well known, the right wing retained its command of the Congress Party.

With the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Communists in India worked energetically to sow discord throughout the country and to prevail upon the Congress to adopt an overtly hostile attitude toward the war effort. When England and Soviet Russia became allies, however, the Communists naturally felt obliged to change their attitude and were faced with the problem of reconciling support in India for an "anti-Fascist" front while continuing their fight against "Imperialism" as it exists under British rule in India. The Party's new policy was announced at the end of December 1941, when it proclaimed itself "pro-war" (i. e. in favor of support of the British war effort in India) on the ground that the war was no longer an "imperialist" war but a "peoples'" war which must be supported.

The group in control of the Congress Party has in the meantime abandoned its policy of non-embarrassment to the British in the war effort and is about to embark upon a line of action which can have disastrous effects upon the war effort in so far as the Indian theater is concerned. The official position of the Indian National Congress and that of the Communists or extreme left wing of the Congress are therefore exactly the reverse of what they previously had been. The Communists' attitude has become "healthy" from the British point of view, and because of this "healthy" attitude the British have considered it desirable to remove the ban on those whom they formerly considered their arch enemies, and find themselves on the verge of civil war with that element which formerly protected them in part from the designs of the Communists.

Whether the latter development is one which the British could have prevented through greater foresight is immaterial to this memorandum. The wisdom of facilitating the dissemination in India of Communistic propaganda is, however, seriously questioned. In view of the religious, racial, and emotional factors involved, it is considered improbable that the Communist Party can, despite its desire for "India's unity with the United Nations", materially lessen the opposition which will be forthcoming against the British in any movement such as is now threatened. Furthermore, in allowing the Communists freedom of action in India, the Government may have lifted the lid of a Pandora's box from which will issue far more elements dangerous to the British position in India, immediate as well as future, than friendly even for the moment. In this connection it may be pointed out that the British military in India reported in February that there was every reason to believe that the Communists in India are still more concerned with their ultimate revolutionary objectives than with the present war emergency.

The following secret instructions to Party members, alleged by the British military to have been issued last January, set forth rather explicitly what is believed to be the Party's attitude:

"To think that our new line is making up with Imperialism is a dangerous illusion. Our new line gives us a programme of action which is the only way out of the present stagnation. . . .³⁰ To relax our efforts to build up and strengthen the underground organisation of our Party is endangering the very existence of our party. . . .³⁰ it becomes our duty to strengthen our underground organisation so that we may better co-ordinate our legal and illegal activities."

The danger exists of course that, realizing that their efforts in support of the war effort would have limited value in the present crisis, the Communists may abandon their interest in the war front as a whole and, through adding to disturbances, endeavor to advance their main objective in so far as India is concerned.

The extent of this danger is indicated by the following pronouncement of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, made in reply to the action of the Government of India in lifting the ban against the Communist Party:

"We Communists will proclaim our unqualified support to the national demand for recognition of Indian independence and establishment of a National Government and popularize the only path for winning that demand through national unity here and now and India's unity with the United Nations."

"India's unity with the United Nations" would appear to be but a secondary consideration.

³⁰ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

In a telegram addressed simultaneously to the British Communist Party the General Secretary stated:

"Our fellow patriots are being provoked to a suicidal course by the recalcitrant insolence of imperialist rulers. Your task is to press your Government to negotiate with the Congress on the basis of the recognition of Indian independence and the immediate establishment of provisional National Government."

The tragedy of the British position in India, wherein the Government is obliged to turn for help to an element which treats it with such contempt, needs little comment.

It may be added that the Indian Princes, controlling one-third of the area of India, have, through their loyalty to the British Crown, assured a maximum war effort from at least that portion of the country. This loyalty is, however, based on self-interest and these Princes will find less enchanting Britannia's couch should she take thereto many partners of too noxious an odor. Too, those groups in British India who have thus far supported the British Raj, may not long continue to do so if elements destructive of their interests are to be allowed to flourish under that Raj.

IV. Interest of the United States in Indian Political and Economic Situation Following Arrest of Gandhi and Other Congress Leaders by the British; Appointment of William Phillips as Personal Representative of the President

845.00/1415: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 9, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received August 9—6:03 a. m.]

581. Gandhi,³¹ Nehru,³² Azad,³³ and about 20 other Congress leaders were arrested early this morning (reference my 580, August 8, 7 p. m.³⁴).

Speaking before All India Congress Committee last night Gandhi stated that he would make every effort to see Viceroy³⁵ before launching struggle but Government was apparently unimpressed by this statement.

There is as yet no news as to whether, in view of foregoing, movement will be started forthwith.

³¹ Mohandas K. Gandhi, leader of civil disobedience movement in India.

³² Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress Party leader; associated with Gandhi in opposition to British rule in India.

³³ Maulana Azad, President of the Congress Party.

³⁴ *Ante*, p. 708.

³⁵ Marquess of Linlithgow.

The Indian defense member confirmed to me last night the explanation given in the last paragraph of telegram referred to above.

MERRELL

845.00/1423 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 10, 1942—4 p. m.

[Received 4:07 p. m.]

585. Situation in India is very confused since hasty arrest of Congress leaders and it will probably be several days before future trends can be anticipated with any degree of accuracy. Most likely possibility seems to be that Government's repressive measures will prove relatively successful temporarily and that movement will be driven underground and assume a considerably more violent complexion than would have been the case were Gandhi and other important leaders available to keep it within reasonably non-violent channels.

Government has taken measure to muzzle press by requiring that all matters relating to political situation be submitted for censorship prior to publication. In this connection, the Consulate Bombay makes the following pertinent remarks with which I agree: "Severe censorship now imposed will create a flood of rumors which official pronouncements will not counteract successfully while people will listen to Axis broadcasts to obtain news of India." All India Editors Conference will meet in Delhi on August 17 to consider position of press resulting from Government orders.

Following arrest of Gandhi yesterday morning demonstrations were held in Bombay which led to firing, lathi charges, and the use of tear gas by police. Five persons were killed and many others, including police, were injured. Similar demonstrations were held in other cities which also resulted in some deaths and many injuries.

MERRELL

740.0011 Pacific War/2718 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 11, 1942—6 p. m.

[Received August 11—5:15 p. m.]

591. To the President from Currie.³⁰ There are disturbing evidences of a tendency on the part of Congress supporters to identify American forces and attitudes in India with the British. Gandhi has stated "You (Americans) have made common cause with Great Brit-

³⁰ Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt; he had been on special mission to China for the President.

ain. You cannot, therefore, disown responsibility for anything that her representatives do in India." *Harijan* August 9. There has already been minor incidents involving American troops. This tendency endangers your moral leadership in Asia and therefore America's ability to exert its influence for acceptable and just settlements in postwar Asia. It is to Britain's own long-term interest that Asiatic belief in American disinterestedness be preserved.

This position must, of course, be preserved in a way that will not unduly embarrass the British. I believe this could be done by making public a communication from you to Stilwell³⁷ through Marshall³⁸ defining our position in India and instructing troops on behavior and attitudes along lines of secret order dated August 8, with certain modifications.

Widespread belief prevails here that nonviolence phase is rapidly passing into violence. The thing to be avoided at all costs is the shedding of Indian blood by American troops. The ability of American troops to prevent this possibility arising would be greatly improved by public knowledge of instructions given them. This consideration also suggests the desirability of modifying point 4 in War Department instructions to Stilwell. In view of larger political interests involved, it is less important to protect property than to avoid shedding Indian blood. I am certain Chinese would concur in this view so far as their property is concerned. Defense of personal safety in point 4 below would actually in practice permit defense of vital military equipment. Clarification of our status here is of great importance in assuring the Chinese that we are not a party to British actions in India.

Racial problems of paramount importance might be minimized by stressing that the fundamental reason for our presence in India is to help the Chinese. It may be possible to persuade the Generalissimo to issue similar instructions to his forces in India. For all these reasons, I suggest a statement along the following lines:

"To Commanding General, American forces in India:

The President appreciates the difficult position in which American forces may be placed because of current developments in India. For your guidance in governing the conduct of American forces, he has directed me to communicate to you the following general statements of policy:

1. The sole purpose of the American forces in India is to prosecute the war of the United Nations against the Axis Powers. In the prosecution of the war in that area, the primary aim is to aid and support China in her war of resistance against Japan. Another aim is to aid in the defense of India in case of attack.

³⁷ Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commander of U. S. forces in India, China, and Burma.

³⁸ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

2. In the successful prosecution of the war, the American Government believes that the closest and most harmonious relations must be preserved between the Governments and peoples of all the United Nations.

3. In pursuance of this principle it is important that American forces in India should take scrupulous care to avoid any appearance of participation in India's internal political problems.

4. It is recognized that the sole responsibility for the protection of American property and Chinese property entrusted to the care of American forces from acts of civil violence rests on the Government of India. American forces will resort to defensive measures only in the event that their own personal safety is endangered."

Merrell concurs in this statement. Am unable to consult Stilwell as he is in Karachi but am communicating this message to him with the request that he inform General Marshall of his reaction. I shall proceed with plan to depart for Karachi tomorrow unless advised by you to the contrary. [Currie.]

MERRELL

845.00/1542g

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1942.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received from Dr. T. V. Soong a further message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which I enclose herewith.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FROM THE GENERALISSIMO,
CHUNGKING, AUGUST 11, 1942

I feel certain that you are concerned as I am at the news of the arrest of the Working Committee of the Indian Congress including Gandhi and Nehru. In my last telegram I expressed my dread that such a development would prove to be a great setback to the Allied cause in the Far East and would certainly have a disastrous effect on the entire war situation. I fear also that if matters are allowed to deteriorate further the influence of the Axis powers would be considerably strengthened and the avowed object of the Allies in waging this war would no longer be taken seriously by the world and the professed principles of the United Nations would lose much of their spiritual significance. At all costs the United Nations should demonstrate to the world by their action the sincerity of their professed principle of ensuring freedom and justice for men of all races. I

earnestly appeal to you as the inspired author of the Atlantic Charter ^{38a} to take (effective?) measures which undoubtedly have already occurred to you to solve the pressing problem now facing India and the world so that normalcy will return and unimpeded war effort may continue to hasten our common victory. Your policy will serve as a guide to all of us who have resisted for so long and so bitterly the brute force of the aggressors. Trusting you will favor me with an early reply.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

740.0011 Pacific War/2714½

President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ³⁹

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1942.

All countries and peoples seeking to defeat the Axis powers will doubtless agree, without reference to the merits, that the unsettled controversy between those forces in India led by Mr. Gandhi and the British Government is unfortunate—equally unfortunate for all concerned. You and I naturally deplore this situation. The United Nations are especially interested in it by reason of its relation to the war situation. We have every desire to contribute to its adjustment.

It is scarcely necessary to reiterate the deep interest of this Government both under its longstanding policy and especially under the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, in independence for those who aspire to independence. This policy has been stated and reiterated over a long period and up to this hour by the official spokesmen of the American Government. It has been put into practical application in such cases as that of the Philippines. No one can misinterpret or misunderstand these crystal-clear acts and utterances of the Government of the United States.

It seems clear that despite all efforts on your part and on my part, without becoming actual parties to the internal controversy existing between the British Government and Mr. Gandhi speaking for himself and his followers, to aid in bringing about an amicable adjustment of this serious disagreement and controversy, it has thus far been impossible to do so. The Government of the United States has thus far been of the opinion that it could exert its influence and efforts more effectively in this matter by refraining from offering active mediation to both sides in the controversy which seems to be a combination of many facts and factors.

^{38a} Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

³⁹ Handed to the Chinese Ambassador (Hu Shih) by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) on August 13, 1942.

You and I realize that irrespective of the merits of the case, any action which slows up the war effort in India results not in theoretical assistance, but in actual assistance to the armed forces of Japan.

We have sought in every consistent way to promote an adjustment which would tide over the war period in order that we may win a victory against barbarism.

We need India's help in this and I wish Mr. Gandhi could see more clearly the need for this immediate help, and also that he could understand that the very worst thing that could happen to the people of India would be victory by the Axis powers.

I told the Pacific War Council today, including Mr. Soong, that I think your position and mine should be to make it clear to the British Government and to Mr. Gandhi and his followers that we have not the moral right to force ourselves upon the British or the Congress Party; but that we should make it clear to both sides that you and I stand in the position of friends who will gladly help if we are called on by both sides.

At the same time I think we should intimate to both sides that because both of them and China and the United States and all the other United Nations are in a struggle for existence, the assistance of India is vital to the common cause, including the cause of the people of India themselves.

I have in mind the history of the Thirteen American Colonies in 1775. Each Colony was a separate sovereignty. They set up differing republican forms of government. They had a loose Confederation, but when their independence was acknowledged in 1783 they realized they must have a breathing spell before they could set up a permanent constitutional form of federal government. They, therefore, went through a six year period of trial and error and discussion. Finally, they adopted a Federal Constitution which is in existence today—one hundred and fifty-three years later.

I think that you and I can best serve the people of India at this stage by making no open or public appeal or pronouncement but by letting the simple fact be known that we stand ready as friends to heed any appeal for help if that appeal comes from both sides. It is my thought that this simple fact need not even be put on paper because it should be obvious to all.

If we both pursue the policy above recommended we can later consult together as to the desirability and feasibility of making available our friendly offices should they be desired by the parties to the controversy.

For your information the following orders have been given to the American forces in India :

"The sole purpose of the American forces in India is to prosecute the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers. In the prosecution of the war in that area the primary aim of the Government

of the United States is to aid China. American forces are not to indulge to the slightest degree in activities of any other nature unless India should be attacked by the Axis powers, in which event American troops would aid in defending India. American forces in India will exercise scrupulous care to avoid the slightest participation in India's internal political problems, or even the appearance of so doing. American forces will resort to defensive measures only in the event that their own personal safety or that of other American citizens is endangered."

I send you my very warm personal regards.

ROOSEVELT

845.00/1516

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1942.

The Ambassador of Mexico ⁴⁰ called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador said that the President of Mexico had telephoned him this morning and asked him to call upon me personally in order to inform me that agitation of considerable volume had already been manifest in Mexico for some steps to be taken looking towards intervention by the United Nations in favor of the granting of independence to the people of India by the British Government. President Avila Camacho told him that he was visited yesterday evening by leaders of the principal labor organizations, all of whom had urged him to request the President of the United States to join with the Soviet Government in offering mediation between the Indian National Congress and the British Government with a view to preventing great loss of life in India and with a view to further Indian independence. The President wanted to know what the views of this Government might be with regard to this question and whether there was anything helpful he could do.

I asked the Ambassador to convey to the President the deep appreciation of this Government for the confidence he had shown, which was a new demonstration of the particularly close and intimate relations between our two countries at this critical time.

I said the President of Mexico could be assured that the President had been giving the utmost thought and consideration to the question of India for a long time past. I said that at the time Sir Stafford Cripps had been sent to India by the British Government it had been the earnest hope of the United States that a satisfactory and

⁴⁰ Don Francisco Castillo Nájera.

fair solution could be found. Unfortunately, those negotiations had broken down. The leaders of the Indian National Congress were demanding complete independence immediately and the British were not willing to concede more than the assurance for complete independence at the end of the war period together with certain adjustments during the intervening period which in the opinion of the British Government would not jeopardize the ability of Great Britain to defend India and legitimate interests of the United Nations. I said that unfortunately it was clear that a stalemate had now arisen and it was difficult to foresee how long this might last.

I asked the Ambassador further to say that as the Mexican Government well knew this Government had officially and publicly stated on many occasions that it favored the independence of all peoples who desired independence and that our policy with regard to India was therefore clearly established. I stated, however, that at the present moment in the opinion of the President of the United States the successful winning of the war was superior to every other consideration. He felt that no steps should be taken by him which would impair the position of the Government of India and its consequent ability to maintain order and to make possible the defense of India against probable impending Japanese attempts of invasion and to insure the passage from India to China of urgently needed military supplies and equipment. I said that if at any time the President believed that both parties to the dispute felt that his friendly services would be of value in putting an end to the controversy, he and other leaders of the United Nations should be in a position to render such assistance, but that he felt his intervention at this time would not be conducive to the military objectives which he had uppermost in mind.

I said that of course the public utterances of Gandhi and the written statements which he had recently made would only lead to the belief that the winning of the war by the United Nations was something in which he was not interested and that the situation which he had now in part been responsible for creating could only be of advantage to Japan and was obviously being stirred up and fostered by Japanese propaganda.

The Ambassador said that in his own opinion Gandhi was secretly working with the Japanese and he feared that was also the case of a large majority of the Indian National Congress.

He said he would immediately communicate what I had said to the President of Mexico and that he was confident that the President of Mexico would understand the situation fully and prevent undue agitation in the Republic.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.00/1533

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1942.

Sir Girja⁴¹ came in to see me, at his request. He was obviously shaken and unhappy about the events of the past few days. He said he had come in more to unburden his mind than for any other purpose. He pointed out the difficulty of his own position. He said that under the circumstances he had felt that he could not talk freely in Washington, but hoped that he could come in from time to time to present to me his appreciation of the facts, which was all he could do.

He then made two points. He said he hoped that we would go forward with the implementation of the Grady report;⁴² and he hoped that we could promptly get a ranking American to India as Agent General. I said that both matters were under close and immediate consideration.

He then stated the now familiar facts in the controversy between the Congress Party and the British Government, and he wondered whether we were taking any attitude.

I took my line carefully from the answer which Secretary Hull had prepared to General Chiang Kai-shek. I said that the last thing in the world this Government felt it could do was to take sides in a controversy, or attempt to pass judgment on the merits. Still less could we expect to obtain any practical results unless there was reason to believe that our good offices were wanted. As we saw it, the cardinal issue was the victory of the United Nations in respect of which the defense of India was a vital part. In line with this, we had a historic interest in the question of independence as shown both by our steady enunciation of principle and our own action in the matter. The British war effort was vital to the defense of the United Nations. The aspiration of India to independence was entirely consistent with our ideals. If forced to choose, defense necessarily had to come first.

Meanwhile, I could only express a personal opinion as to what the Government might do; but my personal opinion was that, at least for the time being, we would not feel free to make any announcement or take any action. Naturally, circumstances might change, but unless and until a favorable opportunity developed, I did not see that we could say anything. In respect of the internal matter, we had little, if any, standing. We had, of course, an over-all interest both as a matter of defense and by reason of the fact that our troops and supplies were in India, and because India was on the line of communica-

⁴¹ Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Agent General for India.

⁴² See press release issued by the Department of State, September 11, 1942, p. 732.

tions to our Chinese ally. But the existence of this interest did not mean that it was desirable to enter, much less take sides in, a controversy at the present time.

Sir Girja said that he was entirely of this view, and very glad of it. He said his own opinion was that the President could only step into this situation when he was virtually assured of success. He said that the British feeling in the matter was not reassuring. The Chinese Ambassador ^{42a} and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross ⁴³ had been at his house to dinner a couple of nights ago; the Chinese Ambassador had indicated the vivid Chinese interest in settlement of the Indian controversy. Thereupon, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross had grown purple with rage and had used language to the Chinese Ambassador which finally forced Sir Girja, as host, to intervene and end the discussion. If, said Sir Girja, the Britishers felt that way about the obvious Chinese interest, it was difficult to see that much could be done until their views had developed further.

He was somewhat worried about the strain on Chinese-English relations.

I said that this was of course regrettable but that some allowance had to be made for the British point of view. They were fighting for their lives; and as they saw it, the Congress movement was endangering their very safety. For two centuries the British Empire had been the symbol of Britain's greatness and position in the world; and while this might not justify all of their policies, it had to be realized that they were operating under a very severe strain. Further, I said, the intercepted first draft of Gandhi's resolution contemplating talks with Japan was not one which would be taken very well by Britain, or for that matter, in the United States. Sir Girja said that that was unhappily true. Gandhi had seemed to indicate that he thought the Japanese and the Germans would win the war—whereas all of our thinking had to be based on an exactly contrary premise.

Sir Girja said he would come in from time to time, in case he got any new light on the situation. I said we should be glad to have him.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

845.20/115

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, August 12, 1942

The following statement of this Government's policy has been made a part of the orders to the American military forces in India:

^{42a} Hu Shih.

⁴³ Chief Economic Adviser to the British Government since 1932; Chairman of the Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.

"1. The sole purpose of the American forces in India is to prosecute the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers. In the prosecution of the war in that area the primary aim of the Government of the United States is to aid China.

2. American forces are not to indulge to the slightest degree in activities of any other nature unless India should be attacked by the Axis powers, in which event American troops would aid in defending India.

3. American forces in India will exercise scrupulous care to avoid the slightest participation in India's internal political problems, or even the appearance of so doing.

4. In event of internal disturbances American forces will resort to defensive measures only should their own personal safety or that of other American citizens be endangered or for the necessary protection of American military supplies and equipment."

845.00/1446: Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, August 14, 1942—noon.

[Received 6:39 p.m.]

603. Sir Richard Tottenham, additional Secretary in the Home Department who is directly charged with the suppression of internal disorder in India, informed me yesterday afternoon that the disturbances reported in my various telegrams⁴⁴ particularly those in Delhi and Bombay are now under control. He described them as outbursts resulting from resentment against the arrest of Gandhi and the other Congress leaders which were spontaneous and sporadic but in some cases directed by lesser Congress leaders. They could not arrest everyone. In some of the most likely places for Congress movements to develop, no disturbance had occurred. He felt that the cause of the Congress Party had been hurt by the violences perpetrated.

Sir Richard expects the real civil disobedience movement to begin later (time unpredictable) starting on a lower level and being more widespread than the recent occurrences. He seemed confident that the Government would be able to keep the movement under control.

Gandhi has not yet started a fast.

MERRELL

741.45/12

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] August 15, 1942.

With reference to the attached communication of August 7 to you from Mr. Attlee,⁴⁵ you and other officials of this Government during

⁴⁴ The many telegrams from New Delhi reporting in detail on the internal situation in India are not printed.

⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 703.

past months earnestly laid before Prime Minister Churchill and other British officials the unequivocal attitude of yourself in favor of an adjustment on a basis that could and should be mutually agreed upon in the relations between the home Government of Great Britain and either officials or certain political leaders headed by Mr. Gandhi in India.

In addition to your plain statements to Mr. Churchill to the foregoing effect, I on one or two occasions, and I think it was two, brought up the whole question of concessions and further adjustments on a mutually agreed upon basis, with Ambassador Halifax. As early as six months ago further earnest efforts on the part of your personal representative in India, Col. Louis Johnson, were made in support of a mutually satisfactory settlement. Our attitude has not been one of partisanship toward either contender, and of course it is not today. In these circumstances, there is scarcely more to add in relation to the accompanying document.

It would seem that if the British Government would repeat with full emphasis its proposal of independence to India at the end of the war, and accompany it by a statement of the adjustments to be made prior to the announcement of independence, including some reference to the equal interest of India with the twenty-eight nations in resisting the Axis powers, it would clarify public opinion and might lead to the resumption of discussions between Great Britain and the Indian leaders. In any event, it ought to have the effect of reducing the feeling of tension in India. You, of course, and all of us, are closely observing to find any way that is at all feasible and acceptable to further encourage and promote a mutually satisfactory settlement.

845.00/1535

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1942.

Sir Ronald Campbell ⁴⁶ called to see me this morning at his request.

Sir Ronald read to me an article appearing in this morning's *New York Times* reporting a conversation which Mr. Norman Thomas ⁴⁷ had yesterday with Secretary Hull and in which, according to Mr. Thomas, Secretary Hull was alleged to have said that the Government of the United States "was constantly awaiting opportunities to bring pressure on both sides" in India.⁴⁸ I replied that I had not had an opportunity of talking with Secretary Hull regarding this con-

⁴⁶ British Minister.

⁴⁷ American Socialist leader.

⁴⁸ Marginal note: "Untrue—Hull."

versation, nor had I seen any memorandum of it. I said, nevertheless, I could immediately, with perfect assurance, state that Secretary Hull never would have used any such phrase as that mentioned, and that the policy of this Government with regard to the Indian question was well known and had been frequently stated. I said that all that Secretary Hull could possibly have implied was that this Government always stood ready to do what it could to be of service in composing differences in India and, as one of the United Nations, it felt, because of the vital effect which any serious crisis in India would have on the common war effort and upon the vital interests of the United States, it was warranted in taking such action in this regard as might be helpful.

Sir Ronald said that he was sure that this was the case and that he understood our situation fully, but that he felt that a report of this character would have a very bad effect when published in India. I stated that, without knowing what the facts might be, I assumed that our censorship authorities would not permit a phrase of this kind to go out.

Sir Ronald had received a long telegram from his Foreign Office with regard to the situation in India. In this, he was informed that the situation in general had greatly improved but that the British Government believed that the Congress Party had been taken by surprise and that the disorders which had broken out were not actually due to any concerted effort on the part of the Party. It was believed that the Party was now planning for a far wider concerted move of obstruction which would result presumably with the stopping of communications. The British Government desired this Government to know that if agents of the Congress Party cut communications or obstructed free communications, the "most severe measures" would be taken by the Indian Government.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.00/1594

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1942.

Mr. Mahindra ⁴⁹ came in to pay his respects. He wished to express the hope that we would continue to implement the Grady report. He said in his considered judgment announcement of our intention to go ahead on the lines recommended would be a very considerable stabilizing influence in the present disturbed Indian situation.

⁴⁹ K. C. Mahindra, of the India Supply Mission.

He added that he hoped the United States might say something which would assist in the settlement of the Indian question. He was clear that what was going on now was merely surface rioting by disorderly elements; the real campaign of civil disobedience had not begun; he thought it probably would begin sometime in October. When it came, it would far transcend in importance anything which had occurred to date.

I said that we had felt we could not take sides in the matter; that any act on our part would only be considered if we had reason to believe it were welcome to both sides. I added that our national doctrines here were in favor of independence and we approved it in the Philippines; but that if it were a question as between defense and independence for India, we should of course choose defense. Without defense there would be no independence for India or anyone else.

Mr. Mahindra said that he agreed. He said that in July every Congress leader had been in favor of defense of India. When he left India in July one of the principal reasons for the Congress upheaval was their understanding that the British did not intend to defend India.

I expressed surprise at this.

Mr. Mahindra then said that a secret staff document had leaked out and had been circulated in Indian newspapers. This was purely and simply a plan for the evacuation of India in the face of any Japanese thrust, leaving the country helpless and at the mercy of the invaders. This, he said, was why the Congress insisted on control of the defense of India. They feared that otherwise they would be abandoned as had been the case with Burma.

I said that my impression was that the present policy was quite otherwise; that the British were reenforcing in India and were asking, in that regard, certain assistance from us.

Mr. Mahindra said that defense of India really turned on defense of the Calcutta area; that the RAF⁵⁰ there consisted of 50 planes though they had been sending in reenforcements of troops. He said that 500 planes in that area probably would be determinative. He was an industrialist and he knew India well; he was not in politics nor had he been in Government service; but he was convinced that defense was possible and that fear that it would not be carried out was at the very root of the Congress movement.

I said that I noted his points. Naturally we were exploring daily any possibilities in the whole matter though at the moment I saw nothing that could be done. Some of us had wondered why the Congress did not state that they were wholeheartedly in favor of defense of India and were prepared to cooperate in that regard, irrespective of other political controversies.

⁵⁰ Royal Air Force.

Mr. Mahindra said that some weeks ago they had been prepared to make that statement; that he thought they would now if Pandit Nehru were not in jail. But as all Congress leaders were in jail now there was no one who could make the statement; and no Congress leader would sit down with the British while they were in jail.

I said that it seemed to me that if the Congress really wanted to defend India, agreement would be established on one point between the groups, namely, that both British and Indians proposed to defend India.

Mr. Mahindra said that they could get together only with the United States on this point. The Congress Party would not now sit down around the table with the British.

I said that I was, of course, not empowered to discuss anything of that sort.

Finally, Mr. Mahindra made one suggestion. He said that the attack on the Solomon Islands was, in one sense, a vigorous implementation of the defense of India by the United Nations, namely, ourselves. It directed Japanese strength away from India and safeguarded their position. He thought our people might well state that fact over the radio for the benefit of the Indian population.

I said I noted the suggestion and would pass it on.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

845.00/1596

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1942.

Sir Girja came in to see me, principally to give his interpretation of the Indian events.

He said that the disturbances in India were not going according to pattern. They certainly were not a non-violence campaign got up by the Congress. They started with violence, and were on a straight revolutionary pattern. Though they started, of course, in Bombay and Allahabad, and similar places, they were now principally affecting the Province of Bihar. The pattern in all cases was the same: a concentrated assault on railways, communications and telegraph lines. The railways running through the Bihar and adjoining districts which were affected carry ninety per cent of the coal and minerals of India to the rest of India; they are therefore strategic.

Bombay, he gathers, is pretty well back to normal; the Government ordnance factories are at work.

But Sir Girja was concerned over a number of developments. The students at the University of Benares had taken over the leadership

of the mob; the University had been closed and occupied by the police, but the students thus dispersed would probably carry the movement to the rural districts. Sir Girja said that under the circumstances the British were entirely right in closing the university—though he felt badly, since he had himself got it financed with an annual draft of \$100,000., in earlier days.

Sir Girja said that they saw, as yet, no evidence of Japanese fifth column penetration outside of Calcutta, where there had been a small amount.

No one was yet certain whether the non-violence campaign was yet to begin.

Sir Girja felt that in view of the way the campaign had been handled, the British had done the only thing they could, in meeting force with force. It was idle to say that they could merely let things alone, or that they were under any obligation not to resist a violent movement directed against them. In practice, no one was prepared to set up a provisional government in India, should the British leave; by consequence, as he saw it, the immediate withdrawal of the British would mean either anarchy and civil war on the one hand, or a Japanese take-over, on the other—neither of which was of any use to India.

Sir Girja said that he had had a number of leading radio commentators in to see him at lunch, in New York. They had asked him why the United States did not make a move. Sir Girja had said that he could not, of course, discuss any such matter; that his personal view was that it would be absurd for the President to make any move unless he were assured in advance that it would be successful. A premature move which aligned the President with one side or the other and led to failure, would mean that there was literally no one in the world (unless one might name Hitler or Hirohito) who could thereafter enter the situation with any hope of success.

Finally, Sir Girja urged again that we promptly appoint a successor to Col. Johnson, saying that the personality and standing of the man could be of extreme importance in the situation. Only in that way could we have any real data on what was going on.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

740.0011 European War 1939/24125

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request. After some preliminary exchanges of information of a general nature the question

of the proper construction and practical application of the political provisions, especially, of the Atlantic Charter came up. I repeated to the Ambassador my ideas of its proper construction and practical application. These provided for its universal application to all nations and peoples—to all peoples whatsoever their condition and whatsoever shade of independence and freedom that they might aspire to. The Ambassador replied that some of the high officials of his Government were in the act of preparing an interpretation and application of the Atlantic Charter as it would relate to the British Empire. I said that while it was not my business except in a general sense, in my judgment the application of the Charter should be made universal, as I had already described it to the Ambassador, and that the British Empire would probably run into constant difficulties if it should seek to have the Atlantic Charter applied in separate compartments, so to speak. The Ambassador said he considered that a very impressive view and that he would at once bring it to the attention of Lord Cranborne, who is in charge of the proposed undertaking to draft regulations relative to the application and meaning of the Charter.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

845.00/1556

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1942.

Lord Halifax called to see me this afternoon at his request. In the course of his conversation the Ambassador informed me for the confidential information of this Government that the Viceroy of India had yesterday reported that the general situation in India was far better and that the only province where disorders were continuing was the Province of Behar. The Viceroy also reported—and it was desired that this piece of information be kept strictly secret—that a strike was in progress at Tata's iron works in Calcutta where by far the greatest volume of war production in India was being undertaken. This strike was causing much concern to the Government of India. The Ambassador stated that no conversations of any kind were in progress between the Government of India and the Indian National Congress and that none were anticipated. He stated that the Viceroy was firmly of the opinion that the Indian Government had the situation well in hand and that no serious crisis was likely at least for some time to come.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.01/239 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, September 3, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received 4:41 p. m.]

674. Since Gandhi now in jail there is no means of delivering President's letter to him except through Government of India channels (reference Department's instruction No. 38, August 5⁵¹). Even if that means were employed there would probably be no way of knowing whether letter actually reached its destination. In addition, any approach to Government would probably develop the fact that President's letter is in reply to one from Gandhi and Government would naturally wonder, and perhaps inquire, how latter was despatched from India without censorship. I accordingly suggest that letter be kept in confidential files of this office or alternatively if Department so desires, transmitted through Consul in Madras to Rajagopalachari, the only important Congress leader not in jail.⁵²

MERRELL

845.00/1601a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell)

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1942—5 p. m.

482. The Department has noted that disturbances in India as reported were not considered part of Congress' mass civil disobedience program the commencement of which was expected at a later date. Please inform whether there are indications that an effort has already been made to put the program in operation or whether its inception is considered still to be in the future.

HULL

845.00/1599

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Ailing)

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1942.

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai called today on some minor matters. I asked him what his impression was of the Indian situation. He said he has the feeling that the rioting has died down but he would not venture to guess whether it was ended. He pointed out that in previous instances when the Congress Party had started civil disobedience

⁵¹ Ante, p. 702.⁵² The Officer in Charge at New Delhi was instructed by telegram No. 505, September 12, 4 p. m., to retain letter until it could be delivered to addressee and then to ask instructions.

and non-violent resistance campaigns the rioting had come later after a period of preparation; in this instance the rioting had started immediately and appeared to have the same general pattern throughout the country, i. e. an attempt to disrupt means of communication.

The Agent General said that he had been giving a great deal of thought to the problem and had come to the conclusion that there was no action which could be taken at this time by the American Government to ameliorate the situation. He went on to say that he did feel quite strongly that it would be advantageous for the American Government to replace Mr. Wilson⁵³ or Colonel Johnson. He said that by having adequate representation at New Delhi not only would this Government be kept better informed of developments but also an experienced representative would be able to bring his influence to bear upon the Viceroy. In this connection, the Agent General pointed out that the Viceroy had been in India for seven years and was probably more or less out of touch with outside opinion, particularly American opinion. He felt it was altogether desirable that the Viceroy should be kept currently up-to-date on opinion as it developed in the United States.

845.00/1565 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Haselton) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, September 5, 1942—5 p. m.
[Received 11:16 p. m.]

680. Congress leaders had drawn no detailed plans of campaign prior to their arrest, believing that Viceroy would certainly accept Gandhi's statement that no movement would be launched before he had made an effort to see Viceroy and reach a settlement. The time that has elapsed since August 9 has accordingly been utilized by Congressmen in drawing up and having distributed throughout country a plan of action. While individual Congressmen undoubtedly participated in the various disturbances throughout India there was no central direction. Although acts of violence, arson and firing by police and military are continuing over wide areas during past few days there has been increasing evidence that movement is becoming less violent and more in line with traditional Congress tactics (reference Department's 482, September 2 [3], 5 p. m.). Leaflets are known to have been distributed throughout India and it is believed that Congress movement will become more prominent within next 2 weeks. Due to great organizational problems involved actual Congress campaign is just beginning to manifest itself. Congress news letters indicate that a special effort will be made on September 9

⁵³ Thomas M. Wilson, former U. S. Commissioner at New Delhi.

which is just one month since Congress leaders' arrest. It is extremely difficult to form any complete picture of what is really going on in rural districts because of severe muzzling of press and obvious disinclination of Government to allow true situation to be known not only to overseas public but to foreign Governments as well. Upon inquiry of a high Government official yesterday Berry^{53a} was informed that total number of killed and wounded throughout India was less than 1,000 of which only about 300 had been killed. This figure is believed to be absolutely ridiculous. Same official informed Berry that he believed Congress program was yet to be launched but that he hoped Government would be able to suppress it. He admitted, however, that there is a great danger that even Government repressive measures will not be able to avoid serious dislocations in railway and other communications.

The Secretary of the All India Muslim League stated privately yesterday that he did not believe Government would be able to put down the movement and that despite what the League said publicly it knew that Muslims throughout the country were participating in the movement and were just as much bitterly anti-British as the Hindus themselves. Four prominent members of the Muslim League have issued public statements calling upon Jinnah^{53b} to abandon his present obstructionist policy and make an effort to reach a settlement with Gandhi. There is reason to believe that Muslim Leaguers are frightened that Government will not be able to put down the movement and that it will be forced to reach a settlement with Congress detrimental to Muslim League interests. Everything depends upon how Jinnah himself feels since he is the absolute dictator of the League and is quite capable of saying to his followers that if they are not satisfied with his leadership they are at perfect liberty to replace him with someone else, knowing full well that his followers realize that he is the only one able to hold the League together. An unconfirmed report from a usually well informed source is to the effect that Jinnah has sent word to Rajagopalachari that he is willing to accept him as mediator between League and Gandhi.

I am quite convinced that Government has no desire whatever to reach a settlement and that it is relying on the intransigence of Jinnah in this connection. It is believed, however, that in the unlikely event that Jinnah requested the Viceroy for authorization either for himself or for a mediator to see Gandhi, such request would be all but irresistible.

The Viceroy is seeing Dr. Mookerjee on Tuesday despite efforts of Viceroy's private secretary to side-track the Finance Minister (reference my 671, September 2, 5 p. m.⁵⁴). It is almost certain that the

^{53a} James Lampton Berry, Secretary of the American Mission at New Delhi.

^{53b} Mohamed Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

Viceroy will not give his blessing to any proposals until Mookerjee has approached Jinnah and received his consent to start negotiations. The Viceroy hopes and believes that Mookerjee will be unable to satisfy this condition. It will thus be seen that Jinnah, who arrives in Delhi about September 10, holds the whip hand and it is impossible to know whether any reasonable settlement is possible until he arrives here and consults with Mookerjee.

Consular officers throughout India report increasing shortages of food.

Consul General in report dated September 3, gives summary of an interview which occurred between an officer of his staff and a civil official of Government of Bihar. According to this official civil Government has disappeared throughout most of Bihar, the civil authorities having been killed or driven out of villages. Leaders of disturbances are controlling villages and collecting taxes. The army has taken control of large areas and it is estimated that at least one division is being used for this purpose. Many military and civilian officers who have gone into rural areas to investigate have been killed. Producers of raw materials are being urged by Congress leaders to conceal their stocks in order not to aid the British. The official said that while situation showed some improvement in last few days it was impossible to tell when and where further disturbances would flare up. Tearing up of railway lines and destruction of culverts are continuing and is repeated as fast as repairs are done.

Consul General has been informed by the President of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, who is a close friend of Gandhi and Nehru, that unless Government opens negotiations soon there will be much more trouble for which many Indian industrialists are prepared to suffer losses if necessary to win independence for India.

Consul General has reported to Department by telegraph the walk-out on September 1, of railway transport workers in Calcutta Port.

Conclusion: The Mission continues to hold view that Government will be unable suppress movement and that serious dislocations in railways and other means of communication will seriously interfere with war effort in this country. Government will make every attempt by suppression of news to convince foreign opinion that it has situation under control but if India is to serve as a basis of operations for United Nations, Government must supplement severe repression with a constructive and positive program to reach settlement with Indian people. There is good reason for believing that Government is strengthened in its present attitude because of belief of British and American Intelligence that there is no chance of a Japanese invasion of this country and that Government will be left free to carry on its own war with internal elements.

HASELTON

845.24/257

Press Release Issued by the Department of State, September 11, 1942

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
INDIA REGARDING THE SUBMISSION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
TECHNICAL MISSION TO INDIA

The final report of the American Technical Mission ⁵⁵ has been submitted by its Chairman, Dr. Henry F. Grady, to the Governments of India and the United States. The report contains much factual data concerning the production in India of essential war materials and the recommendations of the Mission for the expansion of such production. The two Governments are now engaged in studying the Mission's report and the manner in which its various recommendations may be implemented.

The function of the Mission was to investigate the industrial resources of India and to recommend ways and means by which these resources could be developed to augment production for war purposes. The work of the Mission, therefore, was directly related to the common war effort of the United Nations and was not connected with the post-war industrial and commercial problems of India. The report of the Mission contains a survey of the principal industries of India ancillary to the war effort and its principal industrial requirements. For each of these, the Mission made recommendations suggesting action by either the Government of India or the Government of the United States. In those instances in which additional output was shown to be required, the Mission recommended the erection of new plants or the installation of additional machinery in existing plants. It also suggested the rearrangement of existing machinery in order that maximum efficiency in production might be attained. The congestion at certain Indian ports received the attention of the Mission, which made various recommendations designed to expedite the loading, unloading, and repair of ships. In addition, it called attention to the overburdened condition of the railways and suggested measures for its alleviation. Vigorous steps have already been taken by the Government of India to implement some of the recommendations contained in the preliminary report of the Mission; and in this program it is being assisted by equipment and material from the United States and the United Kingdom.

With the full approval of the Government of India, the Mission recommended that a number of production engineers and technicians be sent from the United States to advise and assist in increasing the industrial production in India. Steps have already been taken to secure the services of these experts and a number of them will soon be departing to undertake their new and important assignments.

⁵⁵ Text not printed.

The Governments of India and the United States have been impressed with the comprehensive character of the Mission's report. Its recommendations appear to be both constructive and timely. The Governments concerned will determine the extent to which the Mission's program is to be implemented and will seek promptly to execute their decision.

845.00/1620

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1942.

The British Ambassador called at his request.

I inquired of him if there was anything new in the relations between Great Britain and India. He said there was nothing at this time, but that more recent cables from the Viceroy indicated a further quieting down in the situation.

I said that I would like to make inquiry as to the prospect of any further resumption of conversations between representatives of the two countries. The Ambassador replied that the British Government had contemplated going forward, along the lines of the Cripps Mission and other statements by authorized British spokesmen, but that the present period of violence and resistance would have to cease before the British could carry out their intention to return to peaceful and normal conversations.

I then remarked that the present situation is entirely static and at a standstill, and that there is in prospect in this country a general movement of agitation against Great Britain and in favor of independence for India which might create complications in one way or another later on. I added that with full interest in all phases of the situation and with an earnest desire to see the differences composed, primarily for the sake of the war, I was wondering if speeches adequately firm to meet resistance, but at the same time expressing sympathy and calling attention to the British policy during past years in which autonomy or the equivalent of independence was given to such original colonies as Canada, Australia and South Africa and the continuance of those policies looking toward independence for India, might not be preferable to speeches of a blunt nature. I went on to say that more moderate and sympathetic speeches could make it clear that the British Government desired to resume its course of going forward with its program for Indian independence just as quickly as this movement of violence terminated, and at the same time remove any impression that the British Government is being moved by undue pressure or threats. I said that I was not referring to any particular speeches made in Great Britain, but

I was merely raising this question from the standpoint of dealing most effectively with public opinion in the United States, omitting for the moment the question of the effect on the world war. The Ambassador said that he heartily agreed with my comment. I then elaborated by again saying that speeches that were not too challenging, but entirely firm and at the same time containing concrete reference to the British record in granting autonomy to the three present dominions, et cetera, and their desire to get back as soon as possible to considering the Indian matter might well be considered. I finally added that, if the British could reach a point where they could announce that Indian resistance had definitely terminated and that the British Government was therefore moving back to the resumption of further consideration of its original plans for granting independence to India and if this step soon could be followed by conferences between even one person representing Great Britain and one person representing India, so as to make it appear that the situation was on the move and presumably in the right direction, this, in my judgment, would have a most wholesome psychological effect on public opinion of other nations and India as well.

The Ambassador expressed himself as wholeheartedly and unreservedly in agreement with the statements and implications of what I said. He must have known that I was referring to two recent speeches, one by the Prime Minister and the other by the Secretary of State for India.^{55a}

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

845.01/243

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador discussed the Indian situation with me at some length. He told me that he had urged upon his Government and upon the Viceroy by means of personal telegrams that every opportunity be taken by the British authorities publicly to make it clear that official promises for the ultimate independence of India after the war would be maintained and that while the Government of India found it necessary under present conditions to prevent disorder and interference with the war effort, the traditional policy of Great Britain was not one of repression of India and was not a policy of repression at this time. The Ambassador said that he had

^{55a} Leopold S. Amery.

a very long telegram from Lord Linlithgow which he thought I would find of interest since it dealt with developments in India. He said he would send me a copy of this telegram.⁵⁶

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.00/1649

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1942.

Sir Girja came in to see me, at his request. His purpose was principally to maintain contact.

He said that in his position he naturally had to be very quiet and careful. He had been going about the country seeing a number of editors and journalists, off the record, and giving them some general background on the conditions in India.

Of more importance was his account of dealings with Lord Halifax. He said that he had told Lord Halifax that he was convinced they were at the beginning, not at the end, of the long road of Indian resistance. Lord Halifax had eventually sent a long cablegram to London, which was repeated to Lord Linlithgow, evidencing his (Halifax's) concern about the situation. I gathered that Lord Halifax had urged that attempts at settlement be not abandoned. In response, Lord Linlithgow had cabled Lord Halifax personally, setting out a long justification of what the viceregal government had done, supporting the position at every point, and winding up by saying that Lord Halifax should "pass from the defensive in the United States to the offensive"—which Sir Girja interpreted to mean, start a campaign of propaganda justifying the British position.

Sir Girja added that to date the Indian Government had used a total of fifty-seven battalions in suppressing Indian unrest—a material diminution of their defensive power.

Finally, Sir Girja said that he had received intimations from his staff that our lend-lease and other services had about decided to send no more supplies to India, fearing lest they would be jeopardized by an ultimate Indian revolt. He asked me whether I could confirm this.

I said that I had not definite information on that score, but that I was aware of a feeling of very distinct concern, especially in military circles, as to whether supplies and equipment sent to India might not be lost. I thought it fair that Sir Girja should know this. (I did not tell Sir Girja that the Chiefs of Staff had resolved not to implement the Grady report for just these reasons.)

⁵⁶ Not printed.

Sir Girja plainly evidenced his own concern over the situation. He characterized Winston Churchill's speech as disastrous, and said that in his personal judgment the situation could never be solved as long as Lord Linlithgow remained Viceroy, and Amery remained Secretary of State for India. Sir Girja struck me as a very unhappy man.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

845.00/1740

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me today at his request.

The Ambassador spoke at some length with regard to the situation in India. Lord Halifax said that he would send to me occasional telegrams which he received direct from the Viceroy giving the Viceroy's account of present conditions in India. I said I should be very glad indeed to have these messages for our information. The Ambassador inquired whether I would make available to him similar messages from the American mission in New Delhi. I said that any messages of this character received from our representative in New Delhi which I felt would be of interest to the Ambassador would be very gladly transmitted to him.

The Ambassador then communicated to me a message he had had from his Foreign Office stating that the position of American Commissioner in New Delhi had now been vacant for some time. The British Government felt that it would be very helpful if this position could be filled without much further delay, but, at the same time, made it clear that it believed that in view of the situation in India it would be very desirable that such appointment should not carry with it any implications that the new commissioner to be appointed was to undertake any form of mediation between the British authorities and the Indian leaders. In this regard the British Government further asked that were any statement to be issued by this Government announcing the appointment of a new commissioner, the statement might so be worded as to preclude the possibility of any implication that the appointment was made for the purpose of offering mediation. I told the Ambassador that I would convey this message to the President for his consideration and that from what the President had stated to me, I thought it very probable that an appointment would be made in the near future.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

845.00/1670

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1942.

Mr. Mahindra came in to see me at his request. He wasted no time in coming to the point. He said that for the past three weeks he had noticed a slowing down of interest in supplies for India. He wished to know whether we had changed our policy.

I said I knew of no directive changing policy. There had been, as he and everyone else knew, considerable concern here as to political conditions in India; and this had engendered doubt in some quarters as to whether supplies sent to India would be saved. I did not understand that a change in policy had been agreed upon.

Mr. Mahindra looked a little doubtful and then carried the discussion a step forward. He said that in conversation with various of his American friends, a number of them had taken the position that India might be regarded as an "occupied country" much as the Germans regarded countries which they had seized as "occupied"; and that the military men regarded India as merely a springboard for future conquests. He noted that a British order had been issued authorizing American troops in India, on orders of any officer above the rank of captain, to fire on crowds where needed, or to conscript labor. Since the British had (he said) used 112 battalions in putting down recent uprisings, it was inevitable that American troops would be involved in the event of any general disturbance; and he wondered whether the apparent change in tempo was not due to some understanding reached between the British and ourselves.

I said I knew of no such understanding. We had given orders to our troops to stay out of internal Indian affairs and these orders still held good. I said that as I understood it, any body of American troops would have the right to fire on anyone who attacked them; and they had, and of course would have, the usual military rights in the event they were attacked by enemy troops. The British may have sanctioned this by general orders; but there was a long distinction between the American troops receiving the assent of the British Government to exercising their military rights and any intent of ours to enter an Indian controversy.

Mr. Mahindra then opened his mind a little. He said he had seen correspondence between Halifax, the British Government and Lord Linlithgow. Linlithgow's answer "would have made your blood boil". He expressed real concern as to what might happen.

I said that of course the state of warfare on the ground would create its own circumstances. Were there a Japanese attack and were there an Indian uprising at the same time, it would be extremely difficult to take separate lines of action. The troops defending India would presumably do what was necessary to beat the enemy, including protecting their lines of communication. For that reason, any Indian uprising could not be separated from Japanese action. The Finns had tried to run a separate war against Russia and found that they were automatically assimilated to a place in the German war machine. For that reason I thought that every Indian had the greatest possible reason to hope that no such fate would befall Indian troops.

Mr. Mahindra promptly and vigorously agreed. But, he said, they were offered a terrible alternative. On one hand they now had convincing evidence that the British not only could not solve the Indian problem, but did not wish to. When the war turned in their favor, they would be still less anxious to do anything about it. Nothing remained ahead but a period of long agitation and perhaps a "blood bath". This was the prospect offered them if they kept quiet. On the other hand, an attempt to take their rights by force would place them in a category with Japan—a category where they did not belong, did not wish to be, and did not propose to get into. The only other course seemed to be to hope for a solution by process of reason and negotiation—and this the British seemed unwilling to accept. He said he considered that there never would be any solution unless three men were taken out of the picture: Amery, Linlithgow, and the Indian Secretary, Laithwaite⁵⁷ (?).

He felt that the Indian matter had now become a matter of international concern. The United States had raised a moral issue. This had been taken seriously; and had concerned both our standing and the position of China, and, indeed, the whole position of affairs in that part of the world. From his personal point of view, he thought this could not be indefinitely ignored.

I inquired whether anything would be gained if an initiative were taken from outside which was declined by either of the parties to the controversy.

Mr. Mahindra admitted that nothing would be gained. He closed by expressing the hope that we would send to India the technicians which had been suggested by the Grady Mission.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

⁵⁷ Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Secretary to the Governor General of India.

845.24/2371

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Lend-Lease
Administrator (Stettinius)*

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1942.

MY DEAR ED: I have received your letter of August 19, 1942⁵⁸ in which you refer to the final report of the American Technical Mission to India.⁵⁸ It is noted that before exploring the suggested projects with the Indian Supply Mission and with the British, you desire an expression of this Department's views with regard to the current Indian situation.

As you are no doubt aware, the Technical Mission proceeded to India under the auspices of the Department of State and at the invitation of the Government of India. The function of the Mission was to investigate and recommend ways and means by which the United States Government could assist in augmenting India's war potentialities and to make general recommendation to the Government of India regarding wartime economic problems. In its work the Mission was concerned therefore only with the determination of such improvements in the Indian industrial set-up as might facilitate the war effort of the United Nations. It appears that the Mission in its recommendations has not diverged from this conception of its duties, and unless agencies of the Government possessing the requisite technical knowledge conclude that the implementation of any of the Mission's recommendations would not result in an increase in the effectiveness of the war effort, it is the opinion of this Department that in so far as the United States Government is concerned the desirability of implementing the program in toto is limited only by considerations of practicability, of military exigency, and of the industrial needs of the United States.

In so far as the practicability of the various individual recommendations is concerned, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Shipping Administration, and similarly interested agencies will naturally make the decisions. Decision regarding expediency from the point of view of the industrial needs of the United States must of course likewise be made by the various civilian agencies concerned.

The military aspects of the problem will of course require decision by the War Department and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, involving as they do not only the question of the defense of India as a whole,

⁵⁸ Not printed.

but also the extent to which fighter plane protection can be anticipated for the vulnerable areas in which the erection of certain of the new installations is contemplated. It is understood that the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now considering the report, and that an indication may be expected shortly of their decision with regard to the advisability of implementing or attempting to implement the various recommendations, in so far as the military side of the question is concerned.

It is, I may add, the hope and anticipation of this Department that, military developments permitting, India will become an increasing source of supply for products necessary to the prosecution of the war in the near eastern and far eastern areas. This Department is in favor of the allocation to India of all materials beneficial in this regard in so far as may be deemed advisable and possible by your organization and other interested agencies of the Government. It is hoped that pending advice from the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other agencies of this Government will examine the individual items recommended in the Mission's report with a view to making their own decision in so far as the problems involved come within the scope of their responsibility.

The final action to be taken by this Government, unless entirely negative decisions are reached in the matter, will of course depend upon the reaction of the Governments of India and the United Kingdom to the several recommendations. While those Governments have indicated their complete sympathy with the work and recommendations of the Mission in principle, their attitude toward the individual items recommended has not yet been announced.

I may add that, as we are all well aware, the political situation in India is extremely delicate and any activities in the economic sphere can easily have political ramifications. I am sure you will agree in that connection that any representatives of your organization who may serve in India should keep in unusually close touch with the American Mission at New Delhi and that the greatest care must be taken by all American agencies concerned to insure that undesirable political repercussions do not ensue from the manner in which India's supply questions are handled.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

845.00/1679

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on
Political Relations (Murray)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1942.

During a call from the Indian Agent General this morning he discussed in some detail his relations with Lord Halifax and the efforts

which he had been making to establish contact with the editors and publishers of outstanding American newspapers as well as weekly publications. He mentioned in this connection the *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Chicago Sun*, the *Nation*, and the *New Republic*.

After his recent return to Washington, Sir Girja said he had discussed with Lord Halifax and Harold Butler ^{58a} the impressions he had gained in various parts of the country as to the present American attitude with regard to the Indian problem. He said he concurred fully with the views expressed in a recent editorial in the *London Times* to the effect that the favorable attitude towards Great Britain which had followed the Cripps negotiations in India early this year had now been completely dissipated and that American irritation and dissatisfaction with British policy regarding India were steadily rising.

It appears that as a result of the above discussion of the situation a telegram to the Foreign Office was drafted in the British Embassy setting forth in a rather complacent manner the present American viewpoint on the Indian question as seen by the higher-ups in the Embassy. When the draft was sent to Sir Girja he insisted upon including a sentence at the end to the effect that "the increase in critical American opinion on the Indian question has been so great that it threatens seriously to affect Anglo-American relations". This sentence was allowed to go through to London but, so far as Sir Girja was able to estimate, had no appreciable effect on Government opinion.

Sir Girja then related to me the story which he had told Mr. Berle recently, of Lord Halifax's telegram to Lord Linlithgow expressing sincere concern over the situation in India and asking guidance from the Viceroy. According to Sir Girja, Lord Linlithgow showed considerable irritation in his reply to Lord Halifax; pointed out that the situation in India had radically changed since Lord Halifax's time there; that it would be impossible at this time to open negotiations with the Congress Party; and, finally, that it was high time that Lord Halifax, instead of resting on the defensive in America on the Indian question, should pass sharply to the offensive and defend the policy of the British Government and the Government of India.

It was revealed further in my conversation with Sir Girja that before Lord Halifax made his last trip to London he discussed the Indian situation with Sir Girja and confided to him the proposals which he intended to make while in London. Lord Halifax said he would press for a complete Indianization of the Viceroy's Executive Council and, in the all-important question of the Viceroy's veto, would insist that the Viceroy agree to refrain from exercising his veto except after referring the matter at issue to London and receiving the approval of the British Parliament. Sir Girja, accord-

^{58a} British Minister in Washington.

ing to his story, countered this suggestion by stating that it would be in no way satisfactory to Indian public opinion, which had no confidence in the good faith of the British Parliament in dealing with India. He, on the other hand, suggested that Lord Halifax should press for the transfer of the Viceroy's veto powers to a defense council in India made up of an Indian member sitting together with military representatives from the United Nations. Nothing short of this, he felt, would be acceptable.

After Lord Halifax's return from London, Sir Girja questioned him as to what had happened and he was informed that nothing was decided upon beyond a "shifting about" of the Viceroy's council and that he (Lord Halifax) was sure that nothing further could be done, granted the present attitude of the Prime Minister and Mr. Amery.

In conclusion Sir Girja said he had become discouraged in trying to defend Great Britain's policy towards India, particularly after the deplorable impression made in this country by Mr. Churchill in his most recent pronouncement early in September on this subject. He has, consequently, refused to continue his earlier efforts as an apologist of British policy and has informed the Ambassador that if a defense of the British position is now in order in this country it would be well for him or his Embassy to undertake it.

In departing, the Agent General observed that he had purposely refrained from seeking appointments to see the President, the Secretary, or the Under Secretary, in view of these latest developments. He emphasized, however, that he stood entirely ready to be called upon by the President or any of the higher Department officials if they wished to consult him. He said he would accept without hesitation any such request. And, finally, Sir Girja referred again to the still unfilled position of American diplomatic representative at New Delhi. He added that suspicion was arising that perhaps the British did not want the post filled; that if such was the case he hoped we would immediately reply that we saw no reason for the continuance of an Indian Agent General in Washington, and in that case he would gladly relinquish his post.

845.24/275 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Haselton) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, October 23, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received 12 : 30 p. m.]

816. Although no questions have ever been asked officially, interested branches of the Government have clearly implied that informa-

tion would be welcomed concerning prospective appointment of economic adviser recommended by Grady Mission and his arrival here. Government has also been anxious to know about railway executives and experts and steel technicians who have long been promised.

Sir Homi Mody, supply member Viceroy's Council, is reliably reported to have said a few days ago that United States is apparently so disturbed by political situation here that plans for sending these experts have been abandoned.

In informal conversations with officers of this Mission recently various Government officials have made it clear that they are increasingly curious about long delay in appointment of Chief of Mission here.

The Mission would be extremely grateful for enlightenment on these points as soon as Department is in a position to give it. In any reply which Department may make to this inquiry please state specifically whether information may be conveyed formally or informally to Government of India.

HASELTON

845.24/278a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi
(Haselton)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1942—2 p. m.

627. The Department is conveying information in the following sense to the Indian Agency General and the Indian Supply Mission in Washington. It is thought that the Mission may wish similarly to inform the Government of India:

The program proposed by the American Technical Mission to India under the chairmanship of Dr. Henry F. Grady has been studied by various agencies of this Government. It is the understanding of the Department of State that all of the agencies concerned feel that the implementation of the program is highly desirable, circumstances permitting. The Department of State concurs in this opinion. Study of the various problems involved indicates, however, that currently critical demands for material elsewhere abroad and in the United States and the urgent need of shipping space in connection with other theatres of operation render impossible for the time being the supply to India by the United States of the quantity of material which implementation of the program as a whole would appear to require. Thus, requisitions for supplies for new installations in India of the sort envisaged by the Technical Mission will not ordinarily be approved at the present time. Individual items of this nature which the Indian Agency General or the Indian Supply Mission

wishes to urge will, however, be considered on their merits by the appropriate Government agencies in order to determine whether exceptions are warranted. As it is the desire of this Government to render all possible assistance in the manner contemplated by the Technical Mission, the presentation of individual items for study is desired.

It continues to be the intention of this Government to facilitate, in so far as possible, the shipment of supplies for the existing industrial structure in India and for reasonable expansion of existing facilities. Within this category of supplies would be (a) raw materials necessary to maintain production of war materials or essential civilian goods, (b) equipment necessary to guarantee the maintenance of vital production capacity at maximum levels, and (c) equipment for new plants which are practically ready to produce war materials.

It remains the intention of this Government to make every effort to implement all recommendations of the Technical Mission which future developments may render possible and advisable.

HULL

123 P 54/528 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1942—7 p. m.

5487. For William Phillips.⁵⁹ I have suggested to the President that you be invited to proceed to New Delhi as his personal representative. This suggestion has met with the President's approval and it is the earnest hope of the Department that you will undertake this assignment which is regarded as one of profound importance in view of the political and military problems related to the current Indian situation.

Colonel Donovan⁶⁰ has indicated that if the appointment is acceptable to you, you will be released at once for such period as your services in India may require. I assume that you will have heard direct from Colonel Donovan on this point.

I should appreciate your informing me at your earliest convenience whether the appointment as envisaged is acceptable to you.

HULL

⁵⁹ Former Ambassador in Italy; at this time Director of the London office of the Office of Strategic Services.

⁶⁰ Col. William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services.

123 P 54/524 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 4, 1942—4 p. m.
[Received November 4—3:40 p. m.]

6173. Personal for the Secretary from William Phillips. Your 5487, November 3, 7 p. m. I deeply appreciate the confidence which the President and you place in me in asking me to undertake this important mission. Please assure the President that I will do my utmost to carry out his purposes and that I am ready to proceed to New Delhi whenever it is thought advisable. I look forward with enthusiasm to the task. [Phillips.]

WINANT

845.24/275 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Haselton)

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1942—4 p. m.

639. In view of the policy outlined in the Department's 627 of October 29 it is not the intention of the Department to appoint at this time an "economic adviser" as recommended by the Grady Mission. Reference your 816 of October 23. Consideration is being given, however, to the assignment to New Delhi of a senior commercial officer of the Foreign Service who will perform substantially the duties of such an adviser. In the meantime such essential duties as would be performed by that official can, it is believed, be satisfactorily performed under existing circumstances by the regular staff of your office.

The appointment of railway and steel technicians is dependent upon the availability of properly qualified persons willing to proceed to India, and upon selection of these experts by the Indian Supply Mission in Washington. Appropriate agencies of the Government are endeavoring to facilitate this selection in every way possible. It is understood that after consultation between the Board of Economic Warfare and the Indian Supply Mission a decision was reached to seek a somewhat different type of railway expert than that envisaged by the Grady Mission, and that the experts now desired will be employed by the Government of India and will be specialists in certain phases of railroading. The Supply Mission is understood to be awaiting definite information from the Government of India regarding the precise qualifications which should be possessed by the individuals chosen. In view of this change it has not appeared that Mr. Brooke Edwards' ^{60a} services would be required, but his availabil-

^{60a} Baldwin Locomotive Co. representative in India.

ity may of course be brought informally to the attention of the Government of India. Reference your 651 of October 1.⁶¹

The Government of India may be informed in the premises.

HULL

845.24/290 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, November 14, 1942—5 p. m.

[Received November 14—2:23 p. m.]

882. In a formal reply to this office's note conveying the substance of Department's 627, October 29, 2 p. m., the Government of India strongly emphasizes its hope that there will be no change in Department's policy as regards (1) loan of "experts and advisers" recommended by Grady Mission; and (2) delivery of materials and machinery now under negotiation or already ordered. Government particularly stresses its hope that "very high priority" will be given to raw and finished materials for all forms of transportation—ports, inland waterways, railways and motor vehicles—urgently needed for expansion of India's war effort.

Government of India has nearly completed detailed examination of final Grady report and will soon state which of the projects it desires to adopt. Its recommendations on individual projects considered essential to war effort will be made in the light of Department's policy as outlined in cable cited above.

MERRELL

123 P 54/531 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1942—9 p. m.

5839. Your 6173 and 6178, November 4.⁶² For William Phillips. The President and I are gratified that you can accept appointment as Personal Representative of the President near the Government of India. A telegram concerning your appointment and authorizing the purchase of transportation will be sent the Embassy in the very near future.

Before leaving London you may cautiously and with open mind discuss the Indian situation with appropriate British officials. You are aware of the unsettled and difficult relationship between Great Britain and India, especially as it relates to the question of independ-

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² Latter not printed.

ence for India. The President and I and the entire Government, earnestly favor freedom for all dependent peoples at the earliest date practicable. Our course in dealing with the Philippine situation in this respect, as in all other important respects, offers, I think, a perfect example of how a nation should treat a colony or a dependency in cooperating with it in all essential respects calculated to assist it in making all necessary preparation for freedom. The President and I in public utterances have elaborated on this record of ours toward the Philippines and offer it as a strong example to all other countries and their dependencies. You, of course, fully understand all phases.

In brief, I think the records of the President and myself, as well as the record of our Government, show that we have at all times been thoroughly diligent in our support of the cause of independence and in the encouragement of peoples to prepare themselves for independence, and for its bestowal in each instance at the earliest practicable date.

In the light of the foregoing, I think it can be truthfully said that with respect to the British-Indian relationship, the President and I have given constant attention to the most difficult question, that is the freedom of India, and we have observed all developments from week to week and endeavored to give the fullest attention feasible to the situation. The President and I have not become partisans of either Great Britain or India in the existing exigencies. To do this would seriously handicap us in dealing with the other side. Our officials have sought to consort freely and in a thoroughly friendly way with both the British and Indian people, and especially their leaders, without making ourselves partisans in our acts and utterances to the extent that there would probably be generated friction and ill feeling between us and the outstanding leaders of one country or the other. Therefore, we cannot bring pressure, which might reasonably be regarded as objectionable, to bear on the British. We can in a friendly spirit talk bluntly and earnestly to appropriate British officials so long as they understand that it is our purpose to treat them in a thoroughly friendly way. A settlement arising from such friendly and non-partisan conversations with both sides or with either side, would probably be most practicable as well as most desirable. On the other hand, objectionable pressure upon either side would probably result in no progress but only in exasperation and, in the case of the British, a possible disturbance of the unity of command and of cooperation both during and following the war. The terrific complexities of the Indian situation are difficult to analyze and understand. With your great experience and fine common sense you will well understand how to preserve thoroughly agreeable relations with both countries and how to say or do anything, in a tactful way, that might encourage both sides or either side, in the way of a practical settlement.

It, of course, will not be any part of your function to carry such informal discussions to the point where it might be charged by the opposite side that you and this Government were attempting to intervene and on our own initiative to put up proposals and plans for them to accept. This, of course, would arouse hostility at once on the part of the disappointed party, whichever one that might be. We have an added interest in the settlement of this matter by reason of its relation to the war. This fact would give us a probable opportunity to speak more freely and more earnestly than we otherwise could, so long as we make clear that we are not undertaking to speak in any spirit save that of genuine friendship and of the fullest cooperation both during and following the war. This renders it necessary, for example, that we should not take any steps affecting India, as already stated, without maintaining close contact and friendly collaboration with the British. We will, however, tactfully listen to both sides and endeavor to see both viewpoints as fully and clearly as possible, always keeping in mind our general course and attitude toward freedom for dependent peoples, as illustrated by our attitude in cooperating with the Philippines for the purpose of their freedom.

It may be mentioned that in informal conversations with officials of the Department, the British here have intimated that our professed interest in protecting the integrity of the French Empire is at variance with our attitude toward the British Empire. Our view on this is that the positions of the French Empire and British Empire are in no way similar and hence the question does not arise.

A memorandum prepared by me for the President⁶³ suggesting an implementation of those clauses of the Atlantic Charter dealing with dependent peoples is being forwarded to you in London by air pouch. The President has not yet had an opportunity to approve this memorandum but I shall let you know if and when he does so.

HULL

845.24/298 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, December 17, 1942—11 a. m.

[Received December 17—10:19 a. m.]

954. It was learned informally and off the record today from a member of Viceroy's Executive Council that India telegraphed London about a week ago suggesting Halifax leave [*have*] exploratory informal conversations in Washington with view to ascertaining attitude of United States Government toward direct Lend-Lease agree-

⁶³ Not found in Department files.

ment with India. So far as India is concerned possibility of such agreement appears to hinge fundamentally on extent to which United States might be willing to modify for India post-war tariff reduction provisions of article 7 British master agreement.⁶⁴ It is thought certain Indian business community will bring strong pressure on Government to protect infant industries after war. Government has already guaranteed protection in certain instances. Apparently no change in present reciprocal Lend-Lease policy, now limited to services and supplies for American troops in India, is contemplated.

Understand British Government favors direct agreement.

MERRELL

845.24/299 : Telegram

The Officer in Charge at New Delhi (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

NEW DELHI, December 18, 1942—3 p. m.

[Received December 19—1:18 a. m.]

958. Reliably informed Britain has made following demands on India:

- (1) India to pay for Burma campaigns, past and future;
- (2) India to pay in rupees all expenses of Indian troops in India and abroad. Britain to pay in sterling for that portion of British troops in India which is in excess of normal requirements;
- (3) India to pay capital cost of all airdromes built in India with British capital;
- (4) India to pay for all munitions factories built in India with British capital;
- (5) India to enter into direct lend-lease agreement with United States of America.

Understand first and second proposals unanimously rejected by Viceroy's Executive Council. Cost of third and fourth being investigated before decision. As regards fifth, refer Mission's telegram No. 954 dated December 17, 1942.

The over-all effect of these proposals if accepted by India would be to increase this country's contribution to the war by large sum, and materially to decrease her large sterling credits in London about which Indian Nationalist aides have been seriously concerned for some time.

MERRELL

⁶⁴ Preliminary agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, signed at Washington February 23, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

845.24/299 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge at New Delhi
(Merrell)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1942—9 p. m.

738. Your 954, December 17, 11 a. m. and your 958, December 18, 3 p. m. Any interpretative comment you may offer regarding Lend-Lease agreement between United States and India will be welcome. Since such an agreement is included among the five British financial demands on India reported in your 958, direct Lend-Lease relations between the United States and India would presumably be of financial assistance to Britain. Are you able to offer any explanation?

For your personal information, it has been suggested here that the proposal for direct Lend-Lease relations with India may have originated with American military authorities in India, based on their dissatisfaction with manner in which American Army requisitions for Indian supplies have been met. Please comment.

HULL