Introduction

This project will examine the changes in presidential powers and influence from World War I to the end of the Cold War. Due to the number of military and threat of military conflicts throughout the twentieth century, a particular focus will be on the growth, and the attempts to hinder the growth, of presidential war powers.

Prior to World War I, the United States maintained an isolationist approach in dealing with foreign affairs, meaning that the nation as a whole refrained from involvement in overseas politics, alliances, or wars, and confined its national security interests to its own borders [1]. During the first Great War, under the guidance of President Woodrow Wilson, the United States abandoned isolationism when they joined forces with the Allied powers in 1917 [2]. While the policy was reinstituted at the end of the war, Wilson and the steps he took throughout and after the war helped to set a precedent for future wartime presidents, paving the way for later Commanders in Chief to justify their specific uses and control over military powers [3]. Article II of the Constitution is reserved for the sole statement regarding a president’s war making power, simply stating that the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces [4]. Due to the fact that the precise authority of the office of commander-in-chief is left virtually undefined, presidents have been able to argue the use of new powers that are related to military affairs, claiming that the powers are implied. [5]. Woodrow Wilson was the first president to navigate the United States through not only a World War, but also the first war that the U.S. engaged in on the basis of defending democracy. Wilson, being the first to navigate war on a global scale, sought legislative authority for his actions and, Congress, for the most part, obliged by:

voting the president extraordinary powers not only over the organization of America’s armed forces, but also, on the theory that war required mobilization of economic as well as military might, over the nation’s farms, mines, and factories. During a period of less than two years, Congress enacted legislation that gave the president discretionary authority to mobilize and organize the nation’s manpower and productive capabilities [6].

Although President Wilson went to Congress to more or less gain permission to do what he saw necessary during the war in terms of increased troops and engagement with enemies, Congress granted many of the president’s wishes and, in a period of less than two years, the legislative body enacted legislation that greatly expanded presidential war powers [7]. Three of these acts, all enacted in 1917, highlight, in particular, the growth of presidential war powers. The National Defense Act authorized the president in time of war to place obligatory orders with any firm for any product or material that the president claim to be needed for the nation’s defense, while the Selective Service Act provided for the first draft in the United States’ history, giving the president the authority to raise an army through nationwide military conscription. Another act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, gave the president additional emergency economic powers and empowered them to censor all communications with foreign countries, leading to greater presidential oversight of not only government officials’ communications but also of the general public [8].

After Wilson and with the end of WWI, subsequent presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover led a United States once again virtually committed to isolationism. Because of the country’s commitment to isolationism and due to the lack of involvement in a war, growth of presidential powers remained at a standstill. However, with the start of World War II in 1939, the United States, under President Franklin Roosevelt, once again abandoned its isolationist policy and would never fully apply the policy to its foreign affairs again. Often, FDR marks the beginning of the modern presidency and with that comes the exponential growth of presidential powers, war powers included. Congress indulged the president and his wishes; however, different from Woodrow Wilson, anything that Congress did not give him by statute, he took by executive order, utilizing them to the fullest extent. While many were questioned on the basis of constitutionality, few were found to be unconstitutional, mirroring the idea that in times of war, or at least threats of war, a president can take advantage of the timing and increase their war/military related powers. While the country and most notably Congress still clung to the notion of isolationism, FDR began issuing executive orders to start preparing the nation for what he believed to be imminent involvement in another world war. In 1940, the president issued one such executive order, establishing the Office of Emergency Management. With this order, he assigned the OEM the responsibility for military preparedness and mobilization. To further prepare the nation for another global war, in 1941, he declared a state of emergency and issued a number of executive orders designed to promote military readiness [9]. The use of executive orders to bolster military readiness and the military in general, essentially putting FDR’s words into law by bypassing Congress, granted him the ability to shape the military without congressional consent, something unheard of in the time of Wilson.

After the events of Pearl Harbor in late 1941, Congress rapidly joined forces with the president and, again like they did during Wilson’s presidency, backed up the president through a series of legislation that once more increased presidential wartime powers. The first War Powers Act gave the president the power to redistribute functions among the executive agencies anyway he saw fit, the authority to regulate international financial transactions and censor private communications with any and all foreign countries. This act brought back sections of the acts passed during the first world war while also adding to the authority turned over to the president during times of war, a response to or backing up of, it could be argued, the previously issued Executive Orders [10]. In addition to the increase of presidential war powers during World War II, FDR made headway towards the permanent abandonment of isolationism and, because of this, “the instruments through which the president exercised his wartime powers during WWII, like those in past wars, were dismantled soon after the war’s end, though more were kept than usual because of the growing tensions between the US and the USSR” [11]. The growing tensions between the two nations, launched the United States into a new era in which the U.S., for more than forty years, faced a dire military threat that presidents argued  required the creation of a permanent standing army that would be ready to respond to an attack from an enemy at a moment’s notice. This period of time, known as the Cold War era, blurred the distinction between wartime and peace. So, against the backdrop of the dangers facing the nation, successive Cold War presidents were able to expand the power of the executive branch and affirm their predominance in security and foreign affairs [12].

Although no actual fighting broke out between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War, a series of proxy wars were fought . Congress attempted to curb presidential power but they were unable to do so effectively due to the fact that the conclusion of these proxy wars, Vietnam and Korea, merely met a continuation of the severe tensions between the U.S. and the USSR, leading to the argument that more military development was necessary. The continued threat to the security of the United States allowed for presidents to continue to increase their power [13]. President Truman first demonstrated the extensiveness of the new presidential powers through fighting a war in Korea and effectively resisting efforts by Congress and others to interfere. Truman set the precedent for presidential use of military force in foreign nations without the consent or even approval of Congress. This precedent is upheld throughout the Cold War era in which presidents such as Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, engaged in warfare without a congressional declaration of war. However, in a way, Johnson and Nixon  halted the expansion of presidential war powers because of the clash between Congress and Johnson over the Vietnam War and later with Nixon and the Watergate scandal [14]. In response and in an attempt to curb these growing powers, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution Act in 1973. It was enacted with the intention of preventing a “prolonged period of presidential war making without the formal authorization from Congress” [15]. Despite this new law, that required the president to consult Congress before deploying any troops to combat, a report within forty-eight hours, and to remove troops after sixty days if Congress does not vote to declare war or authorize continued deployment, presidents effectively ignored the act. Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan, while none of them are considered to be wartime presidents, still deployed troops abroad without notifying or receiving the consent of Congress. Presidents since the passing of the act believe that by following the demands of the War Powers Resolution Act, they would set a dangerous precedent that would force a reliance of the president on Congress during times of crisis when decisions need to be made quickly. As Howell and Pevehouse argued, the president possess multiple advantages that lend to their dominance over foreign, particularly military affairs, over Congress [16]. For one, the president has access to more information through intelligence agencies and two, the president, being a singular person, can decide on and make decisions much more swiftly than Congress who would, because of the rules of and conflict within the legislative body, would not be able to make decisions in such a timely-manner [17].

Historically, presidents regularly have greater success controlling foreign policy than they do controlling domestic policy. Domestic policy moves incrementally and it is rather difficult for a president to make a large, lasting impact. In contrast, presidents invest more time on foreign affairs because their competitors (i.e. Congress) are weaker and less able to effectively conduct foreign affairs in juxtaposition to the president [18]. Because presidential powers surrounding war more often than not revolve around the use of military force in or on foreign nations, the president is practically unchallenged in their unilateral ability to commit the United States to war. With the upward trend of increasing presidential war powers from 1917, U.S. entry into WWI under Wilson’s presidency to the virtual end of the Cold War with Reagan’s presidency in 1989, the president has been able to seize, maintain, and monopolize war-making powers [19].

The twentieth century with the commencement and conclusion of two world wars and a Cold War spanning over forty years that involved a series of proxy wars, provides a unique setting for the discussion of presidential powers over time, particularly with a focus on changes in presidential war powers. Congress, in times of war, seems to defer to the president when it comes to making decisions. Through the circumstances provided by WWI, WWII, and the Cold War, presidential war powers extend into times of peace. The extensions of presidential power set by past presidents who built off of one another, grants the modern day Presidents of the United States far more power than their predecessors could probably dream of.

Notes

1. Michael Nelson.The Presidency A to Z. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1998),104.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.,105.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Mathew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg Presidential Power: Unchecked and Unbalanced (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 222. 
7. Michael Nelson. The Presidency, 496.
8. Matthew A. Crenson, Presidential Powers, 222.
9. Ibid., 225. 
10. Ibid., 226.
11. Ibid., 229.
12. Ibid., 244.
13. Ibid., 245.
14. Ibid., 262-263.
15. Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson. The American Presidency: Origins and Development,1776-1990. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly,1990) 319.
16. William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse. “When Congress Stops Wars: Partisan Politics and Presidential Power.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September/October 2007): 98.
17. Ibid.
18. Aaron Wildavsky.”The Two Presidencies.” Trans-action 4, no. 2 (December 1966): 10. 
19. Rourke, John T. Rourke and Russel Farnen. “War, Presidents, and the Constitution.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 513. Jstor.