The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq fundamentally altered the balance of power in the MENA region. Other consequences of the invasion include an increase in anti-American sentiment and a rise in the number and power of terrorist and insurgent groups.
In his 2010 book The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, political scientist F. Gregory Gause notes that “The relative stability of the Iran-Iraq-Saudi Arabia regional power distribution, which lasted through two brutal regional wars, (…) ended with the Iraq war” (Gause 183). Besides removing Iraq as a major player in regional politics and rendering it “no longer a player, but a playing field” (Gause 183), the destabilization of Iraq created opportunities for Iran. Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by a broad US-led coalition, Iraq was placed under harsh sanctions that crippled the state, disproportionately effecting the Iraqi people. Although the sanctions were intended to prevent Iraq from redeveloping its military capacity, “it was clear that the humanitarian cost was unconscionable; and there was continual condemnation from human rights organizations, and opposition from many members of the Security Council as well as numerous entities within the United Nations” (source). However, Saddam Hussein and his inner circle (who had vast wealth reserves hidden outside the country and the ability to manipulate government mechanisms to skim oil profits) were somewhat insulated from the effects of the sanctions (source, source). The 2003 US invasion removed this last remnant of potential Iraqi power. The subsequently instituted democratic government replaced Saddam’s Sunni minority government with a government representative of the Shia majority, some of whom were Iranian allies (Gause 147). As a 2019 US Army study concluded, “‘an emboldened and expansionist Iran appears to be the only victor’ in the conflict” (source).
Iran’s increasing influence in the region impacts the two other main players, Saudi Arabia and the US. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, historically hostile, did not improve following the Iraq war (source). Saudi Arabia sought to contain Iran by increasing its relative power: the Saudis cooperated with Western countries to contain Iran’s nuclear program and established “diplomatic back channels to Israel, the strongest anti-Iran force in the Middle East, partly aimed at coordinating ways to confront the threat from Tehran” (source). However, Saudi Arabia has had to balance its engagement with the West with increasing anti-western (especially anti-US sentiment).
The US invasion of Iraq was deeply unpopular in the Middle East. The US, which had been increasingly involved in the region since the retreat of former colonial powers France and Britain, had three goals of ensuring stable oil production, countering Soviet influence, and supporting Israel. The US, which originally benefited from its image as a non-colonial power and had previously enjoyed broad coalitional support for its leadership in repelling Iraq from Kuwait, saw its image suffer during the harsh sanctions imposed thereafter, and after its 2003 invasion of Iraq (source, source). For example, Gause points out that “Saudi public opinion in the wake of 9/11 was strongly anti-American, as many Saudis saw the American war on terror as a war against Islam” (Gause 146), which forced the Saudi government to be calculating in when and how it cooperated with America (Gause 146-147). The continued anti-America rhetoric (not helped by America’s consistent support for Israel), coupled with “Saudi disappointment with what Riyadh views as a lack of American commitment to the security of the Royal Family” (source) may have contributed to Saudi Arabia’s March 2023 decision to restore diplomatic ties with Iran, a big deal (source). The deal, along with Saudi Arabia potentially normalizing ties with Israel (a deal being brokered by the US) (source, source) might be viewed as Saudi Arabia hedging its bets to retain the most regional power. However, much is up in the air following the Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent response.
Although Iran and Saudi Arabia remain the key players in the Gulf, other states in the region cannot be ignored. The other gulf states periodically challenge Saudi Arabia (source), Turkey has been increasing its influence (including through military interventions and soft power) with the specific goal of re-establishing itself as a regional power (source), Egypt wants the same thing but may be constrained economically (source), and Israel’s strength cannot be ignored (source).
Something to note also is the increasing influence of China. China has energy and economic interests in MENA (they’ve poured money into the region through their belt and road initiative (source)) but is also deliberately countering US influence. China’s “non-interventionist” approach appeals to many MENA countries, and China’s status as a “neutral, non-aligned player in the region has given Beijing a unique ability to increase its engagement in peace promotion and mediation efforts over recent years in some of the region’s most high-profile conflicts” (source). However, China’s infrastructure deals are a double-edged sword (source, source), and how the relationship between China and MENA countries develops remains to be seen.
Another consequence of the Iraq war was an increase in terrorist & insurgent groups. The general chaos caused by the invasion created space for various dissatisfied groups to consolidate (including “former regime elements, members of the Ba’ath Party angered by the loss of their perks and privileges, foreign Sunni jihadists, domestic Sunni jihadists, Iraqi nationalists opposed to foreign occupation, and various Shi’a groups” (source)). Notably, the Islamic State (originally al-Qaeda in Iraq) emerged in this chaos (source). The US resources diverted into Iraq also compromised its ability in Afghanistan, allowing al-Qaeda and the Taliban to remerge (source, source). The invasion itself, and consequent outrage and displacement of Iraqi people, was itself a “call to arms for international jihad” (source). The effects of this have been widespread. Terrorist groups are often extremely difficult to stop: they are flexible and often move between states, they can and do share resources and information with each other (source, source), and they are sometimes supported by states (for example, Iran’s proxy militia network) (source). The instability and fear these terrorist groups create has contributed to general instability in MENA, a region that already faces deep stability challenges.
Leave a Reply