Category: Syllabus Page 4 of 5

“The Mexican-American War resulted from U.S. impatience and aggressiveness and Mexican weakness.  Polk and many of his countrymen were determined to have Texas to the Rio Grande and all of California on their own terms.  They might have waited for the apples to fall from the tree, to borrow John Quincy Adams’s Cuban metaphor, but patience was not among their virtues.  Polk appears not to have set out to provoke Mexico into what could be used as a war of conquest.  Rather, contemptuous of his presumably inferior adversaries, he assumed he could bully them into giving him what he wanted.  Mexico’s weakness and internal divisions encouraged his aggressiveness.  A stronger or more united Mexico might have deterred the United States or acquiesced in the annexation of Texas to avoid war, as the British minister and former Mexican foreign minister Lucas Alaman urged.  By this time, however, Yankeephobia was rampant.  Mexicans deeply resented the theft of Texas and obvious U.S. designs on California.  They viewed the United States as the ‘Russian threat’ of the New World.  Incensed by the racist views of their northern neighbors, they feared cultural extinction.  Newspapers warned that if the North Americans were not stopped in Texas, Protestantism would be imposed on the Mexican people and they would be ‘sold as beasts.’  Fear, anger, and pride made it impossible to acquiesce in U.S. aggression.  Mexico chose war over surrender.”  –George Herring From Colony to Superpower (2008), p. 199-200

Discussion Questions

• The way Herring characterizes the rush to war in 1846 suggests that he considers many of the key decisions to be irrational.  Do you find this persuasive after learning more about the context of that crisis moment?
• What were some of the unintended consequences of the US-Mexican War?

Excerpt from the Diary of James K. Polk, May 13, 1846 (the day Congress declared war on Mexico)

 “Mr. Buchanan said if my views were carried out, we would not settle the Oregon question and we would have war with England.”

Wednesday, 13th May, 1846

…Most of the Cabinet were in attendance, though no Cabinet meeting had been called. A proclamation announcing the existence of the war was prepared and signed by me. This was done in pursuance of the precedent of Mr. Madison, in 1812…Mr. Buchanan read the draft of a despatch which he had prepared to our Ministers at London, Paris, and other foreign courts, announcing the declaration of war against Mexico, with a statement of the causes and objects of the war, with a view that they should communicate its substance to the respective governments to which they are accredited. Among other things Mr. Buchanan had stated that our object was not to dismember Mexico or to make conquests, and that the Del Norte was the boundary to which we claimed; or rather that in going to war we did not do so with a view to acquire either California or New Mexico or any other portion of the Mexican territory.

I told Mr. Buchanan that I thought such a declaration to foreign governments unnecessary and improper; that the causes of the war as set forth in my message to Congress and the accompanying documents were altogether satisfactory. I told him that though we had not gone to war for conquest, yet it was clear that in making peace we would if practicable obtain California and such other portion of the Mexican territory as would be sufficient to indemnify our claimants on Mexico, and to defray the expense of the war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries had forced us to wage. I told him it was well known that the Mexican Government had no other means of indemnifying us.

Mr. Buchanan said if when Mr. McLane announced to Lord Aberdeen the existence of the war with Mexico the latter should demand of Mr. McLane to know if we intended to acquire California or any other part of the Mexican territory and no satisfactory answer was given, he thought it almost certain that both England and France would join with Mexico in the war against us. I told him that the war with Mexico was an affair with which neither England, France, nor any other power had any concern; that such an inquiry would be insulting to our government, and if made I would not answer it, even if the consequence should be a war with all of them. I told him I would not tie up my hands or make any pledge to any foreign power as to the terms on which I would ultimately make peace with Mexico. I told him no foreign power had any right to demand any such assurance, and that I would make none such let the consequences be what they might. Then, said Mr. Buchanan, you will have war with England as well as Mexico, and probably with France also, for neither of these powers will ever stand by and see California annexed to the United States.

I told him that before I would make the pledge which he proposed, I would meet the war which either England or France or all the Powers of Christendom might wage, and that I would stand and fight until the last man among us fell in the conflict. I told him that neither as a citizen nor as President would I permit or tolerate any intermeddling of any European Powers on this continent. Mr. Buchanan said if my views were carried out, we would not settle the Oregon question and we would have war with England. I told him there was no connection between the Oregon and Mexican questions, and that sooner than give the pledge he proposed that we would not if we could fairly and honorably acquire California or any other part of the Mexican Territory which we desired, I would let the war which he apprehended with England come and would take the whole responsibility. The Secretary of the Treasury engaged warmly and even in an excited manner against the proposition of Mr. Buchanan in his draft of his despatch. The Secretary of the Navy, the Attorney-General, and the Postmaster-General in succession expressed similar opinions. Mr. Buchanan stood alone in the Cabinet, but was very earnest in expressing his views and enforcing them.

Towards the close of the discussion, which lasted for more than two hours, I stepped to my table and wrote a paragraph to be substituted for all that part of Mr. Buchanan’s proposed despatch which spoke of dismembering Mexico, of acquiring California, or of the Del Norte as the ultimate boundary beyond which we would not claim or desire to go. I strongly expressed to Mr. Buchanan that these paragraphs in his despatch must be struck out. Mr. Buchanan made no reply, but before he left took up his own draft and the paragraphs which I had written and took them away with him. I was much astonished at the views expressed by Mr. Buchanan on the subject. The discussion tonight was one of the most earnest and interesting which has ever occurred in my Cabinet.

SOURCE: Allan Nevins, ed., Polk: The Diary of a President, 1845-1849 (London: Longmans, 1952), 89-91.

Additional Resources on the Mexican War

• Web guide (Library of Congress)
• Web guide (National Archives)
• Mexican War (House Divided Project research engine)

“The catchphrase ‘Manifest Destiny’ summed up the expansionist thrust of the pre-Civil War era.  Coined in 1845 by the Democratic Party journalist John L. O’Sullivan to justify annexation of Texas, Oregon, and California, the phrase meant, simply defined, that God had willed the expansion of the United States to the Pacific Ocean –or beyond.  The concept expressed the exuberant nationalism and brash arrogance of the era.  Divine sanction, in the eyes of many Americans, gave them a superior claim to any rival and lent an air of inevitability to their expansion.  Manifest Destiny pulled together into a potent ideology notions dating to the origins of the republic with implications extending beyond the continent: that the American people and their institutions were uniquely virtuous, thus imposing on them a God-given mission to remake the world in their own image.  Many Americans have accepted the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny at face value, seeing their nation’s continental expansion as inevitable and altruistic, a result of the irresistible force generated by a virtuous people.  Once viewed as a great national movement, an expression of American optimism and idealism, and the driving force behind expansion in the 1840s.  Manifest Destiny’s meaning and significance have been considerably qualified in recent years.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower (2008), p. 180

Discussion Questions

• Herring labels “Manifest Destiny” (which he usually capitalizes) as both “a catch-phrase” and “a potent ideology.”  But after reading his chapter, would you also label it as official US policy during the 1840s?
• By the outbreak of Civil War in 1861, which side held the upper hand in the national debate: advocates for manifest destiny, or those who were more skeptical of territorial expansion?

Additional Resources                       

Origins of the term “manifest destiny” (1845)

On Texas (July 1845)

“…other nations have undertaken to intrude themselves into it, between us and the proper parties to the case, in a spirit of hostile interference against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”

–Excerpted from John L. O’Sullivan, “Annexation,” The United States Magazine and Democratic Review 17 (July 1845): 5–10

On Oregon (December 1845)

“…that claim is by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty.”

–Excerpted from John L. O’Sullivan, New York Morning News, December 27, 1845 (see also Herring, 191)

“The Monroe ‘doctrine’ was by no means a hollow statement.  It neatly encapsulated and gave public expression to goals Monroe and Adams had pursued aggressively since 1817.  That it was issued at all reflected America’s ambitions in the Pacific Northwest and its renewed concerns for its security.  That it was done separately from Britain reflected the nation’s keen interest in acquiring Texas and Cuba and its commercial aspirations in Latin America.  It expressed the spirit of the age and provided a ringing, if still premature, statement of U.S. preeminence in the hemisphere.  It publicly reaffirmed the continental vision Adams had already privately shared with the British and Russians:  ‘Keep what is yours but leave the rest of the continent to us.'” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 157

Discussion Questions

• It was Secretary of State John Quincy Adams who played the critical role in formulating what is now known as the Monroe Doctrine.  What were Adams’s key diplomatic and strategic goals while he served Monroe and then as he led the nation during his own one-term presidency that defined what Herring labels above as “the spirit of the age”?  How central was the Monroe Doctrine to these goals?
• Andrew Jackson succeeded Adams as president in 1829, but he been influential in shaping American strategic policy since 1814.  Did the Jackson presidency thus simply continue the earlier expansionism of the Jeffersonians?  How central was defending the Monroe Doctrine among the priorities of the Jackson administration?

Additional Resources

• Monroe Doctrine (1823) (National Archives)

“Madison accepted war in 1812 in the confidence that it would be relatively short, inexpensive, and bloodless –more talk than fight– and that the United States could achieve its objectives without great difficulty.  In fact, the War of 1812 lasted two and a half years and cost more than two thousand American lives and $158 billion.  For Britain, the war was a military and diplomatic sideshow to the main performance in Europe; for the United States, it became a struggle for survival.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 127

War of 1812 overview map (Courtesy of World Book)

Discussion Questions

• How did Jefferson’s attempts to embargo Britain during his second term undermine his presidency and cloud his foreign policy legacy?
• The War of 1812 is a misnomer in several ways.  Not only was it a nearly three-year conflict, but also the war involved far more than just the US and British.  What was the role of various Indian nations in this pivotal conflict?  How did the outcome of the war reshape US-Native American relations after 1815?

Additional Resources

• War of 1812 documents (Avalon Project)
• Chapter on Early Republic (American Yawp, online textbook)
• War of 1812:  Perspectives (PBS)
• Star Spangled Banner (CNN / annotated lyrics)

“By any standard, the Louisiana Purchase was a monumental achievement.  The nation acquired 287,000 acres, doubling its territory at a cost of roughly fifteen cents per acre, one of history’s greatest real estate steals.  Control of the Mississippi would tie the West firmly to the Union, enhance U.S. security, and provide enormous commercial advantages.  Napoleon’s sale of Louisiana all but eliminated a French return to North America, leaving the Floridas hopelessly vulnerable and Texas exposed.  The United States’ acquisition of Louisiana established a precedent for expansion and empire and gave substance to the idea that would later be called Manifest Destiny.”  –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 107

Discussion Questions

• Herring describes Thomas Jefferson as a “practical idealist.” Does the story behind the Louisiana Purchase embody this description?  What about afterwards, as President Jefferson pivoted toward the acquisition of Spanish Florida?
• Jefferson’s approach to expansionism and other foreign policy matters represented something of a departure from his predecessors.  How did he try to change both the nation’s diplomatic strategy and also diplomatic style as president?

Additional Resources

• Summary & Context (Jefferson’s Monticello)
• Robert Lee, “The True Cost of the Louisiana Purchase,” Slate, March 1, 2017

“Adams’s more belligerent advisers saw in the conflict with France a splendid opportunity to achieve larger objectives.  The war scare provided a pretext for the standing army Federalists had long sought.  In the summer of 1798, Congress authorized an army of fifty thousand men to be commanded by Washington in the event of hostilities.  Federalists in the cabinet and Senate also sought to rid the nation of recent immigrants from France and other countries who were viewed as potential subversives –and even worse as Republican political fodder– enacting laws making it more difficult to acquire American citizenship and permitting the deportation of aliens deemed dangerous to public safety.  Striking directly at the opposition, the Federalists passed several vaguely worded and blatantly repressive Sedition Acts that made it a federal crime to interfere with the operation of the government or publish any ‘false, scandalous and malicious writings’ against its officials.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 87

Discussion Questions

• The late 1790s was a period of fierce partisan debate over immigration and its perceived threat to national security.  What insights, if any, do you see in the story of the Alien & Sedition crisis for the politics of today?
• President John Adams eventually defused the crisis over Alien & Sedition and the Quasi War with France by forging a compromise with Napoleon in 1800.  He claimed this as perhaps his greatest legacy as a statesman.  Does Herring seem to agree?  What is your assessment of Adams during this period?

Additional Resources

• Alien Enemies Act, Sedition Act with VA & KY Resolutions (Avalon Project)
• Alien & Sedition Acts (page images) (National Archives)
• Good summary of the four major 1798 laws:  Alien Friends, Alien Enemies, Naturalization, and Sedition (Colonial Williamsburg)

“French meddling provoked a sharp presidential response in the form of Washington’s Farewell Address.  Drafted partly by Hamilton, the president’s statement was at one level a highly partisan political document timed to promote the Federalist cause in the approaching election.  Washington’s fervid warnings against the ‘insidious wiles of foreign influence,”and “passionate attachments” to “permanent alliances” with other nations unmistakably alluded to the French connection and Adet’s intrigues.  They were designed, at least in part, to discredit the Republicans.  At another level, the Farewell Address was a political testament, based on recent experience, in which the retiring president set forth principles to guide the nation in its formative years.”  –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 83

Discussion Questions

• In this paragraph, Herring is referring to French meddling in the 1796 election.  What insights for the present day, if any, do you see in the story of French interference in American politics during the 1790s?
• How would you assess the foreign policy accomplishments and setbacks of Washington’s two-term administration?

Additional Resources

• Farewell Address (text) (Avalon Project)
• Farewell Address (page images) National Archives)
• Summary & Context (Mount Vernon)

“One Last Time” from musical “Hamilton”

Performed at the White House in 2016, a musical rendition of Washington’s Farewell Address

“Franklin’s mission to Paris is one of the most extraordinary episodes in the history of American diplomacy, important, if not indeed decisive, to the outcome of the Revolution.  The eminent scientist, journalist, politician, and homespun philosopher was already an international celebrity when he landed in France.  Establishing himself in a comfortable house with a well-stocked wine cellar in a suburb Paris, he made himself the toast of the city. A steady flow of visitors requested audiences and favors such as commissions in the American army.  Through clever packaging, he presented himself to French society as the very embodiment of America’s revolution, a model of republican simplicity and virtue.” –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 19

Discussion Questions

• Compare Franklin’s diplomatic method with John Adams’ approach.  What are the trade-offs with each style?
• Why was the securing an alliance with France so vital to the success of the American Revolution?  And yet how was it also a dangerous gambit?

Engraving by Augustin de Saint-Aubin (National Portrait Gallery / London)

Historians on Franklin’s “salon” diplomacy

Franklin’s headquarters in Paris

Franklin lived here, at what was known as the Hotel de Valentinois, in part of the Chaumont residence in Passy from 1777-1785.   Today the address is 66 Rue Raynouard, Paris (Photograph courtesy of Graham Frater)

Additional Resources

• Model Treaty (1776)
• Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1778)
• Library of Congress webguide on US-French Alliance
• Benjamin Franklin Papers (LoC)

“The American negotiators have often been given credit for this favorable outcome [in the terms of the 1783 treaty].  They shrewdly played the Europeans against each other, it has been argued, exploiting their rivalries, wisely breaking congressional instructions, and properly deserting an unreliable France to defend their nation’s interests and maximize its gains.  Such an interpretation is open to question.  The Americans, probably from their own insecurities, were anxiety-ridden in dealing with ally and enemy alike.  Jay’s excessive nervousness about England and then his separate approach to that country not only broke faith with a supportive if not entirely reliable ally but also delayed negotiations for several months.  It eased pressure on Shelburne to make concessions and left the United States vulnerable to a possible Shelburne-Vergennes deal at its expense.  Jay and Adams had reason to question Vergenne’s trustworthiness, but they should have informed him of the terms before springing the signed treaty upon him. Ultimately, the favorable settlement owed much less to America’s military prowess and diplomatic skills than to luck and change:  Shelburne’s desperate need for peace to salvage his deteriorating political position and his determination to settle quickly with the United States and seek reconciliation through generosity.”  –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, pp. 32-3

Discussion Questions

• The paragraph above mentions four key individuals (two Americans, a Frenchman and an Englishman) and yet makes no mention of Franklin’s contribution to the Treaty of Paris.  How would you characterize his role and what was his relationship like with those other four figures?
• As Herring indicates, American negotiators have traditionally been given enormous credit for achieving a major triumph in the treaty ending the American Revolution.  Why?  What was so impressive about the terms of the Treaty of Paris for Americans?

Please identify the figures (left to right) in this unfinished composition by Benjamin West (Maryland State House)

Then consider how painter Benjamin West portrayed the characters, personalities and relationships of the American delegation to the Treaty of Paris negotiations in 1782.  And here are some other (less famous) visualizations of the power dynamics and issues at stake in the making of the 1783 peace treaty from previous History 282 students.

From Prerana Pakhrin:

From Anne Crowell:

“Foreign policy issues played a major role in calling the convention and would be important in the deliberations themselves.  The fundamental question of the foreign policy powers to be assigned to each branch of government created ambiguities that have vexed the republic ever since.”  –George Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 51

Additional Resources

One of the best online resources for studying the U.S. Constitution comes from the University of Chicago and its online edition of the Founder’s Constitution.  See the main Table of Contents for a general overview to their fine annotated, clause-by-clause presentation.

Students in History 282 should be especially familiar with these clauses:

• Article I, Section 8 (Commerce)
• Article I, Section 8 (Declare War)
• Article II, Section 2 (Advice and Consent)
• Article III, Section 3 (Treason)