Research Question: “How have EU relations with North African states on migration and security cooperation changed since the 2011 uprisings? To what extent are North African interests driving these changes, compared to European interests?”
Introduction and Thesis
In 2011, North African governments were faced with revolts that started in Tunisia, and worked their way to Egypt, Libya, and Morocco. The uprisings have led to the mass migration of irregular immigrants to the European Union, in which the EU has proclaimed as a security threat. The Arab Spring has changed the dynamic of EU-North Africa Relations in the sense that interests of political elites in North Africa are now a priority and these elites have bargaining power.
Literature Review
In this context, elements of constructivism, critical theory, and liberalism are present. It is evident how securitization has clashed with liberalism regarding the violation of international migration law. Securitization is the act of declaring something as a security threat, which legitimizes the concept that it is. Migration is not inherently a national security threat, but the EU has “socially constructed” this idea which then leads to constructed interests. Moreover, there are no limits on what securitization can do, and it can be handled without “normal democratic rules and regulations” (Taureck 2006, 55). In other words, when an issue is securitized in a state, the absence of morals is ultimately justified. The EU has done this with the migration crisis post Arab Spring, and their actions have violated international law and norms. The United Nations 1951 Convention on Refugees established the universal norm of “setting and preservation of a high-level human rights standards, in particular in relation to refugees as one of the most vulnerable categories” (Lang 2017, 511). The EU reaffirmed this norm by putting it into law in their Charter of Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, the UN also declared that irregular immigrants have the right to social, economic, and cultural privileges no matter what their status is.
Background
Prior to the Arab uprisings and post 9/11, the EU was already starting to make structural changes to their Justice and Home Affairs pillar. The Tampere Program and the Hague Program were created by the European Council in 1999 to control the migration flow from the Southern Mediterranean (Richey 2013, 410). Then, when the global war on terror took place, fear was sparked in the Union. No longer was it just about borders and migration, but the threat of extremist terrorist groups. The Madrid bombings of 2004 only exacerbated these concerns, as they were linked to a Moroccan Islamic group (Durac 2018, 107). The aftermath of these bombings was the development of Frontex in 2004, which played a key role in the post 2011 migration crisis. Additionally, the European Neighborhood Policy was created in 2004 to integrate Europe and its Southern neighbors, and border control was on the agenda. Moreover, countries in the ENP could have market access if they complied with the political reform that the EU was asking for. It is important to note that the policies enacted before 2011 regarding migration were unilaterally done by the EU, and very little dialogue between Europe and North Africa took place.
The Arab Spring started in Tunisia with the overthrow of Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. Then in the following month, Egypt’s dictator Hosni Mubarak was forced to resigned. Simultaneously, protests were occurring in Libya, which led to the murder of Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011. Libya’s story is a devastating one, considering the country is still in a civil war today and there has not been a unified government since the uprisings. The revolutions in the former three countries then inspired protests in Morocco, for the same reasons such as corruption, unemployment, and limited freedom of speech. Although, Morocco never ousted their King, Mohammed the VI, they just demanded a new constitution.
Between January and March 2011, the island of Lampedusa, Italy saw as high as 26,000 migrants from Tunisia and Libya (Richey 2013, 411). This is just a glimpse of how quick, and intense the migration was at the time. In April 2011, a boat sunk with 200 people on it, and this was the beginning of many sinkings. (Richey 2013, 412). The migration route through the Mediterranean Sea is dangerous and many lives have been lost due to boat malfunctions. In the early days of 2011, migrants were sleeping in tents outside because Lampedusa only had the capacity to take in 1,000 people, and this resulted in migrants having to travel to other cities and countries. Just in 2015, 885,386 refugees came via the eastern Mediterranean route (Dankert 2017, 39).
Italy, Greece, and France were hit the hardest by the overwhelming numbers of migrants. This caused dissatisfaction with the commission and with each other, especially in Italy and France. France was refusing to accept any migrants and suspended the Schengen agreement in 2011, causing hostility with Italy. Even more so, France sent back 1,7000 Tunisian migrants to Italy in just one month (Richey 2013, 412). On the other hand, Italy received help from Frontex after continuously asking for government support. Not only did they send Frontex to Italy but the EU enacted new migration quotas for member countries, dividing up the numbers between Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Austria. President Orban of Hungary was opposed to these quotas due to his devotion to keeping a Christian country. This mix of “xenophobia” and “cultural isolation” perpetuated on a larger scale within the EU over the years, and led to Britain disassociating and the rise of the right (Dankert 2017, 26). The EU has increased their financial aid to Frontex since 2011 and this has allowed the task force to conduct specific missions such as Triton, Hera, and Poseidon.
Egypt
Egypt has been the most prioritized North African Country for the EU because of its ability to become a strong police power and its regional influence. Prior to 2011, the EU had started working with Egypt on democratic reforms and border stability. In 2007, the EU-Egypt Action plan was enacted to make sure Egypt was making progress in this sector, and they had to provide yearly reports. After 20,000 Egyptians marched in the streets of Cairo to topple the dictator Mubarak in 2011, everything changed. When Morsi was elected in 2012 the EU was relieved because there was finally stability, but not so much democracy. Right after the election, the EU-Egypt task force was formed which declared the two countries as equal partners. Morsi was not as liberal as the EU had hoped for him to be, and his abuse of power and hindering of judicial review soured his image. Despite, this the EU continued to give him money, and in 2012 they pledged 5 billion euros to Morsi with 303 million being grants (Hassan 2015, 68). Europe turned a blind eye to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s authoritarian policies because they were more concerned about a leader who could slow down migration. In 2013, Morsi was removed via coup, and this sparked a new crisis for EU-Egypt relations. The EU stated that Egypt needed to return to a working, democratic government, and even advocated for the participation of Morsi’s party in the new elections. The interim government after Morsi was causing violence in the country and the EU could not monitor the 2014 elections fairly because of this peril and anti-Westernization.
In 2014, Abdel Fattah El Sisi was elected as the new president of Egypt, and the EU was quick in their efforts to form a relationship with him. Sisi visited Italy and France in November 2014, and after this the Union gave more aid to the new Sisi government. The ENP was no longer persistent about their reforms on human rights, they were focused on domestic solidarity. Sisi has not made any progress in democratic reforms, in fact he has strengthened his authoritarian regime over the years. One prolonging issue of his government has been mass incarceration. Sisi has imprisoned large amounts of people from the Muslim Brotherhood, and they have not been released to this day. Yet, once again the EU has not imposed any sanctions on Egypt for this brutality.
In 2017, Egypt and Germany signed an agreement on migration, which consisted of France, Germany, and the UK financing the Egyptian navy. Also in 2017, a new partnership program was launched in order to enforce cooperation on the economy, and migration. The main goals of this program were to increase free trade, provide more development for the Suez Canal, “enhance law enforcement”, and encourage “voluntary return of irregular migrants to their country of origin” (Delegation to Egypt, 2021). More interestingly, the EU made sure to emphasize Egypt’s important role in bilateral decision making because of their position in the UN Security Council. Throughout 2018-2020, Egypt had repeatedly refused to participate in EU programs that focused on human rights. Then in 2022, the European parliament even proposed a solution to human rights abuses in Egypt and Egypt publicly denounced it. Yet in 2022, another 240 million dollars was allocated to Egypt in an EU-Egypt association council meeting. This was intended for human and social development, and another 100 million was allocated to compensate for the rising food prices (Council of the EU, 2022). Also in this time period, Egypt was given new thermal cameras and satellites for their borders. In terms of trade, Egypt has been able to capitalize on the Ukraine war by becoming a major gas exporter. Since there are now sanctions on Russia, the EU has been buying gas from Israel that is shipped from Egypt.
Tunisia
On April 6th, 2011, Italy met with the Tunisian government after the overthrow of Ben Ali to discuss migration. Tunisia agreed to take back newer migrants but not those who had already settled in. Although, Tunisia would only take back these newer migrants if Italy granted temporary residence to 23,000 migrants (Richey 2013, 413). Italy agreed to these conditions because they knew if temporary residence was provided, then these irregular immigrants could travel to other countries under the Schengen area. This discourse was the catalyst for the hostility between France and Italy, and some EU member countries vocalized their support for the former Ben Ali regime because there was some sense of stability. Just between 2015 and 2020, 23 million dollars has been endowed to Tunisia for their security programs (Ghanem and Jrad 2023, 42). In November 2022, a conference was held in Tunis to talk about cross-border management in the region, with a focus on Tunisia and Libya. At this meeting, Tunisia declared their commitment to trying to manage the flow better. Then, in December 2022, the EU announces a 40-million-dollar aid package to Tunisia (EEAS press team 2022). Next, on June 8th, 2023, another meeting was held between Tunisia and the EU. Europe was concerned about President Kais Saied authoritarian policies and economic regression that could be correlated to the significant increase in migrants at the time. At this meeting, EU representatives urged Italy to contribute more to Tunisia instead of merely complaining about the migration crisis, and some participants even stated that money should not be sent to Tunisia if there hasn’t been any long-term progress. However, this did not happen, and on June 11th, a new 105-million-dollar package was announced for Tunisia (European Comission 2023). This deal was signed by Ursula Von der Leyen, commission president, and Giorgia Meloni, Italian prime minster. Not only that, but another part of this package was a macro-financial loan up to 900 million dollars. On top of that, this year, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the EU and Tunisia which agreed to give Tunisia financial rewards for keeping their border in check. This financial reward would come to a total of one million dollars for trade and investment. This MOU was necessary because of the increasing numbers of Tunisian migrants since 2015, with just 9,283 migrants arriving in Italy in 2023 (Ghanem and Jrad 2023, 48).
Morocco
In 2013, a joint declaration for partnership in mobility was signed between the EU and Morocco. This was designed to find a strategic way to deal with the mass movement of people, and the EU compromised by issuing visas to Moroccan students, researchers, and business workers. As of 2012, 322,094 visas were granted to Moroccan citizens (European Commission 2013). Then in 2015, an action plan was set out to give Morocco advanced status in EU relations. This relationship kept building over the years, and in 2019 a joint declaration was formulated between Morocco and the EU. This declaration emphasized the need to respect Morocco’s conditions and expectations. Some key elements of this partnership were the “full implementation of Morocco’s national strategy”, “mutually beneficial human exchanges”, stronger UN-Morocco relations, and Moroccan participation in EU civilian and military operations (Delegation to Morocco 2021). Along with this, Morocco was the second largest partner in the EU trust fund for 2015-2021 with around 234 million dollars’ worth of funds (Fakir 2023, 32). Morocco has become a hotspot for irregular migrants and has a large influx of their own. There has been an EU urgency to tighten Morocco’s border without acknowledging the needs of the migrants settling in Morocco. In 2022, Morocco was given 150 million dollars for migration tools and cooperation efforts, such as providing the EU with surveillance and intelligence on migration pathways.
The EU has deeply invested into the Moroccan energy transition in order to help Morocco become more self-sufficient. Morocco is also capable of “[securing] supply chains” that have been damaged by the Ukraine war, and their phosphate reserves and agriculture are important for trade (Fakir 2023, 36). The EU is their largest trading partner, and they have shown their loyalty to Europe since the Cold War by continuously trying to become an informal member.
Libya
Libya’s relations with the EU are not as clear cut because of the ongoing war. While Libya is in shambles, various powers have been trying to take advantage of this power vacuum and to spread their influence. Libya’s oil and border control is of high importance to Europe, and they have attempted to take institutional control. The UN backed government of National Accord is supported financially and ideologically by the EU, but this government has its flaws. The EU prioritizes fast elections rather than fair ones in order to implement stability, which then can be a tool to prevent refugees from migrating to Europe. For example, the EU enables and accepts the leader of the house of representatives, Saleh, despite his corrupt way of gaining power. Saleh is a puppet of the Egyptian government, and he follows whatever Sisi tells him to do. Fair elections are not the only moral the EU has neglected in Libya- human rights are also on this list. In 2017, the Italian interior minister came up with a new plan to “financially incentivize Libyan militias” by increasing funding to coastguards and detention centers for migrants (Megerisi 2023, 27). These detention centers are full of violence, sexual abuse, and starvation, and the EU is sending these migrants back to these inhumane conditions.
The central Mediterranean route is the deadliest migrant pathway and these interceptions at sea started around 2016, and just in 2017, 82,00 refugees were sent back to Libya (Abrahams 2022). In 2021, 32,425 refugees were sent back to Libya and 1,553 migrants died at sea or went missing (Abrahams 2022). Migrants in these detention centers have asked for protection from the EU but have received none. The 2017 Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and the government of National Accord has been the primary source of funding for the Libyan coastguard and was renewed for another three years in 2022. Furthermore in 2020, Operation IRINI was formed to intensify Libyan coastguard operations, and the main goal of this was inspect illegal oil exports, migrant smugglers, and vessels filled with arms. Since 2011, the EU has given Libya a total of 75.3 million in aid (Delegation to Libya 2021).
The EU commission might support the government of National Accord in Tripoli, but the member state themselves are divided on this. The opposition government, ran by Haftar and his Libyan National Army, has made its goal to destroy the Tripoli government. France has had most interactions and negotiations with Haftar, for they believe that Haftar has the potential to end the war and get rid of radical Islamists groups. More importantly, Haftar has gained control over vital oil fields in the East. France has provided Haftar with weapons and even met with him in 2020.
Analysis
How have EU-Africa relations changed? Prior to Arab Spring, the EU had been the drivers in decision making with North African states. A concrete example of this is through the European Neighborhood Policy, and how there were conditions that needed to be met in order for North African states to have access to the European market and aid. These ENP policies pre-Arab Spring illustrated the commitment to democracy and human rights without budging, as the ENP demanded country reports on progress before holding any bilateral meetings, events, or councils. It is also evident before 2011, that migration was not as externalized which gave the EU more power. The Tampere and Hague programs focused on internal issues regarding the treatment of migrants and making sure that member states were upholding the pillars of freedom and justice. These programs did not include North African leaders in the negotiations or take into consideration the unique domestic politics of the region. In Christos Kourtelis’s work, The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy, he criticizes the Union for making the ENP so euro-centric and treating North Africa as an object- not a partner.
There is a shift in the dynamic between the EU and North Africa after 2011, where a new balance of power can be recognized. However, this dynamic is variant in the region in the sense that benefits are not the same for each country. Starting with Egypt, Sisi leverages the concept of maintaining his oppressive regime for migration cooperation. Sisi came to power in good timing, considering that Morsi was ousted via a coup, and the EU was willing to do anything to have a stable government that they could partner with on migration. Like previously stated, the EU needs Egypt- they have resources like the Suez Canal, regional power, and a geostrategic area. The EU has repeatedly asked Sisi to free his political prisoners, but he does not, and Sisi does not face any repercussions. Sisi has refused to adapt to the human rights policies that the EU has demanded in their bilateral agreements, and the EU still gives him aid for his coast guard, border, and economy. Egypt has been a key partner in migration cooperation because of its effectiveness in tightening its borders and preventing migrants from using Egypt as an area of departure. As long as Sisi keeps a stern border and coastguard, the EU will continue to turn a blind eye to his oppression.
Tunisia is similar to Egypt, specifically in comparison to their authoritarian leaders. Although, the financial benefits are most important to Tunisia due to their spiraling economy. As of 2023, debt accounted for 80% of their GDP and they have one of the highest debts in the world (Ghanem and Jrad 2023, 43). Kais Saied has been a leader of concern in the international community because of his regression in democracy through his censorship policies. The EU condemns his actions in their rhetoric and has asked him to change his ways various times, but like Egypt, their words do match their actions. The EU has given Tunisia generous financial packages and as the number of migrants go up- so does the money. Tunisian migrant numbers have gone up recently, and the EU has increased their grants and loans to the country as a result. Saied has the power and money to better secure his borders, but he continues to bargain by asking for more money in return for his compliance. Especially for a country like Tunisia, who do not wish to be an informal member or have strong relations with the EU, they need a tangible benefit for migration collaboration.
Morocco is a different situation than Tunisia and Egypt, for Morocco’s benefits are not open and clear transactions. Morocco has been the most committed African country to the European Union, and they want the benefits that come with being a close EU partner- market access, global clout, and legal migration. In exchange for trying to manage the flow of migrants from Morocco, the EU gave Moroccan citizens visas for the Schengen area, and advanced status in relations. Not only that, but they are now allowed to participate in EU military operations. These privileges deepen Moroccan-European integration and boost Morocco’s image in the international community. Another difference with Morocco is how the EU has approached the migration crisis in this country- rather than focusing on short term solutions they have invested in long term ones. The best example of this is the EU’s financial assistance in the Green Morocco plan which is helping Morocco transition to renewable energy sources. Since Morocco imports most of their energy, this transition would provide Morocco with economic growth which then leads to a lower probability of irregular migration.
The bargaining power in Libya is not just in the hands of the government of National Accord, but also in the hands of non-state actors. The EU has given large amounts of money to the Libyan coastguard and detention centers in Tripoli because this is where the UN recognized government is. However, abusive and dangerous militias run both the coastguard and centers, and they do not use the money in the way the EU has intended them to use it. On the other hand, France has given power to Haftar’s militia, but not for migration purposes. France wants to ensure that oil assets are in the proper hands and are protected. This divide between the EU commission and France shows the diverging priorities present here- whereas the EU only supports the UN backed government in Tripoli because of its harsh migration policies.
The Arab Spring of 2011 changed the course of EU-North Africa relations and revealed the weaknesses of the European Union’s soft power. No longer is EU migration policy internal and unilateral, it is now externalized, securitized, and bilateral. As the migration crisis worsened in 2015, the EU chose to step down from their moral pedestal and took any measures necessary to control the migration of irregular immigrants to Europe. By the EU giving North African political elites the power without conditions and rules, this has created long term issues for democracy and human rights.
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