ISSN 1076-9005
Volume 28, 2021
Is Buddhism Individualistic? The Trouble with a Term
Donna Lynn Brown
University of Manitoba
Western scholars have been calling expressions of Buddhism “individualistic”—or denying the charge—since the 1800s. This article argues that “individualism” and related terms are sometimes problematic when applied to Buddhism. Because they are associated with Western modernity, they contribute to hegemonic discourses about Asia and Buddhism, skew representations, and reinforce stereotypes. Because their referents have been many and varied—including escaping caste and family, asociality, lay practice, and racism—their use leads to imprecision, confusion, and lack of comparability among analyses. And because they have moral connotations, they can blend observation with valuation and polemic. The article examines selected scholarly works that maintain or deny that Buddhism is individualistic, highlights problems associated with the term, and concludes that, in many cases, more precise and less value-laden descriptors should be found.
Hi Donna,
Thank you for the article. Overall, I found it really interesting and thought-provoking. I particularly liked the parsing out of different uses of individualism.
I also have some real concerns over what I feel was your misrepresentation of my book on multiple levels. In essence, you equate my ethnographic based treatment of individualism with a term I myself or my interviewees never use—asociality—which collapses and does a real disservice to the multiple ways my interviewees reported experiencing individualism in convert communities.
Regarding your treatment of my summary of secondary scholarship:
1. In relationship to summaries of scholarship on meditation-based Buddhism, I highlight their use of individualism in two ways: (1) privileging of lay individual meditation practice; (2) a lack of interest in community-building. Your term “asociality” does not reflect both at all. It works better with point 2 but is still limited (you can be a sociable person but not prioritize community) and perhaps is why you do not see it used by any of the scholars–including me-—you cover in your article.
2. I find the overall orientation of your representation of my summary of scholarship quite odd. Just above it, you identify several scholars who call Western Buddhism individualistic: Bauman calls it individualistic because of its emphasis on inner experience and lack of emphasis on community-building, Alan Wallace because of its focus on lay practice, and Richard Seager because of its focus on lay meditation and inner experience. Yet, you then claim that the scholars I use (Fields, Coleman, Prebish and Cadge) do not say it is individualistic in almost the exact same ways as the scholars you have just mentioned.
3. You bring in McMahan to support your point of asociality but when I mention McMahan on page 30 of American Dharma, I actually focus on his emphasis on individuality in terms of meditation practice. My quote is: [McMahan focuses on] “the individualization of meditation, in which the practice has been transformed from a communal endeavor embedded within the sangha and wider community of laity to a private individual spiritual practice.” So, my use of McMahan in American Dharma supports not individualism as asociality but individualism as a focus on individual meditation practice.
Given the points above, I would conclude that aside from Cadge—-who I agree, on closer reading, that I don’t summarize sufficiently-—your representation of my summary of secondary scholarship on American Buddhist modernism is selective and misrepresentative.
Regarding your treatment of my conclusions that are based in my ethnographic data, you write: “Gleig herself suggests that Buddhist modernists are asocial, but, as discussed above, on weak grounds. If individualism means asociality and disengagement, there is little scholarship showing that either modernist or postmodernist Buddhists are individualistic” (page 35).
For reasons I cannot fathom, you do not mention at all where my “suggestion” comes from-—which is several years of multi-sited ethnographic data. In fact, I’m not sure you mention my book is an ethnographic study at all and you certainly don’t mention my interview populations. If I was reading your article and I hadn’t read my book, I would have the impression that Gleig just come up with this position from nowhere. I am honestly confused as to why you don’t mention the ethnographic data—-which makes up three-quarters of my book-—that I draw my conclusions from?
Some of the ethnographic data I present in my book regarding how my interviewees understand individualism as a key characteristic of first-generation American convert Buddhists (modernists):
1. In 33 interviews with Gen X teachers, they themselves identified individualism as a key component of baby boomers and something they are intentionally hoping to counter. The chapter is literally overflowing with examples of the multiple distinct ways that Gen X teachers find Boomer teachers individualistic and the specific ways they are countering that individualism. See page 218: focus on developing peership and models of teaching that are more collective. Page 220 in the section “On the Boomers” names four distinct ways Gen X find the boomers individualistic including characterizing their boomer teachers as “lone wolves,” “maverick individuals,” or as having a “lack of accountability.” Page 221: Jessica Morey talked of teachers as “not having personal or professional relational skills” and connects this with the focus on individual meditation practice. Page 221, in the sub-section titled “Communication is Oxygen for Us,” details the ways Gen X intentionally attempt to count this individualism. Pages 224 and 225 talk about the need to build more collective-oriented teaching models and communities. Page 245 talks about the limits with the first generation focus on individual meditation practice and the desire to focus more on community-building. Page 249, titled “We’re Just More Fluid,” opens with a quote from Rev. Angel Kyodo Williams: “There’s a social shift happening in America in general . . . a shift from the hyper-individualization to a more collective network,” and then goes on to argue this is what is happening with the shift from boomer to Gen X. Page 248 names several dimensions of this move from the “me” to the “we.” Moreover, I note that my findings supported Sumi Loundon Kim’s findings that one of the younger Buddhist concerns is developing peer relationships and community (page 218). The considerable ethnographic data in this chapter has obvious ramifications for your article and cannot be ignored.
2. In my chapter on racial justice for which I interviewed around 22 practitioners and teachers, they point to the multiple ways that they see whiteness in boomer lineages as expressing itself through individualism. They also discuss the multiple ways that racial justice working as a counter to whiteness is also a counter to individualism. For instance, Larry Yang actually named his book Awakening Together as Spiritual Practice and frames DEI work explicitly as a collective practice that counters the individualism of the first generation of American Buddhists and is a “gift of community to them.” So, in the racial justice data, individualism is far from just “asociality,” but rather points to a core component of whiteness itself. I am confused as to why you do not discuss individualism in relationship to whiteness in your article. This is absolutely central to my thesis in American Dharma. I also talk about the individualism of liberalism here, which you similarly ignore despite me returning to it specially in the summary that you do reference.
3. In terms of socially engaged Buddhism, being socially engaged does not mean one is also involved in community-building or that one is free of white individualism. Individualism also exists inside of social engaged Buddhist organizations themselves. For instance, I cover in some detail how the Buddhist Peace Fellowship has adopted intentional community-building in recognition that was missing in the organization. On page 255, for instance, I identify three new features of intentional community building: one is a focus on coalition-building: one on friendship building within the group; a third on featuring members in group promotional material. Similarly, I discuss the ways BPG has worked with whiteness as individualism. I conducted participant-observation with BPF and interviewed their co-director for this section.
4. I don’t explore McMahan’s use of expressive individualism in my book. Rather I take up his focus on the individualization of meditation. I explicitly highlight this including the use of italics on page 34. My chapter 4 then explores the modernist individualization of meditation including how it has been both extended and challenged in convert Buddhism. The challenge is what I call the relational/integrative turn. I give many examples of this which I explicitly note are attempts to overcome individualism. Examples: page 122 “Korda, however, laments that the sangha used here in a loose sense of Buddhist community has all too often been neglected in American convert Buddhism.” On page 124 I discuss how Gregory Kramer and Jessica Morey talk about the neglect of community and the need to move beyond individual mediation practice to forge more relational forms of practice. There is a whole chapter of material here about the move away from individual meditation practice and the attempt to build relationality/community that would have been highly relevant to an article on how scholars have used individualism. Similarly, in my other two chapters on mindfulness and Buddhist Geeks I also point to several ways that Buddhists are attempting to counter the individualism of modernist meditation, from trying to de-center the centrality of intensive meditation retreat as the essence of Buddhism to designing more social and relational forms of mindfulness practice. I interviewed nearly all the teachers named in this section and conducted participant-observation for these sections.
5. Another area that I discuss the collective turn is in reference to a “buddhological” revisioning of core Buddhist concepts on a collective level: including (collective) dukkha and liberation. This is reiterated on page 279 in which I quote Thich Nhat Hanh’s famous comment about the next Buddha being the sangha. This comes from textual analysis and interviews with Buddhist of Color.
As should be evident from above, I never use the word asocial or asociality. What I actually do is describe the multiple ways my research populations use individualism (points 1-5 above). You don’t name or engage with the multiple ways individualism is unpacked in my book because you have decided, for some reason that I honestly cannot fathom, that all the above examples are represented by your term “asociality.” This is a deeply inadequate misrepresentation of my ethnographic findings (points 1-5). At the most you can say it points to one of the four ways that my Gen X teachers name as the individualism of Gen X teachers (that they did not have good interpersonal skills or prioritize communication and networking).
In closing, I want to emphasize that I appreciate your call to scholars to be more precise in unpacking the multiple dimensions of individualism. I don’t see individualism as just denoting one thing (such as your term “asocial”). I cover individualism as a multidimensional phenomenon, one that shows up in the multiple way my interlocutors name it and in the multiple ways they are challenging individualism. Their voices were loud and clear and detailed over multiple chapters.
Here I must add that I am particularly struck by—-and honestly quite troubled by—-how you completely ignore my ethnographic material on Buddhists of Color who repeatedly frame their work as an intentional counter to the multiple expressions of individualism they have experienced in American Buddhist modernism. When you say that there is no evidence that first generation Buddhism is individualistic, you are erasing their experiences. Representing their voices, which very clearly state not only do they experience white majority sanghas as individualistic but that this individualism is a source of harm, is imperative to me as an ethnographer. I would also add that my ethnographic data lends support to scholars such as Cheah, Tanaka, and Mitchell whose claims that Euro-American convert communities are individualistic you also dismiss as being based on “archetypes.”
.
I am disappointed that you have not treated my ethnographic populations/data with the type of care and discrimination you are calling on other scholars to demonstrate when discussing individualism.
Best,
Ann
Dear Ann:
Thank you for your comments. As far as I can see, they mainly relate to things you believe the article says but it does not. Hence, in responding, I do not find myself engaged in scholarly debates; I find myself simply pointing out that the article does not say what you claim it does. Nevertheless, if such significant misunderstandings can arise, I am glad to be able to address them.
I begin with your concluding words. You summarize my article as a “call to scholars to be more precise in unpacking the multiple dimensions of individualism.” This statement reveals a fundamental misunderstanding. The article does not call on scholars to unpack individualism. That is the opposite of what it calls for. It asks scholars to avoid, where possible, using the term “individualism,” because it has a problematic history in Buddhist Studies, fosters inaccurate binaries and stereotypes, and is so imprecise that it spreads confusion. The article suggests that, if scholars wish to discuss “individualism” in Buddhism, we break the concept into its components—precise values and behaviors—and use more exact terms to label them.
Many of your comments seem to stem from misunderstanding this. For example, the article does not dispute your ethnographic findings, or “erase” the voices of your interviewees as you claim; its scope is limited to the usage of a term—individualism—by scholars in scholarship on Buddhism. It does not examine how practicing Buddhists use the term because that is outside its scope.
Specific Comments:
1. The first major issue that seems to shape your comments is a misunderstanding about the aim and scope of the article, as above. You claim I ignore your ethnographic work, but since the article only discusses scholars’ usages of “individualism” terms, your ethnography lies outside its ambit. You seem to find this an issue because you believe that the article evaluates whether certain Buddhists are individualistic or not, and then claims that Buddhist modernists are not individualistic, contrary to the views of your interviewees. However, the article does not do this. It does not assess whether any particular Buddhists are individualistic or evaluate Buddhist modernists as not individualistic. To do so would contradict its thesis, which is that calling any form of Buddhism either “individualistic” or “not individualistic” is problematic because these terms are problematic.
Most of your comments seem to stem from this fundamental misunderstanding, including those referencing McMahan, Wallace, Baumann, and Seager, and comments 1-5 (beginning with “In 33 interviews”). All these comments appear to be arguing that Buddhist modernists are individualistic and/or Buddhist postmodernists are not—as if I were contradicting you in this regard. I am not, because the argument falls outside the scope of the article.
2. The second major issue is the claim you make (four times, I think) that the article says you mean only “asociality” by “individualism”: that the article misrepresents your book by not capturing the multidimensionality you give the term. However, the article does not say that the book uses the term to mean only “asociality”—it describes several meanings given in the book of which asociality is one (that asociality is one is evident on your pp.38-43). This quote from the article shows it describing the multiple ways your book uses “individualism”:
“For Gleig, Buddhist modernists are ‘highly individualistic,’ meaning asocial and not engaged in activism that challenges the social order, and their individualism is associated with ‘racism, classism, and neo-liberalism’ (277–279, 286). They manifest individualism by privileging the ‘inner experience of the individual meditator’ over collective practice, community-building, and inclusiveness; ignoring the ‘sociocultural dimensions of that individual self and the collective suffering of racial injustice’; and not doing ‘diversity and inclusion work’ (4, 38, 173, 175, 277, 279). She acknowledges their social engagement, but indicates it does not overcome their individualism because it is not ‘racial inclusion and justice work’ or community-oriented ‘external mindfulness’ (22, 32, 38, 175, 278–279). Gleig contrasts Buddhist modernism’s ‘general individualism’ with traditional Buddhism’s community orientation, as well as with postmodern Buddhism’s ‘beloved community’ (175, 4). Postmodern Buddhists make, she argues, a ‘collective turn’ toward group activities as well as a ‘critical turn’ toward engaging with race and identity (e.g., 249–263, 277–279). Their absence of individualism manifests as reducing focus on meditation, emphasizing collective practices, and engaging in diversity/ justice activism (170, 173, 175, 198, 278–279). In Gleig’s estimation, they replace Buddhist modernism’s individualism with social, inclusive, and engaged practices.”
This quote makes clear that the article does not say, as you contend, that your book portrays “individualism” only as “asociality.” It also shows that your own words, cited extensively, are the source of its description of your usage of the term. This contradicts your charge that the article misrepresents your book’s usage of the term “individualism.”
3. You write in your comments that, in the article, I “say that there is no evidence that first generation Buddhism is individualistic” and thus, with respect to Buddhists of Color, I am “erasing their experiences.” This is a strange claim since the article does not say this anywhere; indeed, saying it would contradict the article’s thesis, which is that scholars should try to avoid calling any form of Buddhism “individualistic” or “not individualistic.” You are claiming the article says something it does not.
4. You comment: “Regarding your treatment of my conclusions that are based in my ethnographic data, you write: ‘Gleig herself suggests that Buddhist modernists are asocial, but, as discussed above, on weak grounds. If individualism means asociality and disengagement, there is little scholarship showing that either modernist or postmodernist Buddhists are individualistic’ (page 35). For reasons I cannot fathom, you do not mention at all where my ‘suggestion’ comes from-—which is several years of multi-sited ethnographic data.” On your book’s assertion that Buddhist modernists are asocial, the article refers to (and cites) pages 38-43 of the book, which is in a section called “Meditation-Based Convert Lineages: Core Characteristics and Issues.” There, you write that convert Buddhist modernists do not value community participation, which you deem individualistic. You draw on several scholars to try to substantiate this assertion, not on your own ethnography. The article cites the relevant pages, so I do say where the “suggestion” comes from; it is mistaken to claim that I do not (see the article, 79-80).
5. Your comment about Joseph Cheah, Kenneth Tanaka, and Scott Mitchell shows that you have misread or misunderstood the section of the article that concerns their work. You contend that I write about “Cheah, Tanaka, and Mitchell whose claims that Euro-American convert communities are individualistic” I “dismiss as being based on ‘archetypes.’” This claim mis-states what the article says. The article does not dismiss, for any reason, these scholars’ view that Euro-American Buddhists are individualistic; it questions whether Asian-American Buddhists are as different from Euro-American Buddhists as they assert. For example, data presented by Cheah and Tanaka show that there are so-called “individualistic” features that Asian-Americans share with Euro-Americans, which means that both groups may fit the term “individualistic” in certain ways—not that Euro-American Buddhists are not individualistic.
a) On Cheah, the article notes that he appears to rely on archetypes, and gives a reason: he calls Euro-Americans “individualistic” and Asian-Americans “collective” even though, as I write, “the book’s comments on Asian-American assimilation suggest commonalities in some features generally called ‘individualistic’ between ethnic categories, as well as evolution and variety within them”: a reasoned assessment, not a dismissal—and one that points to his own data.
b) The article states that Tanaka’s work is ethnographic; it does not say, as you claim, that he bases it on archetypes. My comment in the article is that “although Tanaka could show commonalities as well as differences [given his data], he uses the concept of individualism to imply categorical difference.” In other words, the ethnographic data he offers show that Euro-Americans and Asian-Americans share, to some extent, features generally connected to individualism as well as to sociality. Hence his binary, suggesting that one group is individualistic and the other is not, may be more categorical than his own data support. This is a reasoned assessment, not a dismissal.
c) Mitchell does seem to base his use of the word “individualism” on archetypes. Again, the article gives a reason for saying so: “He attributes individualism to modern Euro-American culture, and calls it an aspect of convert Buddhist modernism only. He describes it as opting for individual choice regarding what practices, disciplines, or teachings to implement, in contrast to following authorities, and does not distinguish among groups within each ethnic category, although some in each are surely more ‘traditional’ than others . . . Differentiating groups by level of individual compared to hierarchical authority and assuming they split cleanly by ethnicity in this regard may result in inconsistencies; they likely do not.” Here, the article says that the binary created by using “individualism” is likely overstated given Mitchell’s definition. It does not say that Euro-Americans are not individualistic. This is again a reasoned assessment, not a dismissal.
d) You may be claiming that I “dismiss” these scholars’ work as evidence that convert Buddhist modernists are individualistic. If so, that is a misunderstanding: the article is not showing (or denying) that Buddhists of any kind are or are not individualistic, only that the usage of the term causes problems. I believe that all three of these works would present a clearer picture of Asian-American and Euro-American Buddhists if they used terms more precise than “individualism.”
e) In sum, this section of the article does not say what you claim it says.
6. Where I write that distinguishing, as you do, between Buddhist modernists and postmodernists using the term “individualism” engenders paradox, I state that the problem is the term itself (p. 88 of the article). Calling modernists “individualistic” and postmodernists “not individualistic” creates difficulty because the term is vague and potentially misleading:
a) First, it leads to understating similarities, revealed in ethnographic work, between the two groups in levels of sociality, community-building, and social engagement—yet at the same time it obscures ways the two groups’ approaches to these activities may differ. It is too imprecise a term to show where differences lie.
b) Second, also because it is imprecise, its usage covers up similarities between the two groups in other factors scholars of Buddhism (and ordinary people) tend to deem “individualism”: lay meditation; individual freedom; individual authority over practices, conduct, and group membership; and self-expression.
The article states clearly (p. 88) that it is not denying a postmodern turn among American Buddhists. It does not negate ethnographic work that finds differences between Buddhist modernists and postmodernists. Rather, it asserts that the term “individualism” does not capture these differences well.
7. Because misunderstandings surround the term “individualism,” my article suggests that scholars of Buddhism avoid it. The articles cites, as a model, Erik Braun’s 2013 The Birth of Insight, because Braun discusses aspects of modern Buddhism that some scholars call “individualistic” (such as lay practice and seeking mystical experience) and also contrasts Asian-American and Euro-American Buddhists, all without employing the term “individualism.” Braun shows that other, more precise wording can be used.
8. The article also underlines that, although today’s Buddhists, of all types, may view some factors commonly called “individualistic” as negative (such as overly solitary or disengaged practice), they tend to view as positive other factors also commonly called “individualistic”: individuals’ self-expression, freedom, autonomy, and choice. Recognizing that the term “individualism” is hard to separate from components of mixed emotional valence can help us avoid reinforcing stereotypes through the construction of overly categorical binaries.
Conclusion:
Thank you again, Ann, for commenting on the article. You have given me the chance to clarify some of its points and show how it represents the scholarship it discusses. I invite others to read the article and judge for themselves. And if the article prompts scholars to reconsider their usage of the term “individualism” in scholarship on Buddhism, I am glad.
Best wishes, Donna Brown
Hi Donna,
Just a few clarifications:
(1) You say that I misunderstand your article and that “It does not assess whether any particular Buddhists are individualistic or evaluate Buddhist modernists as not individualistic.”
However, your article contains the following sentences:
p.85 Some scholars have thus posited that Buddhists in the West of particular identities are more individualistic than those of other identities. The claim that Euro-Americans are more self-reliant and antiinstitutional than Asian-Americans is undermined by some of the data available, leaving it an area of contestation. The claim that EuroAmericans are more asocial can be questioned given that few scholars ascribe asociality to Western or modernist forms of Buddhism and little supporting data exist.
p. 87 Overall, to be sustained, attributions of individualism or asociality based on identity require additional ethnographic data.
p. 87 Gleig herself suggests that Buddhist modernists are asocial, but, as discussed above, on weak grounds. If individualism means asociality and disengagement, there is little scholarship showing that either modernist or postmodernist Buddhists are individualistic
These sentences are clearly assessing claims (including my own) that Buddhist modernists are individualistic. Phrases such as “undermined by some of the data,” “requiring additional data” and “on weak grounds” “little supporting data” and “there is little scholarship showing that modernist …are individualistic” are clearly assessments. To say that these phrases are not assessments is so absurd that it is hard for me to respond.
(2) Similarly, you take three scholars who have also argued that Buddhist modernists are individualistic –Tanaka, Cheah and Mitchell—and you say that their claims are based on “archetypes”
“Other scholars reinforce archetypes. Kenneth Tanaka, in a 2007 article that also draws on ethnographic data, contrasts Euro-American with Asian-American Buddhists.” (p.82)
“Joseph Cheah, in the 2011 Race and Religion in American Buddhism, also relies on archetypes of individualism and collectivism’ (p.83)
“Scott Mitchell, in his 2016 Buddhism in America, also adheres to archetypes, presenting Euro-American Buddhists as individualistic and Asian-American as not”
If you simply wanted to identify the distinct ways that Tanaka, Cheah and Mitchell use the term individualistic, I would suggest just doing just that. Evaluating their claims as being based on ‘archetypes” goes beyond description of their claims and makes an assessment of those claims. For me, an assessment that a scholar’s work is based on archetypes is a negative one which undermines that work. If that case, I would say you are dismissing their claims that Buddhist modernists are individualist (because for you such claims are based on “archetypes).
(3) You say:
“The article suggests that, if scholars wish to discuss “individualism” in Buddhism, we break the concept into its components—precise values and behaviors—and use more exact terms to label them.”
But in fact, I DID DO THAT. (I apologize for the caps but it’s quite frustrating that you seem to think “unpacking” something isn’t the same as breaking a concept into its components). As I detail above, in terms of my secondary scholarship: I emphasize two ways that I use individualism in regards to previous scholarship on Buddhist modernism (individual meditation and lack of emphasis on community-making). You both (1) collapse these two into your one term asocial and (2) claim there is no evidence that such communities are asocial (thereby also making another negative assessment of the claim (mine) that Buddhist modernists are individualistic)
In terms of my own research populations, I also identify the multiple distinct ways—or “precise values and behaviors” –that my research populations name as examples of individualism. See examples 1-5 above. Indeed, as you say, you do name some of these on pages 86/87, but you end this section with “Gleig herself suggests that Buddhist modernists are asocial, but, as discussed above, on weak grounds. If individualism means asociality and disengagement, there is little scholarship showing that either modernist or postmodernist Buddhists are individualistic.” (p.87)
An accurate and responsible representation of my book would have been to have written that:
“Gleig identifies multiples expressions of individualism in her research populations. These include A, B, C, D, E. And, then you consider if the ethnographic data I presented in my book support my conclusions that you summarize yourself or that I summarize (for instance, under the collective turn, p. 279)
In short, does my ethnographic data (1-5) support my suggestion of a “collective turn”?
Instead you opt for the terms “asociality” or “disengagement” neither which are terms I use in my book. In fact, I include engaged Buddhism as a characteristic of first generation converts (chapter one) but I make a distinction between liberal activism (based in the individual) and progressive activism (based in collective) in my racial justice chapter and also a distinction between liberal feminism (individual autonomy) and postcolonial feminism (intersectional) in my penultimate chapter.
What I am asking for is that you evaluate the conclusions I draw from my ethnographic data on my actual ethnographic data. And, if you then want to put my conclusions into conversation with other ethnographic data that suggests different conclusions (Cadge for example) that would be fine. Similarly, if you wanted to say Gleig identifies these aspects of individualism but does not attend to individualism as expressive individualism (Jorup) that would also be fine. That is what it means to extend a scholarly body of knowledge. But it can’t be done unless the data is represented carefully, which you have not done here. The reason for this, I would suggest, is because, despite your claims to the contrary, you aren’t just focused on describing how I use individualism in my book but rather in negatively (that they are made on “weak grounds”) assessing my claims about modernist and postmodernist Buddhists.
Your misrepresentation of my work continues in regards to how I carefully theorize my considerable ethnographic data. You say:
“Gleig’s distinctions have a purpose…she constructs a break between Buddhist modernists and postmodernists by claiming that Buddhist modernists embody an asocial, inadequately-engaged individualism that postmodernists leave behind (277–279)”
This is a selective representation of my summary on page 277-279 which actually explores both the continuation and countering of modernist strands in contemporary developments. First, I re-summarize the trends from the scholarship in chapter one, and note “on the one hand, the case studies in this book confirm and show the continuation of these trends” (p.277). This includes social activism which I made clear was a characteristic of American meditation-lineages in chapter one. I then make claims of the ways in which they counter Buddhist modernist trends drawing on my ethnographic data covered in points 1-5 above. Hence, rather than “constructing a break”, I actually read my data from the ground up by and show the messiness of current trends in relationship to Buddhist modernism-that its characteristics are both continued and countered.
I also do not just use the category of Buddhist postmodernism to describe them but rather explore multiple categories that I say are needed to account for the complexity of new developments and finally settle on three: postmodern, postcolonial and postsecular. It is actually under the postcolonial and not the postmodern that I discuss the challenge to individualism and an emphasis on collectivity (p.292-293). You completely ignore this—which is troubling given that a critique of [white] Western individualism is key to post-colonial and decolonial thought and praxis. To my mind, it points to the most troubling aspect of your article and your response to my concerns: a complete refusal to engage with the relationship between individualism and whiteness and how white individualism has shaped Buddhism in America.
(4) On the use of the term individualistic
(a) If you want to simply argue that because there are so many distinct ways that my research populations identify and experience individualism that you don’t feel it is a useful term, I would respond that I am very comfortable with using individualism as an umbrella term that refers to multiple behaviors, especially when, as in my case, those distinct ways are also clearly named.
(4b) You seem to think that scholars shouldn’t use the term individualism because it is “polemic” and “value-laden.” If Braun doesn’t use the term individualism that is because it was not relevant to his ethnographic data, which was based in Mynamar. As I have amply documented, however, in my research context, individualism understood in the multiple expressions that it was delineated is absolutely central to the shifts happening on the ground across my different research populations. In particular, given that for many Buddhists of Color, individualism is identified as being at that core of whiteness in sanghas, I could not disagree with you more that we should stop using the term or/and that it is not meaningful. Even on a descriptive level, we cannot ignore individualism when it is a category of such great significance for American Buddhists. And, I personally would go further than the descriptive by saying it’s is ethically imperative for scholars to acknowledge that individualism is experienced as a source of harm to marginalized Buddhists of Color. So, for me not using the term individualism when it was repeatedly named by my ethnographic populations would have been both an intellectual and ethical failure.
(5) Finally, I’m not sure if you are aware of this or not but the sentence by which you open your response – “that you are not engaging in a scholarly debate” is inappropriate and does not model a respectful, hospitable public exchange between two scholars.
Best,
Ann
Dear Ann:
Again, I appreciate your comments. In some areas, I have already provided detailed responses, so although I do respond again below, I try to avoid repetition. I will respond by category:
1. “Individualism” terms. This is the issue that the article addresses: how using “individualism” terms to describe forms of Buddhism can be problematic. In your latest comments, you have stated your view: you are comfortable with the terms for the reasons you provide. I appreciate you explaining your position and value your explanation of your reasons. On this topic I feel your comments are a useful addition to my article.
2. Your claims about modernist and postmodernist Buddhists. You express a belief that my article negatively assesses your claims in American Dharma about modernist and postmodernist Buddhists. I think if you read the article carefully, you will see that it does not negatively assess the substance of your claims—any more than it negatively assesses the work of the 40 or so other scholars it discusses. What the article questions regarding American Dharma is its expression of these claims using the term “individualism” rather than more specific terms. It is the term the article assesses, not the substance of the claims. The usage of “individualism,” as I put it in the article, “engenders paradox.” This is because of its many meanings: even when it is defined in limited ways, the ways it is commonly understood impact how it is read. The examples of this problem that I give in the article with regard to using “individualism” to refer to modernity/ modernism versus postmodernity/ postmodernism are: if “individualism” is taken to refer to asociality or disengagement (as it is by some scholars cited in the article—I am not referring specifically to American Dharma here), by that definition, it seems that neither modern nor postmodern Buddhists are individualistic; on the other hand, if it is taken to mean rational or expressive individualism (as some scholars cited use it and as many readers would understand it), both groups are individualistic because, as the ethnographic data of yourself and others show, both groups exhibit some aspects of these forms of individualism. The “if” in my phrase is there for a reason: it indicates that I am not myself making claims, but rather referring to what various scholars have posited—IF one posits A, the result is B; IF one posits C, the result is D. Hence, on your identification of differences between the modernist and postmodern/ postsecular/ postcolonial Buddhists in American Dharma, the article points to how expressing these differences with the word “individualism” can lead to paradox and a potentially untenable binary. That it is the term which the article states leads to problems, and not the substance of your claims, is also made clear in the article’s final remark on your book: “This does not mean Gleig is mistaken in positing a postmodern turn among some American Buddhists. It demonstrates, rather, that the word “individualism” works poorly for her purpose, a reason to select more precise terms” (88). That sentence reiterates that the article does not question the postmodern or collective turns you identify, nor the differences you find between modernist and postmodernist Buddhists. It is talking about labels only.
There is a need here, in reading the article, to distinguish between discussing whether some Buddhists are individualistic, and discussing the effects of using “individualism” terms. The article is about the latter only, but your comments, in my reading, mix these two issues.
3. What the article says. This is an area we have already discussed in detail both by email and online, but on which I feel I am not being heard. You continue to assert, contrary to fact, that the article claims Buddhist modernists (or Euro-American Buddhists) are not individualistic. You also imply that I am disputing what you call a “collective turn,” which I am not; that I dismiss the work of Cheah, Tanaka, and Mitchell, which I do not; and that I negatively assess your claims about modernist and postmodernist Buddhists, which I do not.
In your comments you say that I am obviously assessing claims about the individualism of modernist Buddhists (including your claims)—i.e. I am not just discussing terms but am claiming modernist Buddhists are not individualistic—by using phrases such as “undermined by some of the data,” “requiring additional data” and “on weak grounds” “little supporting data” and “there is little scholarship showing that modernist …are individualistic.” And you add, “To say that these phrases are not assessments is so absurd that it is hard for me to respond.” I find your comment based on misreadings. Let me explain.
The phrases “undermined by some of the data available, leaving it an area of contestation,” “requiring additional data” (a misquote, but I assume you are referring to the final words of the same paragraph) and “little supporting data” all appear in the same paragraph. Importantly, this paragraph does not claim, as you say, that modernist (Euro-American) Buddhists are not individualistic. Rather, it observes that data do not support the claim that they are more so-called “individualistic” than Asian-American Buddhists. Here is the full paragraph:
You appear to have misunderstood this paragraph and taken phrases from it out of context—please note the top sentence, the topic line, which specifies that the issue the paragraph addresses is whether scholarly work shows that “Buddhists in the West of particular identities are more individualistic than those of other identities.” The paragraph concerns whether differences in individualism “based on identity” have been substantiated, not whether Buddhist modernists are individualistic or not.
The other two phrases you cite are “on weak grounds” and “there is little scholarship showing that modernist …are individualistic.” These come from a different paragraph. Again, you take the words out of context, and you also alter the meaning of the second phrase by cutting out vital words. The section reads:
This section has quite a different meaning, when fully quoted, than the meaning your comments give it. It does not say that Buddhist modernists are not individualistic; it says that so-called Buddhist modernists and Buddhist postmodernists share many features commonly called “individualistic,” meaning that if modernists are deemed individualistic, postmodernists should be as well. You seem, again, to have misunderstood a section’s meaning, and your charge that the article is “clearly assessing claims … that Buddhist modernists are individualistic” is false.
I think it is important to point out that you continue to make inaccurate claims about the article, and do so by reading into it ideas that are not there, overlooking ideas that are there, taking words out of context, and/or setting aside the article’s title, thesis, arguments, and conclusion. My question is: Why do that? Why seek to “prove” that the article makes claims that it does not? Given that your work describes Buddhist modernists as individualistic, why insist that the article disagrees with you on this point when it does not? Perhaps you wish to make me your opponent in a debate about whether Buddhist modernists are individualistic? I am not your opponent on this question, partly because we are not on different sides of it, but mostly because I do not consider it to be well-framed given my view that “individualism” terms are best replaced, where possible, with more specific terms: for example, if modernist Buddhists value solitary meditation and postmodern Buddhists value group meditation, I prefer to say just that, rather than claim one group is “individualistic” and the other is not.
My overall response to inaccurate claims about the article is that I do not wish to keep addressing them because I do not see you attending to what either the article or my comments say. Hence, I refer you, and anyone else interested, to the article itself. I particularly suggest reading the entire article or at least whole sections, and not relying on isolated phrases taken out of context or altering phrases by removing important words.
4. How American Dharma is described in the article. On this issue as well, I have already responded in detail to you by email and in my previous comments, showing the bases of all of my comments on your book, explaining why I believe they are well-founded, and showing where they quote and cite the book. I have accounted for and substantiated each word the article contains about the book, both in the article and in my online comments. I do hear that you would have preferred a somewhat different shape given to the presentation of your book, but that does not mean the article misrepresents it. Having addressed this issue in detail already without, apparently, being heard, I will not go over the same ground again. On a related issue, I feel, based on your latest comments, that you are asking me to give your book more space in the article than it received, but the article is a survey of more than 40 scholars within a limited word count. I felt your book was important and gave it significant space, comparable to what I gave Weber, Lopez, and McMahan.
5. Setting the article’s discussion of American Dharma in context. The article discusses the way approximately 40 scholars use “individualism” terms in their scholarship on Buddhism. You claim that I dismiss the work of Tanaka, Cheah, and Mitchell, and do not properly represent yours. Yet if you read the entire article, you will see that I examine the usage of “individualism” terms in all the works discussed in the same way, asking the same questions and undertaking the same kind of analysis. Usages of “individualism” terms by many distinguished scholars are analyzed, such as Eugène Burnouf, Max Müller, T. W. Rhys Davids, Hermann Oldenberg, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, I. B. Horner, Max Weber, Melford Spiro, Winston King, Louis Dumont, D. T. Suzuki, Trevor Ling, Donald Swearer, Richard Gombrich, Robert Thurman, Damien Keown, Heinz Bechert, Robert Sharf, Donald Lopez, David McMahan, Martin Baumann, Wendy Cadge, José Cabezón, Rita Gross, and Anne Klein. Works by these scholars and those by yourself, Tanaka, Cheah, and Mitchell are treated similarly; no one is dismissed and I don’t think anyone is misrepresented—I quote and cite quite carefully. None of those scholars, of the many still active, have expressed concern about how the article represents them.
As well, perhaps it seems too obvious to say, but my discussion of all these scholars’ usages of “individualism” terms is not a negative assessment (or any kind of assessment) of the broader meaning or contributions of their work—and that includes your work. Many of those discussed are luminaries in our field; the article does not assess or demean their contributions. It is because their work is important, and, in each generation, potentially representative of that generation’s ways of thinking, that I examine it to understand how an “individualism” lens has, over the decades, shaped portrayals of Buddhism.
6. Binaries. Again, if the article is viewed as a whole, it is apparent that one of its findings is that “individualism” has been used over and over in Buddhist Studies to create binaries. These binaries can pose problems. First, they are often less than fully accurate, in part because they are overly categorical—even when “individualistic,” depending on definition and referents, may capture some aspects of the Buddhists described, the label can be too broad and all-encompassing. Second, the binaries impose an interpretive grid on people who may not agree with it, or may feel they are being stereotyped; the article cites Paramasivam and Nair-Venugopal on this point (p.79). Third, the binaries also tend to be evaluative (although not in every case), yet outsiders and insiders both may differ on whether “good” and “bad” evaluations are correct/ appropriate. Reasons for binaries being problematic can thus vary, as can the magnitude of the problem; the article notes that some binaries are more problematic than others. Here are some of the binaries created using “individualism” that the article mentions:
Even this partial list reveals problems; it is evident, for example, that different understandings of individualism must be in use by different scholars, leading, at minimum, to lack of comparability.
I offer this list to show how American Dharma follows a pattern established in previous Buddhist Studies scholarship when it uses individualism to create a binary. The article discusses issues this binary engenders in American Dharma in the same way that it discusses issues that binaries based on individualism engender in the work of earlier scholars. It is worth noting, for example, the parallels between the section called “Phase 4: Distinguishing Modern from Premodern” in which works by Gombrich, Sharf, Lopez, McMahan and others are discussed, and “Phase 6: Distinguishing Postmodern from Modern” in which American Dharma is discussed. The treatment of American Dharma is in line with that of the other works discussed throughout the article; looking at the article as a whole shows this. Looking at the article in its entirety also shows reasons for critiquing binary-creating usages of the term “individualism.”
7. Individualism and whiteness. You write about the article:
This comment includes a false, misleading, and unwarranted accusation. As well, I find the comment unsuited to our discussion of the article, because it does not relate to what the article is about. The article is about how scholars of Buddhism have used “individualism” terms. It covers scholarship from 1844 to 2019. It is not about Buddhists being or not being individualistic. The problematic accusation is that I exhibit “a complete refusal to engage with the relationship between individualism and whiteness and how white individualism has shaped Buddhism in America.” Here is why I say this charge is false, misleading, and unwarranted:
a) I have, contrary to this claim, already responded to this issue at length: I wrote the following in an email to you in November 2021 in response to your comment that the article should have addressed the conjunction of whiteness, individualism, and Buddhism:
b) As I have noted, the topic of individualism/whiteness only came to my attention after I wrote the article; it is a very recent topic in Buddhist Studies—more recent than the latest work, published in 2019, that I discuss in the article. Hence, I do not show a “refusal to engage” with the topic. The article was published before it came to my attention, as I have already told you, and I engaged with it in post-article comments.
c) Finally, as I have said repeatedly and as the article itself makes clear, the article is about the usage of “individualism” terms by Buddhist Studies scholars. It is not about the forces that have shaped American Buddhism—and you need only read the abstract to know that. To suggest that these forces should also be covered in the article or in my comments is to overlook what the article is about. Why criticize not writing a different article than the one I wrote?
In my reading, you have made a polemical accusation that you must know to be false—is that appropriate?
8. Corrections of factual matters in your comments:
a) Erik Braun. I discuss Braun on p.81 of the article. You write: “If Braun doesn’t use the term individualism that is because it was not relevant to his ethnographic data, which was based in Myanmar.” I assume your point is that he cannot be an example of avoiding the term “individualism” because he is not describing Western Buddhists. However, although his discussion of lay practice concerns Myanmar, Braun is discussing American Buddhists on the other topics I mention: contrasting Asian-American and Euro-American Buddhists without labeling one group “individualistic” and portraying Westerners meditating for “self-cultivation and personal flourishing” and “mystical experience” without terming people or practices “individualistic.” I cite Braun because he describes ways Westerners practice Buddhism that some scholars call “individualistic” without using the term. That example stands.
b) Where you misquote me. You misquote my earlier response to you and then say those words (which you wrote, not me) are inappropriate. That concerns me. I began my earlier response with the following: “Thank you for your comments. As far as I can see, they mainly relate to things you believe the article says but it does not. Hence, in responding, I do not find myself engaged in scholarly debates; I find myself simply pointing out that the article does not say what you claim it does.” This is an accurate description. In your response to that, you write “the sentence by which you open your response – ‘that you are not engaging in a scholarly debate’ is inappropriate ….” Here, you have put in quotes, as if I wrote it, the phrase “that you are not engaging in a scholarly debate”… but that is not what I wrote; you misquote me. What I actually wrote was not inappropriate. I’m sure you meant no harm, but I don’t feel OK about you misquoting me to make it look like I said something I didn’t—and then saying those words (that I didn’t say) are inappropriate.
9. What we are “doing” with “individualism.” I believe that one reason you and I have different perspectives is that we are “doing” different things. Your work is concerned with some Buddhists being individualistic, and how this perceived inner quality of individualism manifests in harmful conduct; mine is concerned with Buddhist Studies scholars’ varying and sometimes problematic usages of “individualism” terms.
Underlying this difference may be different treatments of “individualism.” I treat it as a label and an imputation on various factors. Given this, I propose that scholars reduce their use of it because the factors on which it is imputed can be identified more clearly, less confusingly, and less polemically without it. These factors may include solitary meditation, personal autonomy, self-expression, individual choice, and so on. By contrast, it seems to me that you treat individualism as a phenomenon in itself present within some people and not others. Given this, it looks like you treat factors like solitary meditation, personal autonomy, self-expression, individual choice, and so on as manifestations (that can be unpacked) of an underlying phenomenon called “individualism” present within some people. Your criticisms of the article thus may derive in part from a feeling that I am saying this underlying phenomenon called “individualism” is absent in Buddhist modernists, when you can cite outer manifestations (like a fondness for solitary meditation) as evidence of this phenomenon’s presence. Yet I am not denying the presence of these outer manifestations or even that by some definitions these can be called “individualistic.” What I claim is that “individualism” is a problematic label / imputation to place on these kinds of factors, which can be more precisely called by their own names. And beneath my claim is my treatment of individualism as a label and imputation only, not as an inner phenomenon in some people out of which other factors (like preferences for solitary practice) grow. This is not a matter on which either of us can be definitively proven correct or incorrect; these are different perspectives on the ontological status of individualism…
10. Conclusion
a) As I said in my previous comments, I believe one reason for misunderstandings is that “individualism” terms are vague and multivalent—that is what may be steering you toward mingling two issues that the article separates: (1) Whether or not certain Buddhists are individualistic, a subject the article does not address but your comments tell me that you think it does or should; (2) Whether “individualism” terms, in Buddhist Studies contexts, are better replaced with more precise terms for the factors on which “individualism” is imputed. This is the subject of the article.
b) I am happy to continue this discussion if we can turn to issues incremental to the above topics, such as:
Best wishes, Donna
This was a lively discussion and I wonder how research regarding individualism might differ between fields. For example, Antonio Lebrón is a researcher from San Juan Puerto Rico whose interest lie in global business and cultural studies. His article cites scholars who have this to say about research into individualism amongst various communities in the United States:
Lebrón, A. (2013). What is Culture? Merit Research Journal of Education & Review, 1(6), 126-132.
Very interesting! What makes it notable in the contemporary context is that individualism, especially when defined as the opposite of collectivism, is often associated with whiteness; some scholars and teachers of Buddhism contend that Euro-Americans are more individualistic and less collectivist than POC. The article you cite seems to undermine that claim. I would suggest that the existence of the article–and I am glad you pointed it out–points to the need for more ethnographic work before drawing conclusions, work that looks at factors often labeled “individualistic” or “not individualistic,” like sociality, collectivist views and practices, social engagement, and valuing of freedom of choice, authenticity, personal expression, and so on, to explore in greater detail if and how beliefs, values, and practices vis-à-vis individualism vary by race or ethnic group within the US and Canada. Thanks for posting, Donna