Ex Parte Vallandigham

As part of Daniel Farber’s book, Lincoln’s Constitution, he uses the Ex Parte Vallandigham Case of 1863 to demonstrate how Civil War military authority played a role in inhibiting free speech.  This case is important to our understanding of Lincoln’s questionable Civil War era policies and the impact they had on the public.

In this case, former Ohio Congressman and Peace-Democrat, Clement Vallandigham delivered a speech in which “he had called the war …a war to fight abolitionism rather than to save the Union.” (Farber 171) However, the grounds for Vallandigham’s arrest was his reference to President Lincoln as “King Lincoln” and his call for support to “hurl ‘King Lincoln’ from his throne.” (Farber 171) Previous to this case, an order had been implement entitled General Order No. 38 by General Ambrose Burnside which stated that the “habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed” and that treason “expressed or implied” (Farber 170) was prohibited. Vallandigham was imprisoned but ultimately, Lincoln overturned Vallandigham’s arrest and instead confined him to Confederate territory. Following this, the case was brought before the Supreme Court via a writ of certiorari.

The judge that presided over this Supreme Court case was Chief Justice Salmon Chase. Under his ruling, Chief Justice Wayne delivered the statement that it held no power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a military commission (Court Decision)

This case provides insight into the way Lincoln and other citizens viewed the First Amendment. However, Farber concludes that although these impedements on free speech may seem unnecessary, “Lincolns intuition that free speech should be suppressed only under imperative circumstances was correct.” (Farber 174) Farber uses World War I-era cases to prove the presence and confrontation of free-speech limitations through a more modern lens, the most prominent example being Debs v. United States. In this example, presidential candidate Eugene Debs openly criticized the U.S. government and the draft as a whole. Ultimately, the court sentenced him to ten years in prison. With this example in mind, Farber is reminding us that considering the extreme political situation at hand, Farber believes that Lincoln’s actions, although perhaps excessive, were justified.

This case is highlighted by several historians as one of the more notable cases of the Civil War era during the military trials that took place amidst the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. One book, Lincoln and the Court, by Brian McGinty highlights many of miltiary trials that took place during the Lincoln administration that brought the First Amendment into question. However, McGinty also addresses some fundamental problems that the judicial system was having at the time concerning reorganization. This structural disarray placed more stress on the same Supreme Court judges who were dealing with the effects of a sectional war. A review in the Yale Journal of Law of McGinty’s book, entitled “Lincoln and the Court” as well, by R. Owen Williams cites that McGinty “successfully demonstrates that the Civil War was essentially a legal struggle with the Supreme Court at its core.”

Another resource that helps to shed light on this Supreme Court case and where the question of constitutionality and Lincoln’s perspective on it comes into play is in a public letter written to Ohio Democrats, namely Matthew Birchard, justifying his wartime decisions called “The Birchard Letter“. This letter is relevant in that Lincoln offered to release Vallandigham back to his home state should a majority of the letter’s recipients vow that “an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion” and that none will “tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy.” Lincoln also used this letter as a means to justify his wartime decision and claimed that “by the constitution the benefit of the writ of Habeas corpus itself may be suspended when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” However, Lincoln also acknowledged his dissenters and went on to say that although the Constitution does not specifically grant one single person the power to make decisions during wartime, it is implied that “the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the constitution, made the commander-in-chief, of their Army and Navy, is the man who holds the power, and bears the responsibility.” This 2,000 word letter provides a clear and detailed argument for Lincoln’s stance on the constitutionality of his decisions, and is a valuable resource in understanding the effects of the Vallandigham case.

These sources give readers of this case insight into the meaning behind the Vallandigham case and what roles the First Amendment, civil war tensions, judicial stress, and Lincoln’s interpretation of constitutionality play in this important Supreme Court decision.

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Dred Scott Case

Original from Frank Leslie's Magazine; Digital Copy Courtesy of House Divided Project

In Lincoln’s Constitution (Chicago, 2003), Daniel Farber identifies the Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) as the turning point in Lincoln’s constitutional attitudes.  “Before Dred Scott,” Farber writes, “Lincoln does not seem to have questioned the role of the courts in maintaining the constitutional order” (177).

Farber focuses on Lincoln’s decisions as a wartime president, but the most important new developments in the scholarly understanding of the Dred Scott Case have been revelations about the people actually involved in the case.  Most scholars knew, for example, that both Dred Scott and his wife Harriet Robinson Scott filed freedom suits on April 6, 1846, but it has only been in recent years, and especially because of the work of University of Iowa law professor Lea VanderVelde, that historians have developed a deeper understanding of the Scott family and the forces that helped propel them into the most notorious Supreme Court case in American history.

VanderVelde’s fascinating biography, Mrs. Dred Scott:  A Life on Slavery’s Frontier (Oxford, 2009) came out only last year, although an article upon which the book was based (also titled, “Mrs. Dred Scott’) did appear in the Yale Law Journal in January 1997 (now available through Lexis-Nexis).  There is no comparable biography of Dred Scott, but Walter Ehrlich’s book, They Have No Rights: Dred Scott’s Struggle for Freedom (Greenwood, 1979) is widely cited as the best study of the case’s origins in Missouri and the most detailed account of the plaintiff’s personal story (available in Dickinson Library).  Yet the principal source on the federal case remains Don E. Fehrenbacher’s The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (Oxford, 1978), a landmark study which won the Pulitzer Prize, but is not currently available at the Dickinson Library (nor available in any significant way at Google Books).

Dred and Harriet Scott field for freedom in 1846 in St. Louis Circuit Court claiming that they had been held as slaves in the free territory around Fort Snelling (present-day Minnesota) by their master, an Army surgeon named John Emerson, during the late 1830s and early 1840s.  In 1846, they sued Irene Emerson, the surgeon’s widow, invoking what was known as the “once free, always free doctrine” that previous slaves had used in similar cases to win freedom.  In fact, they won their case on this basis before losing on appeal in the Missouri Supreme Court (Scott v. Emerson) in 1852.  By then, lawyers had also agreed to combine the two suits under Dred Scott’s name, since under another doctrine of the day known as coverture, wives found their legal rights subsumed under their husbands.  In other words, if Harriet Scott had won her freedom from slavery, she would still find her independence compromised as a wife.  Lawyers for Dred Scott continued the case after the 1852 state defeat (a surprising verdict that reversed years of precedents in their favor) by pursuing a new case in federal court in 1854, now suing under the diversity of citizenship clause since Irene Emerson’s brother, John F.A. Sanford, a New York resident, had been acting as their master (by supervising their hiring out).  After three years, a divided Supreme Court (7-2) finally ruled against Dred Scott, not only denying him freedom, but also in the process ruling that blacks could not hold federal citizenship, that states did not have to honor each others’ rules regarding slavery, and finally, that Missouri Compromise of 1820 had been unconstitutional because Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories.  This complicated story (combined with a clerk’s error) explains how the story of a couple fighting for freedom in Missouri came to be known in federal courts at Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857).

Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney (Dickinson College, Class of 1795) dominated the Supreme Court which ruled against Scott.  Most scholars still seem to regard Carl B. Swisher’s 1935 multi-volume biography of the controversial Chief as the standard account of his life, though there has also been a recent and generally well-received book-length comparison of Taney and Lincoln by James F. Simon.  There is also a new revisionist article in the Journal of American History by Timothy S. Huebner (Rhodes College) that carefully explains Taney’s complicated anti-slavery background.

Other members of the Taney court who joined the Chief Justice in the 7-2 majority ruling include John A. Campbell, John Catron, Peter V. Daniel, Robert Cooper Grier (Dickinson College, Class of 1814), Samuel Nelson, and James M. Wayne.  None of them, however, have been the subject of recent biographical work.  Nor have the two dissenters, Benjamin R. Curtis and John McLean attracted much modern attention.

There is, however, a major new study of Hamilton Gamble, who was the lone Missouri Supreme Court justice who dissented from the 1852 decision in Emerson v. Scott. See Dennis K. Boman, Lincoln’s Resolute Unionist (2006).

There are also several helpful web-based resources about Dred Scott.  One of the most comprehensive reference guides comes from Washington University in St. Louis which has posted a Revised Dred Scott Case Collection that includes a detailed chronology and more than 400 pages of original documents.  The House Divided Project at Dickinson College has also created a slideshow with the Gilder Lehrman Institute that features page images of the original Scott freedom suits.

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Overturning Proposition 8: A Step Towards Equality

Columnist and Reverend Byron Williams shares his elation at the overturning of Proposition 8 in California by Judge Vaughn Walker, in his August 8, 2010 column in the Oakland Tribune. Proposition 8 had placed a ban on gay marriage in the state of California, and the judge’s decision invoked the 14th Amendment’s assertion of due process and equal protection. Judge Walker’s ruling stated that the “domestic partnerships” designated by Proposition 8 were unconstitutional in that they failed to “fulfill California’s due process obligation to plaintiffs.” In his column, Williams relates his delight at the renunciation of the Proposition, but warns that this issue will not be settled until the Supreme Court provides a final ruling on the issue of gay marriage. He cites this ruling as a step forward in a loose interpretation of the Constitution that allows flexibility in the definition of “we” in “we the People.” The judge’s ruling essentially extends due process and equal rights promises made in the 14th Amendment to gays and lesbians.

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The Right of Birthright?

In “A Birthright That Shouldn’t Be,” Charlotte Allen,  a contributer to the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal, argues for the institution of stricter immigrant laws as a solution to the growing number of children born from illegal immigrants. Allen notes the expensive costs states endure to feed and care for the children and the difficulty Congress would face in trying to change the 14th ammendment, which gives all children born in the United States citizenship. Ultimately, she says, the only way to solve the dilemna of birthright is to stay true to our immigration laws.

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The Debate over Birthright Citizenship

Until recently, citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment was considered to encompass all people born in America, even the children of illegal immigrants.  In his op-ed “Birthright of a Nation” from the New York Times, Peter H. Schuck states that these “anchor babies,” as the children are sometimes called, have become the center of an overwhelming controversy.  Because the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was originally developed in regards to the issue of slavery and in response to the controversial Dred Scott decision, it did not consider illegal immigrants, mainly because, according to Schuck, the mid-nineteenth century witnessed no limits on immigration.  Schuck believes that children of illegal immigrants should be eased into citizenship, perhaps applying by the age of 10.  This ability to compromise, by declaring that the “anchor babies” should not automatically become citizens, offers a creative solution to a question that has Congress preparing for hearings in the fall of this year.

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Anchor babies in America

Professor Peter Schuck of Yale Law school creates an argument for birthright citizenship in his op-ed to the NY Times on 13 August 2010, that uses a legal foundation,  and offers a pragmatic solution to the question of ‘anchor babies’. He begins by quoting the 14th amendment, acknowledging that the amendment is usually interpreted to give citizenship to anyone born on US soil. He then delves into the history of the amendment, from Dred Scott and Native Americans, to 1898, where the Supreme Court made a decision affecting the son of a Chinese couple. His solution to the ‘anchor babies’ crisis is pragmatic.  To solve the problem, Schuck presents a solution that he claims has worked for the United Kingdom.  He suggest that the US make “anchor babies” stay in the nation for ten years before being allowed to apply for citizenship. At that point, they could be made citizens “retroactively, regardless of their parents’ status.”

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Samad on Gay Marriage as a Constitutional Question

Anthony Asadullah Samad notes the significance of the Constitution in today’s gay rights debate in his op-ed piece titled “Overturning Proposition: Gay marriage ban was always a constitutional question” – featured in the Chicago Defender in August 2010. Sparked by a federal judge’s overturn of California’s ban on gay marriage (Proposition 8),  Samad calls on the “Tyranny of the majority” as a fear of the Framers of the Constitution and a reality for supporters and activists for gay rights and marriage. In short,  one “can’t legislate social change” but can only “litigate it.” Samad cites arguments where litigation might favor the question of gay rights, especially since acts like Proposition 8 violate the “equal protection” clause of the 14th amendment. That said, only when gay marriage is made illegal can these arguments become hollow and ineffective and can marriage be determined not to be a fundamental right, as argued by Samad (and in the 1967 case Loving v Virginia, a case that dealt with inter-racial marriage, which Samad also cites).

Samad is a regular commentator as a national columnist and managing director of the Urban Issues Forum. This piece was found in the ProQuest newspaper database.

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Rotundo on Birthright Citizenship

Law professor Ronald Rotunda offers an especially clear argument in favor of birthright citizenship in his Chicago Tribune op-ed from September 16, 2010 (“Birthright Citizenship Benefits the Country”).  In this short piece, Rotunda argues that allowing practically anyone born in the U.S. to achieve instant citizenship (“birthright citizenship”) is “one of our strengths, not a weakness.”  He rejects recent calls for revising the current understanding of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment either by statute or amendment, using examples from history and personal experience and by claiming that the logic of birthright citizenship provides an “incentive” for good behavior.  Not everyone will agree with Rotunda, but he spells out the pro-birthright position with clarity.

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Ratification: Hamilton vs. Mason

In 1787 Federalists and Anti-Federalists adamantly debated constitutional ratification. The two Word Clouds appearing here illustrate points critical to each party in the ratification debates.
Image 1 depicts terms important to understanding Federalists’ reasons for supporting the ratification of the constitution. These words are those that appear most frequently in Hamilton’s Federalist No.1, the terms, which standout include: government, Constitution, men, liberty, union, new, truth and state. Together these words are symbolic of what the Federalists were fighting for. Federalists supported ratification of the constitution because they recognized the need for a new government that could be formed by the union of the states under one government. Federalists such as Hamilton argued, not only would the union crumble without the adoption of the constitution but also its ratification would ensure liberty and prosperity for men. “THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESEVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE PRINCIPALS OF REPUBLIAN GOVERNMENTS IT ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN TTE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY”. (Hamilton, Federalist N0. 1)

Image 2 illustrates the salient points made by the Anti-Federalists as to why the states should not choose to ratify the Constitution. The terms are taken from George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution and together capture Anti-federalists’, such as Mason, problems with the Constitution. Words that stand out include: states, senate, legislature, executive, government, laws, power, rights and people. Anti-Federalists felt the constitution allotted too much power to the executive (president) and the Senate and did not declare the rights of the people. For these reasons anti-federalists feared the president’s and Senate’s unequivocal power over legislation and perceived centralized power as an attempt at monarchy and a threat to the rights and liberties of individuals and states. Mason writes, “ The Senate have the power of…in conjunction with the President of the United States, although they are not representative or the people, or amenable to them. These, with their other great powers, their influence upon, and connection with, the supreme executive from these causes; their duration of office; and their being a constant and existing body, almost continually sitting, joined with there being one complete branch of legislature,– will destroy any balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what usurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the people.”(Mason, Objections to the Constitution) Image 2 also prominently portrays the term United. While Anti-Federalists opposed the ratification of the Constitution, in the end many agreed to pass the ratification provided a Bill of Rights be amended.

An examination of both Word Clouds indicates critical issues in the constitutional ratification debate.  The word clouds illustrate the points that divided the parties and the aspects of the future government each party saw fit to defend.

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Early Debate in Pennsylvania: James Wilson and “An Old Whig”

The "An Old Whig" Articles Nos. 1-8

Just as the ratification process began in Pennsylvania in October 1787, James Wilson gave a speech before a “raucous” crowd that helped offer his responses to various criticisms already made against the Constitution (Richard Beeman, Plain, Honest Men (2010), 379). These critiques were made by individuals like George Bryan and John Smilie, who published a series of eight articles signed by “An Old Whig” from October through to February 1788. The “Old Whig” articles offered the wide range of issues taken with the Constitution as it stood, namely the lack of a “bill of rights” and the fear for expanded powers in the national legislature. A comparison between the top seventy words used in Wilson’s speech and the second of the eight articles, a direct response to Wilson, explains the essential differences between Federalists and Antifederalists in terms of their rhetoric and arguments.

Speech by James Wilson to State House - October 6, 1787

Wilson’s speech on October 6th for a public audience in the Pennsylvania State Legislature was a “passionate but tightly reasoned defense” of the Constitution in its unaltered state (Beeman, 379). Wilson used the word “must” in favor of “may” and “federal” over “confederation,” which arguably indicated his desire to present the Constitution as a document imperative to the survival of the United States. While “state” and “states” appear often, the context of these words in the full text of the speech showed his prevailing arguments against state sovereignty (or a “confederation”). Wilson’s speech fits into the mission of Federalists to reassure the public that the Constitution provided “the best form of government…ever offered to the world.” Of course, not all people subscribed to this understanding of the Constitution, notably George Bryan and John Smilie.

"An Old Whig" Article No. 2

Each composing parts of the “An Old Whig” articles, Smilie and Bryan set out to push the Antifederalist concerns and ideals into a public forum. In the second article published on October 17th in the Independent Gazetteer the “Old Whig” responded to Wilson’s speech. He spoke most fervently about the powers invested in the proposed government. Words and phrases including “power,” “reserved,” “necessary,” and “bill of rights” appear often in the publication. Surprisingly, though they appear in the word cloud of all the articles, the words “state” or “sovereignty” are not central to this particular publication. The focus on Congress and fears that the Constitution provides “unlimited powers…never to be entrusted to any men or body of men.” The Antifederalists did not always directly push for state sovereignty, but they rather attempted to sour the perception of the Constitution. In addition, because the article responds directly to Wilson’s speech, these corresponding word clouds allow for a clear visual of how Federalists and Antifederalists pinned themselves against one another.

The word clouds comparing Wilson to the “Old Whig” do not merely improve the accessibility to the organization of the documents. Beeman notes that both Federalists and Antifederalists fought for a public forum in which to articulate and persuade in clear terms (380). These word clouds help pinpoint the rhetoric employed by an earnest Wilson and fearful Bryan and Smilie. Accordingly, the comparison offers a window through which one can analyze the much larger debate that occurred in other states. Though unfolding in environments far from identical, the general debate over the ratification of the Constitution can be sifted through by identifying key phrases and explaining how both groups persuaded the public.

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