Category Archives: History253

This course covers the history of Russia and the lands that were part of its domains and empire from the tenth to nineteenth centuries.

Pagans and Patriarchs: Russian Orthodoxy and the Mongols in the Thirteenth Century

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The Mongol tide that swept much of the civilized world in the thirteenth century played an integral role in shaping the history of Asia and Central Europe, and few nations maintain as strong a legacy to this day as Russia. During its history under the rule of the Rus princes, the Orthodox Church was a mainstay institution of society, but it truly flourished under the Mongols. Protection from tax collectors, land redistribution, and the ability to pass judgement on any crimes in their holdings gave the Church a next-to unheard of degree of political influence and flexibility. Indeed, juxtaposed against the barbaric slaughter the Mongols perpetrated in the Novgorod Chronicle, their degree of autonomy seems almost impossible in the light of their earlier behavior.

The Chronicle presents the introduction of the Mongols into Rus as a nigh-apocalyptic event issued forth from Hell to extract payment from the Rus for their sins. While the reality was much more mundane, it was nevertheless a major check on princely power throughout the lands of Rus. Unwilling to band together against a common threat, Rus princes presented little more than a token resistance. In the face of the unchecked invasion many princes took to hiding underneath the spiritual bulwark of their local churches, leaving their villages and holdings to suffer the consequences of their short-lived defiance. The churches themselves did little to protect their erstwhile lords, standing against the fire and sword of the invaders as well as a series of wooden walls can be expected to.

It seems odd, then, given their early disregard for the sanctity of the local churches, that the Mongols saw fit to afford the Church institution as a whole so much power. The aptly named Immunity Charter granted the Church protection from land forfeiture, the indenture and enslavement of church affiliated laymen, and tax and tribute gathering. In light of their paganism and evidently savage behavior, why did they see fit to not only spare, but also empower the Church? Was it some dogmatic shift between the initial invasion and the middle ground of the occupation? Or perhaps merely a pragmatic attempt to ingratiate their tribute collectors to a powerful local organization, making resistance to their rule less intense?

The Russian Orthodox Church and The Mongols in the Thirteenth Century

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The Mongol invasion of Rus’ started in the mid thirteenth century and lasted until around 1480. It followed closely behind the fighting between the Rus’ princes over land and power. During this period the two most powerful groups in Rus’ were the Princes and the church. The church quickly blamed the princes for the invasion of the Mongols stating that it was Gods punishment for their foolish skirmishing. According to The Novgorod Chronicle (Kaiser and Marker 99) the church was innocent from all wrongdoing and the Mongol invasion was directed primarily toward the princes as God’s reprimand for their behavior. Throughout the invasion the church became a sanctuary for the people of Rus’. Princes and their closest companions fled to the church, “the pagans breaking down the doors, piled up wood and set fire to the sacred church; and slew all, thus they perished, giving up their souls to God.” (101). The common people of Rus’ also began to take shelter in churches in the face of Mongol invasions and thus the churches gained even more power.

The Mongol Immunity Charter to Metropolitan Peter (101) created a power balance between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Mongols. It basically gave protection to the church from the Mongols letting them trade and function in the Mongol controlled land. It seems that the real purpose was to control the power of the church and keep control of the Rus’ people as much as possible. The Russian Orthodox Church accepted the protection of the Mongols because it helped their power grow. It is a primary factor of their importance and power today.

 

Why did the people of Rus’ embrace Christianity in the wake of the Mongol invasion? What made the people of Rus’ turn toward Christianity and away from their old Pagan religion? How did the Mongols own beliefs affect this decision?

 

How could history have been different if the Mongols did not grant the immunity charter to the church? Would Russian Orthodoxy be as prevalent? Would the Mongols have stayed in power in Rus’ for more or less time?

 

Works cited:

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

The Decentralization and Gradual Decline of Kievan Rus’

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The once powerful principality known as Kievan Rus’ experienced a gradual but steady decline in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact factors that led to the collapse, but it can partially be attributed to political decentralization and foreign invasions. Prior to the fall, Kievan society was characterized by uniform religion, a common language, and a common culture which kept the diverse state somewhat unified. The declining period, known as “appanage Russia”, was typified by a spreading out of political power and territories. This decentralization was caused by the custom of a ruler to divide his holdings up between his various family members following his death. As each generation brought a plethora of new, smaller principalities each micro locality became weaker and more isolated from the rest of Russia, making them easy targets for foreign invaders. The mongols took advantage of this situation and held at least some form of power over Russia from 1240 until 1480 when the Muscovite “gathering of Russia” broke away from Mongol rule. The summation of appanage Russia is a period of isolation and regression. The weakened principalities within Russia were isolated from one another and the nation as a whole was isolated from Western European nations; causing Russia to miss out on innovations and progressions and to regress culturally.

The overall decentralization of power and weakening of princely status throughout Kievan Rus was not consistent among all the principalities. The fate of princes in separate regions differed greatly. In the southwest and northwest, princes lost significant amounts of power as local elites took control over society by hand picking their own princes. This deviates from the tendencies in the prominent principality of Novgorod, a “merchant republic”, where the public imposed restrictions on the prince’s power to protect the interests of the populace and avoid tyrannical rule. The northwestern region deviated from the other portions of the nation as their princes retained unrestricted power. One of the more famous princes from this region was Dmitrii Donskoi, whose will divided  his assets up between his sons and his wife. Donskoi’s will is a clear example of the divvying up of holdings characteristic of Appanage Russia.

Questions:

Was Donskoi’s leaving of land to his wife an anomaly or an indication of a more widespread tendency of giving widowed women assets?

Why did the regions differ so greatly in regard to the decline, or lack thereof, of princely power?

Works Cited

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Mark D. Steinberg. A History of Russia to 1855. 7th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Building a State in Post-Kievan Society

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As Kiev was declining in power, Novgorod was growing and becoming more powerful, evolving into a “’merchant republic’” ((Kaiser and Marker, 84)) (Kaiser and Marker, 84). In Novgorod, princely power existed, but was limited, as seen in The First Treaty of Novgorod with Tver’ Grand Prince Iaroslave Iaroslavich.   This specific treaty lists a number of rules the prince is to follow when in power; it is interesting to note that the majority of the rules deal with land and property rights displaying the importance of land at this time. In Southwest Rus’, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle provides insight to a different form of princely power; instead of princes in Southwest Rus’ the boyars fought for power.  Unlike The First Treaty of Novgorod however, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle does not discuss the importance of land and property but rather the important role power plays in the creation of the state. In Northeast Rus’, The second Testament of Moscow Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi displays the importance of property but also provides insight to what kind of roles women had at this time. For example, Donskoi provides an ample amount of land and villages for his princess but he constantly repeats the importance of the princess in his son’s lives; she is to have the last say and the sons are to listen to her.

 

What can the role of property in these documents tell us about the importance of property or land at this time?

 

What can the role of Donskoi’s wife tell us about gender roles at the time? Can we claim that all women had an important role in society or only women in the princely, upper class?

The Diminishing Unity of “Russian Land”

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The Kievan Empire can be characterized by its strong sense of unity in religion, language, and culture.  The State is very much governed by the Church which contributes to this concept of “Russian Land.”  This very concept provides Russians with the unity and strength that will be tested for the next hundred years because of decentralization and conquest.

Prior to the Mongol attack on the Kievan State, Russian Appanage weakened the great strength of Russian state and cultural capitals.  Appanage is the passing down of land from one ruler to many.  Usually this was done in the form of a ruler handing down his land to his many sons, known as princes.  We see evidence of this in the Second Testament of Moscow Gran Prince Dmitrii Donskoi in 1389.  In this testament that starts off with a prayer, Donskoi appropriates which of his sons will get parts of his estate.  It is important to note that Donskoi promises land and power to his daughter.  In fact Donskoi writes that if one of his sons is to pass away, “then my princess shall divide his patrimonial principality among my sons” (Kaiser and Marker, 89).  This type of appanage is common in Russia and results in smaller and smaller political entities, which decentralizes power in many Russian states, allowing for easier conquest of those smaller entities.

Contrary to the family appanages of land, the readings reveal that different regions of Russia experienced decentralization of power in more republican approaches.  For example, in Novgorod, during the rule of Grand Prince Iaroslav Iaroslavich, the people of Novgorod wrote a treaty to the prince.  In this treaty, the people of Novgorod define what the prince’s role is in their government.  Common themes include the prince being religious but also following previous actions of the father, or predecessor.  Prior to this treaty, in 1136, the people of Novgorod actually revolted and dethroned their ruler.  What resulted was this treaty in 1264 that reflects a very civic approach to the state in Novgorod.  Even though this document seems very democratic in nature, we must be aware of the very possible and strong elite influence of this revolution.  We see a boyar takeover in Southwest Rus’ in 1240 with the overthrow of the ruler only to replace with Danilo, a boyar.  This takeover was strictly one fueled by the elite attempting to take power away from the throne, resulting in separate boyar power, stronger than the state’s power.

This internal weakening of the Russian state contributed to its defeat by many other empires, including the Mongols.  The decentralization and conquest also contributed to what many scholars call the parochialism of the previous rich state of Kiev.  It won’t be until the successful Muscovite “gathering of Russia” that marked the end of appanage.

With all this in mind:

Why would the larger population of Novgorod be willing to participate in a revolt against the throne as opposed to other regions of Russia?

Why is there more of a focus on European Russia?

How is the Church influencing continued unity during this time?  Is there any evidence of this in the documents we have read?

Works Cited

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Fall of the Kievan Rus’, and its Aftermath

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The Kievan Rus’ were once a formidable power, but that strength shifted away from Kiev in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The reasons for this shift were numerous, and the power structures which came in Kiev’s place were also varied.

Indeed, according to A History of Russia to 1855, “there is considerable controversy about the precise nature of these factors [related to the decline and fall of Kiev] and no consensus concerning their relative weight” (Riasanovsky and Steinberg 36). Instead of determining the precise nature of Kiev’s decline and fall, the authors mentioned a number of issues that could’ve led to this event: social conflicts, a collapse of previously important trade routes, political problems, and other foreign pressures, among other things (36-37). All of these factors seem plausible, but there is room for further research on the issue of Kiev’s decline and fall.

Hierarchies in the post-Kievan Rus’ world were also varied. In Novgrood, its prince had restrictions on when he could travel, what land he could give out, and when/where he could hunt (Kaiser and Marker 84). The princes in the Southwest Rus’ were also weak, as various boyars (which were described in the Kaiser-Marker book as “local elites”) were jockeying for power (85). In fact, only the Northeast Rus’ seemed to have a grand prince (Dimitrii Donskoi) who held power significant enough to control land and decide for himself which people got what lands (87-90).

While people might be tempted to come up with a singular explanation for the fall of the Kievan Rus’, as well as a singular explanation for what happened after the fall of Kiev, those who study Russian history should resist that temptation. By doing this, people can understand everything from the weakness of Iaroslav Iaroslavich to the strength of Dimitrii Donskoi.

Questions:

1. How scant (or extensive) is the evidence for the mentioned causes (example: trade problems) of the fall of the Kievan Rus’?

2. Did any of these regional differences in power structure exist before the fall of the Kievan Rus’? If so, what evidence is there for these power structure differences?

3. What factors led the Muscovite princes (particularly Dimitrii Donskoi) to become more powerful than their Northwest and Southwest Rus’ counterparts?

Works Cited

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Mark D. Steinberg. A History of Russia to 1855. 7th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.