Tag Archives: Germany

Eugenics and Citizenship

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In Leora Auslander’s ‘National Taste’? she explains how the German and French populations addressed questions about the conceptions of citizenship by examining the tastes and preferences of various citizens within specific regions and also the nation-state as a whole. Although each country had its own unique concept of citizenship; the French interpreted citizenship using a just soli policy (citizenship determined by region of birth), whereas in Germany citizenship was determined by ancestral lineage and blood lines, both cultures developed their own “language of goods.” This “language of goods” enabled citizens to look beyond the mere race or appearance of a person and instead focus on their material possessions to gain a cohesiveness between distinct social groups and form a national identity. The Jewish populations were oftentimes ostracized and blamed for many of the misfortunes that proceeded WWI without just cause. In reality they were not culturally different from the non-jewish citizens, they were incorporated into either German or French societies, forming a part of the nation-state and adopting the accepted customs.  

In chapter four of Dan Stone’s Breeding Superman he examines the relationship between race and social class that existed in British eugenic theory throughout the interwar period. The racial component of eugenics has always existed, however Britain has been traditionally viewed as a government that focused primarily on the social components of eugenics while disregarding that of race. Stone explains how this is a misconception because the reality is that the racial and social components are inseparable. Many British officials believed in a racial hierarchy that saw white Europeans at the top and black Africans at the bottom. While policy makers sought to boost their respective populations, they wished to do so in a manner that limited the reproduction of the unproductive and parasitic social classes, and the ‘inferior races’ as well. The Nazi government of the Third Reich is singled out for their racist policies, and although they implemented these policies to an extreme degree, they were by no means the only country to do so. It was a common practice throughout most of Europe.

 

 

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Leora Auslander wrote, in “National Taste? Citizenship Law, State Form, and Everyday Aesthetics in Modern France and Germany, 1920 – 1940,” how the concept of European national citizenship developed in the years between the world wars. She theorizes that the concept of citizenship is inextricably linked to the cultural understanding an individual’s everyday life, and that this link is traceable through the evidence of not political but anthropologic sources. Specifically she examines how the French and German citizens developed from regional to national citizens focusing on cultural norms and uniformity. She further divides the research into two group, the Jews and Gentiles, who lived on either side of the Rhine River.

She finds that citizenship is a concept already well developed by the twentieth century. Looking back to the French Revolution and German Unification, the idea of the larger national identity is a growing force of the centralized state. Her conclusion, drawn on detailed evidence and sound logic, discovers that the cultural similarities between the French population’s Jewish are strikingly consistent. That, juxtaposed to the German population of a similarly diverse Jewish and non Jewish body, are comparably also unified, but distinctly separate from that of the French nation.

Overall, the article seeks out a meaningful comparison through abstract means of developing an individual citizen. It deeply resonates with “The Lost Children” accounts of nationalism. The product of the French national education discussed in Zahar’s work is culminated in the uniformity of French society viewed in Auslander’s article. Therefore, in a sense singing “La Marseillaise” as a child in the French educational system had an affect proven by the homogeny of the French interwar population in comparison to the Germans or other states.

Eugenics and National Identity

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In Breeding Superman, Dan Stone aims to describe and resolve the confusion that still surrounds eugenics in inter-war Britain.  Many people are under the impression that the study of eugenics in Britain was based primarily on class, and was less focused on race.  However, Stone argues vehemently against this belief, stating that race and class eugenics were virtually interchangeable in Britain.

Stone notes several influential British eugenicists, including Robert Reid Rentoul, Charles Armstrong, and C.P. Blacker, all of whom advocated on behalf of racist eugenics.  The racist opinions of these men greatly impacted Britain’s overwhelming fear of miscegenation.  When describing the extremist eugenicists, Stone states, “Although these were extremists, there were too many of them, and their views were not so far removed from those of the mainstream ideas on race” (99).  Eugenicists also upheld the belief that Britain was not concerned with race, but only class eugenics.  This ideal was promoted to ameliorate Britain’s image in terms of the eugenics.  Contrary to popular belief, the history of inter-war Britain was far more racist than many people care to realize, and this is due in large part to various racist eugenicists.

In “National Taste? Citizenship Law, State Form, and Everyday Aesthetics in Modern France and Germany, 1920-1940,” Leora Auslander addresses the nation-state from various viewpoints, and how citizens and groups are impacted by state policies—specifically pertaining to Jews in France and Germany.

While France aimed to create a more central government, and encouraged all its citizens to emulate French culture, Germany allowed its citizens to have much more independence, as it had recently merged twenty-two monarchies and three republics.  In response to these cultural guidelines, French and German Jews responded appropriately; French Jews chose to adhere “to a common, distinctively French culture,” while German Jews focused less on remaining civilized (123).  This is significant, because both the French Jews and the German Jews felt obligated to accurately represent their country, as a means of national identity.

Both Stone and Auslander describe the issue of national identity, through eugenics and everyday cultural expectations.  However, both arguments are similar because they depict the hysteria that can surround one nation’s self-image.

National Identity: the Role of Eugenics and Culture

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Leora Auslander’s “’National Taste?’ Citizenship Law, State Form, and Everyday Aesthetics in Modern France and Germany, 1920-1940” described the way in which the French and German nations had dealt with the issue of identity and citizenship, specifically in terms of the Jewish populations. This text illustrated the similarities between Parisian and Berliner Jews and the larger French and German populations. These groups were marginalized in various and different ways in each country, but, through analyzing personal belongs and furnishings, Auslander discovered a cultural cohesion throughout the groups. Because the Jews and the non-Jewish French and German populations decorated their houses in much the same way (the French decorated similarly, but their style was different from that of the German populations), indicating that these populations (German or French versus Jewish) were not fundamentally different as many eugenicists had argued during this same era.

Throughout the Interwar Period especially, eugenics evolved and advanced as an area of study that gained more and more influence in politics. In Chapter Four of Breeding Superman, the author, Dan Stone argues that eugenics held a key place in British politics throughout the beginning of the 20th Century, as the Empire fought to preserve its strength. This same argument can be applied to France and Germany during this period. Both countries became more concerned with the strength of their populations, especially in light of the massive loses caused by World War I. Each of these three countries defined citizenship differently, though each definition inherently placed some groups above others. The Jews in each case were understood to be inferior to the “native” population. In France, however, this argument became more complex as there was a hierarchy between French Jews and foreign Jews. (This distinction would prove to be very important as both the Occupied and Non-occupied Zones began to deport Jews in 1942.)

Eugenics was not the sole factor in this hierarchy. Auslander explains in “’National Taste?’” that culture was another very important aspect in determining national identity. Citizenship in France became directly linked to culture as the law changed to jus soli (citizenship determined by territory of birth). That is not to say, however, that eugenics did not influence the French during this period. Eugenics shaped politics or political thought throughout most of Europe. While many aspects of eugenics were racist, as Stone acknowledges, this was not forcibly the case; today, people across the world view eugenics in a very negative light due to the policies and actions of Nazi Germany during the war.

Keynes’ Opposition to the Treaty of Versailles

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Keynes’ argument is based on the fact that he believes the environment in Germany established by the Treaty of Versailles will create conditions that force desperate men and women to political instability and radical forms of government in order to survive. When a group of people are pushed into a position of survival, they do not go quietly into the night; rather, they group together to fight for their common interests and survive as a whole. In regards to the 14 points, Keynes seems to argue in favor of them by arguing against the Treaty of Versailles. He states that the War Guilt Clause of the treaty will create the conditions established above. Because of Germany’s economy based around industry rather than agriculture, Germany was required to import food in order to sustain its population. However, with the new reparations and damage to its economy, Germany would no longer be able to subsidize these imports, leading to increased food prices and shortages all around. This is especially critical to the German population due to the fact that Germany was already facing food shortages for the past four years due to the Allied blockade. Keynes states that by instituting this treaty, not only will the Allied powers force Germany to drastic measures (possibly even communism), it will result in the deaths of millions of Germans. Keynes’ argument looks particularly strong to us, especially with our hindsight, and the fact that arguments that said the treaty was just and would support German growth are ignored in this general overview of a class. Further research is needed to see whether Keynes was an outlier in his prediction or if many economists of the time agreed in distaste for the oppression that this treaty created.

Comparison of Keynes and Versailles Treaty/Wilson’s Fourteen Points

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As the founder of his eponymous economic school of thought, John Maynard Keynes contributed many influential theses on the economics of his day.  Nowhere is this more notable than in 1920’s The Economic Consequences of Peace, his controversial criticism of the Treaty of Versailles.  Keynes asserted that the Treaty would do little other than prolong and perhaps exacerbate the period of postwar unrest in Europe, noting that “the Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe” (Keynes).  Instead, the major powers responsible for the Treaty (i.e. France, the United Kingdom, the United States) used it to advocate their own national interests.  With the exception of the U.S., who primarily viewed the Treaty as means of implementing President Wilson’s somewhat unrealistically idealistic Fourteen Points, Keynes argued that the aforementioned nations utilized the Versailles Treaty to reprimand Germany for the damage it caused during WWI , particularly by crippling its economy.  Keynes’ ultimate qualm about these tactics was that because Germany, a formerly thriving industrial nation, had become so firmly established as a staple of European industry and commerce, its virtual elimination from this economic community would cripple not only Germany, but all of Europe.  Although this excerpt did not offer any explicit alternatives to the Versailles Treaty, Keynes was noted several years later (1933) as an advocate of “economic nationalism…the autonomy which individual states had gained over policy as a result of the collapse of a unified international economy” (Mazower, 137).  It is then perhaps reasonable to infer that in the wake of this interwar economic crisis, Keynes felt that a Europe composed of economically independent states would be more stable than the tightly interdependent economic climate that dominated the decades prior.

The Economic Consequences of the Peace

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In this section of his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes discusses what he believes to be the failings of the Treaty of Versailles.  He believes that the treaty will cause the economic situation in Europe to worsen, as well as fail to prevent future animosity amongst the opposing countries, stating that it contains “…nothing to make defeated Central Europe into good neighbors.”  Keynes’ views appear to be more similar to those of Woodrow Wilson in his 14 Points than those expressed in the official treaty, arguing that the treaty did too much to harm Germany.

Keynes offers many predictions as to how the treaty will throw Germany and blames the selfish wants of the leaders who drafted it for this.  He writes that the treaty has given Germany no means as to care for its people–most of the war debts have been placed upon them, making importing necessary resources from other countries near impossible.  Germany had already been weakened by the Allied Blockade during the war, making famine and death on a large scale inevitable under the conditions which the treaty created.  Immigrating out of Germany was also a challenge due to the large amounts of animosity directed toward them after the war, and the Treaty of Versailles forced them to take all blame for the war.  All of these harsh punishments both directly and indirectly imposed on Germany created a lasting bitterness which eventually led to even greater conflict.

Keynes’ views on post-war European economics are similar to those of Mark Mazower, who ascertains in Dark Continent that “Europe’s economic life was in chaos” (Mazower 104).  While Keynes focuses on Germany, he also argues that the rest of Europe is unprepared for such a great economic disaster that is to come.  His predictions that this economic turmoil will lead to even more conflict are accurate, as it allowed for the rise of vengeful leaders.  The poor economic conditions of post-war Europe are one of the greatest indirect causes of World War II.

John Maynard Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1920.

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In this article, Keynes talks about the Treaty of Versailles, and it’s failure to address the economic issues of a post-Great War Europe. He states that victorious Allied powers fail to realize that the stability of Europe, and thereby the stability of both France and Britain as well, is reliant on a complicated system of continental and global trade, which the Treaty attempts to disintegrate.

He focusses on Germany and uses them as a representative of post-war Europe. He believes that the booming population levels, in relation to the rapidly increasing pre-war industrial levels, would not be able to survive with the territorial and financial sanctions the Treaty proposes. His prediction is proven by Mazower in his text “Dark Continent”. Mazower states that because the smaller Central and European nations did not have sufficient resources, they suffered in the post-Great War period. It was only with American loans were they able to initially recover, and thus through American liquidation during the Great Depression they were thrown back into economic turmoil. Alternatively, Russia was self-sufficient during the interwar period, and thus was an economic success, admittedly with a large human cost (Mazower, p.124-5). Finally, Mazower states that while autarky was a good short term plan, in the long run it was detrimental to the Russian economy (Mazower, p.119), especially in comparison to the trading-centric post-World War Two continental economies.

While Keynes’ criticisms are economically valid, he fails to address the volatile political situation of 1919. A perfect example of this revenge-based politics is the War guilt clause written into the Treaty of Versailles. This was unnecessary addition economically, but was an important political addition, especially to the democratic governments in Britain and France. In my opinion, Keynes, while economically correct, fails to acknowledge the context of the Treaty signing, and thus fails to provide viable alternative solutions.

Europe’s Economies after the First World War

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When the Allies met in Paris to negotiate the terms for peace after the First World War, their main goal was ostentatiously to create stability in Europe, but each representative came to the table with his own specific interests in mind. This led to major issues in the Treaty of Versailles, such as its questionable economic feasibility. In his book, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes discusses how the preoccupation of the Allies caused them to deal with economic issues using politics and without considering the future of Europe’s economies. While the Treaty of Versailles set many future events in motion, the economic turmoil it created was the most dramatic and disastrous effect it had on the European Continent.

As Mark Mazower writes in Dark Continent, “After the Great War, Europe’s economic life was in chaos.” He goes on to describe the hunger and rapidly falling prices that ensued in Europe following the war. (Mazower 104) Keynes elaborates on the same point, stating that, “In relation to other continents Europe is not self-sufficient; in particular it cannot feed itself.” The people of the industrialized cities of Europe need to obtain supplies like food from outside their cities if they are going to survive. When war breaks out, these supply lines are broken, and because of “… the interruption of the stream of supplies, a part of this population is deprived of its means of livelihood.”(Keynes) After the war, no agreement to eliminate economic tariffs is made, as was suggested by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points, causing even more economic stress in Europe.

A large part of the economic wrongdoing in the Treaty of Versailles was directed at Germany. Not only did Germany have to accept blame for the war, it also had to pay reparations to the Allies for the damage it caused. Germany was also stripped of its colonies, leaving it little economic prospect for paying the Allies.  In response to these terms in the treaty, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau identified that the terms of the peace treaty would literally and economically starve Germany, and that, “Those who sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women and children” (Keynes).

The Treaty of Versailles possessed many economic faults, and, writing in 1920, Keynes foreshadows many of the consequences that these faults will have on Europe. The treaty doesn’t help to restore Europe’s economic vitality or create stability in Central Europe, leaving Europe liable for depression and bloodshed.

Versailles Treaty

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The Versailles Treaty ended the First World War and effectively left Germany in a state of disrepair. The allies viewed Germany as the aggressor, and thus required them to make full reparations for the damages that the war caused. From the allied perspective it is easy to understand why they came down so harshly on Germany for all the suffering that was caused, however the demands were unrealistic, prompting future conflict by creating an unsettled atmosphere that ultimately contributed to Hitler’s rise.

The treaty was especially harsh in terms of Germany and her territories. Articles 45, 51, 119, and 156 were meant to strip Germany down to a mere shell of its former self by forcing the cession of many territories. The coal mines in the Saar Basin were to be ceded to France as compensation for the destruction of coal mines in the north of France, frontiers from 1871 were restored, and claims to overseas possessions were renounced. Many of these land cessions were to the direct benefit of France because out of all of the Allied countries, France took the harshest blows from the war because a lot of the fighting took place on French soil. To this day there are still regions in France that are unlivable because large amounts of live munitions remain undiscovered.

It was also evident that the Treaty intended to prevent a future war with Germany by imposing severe limitations on the capabilities of its armed forces, which is demonstrated in Article 160. Although this may have seemed like a viable solution at the time, in hindsight it is apparent that such a policy was nearly impossible to enforce. This policy lead to a series of appeasements, which allowed Germany to slowly rebuilt its armed forces while under Allied watch, ultimately allowing them to accumulate a powerful arsenal that was at Hitler’s disposal.

After the Second World War the Allies approached the post-war rebuilding process far differently. Applying unfair and impossible demands to a defeated country leaves the political atmosphere ripe for radicalism. They learned from their mistakes and adopted a policy that was less harsh and more constructive.