Ivan’s Insecurities

Ivan “The Terrible” during his later reign, seems to be pretty catastrophic for Muscovite Russia.  The creation of the oprichniki was his way of getting rid of anyone that could threaten his rule.  This group became extremely problematic, as they had unrestricted authority wherever they went.  There required garb of black further linked them to a sort of “Unholy” group that was linked to Ivan, not the church.  The oprichniki were able to steal property and money from the zemskie people without any punishment.  Anyone who stood in the way of this group or tried to stop them were immediately killed.  One of the governors even fled to Poland once he discovered what was going on with the oprichinia (KM, 152).  Country sides were being ravaged without orders and shows how much power they had accumulated.   Ivan had anyone who he thought suspicious killed and it could be imagined the amount of people living in fear.

However, we see the the Tsar having the leaders of the oprichninia killed as well.  Perhaps it seems that he believed that they had gained too much power and were becoming a threat to himself at this point (KM, 153).  The killing of these leaders was brutal and sent a message to the people in Russia that he was not to be reckoned with.

Was Ivan’s terrorizing rule perhaps good for guaranteeing loyalty for future Tzars?

Ivan the Power Hungry

Ivan’s rule was centered around the pursuit of power for self preservation. After seeing so many of those close to him dying, whether it was the suspicious death of his mother, or the tragic death of his beloved wife, death had surrounded Ivan from a young age. Many of the actions he took were strengthening the central government in Moscow by directly enhancing his own power and giving billets in local government to his supporters, but he also gave power out to loyal servants, “oprichniki” to do his bidding. These oprichniki acted in unrestricted violence to do whatever Ivan told them. Their violence towards boyars, churchmen, and normal citizens were truly terrible.

In the account of a foreigner, Heinrich von Staden, working as an oprichniki he described some truly sadistic punishments that were directly ordered by Ivan. His bloody and merciless path to find who was against him cost many innocent people their lives. (Kaiser 153) However, this is the account of a foreigner who used these stories to try and convince the German Emperor to invade Muscovy. The actual twisted nature of Ivan can not be accurately found in these accounts.

However, the boyars were not simply useless to Ivan, he did strengthen the boyars who supported him, again showing how he was seeking power to protect himself. It was quite natural for leaders during this time to consolidate power and kill people who opposed them. The Western idea of Ivan and “the Terrible” can quite possibly have been distorted by the report of von Staden. While the tragic events in Ivan’s youth and young adult life could certainly have done some mental damage, most of his actions seem rational to strengthen the state, but more importantly, his own safety.

Did the actions Ivan take accidentally strengthen the state, or was it a conscious action to protect Muscovy?

 

Maniacal or Misunderstood?

No one likes to be misunderstood; however, sometimes we cannot control how people perceive our actions. The two short readings on Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) present two contrasting narratives about his character and manner of rule. The first document is the account of Heinrich von Staden – a foreigner who served Ivan IV. The account describes Ivan’s seemingly unrelenting and unrestrained violence. He sacked prosperous cities, burned and looted churches, let his henchmen run wild, and killed countless kin. ((Heinrich von Staden, “A Foreigner Describes the Oprichnina of Tsar Ivan the Terrible,” in Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings 860s-1860s, ed. Daniel H. Kaiser and Gary Marker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 152-153.)) According to this account, Ivan IV lived up to his epithet: a man of terrible, unchecked violence. However, Russian History Nancy Shields Kollmann depicts the power structure between the Grand Prince and the boyars as much more intricate. Accounts, according to Kollmann, of a Grand Prince or Tsar’s autocratic rule result from a conscious, collective decision to maintain an image of autocracy. ((Nancy Shields Kollmann “The Facade of Autocracy,” in Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings 860s-1860s, ed. Daniel H. Kaiser and Gary Marker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 155.)) Promulgating an account of the Tsar’s autocracy actually helped maintain peace among the boyars: the Tsar’s administrative resources. ((Kaiser, Reinterpreting, 156.)) Kollmann even references Ivan IV and his expressed desire for peace among the boyars and their help in maintaining order. ((Kaiser, Reinterpreting, 155.))

In a sense, the dog’s bark is worse than it’s bite. Perhaps the stories about Ivan are embellished to instill fear and respect throughout the population. Perhaps, a middle ground is also acceptable. Ivan IV committed atrocious violent acts on those who challenged his rule. I do not doubt that he committed terrible acts of violence against members of the church, against cities such as Novgorod, his own family, etc. which extended beyond the precedent established by his predecessors. However, violence stood the keystone of effective rule throughout the world during the 15th and 16th centuries. This was the period of Machiavelli and murderous popes of “Bloody” Mary I of England and her unrelenting persecution of Protestants. Ivan’s actions fit the norms of a very violent period in history.

Wednesday we discussed how Ivan reformed several aspects of his administration. Under these reforms, do you feel that his violent actions were excessive and earn him the title of “Ivan the Terrible”?

How Terrible was Ivan the Terrible?

Ivan the Terrible is a very complicated ruler to label as simply “a good guy” or “a bad guy.”  Both good and overlapped throughout his life, coming up at different times, but I don’t believe one is more prominent than the other.  Even more interesting and important to remember is all of Ivan’s personal troubles while he was young and how they could have possibly affected his future as Tsar.

Ivan was successful in bringing change to Russia, although it can be difficult to view his rule as a reformation rule.  Ivan implemented a new law code, paid order to the church, strengthened the military and ordered out bureaucracy.  Ivan was creating an honest and efficient administration.  These reforms were positive towards Ivan’s rule and Russia benefitted greatly.

However the bad of Ivan also has to be analyzed.  Because Ivan was so skeptical of who to trust, he began to “wipe out all the chief people of the oprichnina” ((Kaiser and Marker 153)).  Brutal, horrific deaths began occurring; Ivan’s brother in law “was chopped to death by the harquebusiers [musketeers] with axes,” “Prince Vasilii Temkin was drowned,” “Peter Seisse was hanged from his own court gate,” and more ((Kaiser and Marker 153)).  What was the cause of these awful deaths?

It is interesting to analyze the beginning or early periods of Ivan’s life.  Many tragic things, the death of his mother when he was a young boy and the death of his beloved wife, could be possible reasons as to why he was so agonized.  Ivan also came to power at age three, so it’s possible he never knew who to trust from the beginning since his mother and wife died early on.  His life and personality are too difficult to label as just good or bad; regardless he was a powerful ruler.

Can Ivan the Terrible be classified as just good or bad?

Is it wrong to blame the tragedies of Ivan’s early life for the brutality in his later life?

 

Works Cited

Kaiser, Daniel H., and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860’s. New York: Oxford UP, 1994. Print.

The Psychology of Ivan IV

As a young child, Ivan IV was a victim of the same caprice and cruelty that would later characterize his own reign. After his mother’s “haughty and arbitrary”  ((RS 101)))  regime, the young Ivan lived under chaotic boyar rule where “imprisonments, exiles, executions, and murders proliferated.” ((RS 133))  The boyars who had served Ivan as an autocrat while his mother was alive became neglectful and cruel of the young heir in his private life. Ivan seized his rule at age 13 and insisted that he be crowned as tsar (rather than Grand Prince) at age 16. Though he enjoyed a happy marriage to Anasatsia of the Romanov boyar family, Ivan’s personal traumas continued. Soon after his wedding a great fire razed Moscow, leading to riots that killed his uncle and nearly killed Ivan himself. Riasanovsky and Steinberg call the riot “one of the psychological crises that were periodically to mark his explosive reign.”

I found Ivan’s psychology intriguing, since he – like Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin – was a fearsome ruler who grew up in a home marked by violence and trauma. Ivan’s psychological profile seems to be a topic of interest in Russian history, since the 1897 portrait by Victor Vasnetov is characterized as a “psychological portrait.” The actions that characterized his Reign of Terror (such as the founding of the oprichniki) don’t seem so much like sadistic punishments of his people as a they do a measure of personal protection.

 

Discussion questions:

What were Ivan’s motivations for his Reign of Terror? What events in his life made him paranoid and fearful for his personal safety and hegemony?

Ivan IV, the Confused Puppy

The regime of Ivan IV was not terrible as his epithet might scream. Ivan’s reign was filled with rather level-headed ideas of the time such as more control over your kingdom and personal safety from enemy assassins. His creation of the district elders in cities and later other parts of the country made complete sense. Criminals needed to be punished without every petty crime involving the Prince. Ivan increased the amount of justice served in Rus’ and the communities in which these elders resided were happy to be rid of crime.

To protect his person from bodily harm, Ivan instituted a body of government to weed out those who were against him, publicly or  not. It was here that Ivan received his title of “the terrible” because of how this institution, the oprichnina, operated and more so because of Ivan’s mental disability that impaired his judgement on who was actually out to get him. He was so paranoid that everyone was inherently against him that there were seven “[y]ears of absurd denunciation, sudden arrests, and horrifying executions”1 carried out by the oprichnina.

Ivan IV was not a ruthless leader who would stop at nothing to harm innocent citizens in a sadistic type of way. Ivan simply wanted a guarantee that no one would hurt him. He was an important Grand Prince and world leader of orthodoxy; there’s a price to pay for that kind of power and Ivan thought it was in his safety. But, he was not “the terrible”. He was more like a wayward puppy, confused as to who was friend or foe, and not being able to see the difference between the two.

1Crummey, Robert O. Ivan IV: Reformer or Tyrant? in Daniel H. Kaiser, and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860’s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. p 162.

Evaluation of Ivan the Terrible

Ivan the Terrible (1533-84) began his rule in 1547 at a young age and during the first half of his reign he and his administration made great strides toward reform in the Muscovite lands. In 1564, however, his health starts to decline and so does his power to rule. He separated his administration into people who he could trust, and it is possible that he became mentally paranoid, and a second administration run by boyar elite and nobles. This double administration was called oprichnina and it was also a time of killing anyone Ivan felt he couldn’t trust.

I agree with Crummey’s analysis that Ivan III created reforms to help the good of the people but then his personality changed which disrupted this reformation and ultimately made a failure of the oprichnina. But even in the beginning of his rule, I think he was a bit deceptive with his motivations for certain reforms. His government attempted to strengthen the army, something seen as good for the people, but Crummey argues that it was also to “strengthen the upper echelons of the service nobility” ((KM 159)) . Another reform aimed to grow the central administration, which kept elaborate records and thus “considerable increased its control over the country and its resources” ((KM 159)) . From this reading, it seems that he had hidden motivations as to why he put these reforms in place: to increase his power and control over the region. This sounds like he was trying to deceive the people, but in reality these reforms did indeed aide the population, and I don’t think this deception is integrally connected to his paranoid “reforms” later on.

How did his reforms ultimately influence the Muscovite government in the long run?

What was his “Reign of Terror” and who was it directed towards? Why did he target these people?

Worked Cited

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

The Third Rome: Autocratic State in Moscow

Monday 28, 2015

After almost two centuries of Mongol rule and influence, the Moscow Empire compiles many of the old Kiev appendages into one Muscovite State.  Unlike the governance in Novgorod, in the Muscovite state, the Grand Prince becomes a lord, with all land belonging to him.  In fact when property was sold the deed read, “I have sold the land of the sovereign and of my possession,” (Kaiser & Marker, 103).  This feudal society is known as an autocracy, the Grand Prince having all the power as the head of state.  What unfolds after 1453 (the fall of Constantinople to the Turks) is an additional power and prestige bestowed upon Russia with the world declaration of it being the “New Israel” or “The Third Rome,” (Kaiser & Marker, 104).

After the fall of the Roman Empire, Constantinople became the center of Orthodoxy under the Greek Empire’s control.  Rus’ always viewed this area, especially the Byzantine Empire as the source of Orthodoxy, so much so that the Muscovite prices Ivan III and Vasilii III regarded themselves as the descendants of the Greek tsars (Kaiser & Marker, 104).  Thus with the fall of Constantinople, the Grand Prince of Moscow adopts another important role, a pope-like figure almost, as the Tsar, or Head of the Orthodoxy.

A monk named Filofei declared Moscow as the Third Rome and emphasized it’s importance as the center for Orthodoxy for the entire world.  The Turks, who took over Constantinople were regarded as “Godless infidels” and it was up to the Tsars of Russia to create a place of salvation for the world, (Kaiser & Marker, 104).  In the Filofei excerpts, the monk emphasizes the importance of this new capital of Orthodoxy, but also yields the Grand Prince of not abusing this power and that the Tsar is a servant for God.  Filofei by declaring the Muscovite State as the new Rome also states, “And there will not be a fourth. No one will replace your Christian tsardom,” implying not only Russia’s new position in the world, but also indefinitely expanding the autocracy of the Tsar, (Filofei, 1).

With this in mind:

By comparing the two documents we read for Monday’s class, which form of governance holds more power?  The Tsar, who is a representative of Orthodoxy for the world?  Or does the Church have more power over the Tsar?

After reading the new law codes of Moscow and their strict punishments, in what ways in religion a unifier for the new Moscow Empire?

Do you think there could be possible problems that arise from the Tsar being aligned with the Church?  Does this give him ultimate power?

Works Cited

Filofei. Moscow The Third Rome (Excerpts). Harrington. Community UK. http://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/3rdrome.html

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994

Religious influences on Russian Pop Culture

Religion played a central role in the everyday life in Post-Kievan Rus’.  The church was still what bound the people together in a very much separated society.  Much of what was happening with pop culture in this time was directly affected by the church.

During this time, the provisions of wills was distributed by the church due to the fact writing was not wide spread.  It is seen in the last will of Patrikei Stroev, that church plays a big part in the will itself.  The first line reads, “In the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost” (KM 130), showing that this is a religious document from the very first line.  Later on in the will we see that he donates an entire village and three beehives to the Holy Trinity monastery (KM 130).

The church was also very critical of minstrels.  These groups of entertainers were able, “to flourish in the northwest…” (KM 135), where Novgorod was located.  However, the northeast proved to be tough for the minstrels as the church capital and Grand Prince lived in Moscow.  The prince strictly forbids any minstrels to enter any land belonging to the monastery (KM 135).  To the church these entertainers demonstrate satanic rituals and witchcraft.

Literature and art were extremely influenced by religion and some cases they really had a monopoly over both.  Icon painting became very popular as seen with the development of schools specifically for painting icons.  Andrew Rublev became famous with icon works such as, the Old Testament Holy Trinity, that were created for the church (RS 121).  Church literature was being developed on a considerable scale as well (RS 116).  The teachings of saints was also an important educational tool being used at the time.

Did the involvement of the church in pop culture have a more negative or positive effect for Post-Kievan Rus’?

The Influence of Religion on Russian Culture

As we have seen multiple times throughout the readings, the influence of the Church was able to penetrate nearly every aspect of Russian life. Popular culture was definitely not immune to the domination that the Church had. The strict social hierarchy that included the high social classes and the Church were very prevalent in Russian society, they were essentially in control of what would be passed down generation to generation. Since most of the literate population was somehow involved with the Church, their damnation towards minstrels and their performances led to very little historical record of them, and what remained is never very positive.

The minstrels mostly entertained local villagers, who held their performances in the highest regard. “Surviving village inventories from around the year 1500 list minstrels just as they might some priest or smith, indicating not only a tolerance for such entertainers, but also a recognition of their social station and value.” (Kaiser 131) However, since the Church disapproved of them and their, “bawdy songs”, and how they “caricatured the world around them.” (Kaiser 128) Therefore, the Church was able to end the passing down of performances since they controlled a majority of the literate population. In some cases, princes would seek to have minstrels banned, in order to preserve their social order. (Kaiser 132) Minstrels did have an effect both on the lives of the average person and they upset the elite culture.

When observing the will of Patrikei Stroev, the presence of the Church and fear of God is evident immediately. He not only begins his will with a prayer, but he also gave a village and three beehives to the Church. Meanwhile, he gives his descendants animals or money.  (Kaiser 130)

The paintings of Rublev are very similar to the paintings that would have been found in Italy during the Renaissance due to their religious nature. Art was a market that was driven by the patron, and often times, the artist themselves were deeply religious. (Kaiser 142)

Was pop culture truly representative of the people living during that time? Or is it purely whitewashed by the Church?

Works Cited

Kaiser, Daniel H. and Gary Marker. Reinterpreting Russian History: Readings, 860-1860s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994