Tag Archives: soviet union

Nazi-Soviet Pact, Stalin’s Speech

Posted on by

The Nazi-Soviet pact was a non-aggression pact signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. It stated that neither country would attack the other, and that neither would ally with an enemy country of the other. In addition it divided Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland into Soviet and German “spheres of influence” through a secret protocol.

The pact gave the Soviet Union safety from the Nazis, which was important because the Soviets were neither militarily nor economically prepared for war. It gave Germany access to Poland, which they invaded on September 1, 1939. The pact was broken when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

Stalin’s speech addressed the industrial advancements the Soviet Union saw during the mid 1900s, and the challenges it faced during WWII. Stalin explained that the advancements were due to the communal hard work of the Soviet people during the five-year plans, and described WWII as an obstacle that was overcome through coordination and strength.

Youth Delegates at the Moscow World Fair

Posted on by

Youth and children in general are widely known for being easily influenced and moulded. So why then, did the Soviet Union choose this particular demographic to represent the face of the nation? Was it because the party wanted to ensure delegates would only spout Soviet propaganda? If that it true, then the 1957 World Moscow Festival did, in fact, completed some of the goals it set out to accomplish. As Peacock notes in her article, The Perils of Building Cold War Consensus at the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students, there were no organized protests during this particular festival. Delegates routinely answered questions with the same responses, presenting the unified, joyous front imperative for both Soviet propaganda and ideology. More importantly, perhaps, was the exchange of cultures that occurred between delegates of different nationalities. Soviet delegates, and those from other communist nations, were exposed to the capitalistic lifestyle normative of most of Europe and the West. In return, delegates from Europe and the West received a look into life in the Soviet Union, albeit a carefully constructed and falsified one. Although the majority of delegates were probably already members of a communist organization within their home country, the Moscow World Festival allowed them unprecedented access to the actual application behind Marxist theory. The festival may not have completely accomplished its political agenda, but it provided a cross-cultural exchange that laid the groundwork for future interactions between the world’s youth.

The perils of building Cold War consensus at the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students

Posted on by

The importance of the young people to the Soviet regime is widely known. Children were to have sheltered, happy, healthy and vibrant childhoods to show the prosperity of Stalin’s reign. By 1957, the political party leader has changed and the propaganda is shifting. Fortunately, the problem of the thousands of homeless and vagrant youths no longer exists. The child labor camps and the elapse of time allowed many of these orphans from WWII to grow up. The Soviet youth are now to symbolize the organized populace peacefully and actively demonstrating against the propaganda of the United States during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States fought their ‘proxy wars’ in third world countries, but also in the media. Each side attempted to highlight their own strengths and their opponent’s faults. This sets the stage for the massive campaign organized by Russia to host the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students. Russia obviously has to appear to the world as the more virtuous and successful nation. Therefore, years before the event, construction takes place to many of the buildings within Moscow and throughout the city, a rejuvenation of the landscape commences. Months before the event, the police have orders to clean up the streets of any undesirable people. The Soviet youths who will participate in the large-scale project of showing the world that the Russian people are prospering, united, active and willing participants of the government had thoroughly rehearsed the party line to respond to all questions. The grandiose events were numerous and designed to show case the achievement of socialism.
The soviets “saw this festival as a project that would ultimately present a choreographed display of Soviet popularity and moral ascendancy…and would provide a public venue for the demonstration of Soviet wealth and benevolence.” ((Margaret Peacock, The perils of building Cold War consensus at the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students ((Cold War History, 2012) 518)) Overall, the event is successful and praised by attendees, but contact with Moscow from the outside world allowed the emergence of debate on both sides. Ironically, one journalists proved that they were successful. Rinto Alwi, a correspondent for an Indonesian newspaper said that, “this is all artificial, perfected and directed from higher up.” ((Margaret Peacock, The perils of building Cold War consensus at the 1957 Moscow World Festival of Youth and Students ((Cold War History, 2012) 524)) What do you think? Would the Soviets have been better off not attempting to control every detail of the event? Could all of the delegates have then been able to focus more on the magnificence of the events and less on the propagandized slogan of willing youths robotically saying the same thing? More importantly, would it have been any different if the United States were hosting such an event? Ironically, maybe the US and Russia had more in common than they presumed.

Developing Countries and the Cold War

Posted on by

In “The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for ‘Wars of National Liberation'”, Kanet illustrates that the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War had deep, lasting effects in the developing world, as each superpower attempted to assert its dominance over Third World countries to either lead them on the communist path or away from it. Unlike my previous perceptions of the Cold War, Kanet characterizes much of the Soviet Union’s initiative as resulting from a lack of US response. After the Vietnam War, the United States stepped back and displayed a general inability to respond effectively to Soviet initiative. Such inability to act and deal with political instability was mirrored in other modern, pro-Western governments, resulting in the rise to power of a strong group of anti-western governments in the 1960s and ’70s. The United States, of course, reacted negatively to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but, even here, the US reaction was not strong enough to illicit change – at least in the eyes of the next US President, Ronald Reagan. I had not before put such blame on the United States lacking initiative, but usually approach the Cold War as a somewhat balanced game between the two superpowers of stepping forward, then being pushed backward again, resulting in a somewhat continuous cycle between the two.

The Cold War is often painted as differences in ideology between the United States and the Soviet Union, but with an emphasis on the lack of actual, direct military action taken against either Superpower. In the focus on the direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the countries that are affected in the wake of the conflict are often underrepresented. How did the Cold War affect the economic and political development of these countries? What would have happened if they had been left alone? How did the United States and the Soviet Union change these governments’ (Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Cuba, etc) priorities?

A New Cold War Narrative: The Superpower Quest for Empire

Posted on by

Spies. The Space Race. The Cuban Missile Crisis. The Iron Curtain. These are all aspects that the general public closely associate with the era of the Cold War. Save for the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, people do not immediately associate the conflict between capitalist United States and communist Soviet Union with hostilities in the Middle East, Latin America, or South Asia. However, in his article, “The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for ‘Wars of National Liberation,’” Roger Kanet focuses strictly on the affect the Cold War had on the developing countries in these regions. Kanet argues that the superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, drew their attentions away from Europe and towards the developing world after the mid-late 1950s in an effort to establish their economic and political dominance.

He supports his main argument through an analysis of the increase in Soviet involvement in support of “progressive forces” across developing nations in their campaigns against Israeli and American imperialism. He also explores the United States’ response to these efforts by providing its own support to countries in the Third World against Soviet expansion. All of which led to military conflicts spread out throughout West Asia, Africa, and Central America. Kanet cites various treaties made during the Cold War to illustrate the new alliances that formed during this period between Third World countries and either the United States or Soviet Union. However, he relies heavily on secondary sources with few primary texts mostly in the form of memoirs of American political leaders such as Henry Kissinger. The lack of primary documents detailing either superpower’s decisions to enter into conflicts in the Third World as a way of attacking the other’s authority and power is surprising. Even with their biases, one would expect to see newspaper articles mentioned throughout the essay or even in the bibliography. Certainly, government documents should be included in a discussion regarding a nation’s military campaigns.

Regardless, the narrative Kanet presents in his article is one that few Americans know or understand. Americans generally associate the conflicts in Korea, Egypt, or the Middle East during this period as individual isolated occurrences not as the larger Cold War. Therefore, Kanet’s article is important to furthering the United States’ understanding of the Cold War.

Sevastopol and the Soviet Union

Posted on by

The article, “Who Makes Local Memories?: The Case of Sevastopol after World War II” makes a distinct focus on the impact and significance of Sevastopol to the Soviet Union in the time following World War II. Qualls asserts the point that Sevastopol, simultaneously shed its identification with two countries at the same time, he explains how the city marginalized the Soviet Union and completely ignored Ukraine and refused to be apart of it, which was due to the goal of tying to highlight a deeper Russian history, but instead creating a localized mythology. Quall’s argues that through the emergence of mythmaking and by introducing military valor and extraordinary feats by civilians, military personnel were combining pre-Revolutionary and Soviet conceptions of heroism. With this, heroism, resistance and self-sacrifice became the face of the city and what it was most known for. The city became to be the “glory of the Russian soul’, and a “symbol of faithfulness” the lives that were lost during the war. Quall’s explains how Sevastopol focused only on becoming local and not national, further removing itself or “shedding” itself from its Soviet identification. He argues that local city planning changed the topography and toponyms of the city that put society back to pre-revolutionary heroism and guidebook authors who wrote for international audiences further scattered the myth of Sevastopol more broadly.

With the removal of Soviet identity, the article has me question how Sevastopol’s evolution really affected the Soviet Union in a negative way, if it seemed that the city was only raising the Soviet Union on a pedestal, representing its victories and its heroic features.

Sevastopol and Local Identity

Posted on by

In “Who Makes Local Memories?: The Case of Sevastopol After World War II”, Qualls asserts that various conflicts, most notably the Crimean War, have shaped the construction of the identity of the city of Sevastopol and it’s people in relation to Russia. He cites the example of the Crimean War in which Lev Tolstoy, a journalist, wrote of the Russian character of the city and necessity of fighting for it as one would do for Russia. At this stage the Russian identity of the city was reinforced through examples of military valor in the Crimean War and the loyalty of those who defended it. As Qualls points out these national myths serve to reinforce the identification of the city and it’s residents with the nation. Simultaneously Russia is able to generate a sense of belonging amongst the citizens and legitimize it’s claim to the region as a national power. This process of creating national myths continues into the 1930s when the Soviet government adapts the narrative once again to redirect loyalty towards the Party through the use of myths which center around the “ideal Soviet citizen,” who serves as an example of the importance of the Party in daily life and of what can be accomplished through allegiance to the Party.

With the onset of World War Two the narrative changes from loyalty to the Party or military valor to that of duty to citizens, soldiers, and Sevastopol. It is interesting to note the adaptability of the sense of identity and it’s importance to the citizen’s identification with Russia rather than Ukraine. Furthermore Qualls analyzes the myth creation blending the World War Two narrative with that of the Russian past and the Crimean War. It would be interesting to see on an individual level from the citizens of Sevastopol, how long it took for them to internalize this new myth and sense of identification and if there was any resistance. Also in if this identification with Russia, rather than Ukraine, extended to all citizens or if it was more prevalent amongst certain age groups? In the latter part of his article, Qualls did a good job demonstrating how the Soviets supported this new myth with propaganda. The Soviets utilized new media formats, such as film, to reach a broader audience and reinforce the new narrative. Finally I found it interesting to read about connection of the reconstruction of the city to the sense of identity, specifically how Trautmann campaigned for the renaming of streets and city areas for local heroes rather than Party heroes.

Sevastopol & Local Legacy

Posted on by

Qualls’s discussion on instill a local legacy within Sevastopol in the post-World War II world seemed quite compelling, as it deviated from the narrative generally presented about cities within the Soviet Union.

Most cities and locales within the Soviet Union, it appears, followed a particular school of thought, which exalted Lenin and other important thinkers involved with the history of Communism, and integrating their own histories with the collective history of the USSR. In Sevastopol, however, local officials paid more attention to local heroes and history, highlighting the importance of Sevastopol throughout Russian history (not just the history of the Soviet Union).

My main question, I suppose, is why was this able to become successful within the context of the Soviet Union–I’m not quite sure I fully understand how Sevastopol successfully achieved its local legacy, essentially rejecting the (perceived) more important legacy of the USSR as a whole.

Sevastopol

Posted on by

Professor Qualls’s article, “Who Makes Local Memories?  The case of Sevastopol after World War II” discussed who created memories of Sevastopol and how they were created after World War II. In his piece, Professor Qualls argued that despite central authorities attempts to paint Serastopals history in a certain way, it was the “municipal and naval officers” who chose to write the history of Serastopal in a “deeper Russian Historical” way, thus creating a “localized mythology.”  ((Professor Karl Qualls, “Who Makes Local Memories?: The Case of Sevastopol after World War II”  Carlisle: Dickinson College Faculty Publications, Paper 1, 2011. 3))  Citing important authors such as David Brandenberger, Karen Petrone, and Matthew P. Gallagher, Professor Qualls used his argument to show how local communities within the Soviet Union created their own mythical like images to advertise their cities.

One of the most interesting points that Professor Qualls brings up was his connection of the myths used with Sevastopal following World War II with the use of heroism in Soviet Propaganda during the 1930s.  He noted that “the military and local officials took the lead in crafting a myth of Soviet Sevastopol and its citizens as an extension of the great Russian defenders of the Motherland who sacrificed everything for a greater good.”  (Professor Karl Qualls, “Who Makes Local Memories?: The Case of Sevastopol after World War II”  Carlisle: Dickinson College Faculty Publications, Paper 1, 2011, 12)) Qualls noted here how the leaders Sevastopol took the methods of heroism in 1930s. He explained how the myths that were created had a heroism type feel to it so that the memory of Sevastopol would stand out.  I found Professor Qualls to be very effective in using 1930s Propaganda and its use of Heroism to discuss the memory of Sevastopol.  His comparison of two different periods split by World War II and his use of a variety of different scholars, showed how he was effective in writing about the memory of Sevastopol.

 

Children of the War

Posted on by

The drive for the collective propagated the Soviet image during World War II. In his article “Between Salvation and Liquidation,” Furst notes that images of crying, bedraggled children could be found between posters of heroic soldiers and dutiful citizens. The presence of street children and orphans was not to be blamed solely on their parents; the Soviet Union, as a collective, was at fault. Therefore, it was the duty of the Motherland as whole to find a solution. Thousands of prospective foster-parents flocked to orphanages, eager to play their part in vanquishing Germany. But were the children really better off with unqualified, duty-bound parents? There is no doubt that the vast majority was physically better off in their new homes; begging is not a consistent food source. However, most of these children carried psychological scars unimaginable to those untouched by war. They deserved a second chance, a fresh start with loving parents who could care for them unconditionally. Clearly, by the number of reports of both runaways and foster-children with “nervousness,” their psychological states were not being well looked after. So did families feel obligated to adopt children? Did they reluctantly take in little girls and boys into homes where they played second fiddle to biological children? Did the Soviet state’s efforts to encourage adoption help or hurt the waifs and orphans?