Out of the Ashes: Social Problems Faced by Soviet Children Post WWII

In her article, Juliane Furst  makes the claim that the Soviet Union emphasized two contradictory campaigns that attempted to rebuild a war torn country that suffered many losses in both human lives and economy.  These losses created a problem in that many of the youth of the country were to grow up impoverished and as orphans.  When the Party realized this, they attempted to eradicate the issue by initiating two ideologically opposite campaigns.  The Party attempted to attack the notion that this war would have an effect on Soviet ideals therefore discontinuing the Soviet project.  Before the war, the Soviets emphasized how molding the next generation of Soviets was essential for the survival of the Party according to Comrade Stalin.  Children must act, be educated, and live the Socialist way in order to give hope to the Soviet people that the Tsar and/or Capitalist way of life will not return to Russia.

The only question was how was this going to be achieved? Stalin knew that if he did not target this issue directly, it would bring decimation and ruin for the continuation to the Party.  Similar to the concept of the work camps , Stalin created the concept of the Juvenile camps.  Essentially the camps serve as labor centers just under a different name.  Stalin was smart to at least proclaim that the safety of the children was on the forefront of his reconstruction acts, as the propaganda of what were to happen should children fall into the Germans hands scared the whole country. Stalin was “saving” these displaced children by collectivizing them and then making them work in traditional Soviet fashion.  I propose that with the combination of poor and malnourished children without parental protection, children chose to turn to a life of thievery or were sent to these labor camps; a very dismal future either way.

Between Salvation and Liquidation

Juliane Fürst, a lecturer in the Department of Historical Studies at the University of Bristol, wrote “Between Salvation and Liquidation” for The Slavonic & East European Review published in 2008. In this article, Fürst discusses one of the most perceptible and disturbing consequences of WWII for the Soviet Union: vagrant and homeless children. They were unavoidable evidence of the damage the war had caused the Soviet Union- both physically and psychologically. Fürst analyzes the Soviet response to these children and gives us an idea of what this phenomenon looked like. These children were nothing like the perfect picture of Soviet childhood that had been painted. Fürst determines that the disconnect between this idea of Soviet childhood, and the reality of homeless and vagrant children allowed for the overall lack of acknowledgment and neglect these children suffered. The poor, orphaned children on the streets did not fit the established narrative of perfect Soviet childhoods, and were therefore ignored. This unwillingness to acknowledge and ultimate rejection of those who strayed from the narrative of integration and salvation is further indication of the Soviet stratagem that promoted collectivization by means of intolerant marginalization.

Salvation and Liquidation: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Perception in the Soviet Union was one of the most critical concerns of the government, from identifying “kulaks,” real or imagined, to outing prisoners-of-war turned German spies, and the legions of orphaned vagrants in the streets were no exception.  The prospect of orphaned children in the public eye created a challenge to the effort to portray the Soviet Union as an idyllic society free of the capitalist-based sins of the West.  Eventually, however, children were subjected to the same “work or starve” ethic that their elders found themselves placed under, and the focus of rescuing wayward children became an initiative to build socialism rather than add any particular meaningful happiness to their lives.  Children were considered a symbol of the state, an innovative presence to foster for the future, and thus could not be allowed to become tainted or lose their value to the state.

More than merely failing to contribute to the image of a healthy Soviet family life, many vagrant children became beggars or thieves living on railways.  This blatant lawlessness struck at the regime as an inability to police their own house, as it were.  The government response to child-crime was a far cry from the salvation campaigns aimed at rescuing orphans.  Waifs were to be ousted from their train station hideouts in raids reminiscent of hunting game.  Just as children were measured in productivity by the same measure as older Soviets, so too were they subject to the same level of prosecution.

Vagrant Minors in Post War USSR

Fürst’s article concerning the orphans and those who were living on the streets aims to distinguish the USSR’s claim of trying to save the children, while also subtly hiding this problem and keeping it out of the public eye.

Fürst begins by declaring that the the original ideal of the Soviet Union was to save the children and relieve them of their horrible state.  Fürst claims that this position was most prominent during the 1930’s and the beginning of the war period.  However, the problem became more about solving the issue, rather than the issue itself near the war’s end.  Fürst states the Soviets wanted this “-as a phenomenon- […] to be liquidated” as subtly as possible, as the mere fact that children existed in this state was “an embarrassment to the government” (233).

Fürst first looks at the 1930’s and how children were vital to the USSR, as the new generation that will become productive and helpful members of society.  While education had significant undertones of communism and the Soviet party, students nonetheless excelled in academic and artistic endeavors.  This devotion to the next generation continued until the end of the Second World War.  ‘Saving’ the children was of utmost importance, and those who had their parents killed during the war were to be saved by other members of society.

At the end of the war, it was clear to the Soviet government that the children were going to be a hindrance to the populace.  With tens of thousands of children being orphaned, many resorted to street gangs and criminal activity, which mostly consisted of theft.  Fürst points out that a large number of these children had already been ‘saved’ once and were, in fact, trying to run away from the  orphanages, factory schools or foster places”, where the children had previously been residing.  The Soviet government became increasingly frustrated with its failed efforts, as well as the embarrassment of being unable to uphold one of its core ideologies: that children were one of the most vital part of the USSR.  Fürst describes the decline into ‘liquidation’ of the soviet police, which she equates to “animal hunts” (250).  These raids resulted in a substantial number of arrests made on homeless children, resulting in being sent to their parents, factory schools, and sometimes labor camps.

Do you agree with what the Soviet Union did, in terms or resorting to arresting these vagrant children?

Do you think the Soviet government exaggerated the embarrassment they felt with this ‘black mark’ on both a national and international scale?

Children of the War

The drive for the collective propagated the Soviet image during World War II. In his article “Between Salvation and Liquidation,” Furst notes that images of crying, bedraggled children could be found between posters of heroic soldiers and dutiful citizens. The presence of street children and orphans was not to be blamed solely on their parents; the Soviet Union, as a collective, was at fault. Therefore, it was the duty of the Motherland as whole to find a solution. Thousands of prospective foster-parents flocked to orphanages, eager to play their part in vanquishing Germany. But were the children really better off with unqualified, duty-bound parents? There is no doubt that the vast majority was physically better off in their new homes; begging is not a consistent food source. However, most of these children carried psychological scars unimaginable to those untouched by war. They deserved a second chance, a fresh start with loving parents who could care for them unconditionally. Clearly, by the number of reports of both runaways and foster-children with “nervousness,” their psychological states were not being well looked after. So did families feel obligated to adopt children? Did they reluctantly take in little girls and boys into homes where they played second fiddle to biological children? Did the Soviet state’s efforts to encourage adoption help or hurt the waifs and orphans?

Between Salvation and Liquidation

Children were the future of Communism. Childhoods were to be happy and foster the next generation of “good” comrades. How would the regime spin the existence of thousands of parentless, homeless, and post traumatically stressed thieves? During the war the humane slogan quickly rose to save these children, adopt them and do your part for the war against the evil fascist. For those living behind the line of the war torn frontlines the people naturally embrace this idea. The rates of adoptions rose significantly. Everyone wanted to help in the war effort. As on teacher said, “Let’s banish the word “orphan” from our usage. There cannot be orphans in our country, where all are mothers.[….] We are raised by the Great Stalin, educated by the Party of Lenin and Stalin, we live in the Soviet Union. Here we cannot speak of orphans. We will speak of wonderful mothers, loyal to the Party of Lenin and Stalin, and of our own children, not of orphans.” ((Julian Furst, Between Salvation and Liquidation: Homeless and Vagrant Children and the Reconstruction of Soviet Society. The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 86, No. 2, The Relaunch of the Soviet Project, 1945-64 (2008) p.243)) Emotions ran high because much was at stake, namely, the achievement of the entire nation.

The war eventually ended and in its wake, the number of street children quickly began to plaque the Soviet regime. The dilemma was difficult to resolve, continued for many years, and surprisingly grew because the street appealed to some children who had parents and homes. Many of these children ran away when caught. Many adopted children exhibited significant indicators of posttraumatic stress. The psychologist could not help with this condition because they had all been victims of the purges. Unfortunately, this problem of street riff raff seemed to be growing like a plaque. Of course, this could not continue and immediate action needed to take place. The creation of children work camps became the solution to do away with these children from public view. As in most correctional institutions, reforms of inappropriate behavior did not take place. Sadly, these victimized children of the war continued to flaunt authority and many became hardened criminals. Silence on the problem of the nonexistent orphans became the new slogan of propaganda.

Stalin Against Capitalism and Churchill

Throughout Stalin’s speech, given at a meeting of voters of the Stalin electoral district, Stalin continually mentions the superiority of the Soviet system and its greatness. This is also evident in his response to Winston S. Churchill’s speech on the “Iron Curtain”, given in 1946. In both of these speeches Stalin makes frequent comments on the inefficiencies of capitalism. This further proves that Stalin was not a fan of capitalism and its capitalistic ideas. In his speech to the voters of the Stalin electoral district, Stalin blamed the Second World War on the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism, mentioned that the capitalistic system contains some aspects of a general crisis and military conflicts and almost never proceeds smoothly. He glorified the Soviet Union’s victories over their enemies and the war and determines the nation’s victory through the “victorious” Soviet social system, in which he says “passed the test of fire and war and prove to be fully viable”.
Stalin continues further to exaggerate the Soviet Union’s greatness by direct attacking Winston Churchill in his response to the “Iron Curtain” speech. Stalin directly states that Churchill only thought of English speaking nations as the only valuable nations that were actually worth something and should rule over the rest of the world. This is a very strong statement to be said especially to such large public, it proves that Stalin only had one intention in these two speeches, to increase his popularity within the people of his nation and to encourage his nomination as a supreme Supreme Soviet. I would say that these two speeches were mainly used as a way to increase his popularity within the public he appealed to.

The best/worst of two evils

After reading Churchill’s speech and Stalin’s response on it, I wonder what a smart orator Soviet leader was. They both were trying to convince their audience in the idea that another one is a possible threat for the world, but do it in a very different way, and, from my point of view, Stalin is more effective in that.

Churchill introduced some facts, like growing influence of communists parties on the other side of the Iron Curtain, and then just added the claims that it was bad, dangerous for the world piece, destroying, etc. He did’t provide these claims with evidence, he didn’t present clearly why he thought that it was the possible threat for the world, etc.
At the same time, Stalin did his job great almost just by paralleling Churchill’s speech with nazi Germany’s ideology. He even didn’t have to explain it further to reach his audience, probably, not only in Soviet Union, but all other the world by that. This parallel, I think, should be very effective in a post-war world, as everybody remembers nazi’s rhetorics, ideas on which that ideology was built, etc. So, even if Churchill’s speech was about to inspire nations to think about the communists as a potential thread to the world, this passage made Britain look as the country which wants to expand its’ influence to the entire world, supported by english-speaking countries and persuading them to aggressive policy because they have a “traditions” or “values” which have to be spread and destroy other ideologies. Pointing on that, Stalin did a clever hook in maybe not making soviet ideology more popular, but at least in showing his opponent being the worst of two evils.

Stalin’s Speech

In his 1946 speech, Joseph Stalin reflected on the events that occurred in Europe the last few years by ripping into the Capitalist system, praising the strength of the Soviet People, and discussing the positives of the war on the Soviet Union.  Of the items that Stalin covered in his speech, his praising of the Soviet people stood out to me the most.

During his discussion of the second World War, he noted that the war “was the fiercest and most arduous ever fought in the history of our Motherland.” (Stalin Speech: http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html))  Highlighting the fact that the Soviet state had endured so much death and destruction from the invasion of the Nazis, Stalin recognized the fact that the Soviet Union had survived because of the determination of its people.  If we place his praising of the Soviet people into context of the late 1930s and early 1940s, one could theorize that the people either had no choice to Serve in the Red Army as a result of the fear of being purged or secondly to protect their families from Nazi occupation.  It strikes me as interesting that Stalin would praise his own people considering the policies he had launched during the 1930s.

Another significant part of his praising was of the Red Army.  He stated that “our victory signifies that the Soviet Armed Forces, our Red Army, was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor.” ((Stalin Speech: http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html))  Stalin used this statement within his speech to not only compliment the bravery of the Red Army, but he also used his speech to hide the blunders that he had made with the purging of his military leaders and the lack of militarization during the 1930s.   When the Germans had invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 the Red Army had lacked any leadership as a result of these purges and had lacked military preparation.   As a result, Stalin had to rely on help from western powers to defeat the Nazis.

Although some could argue that the Soviet Union and its system could not have won the war without help from western powers, it can also be argued that if Stalin had not purged his military leaders, had he prepared for the Nazis much sooner than he did, the Soviet Union would have held its own against the Nazis, perhaps winning the war on its own.

Indirect Correspondence between Stalin and Churchill

Winston Churchill speaks extremely highly of the Ally powers in his speech discussing the Iron Curtain and his desire to unite the English speaking commonwealth with the United States.  Although his main goal appears to be a peaceful settlement with the Soviet Union and elimination of their “expansionist” policies, he focuses much more on global security and the strength of the United States and England.  For instance, he opens his speech with the phrase “The United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power.”  Churchill does so not as a warning or criticism, but rather offers praise and strategic help.  “You must feel not only a sense of duty done, but also you must feel anxiety lest you fall below the level of achievement.”  Churchill is not berating the United States for laying the foundation of the title of “World Police”, he is instead offering support.

Churchill’s speech is seen in a very poor light by Josef Stalin.  Stalin asserts that the British are only mimicking the same racial theory that Hitler brought to Germany.  Stalin claims that Churchill’s assumption of their desire to ensure the security of their future as a means of forceful expansion is inaccurate. Stalin is sure to mention the faith that he has in the people has no limitations and that they are much smarter than Churchill proclaims them to be. The two leaders have extremely different views on how each side of the Iron Curtain operated, and both believed the other to be incorrect. Stalin proclaims power to the people while Churchill broadcasted a message of national cooperative power regardless of the people’s wants.