1.) Ivan IV reigned over a period in Russian history where the growth of the central government was rapid and intrusive to local administrators. Was centralizing Russia a positive or negative idea?….regardless of whose in charge?
2.) What was the role of the Zemskii Sobor? The “Assembly of Land” took place centuries after Ivan IV, what does this reveal about Russian culture?
3.) How does The Reign of Terror represent Ivan’s irrational approach to ruling over Russia?
Was Ivan well-liked or at least tolerable in the 1540s and 1550s, prior to his institution of the oprichnina? Does the oprichnina mark the period in which Ivan’s mental health deteriorated or was he extremely paranoid throughout his entire rule? What exactly was the oprichnina? I know it was a second, separate administration instituted by Ivan but what was its intended goal? Did the oprichnina have any other function besides its infliction of a reign of terror?
Is a politician’s image imposed externally, by admirers and critics located domestically as well as abroad, examining the politician within his respective surrounding context and time period? [Bottom-up] Or, on the other hand, does a ruler paint his own political picture, a self-created phenomenon, descending internally from the ruler himself? [Top-down] This is the question that R. J. B. Bosworth examines in a chapter of his 1998 publication, “Mussolini the Duce: Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?”. Truly, as Bosworth illuminates based on multiple academic’s opinions of Benito Mussolini during and after his reign of power, a politician’s image is both a combination of self-determining propaganda and external popular evaluation.
Mussolini ruled as a charismatic leader, relying upon his positive public image to reinforce his extremist Fascist party ideology and state. While the Duce’s dictatorship and personality paled in comparison to Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (hence the Dictator Minor label), all three rulers shared in common a tendency toward the ‘Great Man’ approach. This approach to history evaluates a leader based on his heroism as the determining force of his historical impact. As Bosworth asserts, normally this approach to analyzing history is “well out of favor” but “to some extent, however, the history of Fascism and, more generally, that of twentieth-century European politics, is an exception to that rule.” ((B.J.B Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce; Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?” The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, London: Arnold, 1998, 74. 59 ))
Bosworth examines how over the course of Mussolini’s dictatorship from 1922 – 1943, the effective influence of Mussolini’s fascist rule lost power parallel to the decline of what Emilio Gentile calls, ‘the imagined Mussolini’. Passerini accepts Gentile’s view “that Fascism brought mythical thought to power.” (( Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce”, 61. )) Other historians, throughout Bosworth’s article, refer to this grandiose conception of Mussolini as ‘the myth of Mussolini.’ When Mussolini rose to power, he did so under the pretense of embodying the values of the Italian public, as a “medium of a mass age.” (( Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce”, 62. )) Public reverence for the heroic dictator reached levels of deep religious awe; Mussolini’s call for a New, collectivist, Italy resonated deep in the Risorgimento national spirit. Italy was traditionally a diverse and separated country, even after the Italian Unification of the 19th century – Could Mussolini finally be the leader destined to bring together the Italian people into a united nation? Mussolini capitalized on the declining pre-modern Catholic papal influence to replace with a modern religious appreciation of the secular state. But after 1925, when Mussolini decided against ruling by the Italian Constitution and created his own pseudo-legal totalitarian state, public adoration turned to public crucifixion.
Especially when Mussolini – always an an advocate of aggression rejecting the doctrine of pacifism – joined the WWII offensive in June 1940, with a false consolation to the Italian masses that it would be a short-lived dispute, public opinion of him really fell out of favor when increasing global military conflict created a sense of betrayal within the Italian people. Bosworth extols this concept, “Figures blessed or afflicted by charisma may, of course, be hated as well as loved. Prayers to the good Mussolini were matched by anathemas to the evil one.” (( Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce”, 65 )) While the Duce may have been a master propagandist in his own right, his pervasive slogan, ‘Mussolini is always right’ will go down in history as an ironic catchphrase, as his resonant historical image, in the words of Bosworth, is as war-time Europe’s “failed dictator.” (( Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce”, 59 ))
Based on your understanding of each of the dictator’s cult of personality and their respective states (Mussolini’s Fascist Italy, Stalin’s Communist Russia, and Hitler’s Nazi Germany), do you believe that Bosworth’s concluding assessment of Mussolini’s “image of a failed dictator, at least in contrast with Hitler and Stalin” (( Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce”, 59 )) is an accurate evaluation?
Mussolini’s legend remains comparatively shrouded alongside Stalin and Hitler in the context of understanding the evolution of dictatorship and the perception of state leaders throughout interwar Europe. Historians consistently credit these leaders with having tremendous amounts of charisma favorably coupled with an appeal that the masses embraced with certainty. Mussolini’s mythic status, however, proves increasingly “hollow” in its analysis relative to his German and Russian counterparts. (60) Why?
B.J.B Bosworth, author of “Mussolini the Duce,” claims Mussolini’s status as Italy’s padreterno or eternal father merely reflected the superficial nature of the original Fascist regime; that the spirit of Mussolini materialized from the desires of Italians themselves and his self-perpetuated image manifested as a Ceasar esque figure. (65) Bosworth attempts to disillusion his audience by using primary sources to clarify that the process of Mussolini’s ascension to deific status mostly lended itself to self-promoting propaganda and not his realistic influence.
Although Bosworth criticizes Mussolini’s legitimacy regarding his reputation, he concludes the article by inserting the historiographical element that not enough is known about Mussolini’s direct relationship to Fascism to truly understand how the soul of Mussolini came to be. (81)
B.J.B Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce; Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?” The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, London: Arnold, 1998.
Mussolini ha sempre ragione, loosely translated to Mussolini is always right, in many ways perfectly embodies the complicated identity of the Italian fascist dictator. ((B.J.B Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce: Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?” In The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism ed. by Bosworth (London: Arnold, 1998), 64.)) As B.J.B Bosworth explored the various biographies put forth about Mussolini in “Mussolini The Duce: Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?” several key themes emerged in his analysis. The local and international idolization of Mussolini coupled with the external pressure of several wars partially explained the downfall of the Italian Fascist regime and Italy after the Second World War.
Mussolini’s image as a capable stalwart symbol of Italian potential gained much of the initial support for the Fascist party. By 1923 and the official takeover of the regime, Mussolini attained an almost godlike and Messianic position in mass politics. ((Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce,” 65.)) The main problem with placing Mussolini on a pedestal came when he could not live up to the heroic potential he promised. While throughout the 1920s Italy became a great European power, with the rise of Hitler and the Nazi party in Germany, once more the country lost its prestige. Moreover, the almost immediate disaster in Greece following entry in WWII obliterated the superman image of Mussolini. This turn away from Mussolini as a savior, or even a shining example of an inferior race (in Trevelyan and Coote’s perspective), propelled biographies from the mid-1930s towards labeling him a consummate actor caught up in the role of a godlike dictator. The fall in public opinion on Mussolini signaled the end of popular support for the Fascist state. Bosworth stipulated that Mussolini as a fake superman lasted in popular and scholarly biographies through the 1980s. ((Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce,” 81.))
The broad change in opinion over the true identity of Mussolini brings up two important questions. Can the blame for Italy’s failure to truly dominate as a great power during and after World War Two be placed, even partially, on Mussolini’s shoulders?
“Mussolini the Duce; Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?” by B.J.B Bosworth discussed the different views of Mussolini. Mussolini was fascist Italy. There cannot be one without the other. He was imbued with mythical even biblical status by his followers. He was a hero to Italians across the globe, he offset the negative Italian stereotype many faced. Each dictatorial nation created a myth of the leader, and Italy was no different. Mussolini was initially welcomes and praised as fascism led Italy out of the Great Depression.
To fully understand Mussolini and fascist Italy one must also look at the circumstances of the time. At first Mussolini was viewed as a pioneer in Europe, he controlled a nation for more than two decades. He modernized Italy and expanded it’s border in an attempt to recapture it’s roman prestige. Fascism allowed Italy to overcome the Great Depression with greater ease than other nations. Mussolini was initially looked upon with admiration and respect before the Nazis rose to power in Germany. With the emergence of the Nazi party Italy was downgraded to the lowest of the “great European powers”. As Bosworth stated, Mussolini became a “dictator minor”, he did not command the same respect and power that Hitler and Stalin did.1
Mussolini in 1934 was more than willing to fight against the union of Austria and Germany. He was an opponent of the Nazis belief of the existence of a true Aryan.2 However, when Italy entered WWII six years later, the people felt betrayed by their leader.3 Mussolini created a nation in a period of peace that fell short during the war.
According to Emil Ludwig, in the 1930s, Mussolini was the “Nietzschean superman”, whose movement helped Italy to prosper4. His fascist nation created “new forms, new myths, and new rites” for the Italian people. This is in opposition to many reviews of Mussolini that portray him as a propagandist, a man who failed as a leader. There are many conflicting views, and as Bosworth stated in his conclusion, more research needs to be conducted to make a full “appraisal” of Mussolini.5 There is still much unknown as to his decision making role.
1. B.J.B Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce; Sawdust Caesar, Roman Statesman or Dictator Minor?” The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, London: Arnold, 1998, 74.
2. Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce” 73-74.
3. Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce” 67.
4. Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce” 73.
5. Bosworth, “Mussolini the Duce” 81.
In traditional examinations of the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin, the singular point of focus is the complete domination that the two leaders exerted over their people. However, one particular that is often left out of the comparison is how the regimes functioned in conjunction with the respective parties of the two states. Similar arguments are found in Schivelbusch’s Three New Deals – a comparison of Roosevelt, Hitler, and Mussolini’s state-building practices – and Yoran Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen’s article “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism”, an in-depth look at the striking differences between the Nazis and the Soviets. In both pieces is made the argument that Hitler used his image and position as Führer to propel his policies forward, though Gorlizki and Mommson go even further, arguing that while Nazi control was exerted legally through the state, Soviet power built itself from the bottom up by means of a party bent on “wholesale restructuring of domestic state and society”. ((Gorlizki, Yoram and Hans Mommsen. “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism.” In Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, edited by Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, 41-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 44))
In Stalinist Russia, the Soviet party dominated policies of the state. Through bureaucratic reformation and extremely tailored individual appointments, Stalin was able to unify the purposes of his party with the ideology it was founded on in order to create a totalitarian state. By 1930, he was confident enough to publicly imply that certain governmental positions existed only to perpetuate the aims of the party. ((Ibid., 51.)) Gorlizki and Mommsen explain that this dynamic developed in such a manner due to the revolutionary climate at the time of the Soviet rise to power; as such, the party ideology came first, and by Stalin’s skillfull administrative practices, the government was reformatted around it. ((Ibid., 64.))
The Nazis, however, came into power under very different circumstances. There existed already a well-established and firmly authoritative government in 1933 when the party took over; it was simply a means of maneuvering legally in order to secure the power to facilitate party operations. This process reached a peak with the death of President von Hindenburg; Hitler assumed the position of Head of State, thus “constitutionally [reinforcing]” his power and policies. ((Ibid., 55.)) However, Hitler had not the bureaucratic finesse of Stalin, and as such most of his power came directly from his own image. Presenting himself as the “incarnated soul of the people”, Hitler moved his people to action not through the subjugation of politics to ideology but by imposing his persona on every man, woman, and child in Germany. ((Shivelbusch, Wolfgang. Three New Deals. New York: Picador, 2006, p. 52.)) For the Nazis, there was no reconstruction of social order, because a social order already existed; there was simply a mass movement spurred by a charismatic figure and a politically secure ruling party.
Although the two texts this evening certainly convey their historical narratives in different manners, they both strike a remarkably similar theme. Throughout Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen’s rather exhaustive comparison of Nazism and Communism’s unique implementations and Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s analysis of Hitler and FDR’s ability to garner public adoration and support, you can see how each leader deliberately and continuously tailored their actions to their environment.
In the second chapter of Three New Deals, Schivelbusch identifies more than just FDR and Hitler’s common interaction with the people. While such exchanges proved vital to each leader’s success, the mediums they employed dictated their success. Both men operated within the boundaries of their peoples’ comforts. The widespread American ownership and familiarity with radios allowed FDR to capitalize on such technology. Conversely, radio’s limited presence, and thus familiarity, among German households rendered such technology ineffective ((Shivelbusch, Wolfgang. Three New Deals. New York: Picador, 2006, p. 66-68)).
In their essay “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism,” Gorlizki and Mommsen build off of a concept that Shivelbusch stresses later in the chapter. He notes that Hitler and FDR connected with the people only as much as the prevailing political situation demanded. The frequency of Hitler’s public appearances diminished once he completed his ascension to total power. His speeches, which were originally delivered to develop a supreme national confidence in him, assumed the role of a bookmark: an occasional reminder of his place ((Ibid., p. 65)). Meanwhile, FDR’s fireside chats continued due to the necessity to constantly maintain support in a democratic government ((Ibid., p. 65)). It is this political awareness that Gorlizki and Mommsen also acknowledge in Hitler but also extend to Stalin. Gorlizki and Mommsen identify the manner in which Hitler’s public speeches and creation of his deific status suited the very functions of the Nazi government. The decentralized structure of the Nazi party paid tribute to Hitler’s demeanor. His charisma and connection to subordinates empowered them to act with authority ((Gorlizki, Yoram and Hans Mommsen. “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism.” In Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, edited by Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, 41-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 55)) Similarly, the centralized structure and goals of Russia’s Communist government pushed Stalin to influence public mentality through extensive administrative juggling and realignment instead of public broadcasting ((Ibid., p. 64)). In Stalinist Russia, the party came before the leader and the entire government needed to reflect the party’s standards.
Each leader consciously situated himself exactly where his political system required. From FDR’s intimate, reassuring fireside to Hitler’s empowering speeches, each leaders’ actions were meticulously rehearsed and precisely tailored ((Shivelbusch, Wolfgang. Three New Deals. New York: Picador, 2006, p. 70-72)). Their individual success came from their ability to successfully control their country in whatever manner the political and social atmosphere required.
The desire to make such historical comparisons is especially evident when examining the political systems of systems of Europe and the United States in the period surrounding World War II. Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen’s article “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism” and Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s book Three New Deals make comparisons between the political systems of Hitler, Stalin and Roosevelt.
Both the pieces look at the leadership qualities of Hitler and compare them to another notable leader during the same time. With new Soviet archival information, Gorlizki and Mommsen argue that the Soviet Union under Stalin and Germany under Hitler were fundamentally different in leadership, country development patterns, and how WWII impacted the their systems ((Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen, “The Political (Dis)Order of Stalinism and National Socialism,” in Beyond Totalitarianism, ed. Michael Geyer and Shela Fitzpatrick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42.)). This difference is in part a result of the countries differences in “socioeconomic development and national integration” when Hitler and Stalin came to power ((Ibid., 43-44.)). According to Gorlizki and Mommsen Hitler did not micromanage and work closely with the day-to-day procedures and functions the government ((Ibid.,64-65.)). This laissez-faire approach was quite the opposite of how Stalin preferred managed his political system. They cite that Hitler’s great strengths were in his charisma and ability to exploit propaganda opportunities which the party relied heavily upon to generate support for the National Socialist party ((Ibid., 55,64.)).
Like Gorlizki and Mommsen, Schivelbusch also evaluates the Hitler’s ability to captivate an audience through public speaking. He had the ability to create a sense of commonality between himself and German citizens. Joachim Fest described a typical speech by Hitler as “a hybrid between a circus, grand opera, and Catholic liturgy” ((Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Three New Deals (New York: Picador, 2006), 62.)). These speeches were highly rehearsed and followed a common formula which was meant to engage and create emotion with the live audiences. This was then compared/contrasted with Roosevelt’s Fireside chats which were also highly rehearsed and meant to create a connection between Roosevelt and the individual. This reflected a technological and cultural transition in the United States. ((Ibid.,70-72.))
Schivelbusch makes the strong statement that without such charisma and ability to engage an audience the New Deal and National Socialism would not have been possible. To what extent do you agree?
One of the more overlooked aspects of culture of post- Kievan Rus’ was the role of the minstrel. The minstrel, or skomorokhi, was a musician, actor, and all-around entertainer that operated in a wide variety of venues. These could range from small villages to large cities such as Novgorod. The minstrel sub population moved Northeast in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries into the region more known as Russia.
It is very surprising to note that Minstrels often played secular music and preformed secular entertainment. Despite this, they were not banned from performing for nearly 400 years in Novgorod.
The minstrels, as depicted by manuscripts from 1323, were always dressed in elaborate costumes, some with headdresses. It is possible that these may have been religious in nature. This is reinforced by the fact that a large majority of the artifacts recording their existence are maintained in the north where their beliefs would be more tolerated.
The influence of Christianity continued to grow in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, thus creating working conditions for minstrels more difficult. Since the skomorokhi were secular in nature, the church was vehemently against any of their behavior and work. In 1470, they were banned from all of Muscovy by Iurii Dmitrov. Maksim Grek continued this opposition into the sixteenth century, stating “the skomorokhi have learned their trade from Satan himself” and by virtue of this are already cursed and damned”. Despite this, the minstrels continued to be a integral part to Russian Culture. Some were wealthy enough to even be required to pay taxes, but many were peasants or even serfs.
Why were minstrels more accepted in the north versus the south?
What was the gusli and what purpose did it serve to the skomorokhi?
Were the headdresses worn during performances religious? Was this a reason for their eventual expulsion from Christian regions?