Category Archives: HIST254-Archive

Khrushchev’s Unintended Consequences

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In response to Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in Moscow, as well as to the growing discontent at home, citizens of Poland, Hungary and eventually Czechoslovakia.

Poland: June 1956

Workers broke out in protest against the unpopular Communist regime and demanded better pay and treatment at the hands of the government. The demonstrations eventually fizzled out thanks to the reformist Wladyslaw Gomulka, who worked with Soviet leaders and the Polish Communist Party to appease the workers and avoid a revolution.

Hungary: October 1956

A year prior, Hungarian’s liberal leader Imre Nagy was removed from power by supporters of his previous opponent Matyas Rakosi (who had run Hungary up until 1953, when Nagy took power). Discontent continued to grow until October of 1956 when students who had followed the protests in Hungary staged a demonstration that turned violent. The violence soon grew out of hand with rebels arming themselves and forming councils to take over factories. Soviet forces were a part of the initial struggle but it wasn’t until October 31st that Khrushchev decided that a full invasion was necessary to control the situation. Nagy, who had been restored as Prime Minister on the 24th, frantically declared Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact in an attempt to place himself at the center of the revolutionaries resistance. Nagy was eventually captured, tried and executed by the Soviets, along with other insurgent leaders.

Czechoslovakia: 1968

Alexander Dubcek became First Secretary of Czechoslovakia in January 1968 and brought with him the promise of “socialism with a human face.” His grand vision of reform was most unwelcome to the Soviets, who not only feared what could happen in Czechoslovakia, but also what would happen if the wave of reform spread to the Union itself. Soviet officials tried to force Dubcek to abandon his reform plans but he argued that it was too late–the people had too much momentum to accept a return to old ways. In late August the Politburo launched a joint-Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia to contain the situation.

This invasion translated into the new Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the rights of “the right and responsibility of Communist parties of fraternal socialist countries to intervene against anti-socialist degeneration.” (www.soviethistory.org) Although the invasion was relatively violent-free, the reform movement was squashed and would not regain momentum for quite a while.

Nuclear Waste Sustainability in Russia

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This brief draft concerns the economic interests in Russia and how they have, and will shape, the development of nuclear policies in the country. In this early work, I acknowledge that I often seem to repeat myself. This, I believe, is the result of presenting the same information a number of times, but considering it from different standpoints. Upon revision I hope to condense what is said to become a briefer part of the overall project.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/drin61h6c1qbe8s/1000%20wrd.docx

Tuberculosis and Health Care

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Here is my first draft for my project on tuberculosis in Russian prisons. This draft focuses on public health in Russia and the rate of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis from the 1940s until present day. This draft will eventually be a part of my final project as an overall summary of health care and disease control in Russian history.

Here is the link: http://goo.gl/1LajGZ

Shhhh…It’s a Secret Speech

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Khrushchev’s secret speech, given to party officials but not published for the general public, showed his desire for de-Stalinization.  Basically, Khrushchev has the same criticisms about Stalin that the rest of the world had: he was paranoid, rude, and killed too many people. Khrushchev believed that Stalin had given the world a bad example of socialism.  He also stated that many innocent lives had been lost.

When Khrushchev is speaking, he is careful to maintain the language of the party.  He emphasizes the point that Lenin didn’t like Stalin.  If Lenin, who cannot be wrong, disliked Stalin, than logically this must mean that Stalin was a bad person. Since Lenin expressly stated he did not want Stalin to be the next leader of the USSR, then Stalin’s reign could be viewed as a mistake and a break away from communism.  Khrushchev makes it seem as though a communist must choose between Lenin and Stalin.  And a good communist will always choose Lenin.

My questions after reading the speech were these: Did Khrushchev dislike Stalin because Lenin disliked him? Or was this speech, as I suspect, a cleverly designed mask for deeper feelings? Did Khrushchev dislike Stalin for the obvious, ethical reasons? Or personal reasons? Whatever the reason, conditions in the Soviet Union began to improve under de-Stalinization.

Secret Speech

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We’ve talked about Khrushchev’s contradicting opinions of Stalin while he was the Party First Secretary and later Chairmen of the USSR, but his “Secret Speech” seems to finally put to rest his true opinion on Stalin’s dictatorship. The speech was known as such because it was read in a session without discussion and was not reported in the Soviet press. However, the Communist world knew of its existence and the claims within- that Stalin’s “Cult of Personality” was responsible of crimes such as the Terror of the later 1930s to the deportation of nationalities in the early 1940s- shocked and led many Western Communists to abandon Communism altogether. Not only did this speech reveal how Khrushchev truly felt about Stalin’s dictatorship and his desire to create a more Leninist society but also consolidated his authority over other Stalinist Party members.

Khrushchev’s speech argued that Stalin’s role in the Party was completely the opposite of the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, thus blaming for the various crimes in the past three decades. He also claimed Lenin recognized Stalin’s negative qualities which made him a poor leader as early as 1922. He spoke of Stalin’s continuous violence and suspicious nature as leading reasons why the Soviet Union suffered such great losses during the war without necessary preparation. His final message is of the abolishment of the “cult of the individual” in favor of the unity of the Party. Ultimately, he is condemning the small role Leninism has played within the government and the atrocities committed under the name of Marxism-Leninism and Stalin.

Socialist Science

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The way that the Soviet state intervened in the “Triumph of T.D. Lysenko” is similar to the intervention exercised in other fields of the economy. This ‘top-down’ approach was geared toward progressing the Soviet agenda. In agriculture and industry it is easy enough to see if efficiency or output is increasing, but in experimental sciences how could the Soviet agenda be defined?

 

Georgian Presidential Election

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In case you’re a bit under informed, the state of Georgia has not held Presidential elections in a second attempt to secede from the Union.  I’m talking about the small nation-state of Georgia, which held presidential elections on the 27th of October. Georgia is located on the southwest border of Russia in the caucasus region and its relations with Russia have been strained, at best.

In August of 2008 the two countries, along with the separatist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, fought in a 5-day war that ended up being a huge embarrassment for Saakashvili, the Georgian president at the time. Although the events leading up to the war are somewhat complicated, what was obvious was Russia’s intention of ending Saakashvili’s rule and installing a new president. They were unsuccessful in 2008, but on November 13th they will achieve just that: Saakashvili will step down and make room for Georgia’s new president, Georgy Margvelashvili of the Georgian Dream Party.

Russia may finally be rid of Saakashvili, but it warns that Georgian-Russian relations will not see drastic improvements anytime soon. If citizens on both sides of the border were hoping for a detente of sorts with the new president, they may have to wait a while.

Side note: the Georgian Dream Party is supposedly named after this Georgian music group’s song of the same name:

[youtube_sc url=”http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vo90tztqTL4″]

You may not understand a word, but it does show some beautiful Georgian scenery.

Soviet Union ideologies in a post WWII era.

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In post World War II Soviet society, the Party’s power seized the reigns on cultural movements including arts and sciences. Through his prior connections with Stalin, Zhdanov ascended to power in an autocratic, post war environment, where he would constrict ideological parameters. Zhdanov’s imposition in the scientific sphere ultimately led to the repression of Soviet genetics research, which remained postponed until the 1960’s. This was because Stalin and other Party officials saw Lysenkoism, a farming method in which the seed is conditioned with cold water in order to maximize production, as more important than genetics research, despite the method’s lack of evidence. This had a disastrous long-term effect on the progress of genetics research and the biological discipline as a whole. Zhdanov’s suppression of cultural progress manifested itself in the form of vehement anti-cosmopolitanism, which simultaneously pressured artists into creating more ideologically friendly pieces and in turn diminishing potential artistic transcendence. Another method Zhdanov used to perpetuate his strict ideologies was his creation of “Cominform”, a propaganda machine that used periodicals as the means to further the Party’s influence. Zhdanov’s abrupt death in 1948 led to instability in the political ring. The Leaders of Leningrad and Russian Federation executed a mass purge of thousands of Party officials as a result of the insecurity in the political atmosphere.

I imagine that this would create drag for the Soviet Union in the competition that emerged between the USSR and the United States after World War II, where they were the two remaining super powers, and ultimately had an impact on the Cold War down the stretch. It also portrays the lack of inner stability and further fear in the Soviet Union, which was most likely a residual effect, left by Stalin and mixed with Zhdanov’s fervor.

 

 

Reconstruction of Sevastopol: An Inevitable Disaster?

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Reconstruction of Sevastopol, following the Nazi’s attack on this vital naval city, started the Soviet’s regime of rebuilding the country’s architecture and infrastructure. The Soviet Union created the Committee on Architectural Affairs; I think this is a testament to the State’s commitment to rebuild cities with the State’s ideal in mind. The Soviet Union wanted these new building to be dedicated to the great heroes such as Marx and Lenin. Streets and squares were renamed in an attempt to return to historical roots. As the article, “To Agitate and to Render Service: Replanning the Hero-City Sevastopol” says, “name changes suggested political shifts.”

A problem with housing emerged as the city of Sevastopol was rebuilt. Although promised adequate housing, overcrowded and infectious residences were overwhelming. The money of the State had gone to other projects and resources to fix these housing dilemmas were in short supply. People began taking matters into their own hands; workers began building housing illegally, without approval of the State. With poor, overcrowded housing came poor hygiene, causing a spike in disease. These health problems could not be fixed due to the lack of equipment such as x-ray to diagnose patients.

Could these health problems have been avoided or with overcrowded, non-regulated housing, was it inevitable?

Replanning Sevastopol

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Students know of the widespread devastation that resulted from WWII, but most history lessons stop just short of how those countries, cities and towns picked up the pieces and rebuilt their homes. As this reading shows, it wasn’t an easy task. Sevastopol needed to be completely rebuilt–and not just the buildings, but social services as well. Infrastructure was close to nonexistent, public health services were failing the population and all the while, architects and city planners were attempting to “russify” the Ukrainian city with a city-wide face lift in the Russian style.

Credit: crisisboom.com

Credit: crisisboom.com

In typical Soviet Union fashion, the state wanted Sevastopol to be rebuilt in the Russian image. As Professor Qualls wrote in his article, “the perceived reversion to tradition meant a Russian ethnic identification wrapped in a Greek architectural façade, yet devoid of all hints of competing identifications.” When I read this, I was completely unfazed. Why of course the government would use this opportunity to impose Russian culture on  Sevastopol. It would be logical for the people of Sevastopol to want to rebuild their own heritage, commemorate their losses in their own fashion and construct a city of their own choosing–but this wasn’t an option under Soviet rule.

It was this “top-down” approach to reconstruction that most caught my attention in the article, but the health and safety conditions plaguing the city were of great importance as well. It took several years before disease began to decline, living conditions (such as apartments with adequate space so as not to spread disease) improved, health services (such as ambulances) were restored and the population began to rebound. Of course, the important thing is that the city did achieve this stability, but I’m sure that if compared to the reconstruction timelines of Western European nations, the case of Sevastopol look quite bad.