Tag Archives: Three New Deals

Creating a Modern Public

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In the fifth chapter of Three New Deals titled “Public Works,” Wolfgang Schivelbusch compares the motivations for and the goals of the large public projects carried out by Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the United States during the 1930s. Schivelbusch argues that each country’s project responded developments within the Soviet Union, their shared competitor ((Wolfgang Schivelbusch, “Public Works,” in Three New Deals – Reflections on Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s Italy, and Hitler’s Germany, 1933-1939) (New York: Picador, 2006), 104)). Although Italy’s drainage of the Pontine Marshes, German’s construction of the autobahn, and the United States’ construction of dams and power plants through the Tennessee Valley Authority Act uniquely reflected each country’s unique social context and needs, all of the projects reflected the modern theme of promoting individualism through collectivism. 

These projects drew the attention of the entire nation while only actually affecting a small portion of the population. Nevertheless, with each project the state created a new national prize and monument around which the people could feel a sense of pride. The projects themselves served as propaganda, they created fantasy’s that masked the national reality. Mussolini galvanized and militarized the Italian people with his “harvest battle” as he marched tractors and people into new cities long before the start of WWII ((Schivelbusch, Three New Deals, 151)). To quote David Lilienthal, a member of the TVA’s board of directors, the new electrical dams and towns created by the TVA  represented “a token of the virility and vigor of democracy” during the depths of the depression and a period where only 20 percent of American home had electricity ((Schivelbusch, Three New Deals, 151)). Hitler preemptively constructed the autobahn before the motorization of Germany ((Schivelbusch, Three New Deals, 170)). These national projects united the people around a sense of achievement while also promoting a sense of individuality. The new Italian agricultural land and towns promoted self sufficiency and an independent lifestyle. In the American and German projects, the myth of widespread electricity and mobility respectively fostered a sense of freedom that technological developments facilitated. All three projects left the majority of the population yearning for a new lifestyle; albeit, a national dream.

As Schivelbush outlines in chapter four titled, “Back to the Country,” the aforementioned states tried to develop the same sense of collective individualism in their efforts to institute economic autarky, national economic stability achieved through individual self-sufficiency ((Schivelbusch, Three New Deals, 107)). Furthermore, each state’s program reinforces one of core characteristics of a modern state outlined by David L. Hoffmann in his book Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices. Hoffman identified the modern state’s ability to “utilize the emotional and mobilizational power of traditional appeals and symbols, themselves disembedded from their original context and recast for political purposes” ((Hoffman, David L, and Yanni Kotsonis. Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 247)). Postwar, modern governments seemingly never acted without some ulterior or latent political motive. What other government programs support this thinking? Could a modern government ever implement policy devoid of propagandistic values? How did/has the public works of Italy, Germany, and the United States changed our view of government programs? Did these public works achieve their goals? How are they viewed today?

Public Works

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The management of a country is like managing a machine.  Occasionally its parts need to be fixed or replaced to keep the machine moving forward.  For a country, a leader must install or fix its parts to help the country move forward.  In the, Three New Deals, WolfGang Schivelbusch spent his fifth chapter on public projects that were introduced in the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, the United States, and Nazi Germany.  Schivelbusch wrote that Italy, the United States, and Germany, under the conditions of the Great Depression, looked to the Soviet Union for innovation and progress.  He stated that the leaders of these countries introduced programs in which they would help their countries move forward.

One of the more intriguing projects that Schivelbusch discussed in his fifth chapter was   on the ‘Autobahn’.  The autobahn, according to Schivelbusch represented what the TVA represented for the United States: “a promise that……had implied not just an increased convenience but also a kind of symbolic salvation.” ((Schivelbusch, Wolfgang.  “Public Works” in Three New Deals.  New York: Picador. 2006, 169.))  The autobahn represented a sense of progress for German people.  It meant that people did not have to rely on the state as much.  What really intrigued me about this is that Germany decided to complete the autobahn before they completed the Volkswagen.  How could a country like Germany install a major highway in before people had cars?  As Schivelbusch stated, it was about capturing peoples imaginations about the possibilities, making people excited for the future and excited about the prospect of driving along the German landscape. ((Schivelbusch, Wolfgang.  “Public Works” in Three New Deals.  New York: Picador. 2006, 172.))  

What strikes me about the autobahn, to me, is that it represented freedom.  It seemed like a way of venturing off into the German land without any care in the world.  Considering that Nazi Germany had repressed many freedoms, it seems strange to me that the Nazis would build a highway that could give Germans a dream of endless possibilities.  Do you think that the autobahn was part of a greater dream of the Nazis?

Public Works

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The chapter “Public Works” from Schivelbusch’s Three New Deals covers the transformation of undeveloped land through industrial means as a form of social mobilization. It is first explained that all major powers looked to the Soviet Union’s collectivism for inspiration. Prior to the Great Depression, Western countries perceived the Soviet agenda as “fantasy”- but as capitalism failed those countries leading up the the 1930s, they began to imitate Soviet policies. ((Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. “Public Works” in Three New Deals, 140-141. New York: Picador, 2006.))

Fascism in Italy was the first to take the reigns on this matter through the project of the Agro Pontino. Mussolini’s regime attacked the problematic swampland, transforming it into a productive area through various policy initiatives. They also used it to public effect, presenting the problem as a matter of national participation. Three New Deals contrasts this to the Tennessee Valley Authority, claiming that the Agro Pontino focused more on settlement than development. Following this segue, the reader is presented with a detailed look at the operations of the TVA. Its works are described as “monuments to the New Deal”, a comparison with the symbolism of the public works of the Fascists. ((Schivelbusch, “Public Works”, 160.)) The common vein here, as Schivelbusch argues, was that both regimes used these works as propaganda in themselves, to appeal to the national attitude and move the public to action. ((Schivelbusch, “Public Works”, 167.))

Finally, the German Autobahn is addressed. Finding commonality with the New Deal but difference from Mussolini’s policies in its emphasis on technology, it served as a powerful form of public mobilization. However, emphasis was placed on making it stand out from the environment, unlike the works of the other two nations. What qualities of the Nazi regime, I wonder, led the Germans to try to make more of a distinction?

Back to the Land

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Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s chapter, “Back to the Land” in Three New Deals discusses the concept of a “back-to-the-future movement” with the revival of “the region” (p 111). Fascism, National Socialism, and the New Deal all had reforms focusing on the decentralization of the state’s population. I found Stuart Chase’s perspective of this movement particularly intriguing. He argued decentralization was ideal for “maintaining and encouraging the handicrafts”(p 118). The main idea behind this movement was to restore the unity between nature and economy. The driving force behind this idea was the belief that a large, industrial economy was more problematic than a smaller, “crisis-resistant” economy (p 118). In Germany, these small regional settlements, landstadt, were overwhelmingly unsuccessful. The failure of landstadt was succeeded by the Industrie-Gartenstadt, which tied a community to large-scale industry.

National Socialist Propaganda used these settlements as a symbol of their architecture. However, these settlements did not contain the necessary power to fulfill this symbolic role (p 136). Schivelbusch ends this chapter by stating this orientation was shared with both Fascism and the New Deal. In what ways do you think these regimes shared characteristics with the National Socialists? If the landstadt couldn’t fulfill the symbolic power for propaganda, what could?

 

 

Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. “Back to the Land.” Three New Deals: Roosevelt’s America, Mussolini’s Italy, Hitler’s Germany, and the Rise of State Power in the 1930s. New York: Metropolitan, 2006. 105-37. Print.

Autarky Envisioned

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The idea of autarky was present throughout all of Europe as each nation was affected by the Great Depression.  As the Depression impacted each nation’s economy, a new ideology needed to be introduced to the capitalist society.  Individuals were against the rapidly growing materialistic and capitalistic world as it could be the only explanation for the Depression.  But how was autarky envisioned in the totalitarian state such as Germany and Italy, alongside the democratic United States?  In Schivelbusch’s Three New Deals, autarky can be explained beyond the economic standpoint.  ((Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Three New Deals, (New York: Picador, 2006) )).

As the Depression hit, the rush to create a self-sufficient economic was significant.  If a nation was unable to support themselves the nation would suffer even more.  Regionalism was introduced as well as inner colonization.  This inner colonization as Schivelbusch explains brought forward the importance of nationalism.  The nation must find opportunities in which individuals could become an nation and develop a sense of national pride.  Propaganda and public works projects financed by the state were established to find this national pride within the community.  Individuals were brought to live in small communities in where there were able to develop a sense of family within the state.

Establishments of public works projects and state-funded propaganda gave the government a new view of nationalism and the impact it could make to suppress the effects of the Depression.  While several of these public works projects failed such as the settlements located on the outskirts of major cities, nations were able to develop a national pride that allowed them to gain strength that was needed in WWII.

Knowing Your Surroundings

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Although the two texts this evening certainly convey their historical narratives in different manners, they both strike a remarkably similar theme. Throughout Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen’s rather exhaustive comparison of Nazism and Communism’s unique implementations and Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s analysis of Hitler and FDR’s ability to garner public adoration and support, you can see how each leader deliberately and continuously tailored their actions to their environment.

In the second chapter of Three New Deals, Schivelbusch identifies more than just FDR and Hitler’s common interaction with the people. While such exchanges proved vital to each leader’s success, the mediums they employed dictated their success. Both men operated within the boundaries of their peoples’ comforts. The widespread American ownership and familiarity with radios allowed FDR to capitalize on such technology. Conversely, radio’s limited presence, and thus familiarity, among German households rendered such technology ineffective ((Shivelbusch, Wolfgang. Three New Deals. New York: Picador, 2006, p. 66-68)).

In their essay “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism,” Gorlizki and Mommsen build off of a concept that Shivelbusch stresses later in the chapter. He notes that Hitler and FDR connected with the people only as much as the prevailing political situation demanded. The frequency of Hitler’s public appearances diminished once he completed his ascension to total power. His speeches, which were originally delivered to develop a supreme national confidence in him, assumed the role of a bookmark: an occasional reminder of his place ((Ibid., p. 65)). Meanwhile, FDR’s fireside chats continued due to the necessity to constantly maintain support in a democratic government ((Ibid., p. 65)). It is this political awareness that Gorlizki and Mommsen also acknowledge in Hitler but also extend to Stalin. Gorlizki and Mommsen identify the manner in which Hitler’s public speeches and creation of his deific status suited the very functions of the Nazi government. The decentralized structure of the Nazi party paid tribute to Hitler’s demeanor. His charisma and connection to subordinates empowered them to act with authority ((Gorlizki, Yoram and Hans Mommsen. “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism.” In Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared, edited by Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, 41-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 55)) Similarly, the centralized structure and goals of Russia’s Communist government pushed Stalin to influence public mentality through extensive administrative juggling and realignment instead of public broadcasting ((Ibid., p. 64)). In Stalinist Russia, the party came before the leader and the entire government needed to reflect the party’s standards.

Each leader consciously situated himself exactly where his political system required. From FDR’s intimate, reassuring fireside to Hitler’s empowering speeches, each leaders’ actions were meticulously rehearsed and precisely tailored ((Shivelbusch, Wolfgang. Three New Deals. New York: Picador, 2006, p. 70-72)). Their individual success came from their ability to successfully control their country in whatever manner the political and social atmosphere required.

 

 

Three New Deals

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Wolfgang Schivelbusch opens in his book “Three New Deals” by discussing the history of 1930s monumental architecture and its varying reception in the decades after 1945. Specifically, the author notes that in studying the monumental architecture initiatives of the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, one can find striking similarities between these various projects, an observation that was taboo to mention in the generations following World War II. Talking about this topic allows Schivelbusch to make two general declarations derived from this specific example. First, the author argues that the same stylistic, formal, and technological developments (both in architecture and beyond), can be used to serve radically different political systems. Second, Schivelbusch criticizes later generations for being unable to differentiate between form and content, especially “…when the object of historical study, as is the case with a defeated dictatorship, elicits general condemnation” (Schivelbusch, 9). When transitioning to the regimes of Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler, Schivelbusch will demonstrate that like the monumental architecture of these respective systems, there will be fundamental similarities.

The author opens the first chapter by focusing on the year 1933, saying that “…it represented the nadir of the liberal-democratic system and the high point for the rival Fascist-totalitarian order” (Schivelbusch, 17). During this year, FDR came into the presidency, and was given an unprecedented amount of power. The author notes how FDR’s subsequent emergency relief efforts were seen as a type of reassurance for the Nazis and Fascists, who saw  themselves confirmed by the actions of the US, arguably one of the most powerful nations in the world at that time. Schivelbusch continues along this thread by stating that comparisons between Roosevelt’s initiatives and those of other totalitarian ideologies were topics of conversation not just in Europe, but the US as well, and weren’t always positive. What stood out as particularly intriguing was the discussion about Roosevelt’s personal opinions regarding Mussolini and the Italian’s economic and social order. According Schivelbusch, New Dealers tried to avoid associating their policies with the autocratic and totalitarian systems of Europe, especially in public. However, Roosevelt in private was much more honest about his admiration of Mussolini. While Roosevelt felt “…a world of social, ideological, and political difference [with Hitler], [he] had nothing but ‘sympathy and confidence’ in Mussolini up until the mid-1930s” (Schivelbusch, 30-31). The authors reasons that this was because Italy was not seen as a threat, while Germany was. However, I wonder if there is anything more to Roosevelt’s reasoning, thoughts?

“We Do Our Part”: Looking at FDR, Hitler, and Mussolini

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Three New Deals by Wolfgang Schivelbusch is a historical analysis comparing Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler between the years of 1933 and 1939. Schivelbusch states his thesis in the introduction; he argues that the programs of FDR, Hitler, and Mussolini (specifically the New Deal, Fascism, and National Socialism) all gave a new vision to their respected nation. Each leader did this through post liberal state-capitalist or state-socialist systems, rising as autocrats through legal means, and seeking a nation of protection and equality. Schivelbusch is clear to point out that he argues commonality between these leaders’ regimes, not sameness.

In chapter one, Schivelbusch elaborates on commonalities from Europe’s view, America’s view, common ground between the two, and with a section on “liberators from capital”. In this first section on Europe’s view, Schivelbusch focuses on Roosevelt’s embracement of national socialist economic and social policies. This adaptation can be seen through Roosevelt’s philosophy of collective good of the nation over individual interest. Hitler initially agreed with FDR’s general philosophy of sacrifice, as Mussolini agreed with his economics strategy of a more state-run economy with the National Recovery Administration. However, in the mid-1930s, criticisms of FDR’s policies exploded, ending the seeming ideological harmony between these three countries. In the second section of America’s view, Schivelbusch explains why FDR’s policies were often referred to as fascist. He explains the term “Fabian socialism”: a civilized version of fascism. Schivelbusch describes how commentators during FDR’s presidency used the term fascism while still acknowledging the general preservation of individual liberties. Like any political statement, this was a highly debated topic. Was Roosevelt maintaining liberty? Roosevelt has a keen likening to Mussolini’s economic policies until the mid-30s. Roosevelt kept his research of Mussolini’s policies secretive due to the public’s eye on his policies. Roosevelt knew Germany posed a great threat to the United States than Italy, perhaps influencing his interest in Italy’s politics rather than Germany. The term pragmatism also came up in this section, being described as “America’s philosophy of modernization”. In the liberators section, Schivelbusch talks about the rise of reform, focusing of America’s Progressive movement. He ends with the Progressive ideology, “Laissez-Faire is dead. Long live social control.”

The introduction explains the importance of monumental architecture; how does this fit into what Schivelbusch discussed thus far in chapter 1?

Three New Deals

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In the early 1930s, Germany, Italy, and the United States endured a period of economic downturn known as the Great Depression.  These three countries took separate roads toward recovery.  However, in the book, Three New Deals, Wolfgang Busch argues that the United States may have had more in common with the National Socialists in Germany and the Fascists in Italy.

In Chapter One of his book, Wolfgang Schivelbush gives a detailed narrative about Nazi Germanys’ and Fascist Italy’s perspective on Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.  Schivelbush notes that in the first half of the 1930s, Germany and Italy held a positive position on Roosevelt and his new deal.  Nazi Germany, according to Schivelbush, believed the beginnings of the new deal echoed their “Revolutionary Program”.(Schivelbush 18).   Though FDR did adapt some socialist ideas in his policies, FDR made sure that these ideas were in line with American values and to help quell any concerns over the direction of American democracy.  While intrigued occurred in Germany over FDRs policies, Facists in Italy took interest in FDR and his policies.  Benito Mussolini stated in his book that “The Appeal to the decisiveness and masculine sobriety of the nation’s youth, with which Roosevelt here calls his readers to battle, is reminicent of the ways and means by which Fascism awakened the Italian people”.(Mussolini quote in Schivelbush’s Three New Deals, 23).  Mussolini praised FDR as a strong man who was able to take grasp of power in the United States and move it in a fascist friendly direction.

At home, the National Socialist and Fascist comparisons helped give FDR negative attention, particularly from his political opponents.  Political and civilian opponents believed  that FDR attempted to not only destroy civil liberties and gain more constitutional power, but also establish friendships with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.  Though Constitutional powers were never completely destroyed and an alliance with Italy and Germany never happened, FDR did push against these boundaries so that he could attempt to get the United States get back on its feet.

 

Commonalities vs. Sameness

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In Three New Deals, author Wolfganf Schivelbusch  argues how three powerful states were all led by common ideals leading up to WWII.  This is not to confuse with ‘same’ ideals in any sense.  While these terms may seem alike, Schivelbusch clearly states there is a difference.  He argues that while the United States, Germany, and Italy had common features the three cannot be considered identical in any way.  It is difficult to place the United States, a democratic society, in the same category as two authoritative countries, but Schivelbusch continues to explain how they represent one another while being different at the same time.

Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal consisted of a series of acts that were established to help the United States recover from the Great Depression.  While the New Deal looks as it could help the recovery process, it ultimately did nothing but create criticism both internationally and domestically.  Much of the criticism was towards FDR and his Fascist and National Socialist fascinations.  Schivelbusch argues how Germany and Italy identified the similarities of FDR’s economic solutions and supported his dictatorial leadership style.  While these solutions may have been similar to those of the Fascist or National Socialist, they are not identical in any matter.

Another element Schivelbusch recognizes that is common within these three states is the use of  propaganda, particularly war propaganda.  War propaganda was used create a sense of nationalism through the respected states, and Italy and Germany seemed to create a strong idea of nationalism.  Stated, “fascism and National Socialism saw themselves as the continuation of solders’ solidarity, as heroic, messianic movements that would invigorate nations still ruled by outdated ideas with new revolutionary spirit.  Politics was a call to arms on the home front” (39).  FDR and the United States did not have anywhere near the strength of the Germans or Italians, but was convinced he could spread it.