Tag Archives: USSR

At the Crossroads of Lenin and Stalin

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Map of the USSR portraying 1922-1928

Map of the USSR portraying 1922-1928

(( Soviet Union 1922-1928 : Socialist republics – National powers. Digital image. Hisatlas – Map of Soviet Union 1922-1928. Accessed February 21, 2016. http://www.euratlas.net/history/hisatlas/ussr/192822URSS.html. ))

 

During the Russian Civil War, nationalist uprisings and criticisms left Bolshevik leadership with some important questions and decisions to make. They had to determine whether to grant different ethnicities and nationalities sovereignty, how to cope with those that did not receive as such, and how to make the union of soviet socialist republics stronger and well-connected. Both Lenin and Stalin, in the form of personal writing, shared their thoughts on these issues.

 

Lenin seemed to take an approach not too dissimilar to the ancient Romans: when ruling over another group of people, keep their systems and leadership intact, so long as they provided troops and worked within the greater economic system.[1] Lenin understood that to oppress a minority population led to resentment and an unwillingness to work with the system in place. Furthermore, he claimed to see beyond nationalities in a sense, declaring being a proletariat the superior identifying characteristic. Moreover, if groups worked together long enough, their origins will cease to matter.

 

Stalin argued in a similar manner, but used Western and pseudo-socialist nations to juxtapose where his Communist ideology was superior.[2] He criticized the others for being hypocritical in its views towards imperialism: while they were willing to allow for “self-determination” of their colonies, they refused to acknowledge the similar poor treatment minorities received in the home countries. Furthermore, Stalin criticized the other countries’ warping of “self-determination” to the point where a minority ethnicity or nationality could receive their cultural freedom, but still essentially had to maintain political and economic submission to the mother country. Stalin also asserted the fusion of nationalist revolution against colonialism and imperialism with proletariat revolution against capitalism.

 

However, what Stalin failed to acknowledge were the minority groups under control of Russia at the time.[3] He avoided discussing the people of Georgia, Armenia, and the like. Perhaps because Stalin himself was Georgian and had managed to become a higher up in the Bolshevik Party, he saw no reason for Georgians not to be a part of Russia. In any case, it is at this point where Stalin differed from Lenin, leading to a course of action in which Lenin eventually condemns Stalin in his writing. Lenin acknowledged the nationality differences within the future USSR, and seemed to prepare to figure out how to solve the problem.

 

That being said:

  1. Lenin dictated that being a proletariat in a communist mindset superseded all other forms of identification. In a capitalist system, what gets valued more – economic class or nationality? Does it depend on the class?
  2. Lenin and Stalin wrote these points during the Russian Civil War. Do you think their points would have changed had they been written afterwards?
  3. How did Stalin’s attacks on imperialism fit into the global context at the time (1921)?

[1] Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. “Lenin on Nationality Policy.” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History. 2015. Accessed February 21, 2016. http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1921-2/transcaucasia/transcaucasia-texts/lenin-on-nationality-policy/.

[2] Stalin, Joseph. “The Presentation of the National Question.” The Presentation of the National Question. Accessed February 21, 2016. http://marx2mao.phpwebhosting.com/Stalin/CPNQ21.html.

[3] Stalin wrote in 1921, meaning that it was still Russia at the time.

Propaganda by Rail

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A Soviet propaganda train.

A Soviet propaganda train. [6]

While the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution were made up highly educated revolutionaries who trained body and mind to overcome the constraints of the the capitalist bourgeois, most of the population (around ninety percent) was of the peasant class. Most of the peasants in Tsarist Russia were illiterate, uneducated, and knew little of the world outside the villages that dotted the countryside. These villages were scattered over the 6 million square miles of Russia making contact with all of them a challenge. For the Bolsheviks, an organization that placed great value on the power of the grassroots peasants, this was unacceptable. They needed the peasants to be aware of the changes taking place over the revolutions in the early 20th century, as well as a work force who would be educated in the doctrine of the new communist government. When the population of a country is educated, the value of its human capital increases. This makes the work force more efficient and worth more to the state. With the bureaucracy of the Bolsheviks beginning to follow the philosophy of scientism, the view towards the peasant population changed from indifference, to a need to directly control and educate in order to get the highest production possible out of its workers.[1] The population needed to be in agreement with the actions of the state as well to make the machine of communism run smoothly. Obedience to the state was necessary, and by using propaganda to educate the unlearned peasants they could be made loyal to the Soviet cause. The Bolshevik’s needed a way to reach these people and spread the word of the revolution to the masses. But struggling with the sheer size of the newly formed Soviet Russia was a herculean task.

 

In the early twentieth century the most effective means of traveling the country was by rail systems. Because of the rails already set in place throughout Russia the logical way to reach the people was to use the trains. The first of the trains to reach the isolated peasantry was know as “Lenin’s train.”[2] This train was made up of 15 cars and “decorated with paintings in bright colors, with forceful and unmistakably revolutionary inscriptions.”[3] It is important to note, that the officials onboard the train were members of branches of the “people’s Commissariat.”[4] These men would distribute masses of pamphlets and readings free of charge to the people, as well as answer questions and advise on issues concerning the population. This was a powerful tool for the Soviet government to use, as the population will feel heard, and important to the government. This in turn will promote less resistance to newer ideas and obedience. The feeling of solidarity between the government and the workers was to be fostered in this way.

The success of such trains in spreading soviet propaganda prompted the creation of three further trains, with different routs that would bring the word of the “Revolution” to the “most hidden nooks of Soviet Russia.”[5] These propaganda trains would be responsible for returning the wishes of the people to the government and create an environment where capitalist imperialism would be unable to return to the minds of the population.

 

 

[1] Hoffmann, “European Modernity and Soviet Socialism” in Hoffmann and Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (NY: St. Martin’s, 2000), 245-260.

[2] Iakov Okunev, A New Way for Culture Propaganda. 1919

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Agit-train October Revolution / Vertov-Collection, Austrian Film Museum

 

 

Fascism and the Inevitability of War & Stalin’s Master Plan

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Fascism and the Inevitability of War & Stalin’s Master Plan

 

When representatives from Germany and the USSR established the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, it is difficult to tell whether the Soviets actually believed in the treaty lasting. The fact that the war resulted in a victory for the Allies and the USSR probably allowed the Soviets to see the war differently than the Axis powers, certainly with a different bias. In Joseph Stalin’s 1946 speech, he seemed to think that because the Germans were fascist with the Nazi Party at the helm, war was inevitable. He pinpointed this circumstance on an ideological belief inherent in fascist politics – the need to acquire more foreign territory and attain world domination. He cited that the only reason the Soviets were willing to work alongside capitalist powers like the U.S. and Britain was via a common enemy, the fascists. All three of those parties disliked that the fascists eliminated the sovereignty of small, developing nations; it was likely for different reasons though. The U.S. and Britain likely wanted to see the small nation develop into a trading partner, or at least a suitable ally or buffer country, while the Soviets likely hope to establish a Communist movement there. In short, all three parties understood the fascists to be a threat to the freedom of lots of peoples and, for Stalin and the Soviets, an inevitable source of conflict.

If Stalin believes that the fascists would inevitably create conflict, then why would he sign a treaty with Nazi Germany? In short, there are a few potential answers to this question. Firstly, Stalin could be lying through his teeth and merely just trying to cover himself in this speech; it is, after all, an “election.” Maybe Stalin honestly thought the Germans would honor their agreement. There is also the possibility that Stalin merely wished to delay the inevitable, giving him more time to prepare for a Soviet attack. Without this agreement, Hitler may have jumped straight from Poland and Austria, to the USSR. Stalin also must have known that Hitler’s hatred of Marxists and Communists would have to ground itself somehow.

However, the last possibility is perhaps the most striking, and the boldest out of the three ideas presented here. (In short, bear with me on this one.) Stalin may have known that Hitler would try to stab him in the back and break an agreement; he has had to deal with lots of political enemies himself. Therefore, perhaps Stalin wanted the pact signed, almost as if to goad in or tempt the Nazis, to convince them that the Soviets were in a false sense of security. If a nation, like the USSR, can anticipate and prepare ahead of time for a backstabbing, then it can catch its opponent off guard immensely. Since a backstabbing relies heavily on the element of surprise, if one were to reverse that element, the backstabber would be caught in a near impossible situation. When the Nazis do finally attack the USSR in one of the largest military offenses in history, it initially resulted in heavy losses for the Soviets.[1] However, they were able to absorb the damage, get back on their feet pretty quickly, and retaliate with great strength, as Stalin described in his speech. The Soviets from that point onward made the offensive a war of attrition, using their home territory to their advantage. In short, they took out the German army quite skillfully. Lastly, Stalin continuously mentioned during his speech what a victory it was not just for the USSR as a whole, but for the Soviet social system, the Soviet state system, and for the Red Army. Stalin wanted to prove critics wrong, and Nazi Germany during WWII provided the perfect venue to demonstrate the USSR’s advancements. The U.S. did it during the Spanish-American War, and von Bismarck was well known for starting wars to help get Germany going; is it not unlikely that Stalin wanted WWII to happen and that he wanted Nazi Germany to invade?

 

[1] “Operation Barbarossa.” Wikipedia. Accessed April 8, 2015. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa.

A Manifesto So Compelling, Intriguing, Controversial, and Most Importantly, Still Relevant Today

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The Communist Manifesto (1848)

Author: Karl Marx (1818-1883)

  • One of the most important and influential intellectuals of the nineteenth century
  • Economic situation was very volatile, but usually in poverty
  • Banned from entering many locations due to his radical ideas

Context:

  • Published in 1848
  • Industrial Revolution is either in full swing or starting to take hold, depending on location
  • The Communists has become feared by many in Western Europe, yet the group itself does not have a clear purpose, direction, or organization
    • Many of its members are not that knowledgeable of the complexities and history that Marx was able to notice
  • Western Europe is on the verge of revolution in many different locations – especially Germany

Language:

  • The Manifesto seems to be split into two in this regard:
    • Some sections are very dense with heavy academic wording and style → hard to read
    • Some sections are very straightforward and easy for everyone to understand
      • The list Marx made towards the end of the second section
      • The last words of the Manifesto, which are in all caps and are in simple terms
    • Marx, who ran his own newspaper, likely did this on purpose. Newspapers could publish excerpts from the Manifesto that were clear and easy for everybody to understand. Meanwhile, academics and the well versed could read through the denser sections and understand Marx’s intentions.

Audience:

  • The workers of the world, academics, and political elites were all likely part of the target audience of Marx.
  • Current Communists at the time of Marx’s writings were also part of Marx’s audience because it was in this document that Marx tried to shape the direction of the Communist Party/League.

Intent:

  • Marx was trying to spread the idea of Communism to the rest of Europe and was trying to organize the Communist Party/League.
  • Marx also has a few other motives:
    • Rebuke the Communist Party/League’s critics and return the challenge back in their direction
    • Explain how Communism is different from the varying strands of socialism
    • Explain the history of the bourgeois and the proletariat – highlighting constant class struggle
    • Establish the current state of Communism and revolutionary possibilities across Western Europe

Message:

  • The factory workers, or the proletariat, are the latest in a constant series of class struggle throughout history. The bourgeois are also part of this cycle, and they currently are in a revolution against the feudal powers of old. (These revolutionary beliefs come to fruition in the revolutions of 1848.) For the time being, the proletariat should help the bourgeois in these revolutions. Eventually, the proletariat will revolt against a bourgeois ruling class.
  • It lays the framework for the Communist Party/League, setting it apart from other Socialist groups.
  • All the workers in the world should unite against the capitalism and bourgeois class that oppresses them.

Why:

  • The Communists have been recognized as a threat by many of the Western European powers, and as such, Marx thinks it fitting that he set a standardized position of the Communists and provide leadership to a relatively incoherent movement.
  • Marx likely developed these views after seeing the horrors that capitalism and the Industrial Revolution have caused throughout Western Europe. On top of his own being witness to these situations, he likely has read the writing of many of those before him who also shared some of his thoughts.

Relationship to Previous Readings:

  • Marx alludes to a couple of the writers we have read before, such as Owen and St. Simon. However, despite likely agreeing with their assessment of the negatives of the Industrial Revolution, he distances the Communists from them. In short, in Marx’s perspective, Owen and St. Simon wanted to work within the system and improve all classes, not just the working class. Meanwhile, Marx clearly favors the working class and wants an overthrow or overhaul of the system.
  • Marx is advocating for a complete one hundred eighty degrees from Adam Smith. As opposed to allowing the economy to run its course, as Smith advocates, Marx desires from the state to completely control, balance, and equalize the economy.

Questions:

  • What is the appeal of the Communist Party/League and/or Marxism?
    • Placing yourself in the context of a factory worker, would you want to join?
  • Although we will likely touch upon this later, in what ways did the Soviet Union (USSR) and the People’s Republic of China veer away from the Communist Manifesto?

Terror and Surveillance

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“Surveillance means that the population is watched; terror means that its members are subject on an unpredictable but large-scale basis to arrest, execution, and other forms of state violence.” ((Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “A Time of Troubles,” in Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s. (Oxford University Press, 2000), 190.)) This is the theme of Chapter 8 of Sheila Fitzpatrick’s Everyday Stalinism, in which the modes of Soviet public repression and purging are explored in detail.

The development of the Communist “Great Purges” in the 1930s was a self-propelling loop of suspicion, witch-hunts, and above all else, terror. Initially, excessive disfranchisement of Communist party members led to large amounts of ex-Communists, who were all assumed to be enemies of the state. At first, there was no method of integration by which these ex-members might become respectable citizens once more- the “black marks on the record could not be expunged”. ((Fitzpatrick, “A Time of Troubles,” 193.)) Because of their inability to operate in a country under such intense surveillance and suspicion, many of these blacklisted individuals assumed new identities, oftentimes forging passports and moving and changing their names. This caused the Soviet regime to perceive an even greater threat of disguised corruption, resulting in more purges.

Soviet officials frequently attacked their “enemies” with hypocritical claims. Despite possessing these characteristics themselves, they accused party enemies of engaging in favoritism, the creation of cults, and luxurious lifestyles. The accusers were no different in this regard than the accused, but they painted the victims in such a light as to use them as scapegoats, providing an outlet for the regime. ((Fitzpatrick, “A Time of Troubles,” 197.)) Newspapers even “carried a wealth of startling information about the sins of leading Communists”, creating even more unrest and suspicion among the masses. ((Fitzpatrick, “A Time of Troubles,” 195.)) This particular notion seemed odd to me at first; wouldn’t this cause people to lose faith in the party? However, upon further reading, I came upon the surprising fact that there existed a great deal of resistance to Communist rule during the 1930s- a particular quote regarding taking revenge during World War II (apparently much anticipated) bridged that gap of continuity. ((Fitzpatrick, “A Time of Troubles,” 205.))

“Show trials” were also characteristic of the Great Purges. However, because of the amount of Communist officials that were placed on trial outside of Moscow, these had a distinctively “populist” aspect, which furthers the idea of resistance to the regime. ((Fitzpatrick, “A Time of Troubles,” 203)). These shows of public resistance intrigue me. How did the Soviet regime deal with the deposition of their leaders in rural areas? Perhaps it makes sense that entire villages were emptied and their inhabitants sent off to the Gulags.

A Soviet official crushing the snake of deceit.

One final thought: the fact that most, if not all, of these Purges were state-instituted and not publicly supported, as Fitzpatrick seems to suggest, implies that much of the violence rampant in Stalinist Russia was primarily implemented by the state. Where was the public support that Beyond Totalitarianism tells us was necessary for such violence to exist?

Soviet and Italian Planned Industry 1930s

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While the United States and Western Europe raised eyebrows towards Stalin’s fantastical collectivization plans, Russia committed to several massive industrial projects in order to mobilize the Soviet Union’s rising communist dream. Many of these industrial projects were characterized by prometheanism, or, newfound strategies to subjugate and conquer lands for means of industry. The project of Magnitogorsk, a massive city constructed in the 1930s under Stalin’s five year plan, prevails as a paragon example of Soviet economic mobilization.

Magnitogorsk is located at the far south-east of the Ural Mountains, close to the Ural River. Unusually large iron deposits located there provided Stalin with enough incentive to build an entire city in proximity to harvest the iron for industry. To ensure efficiency, Stalin placed experienced industrial officials at the forefront of the project, while much of the hands on labor force became peasants, kulaks, or other Soviet agitators whose actions merited deportation out past the Urals to Magnitogorsk.

The first to catch on to the rise in Soviet industry, according to Wolfgang Schivelbusch in his Three New Deals, was Mussolini, who subsequently created plans to develop a series of small cities in order to rebuild a powerful Italy. Similarly to Stalin, but on a less grand scale, Mussolini created his city plans year-by-year called the “nuove citta.” Like Magnitogorsk (pre-perestroika), these impromptu, large industrial projects with little modification turned into “anti-cities.” Sabaudia, the city Schivelbusch uses as an example, is reminiscent of a deserted prison marked by its emptiness and harsh geographic structuring.

Sabaudia, Schivelbusch's example of an "anti-city." (p.147)

Sabaudia, Schivelbusch’s example of an “anti-city.” (p.147)

It seems as though both Stalin and Mussolini planned too far ahead for the immediate future. How beneficial were large construction projects for stimulating long term economic mobility for the Soviet Union and Fascist Italy in the 1930, despite the fact that many of these operations fell flat? Was the actual creation itself the goal?

The Age of Propaganda

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japtrap

“Jap Trap,” World War II propaganda poster, United States Information Service, 1941–45. Densho Digital Archive, http://www.densho.org/.

“Propaganda can tip the scales,” claims Schivelbusch in regards to state influence in times of political turmoil in his Three New Deals. (85) The usual dialogue on the topic of interwar propaganda mostly elicits imagery associated with the USSR and Nazi regime, but what about the propaganda and control by the United States government? This is an example:

This blatantly racist imagery not only compares the Japanese to rats, it also depicts the rat with the physical stereotypes American’s gave the Japanese during the time. The squinted eyes, protruding teeth, and cartoonishly animated circular spectacles reappeared throughout anti-Japanese propaganda. The simple process of dehumanization of the enemy through animation also appears commonly in the anti-semitic propaganda perpetuated by the Nazis.

jewishratmsn

The Nazis as well as America assimilated the rat with their enemies. Rats are grotesque, parasitic, and carry disease. Essentially, they are an animal no one loves. It is certainly easier to identify propaganda that is new or foreign, however, after those images are presented repeatedly they become automatically associated with the intended concept and sink into the subconscious. This, in effect, is what makes it so powerful.

If an audience is being persuaded without realizing, can they stop it?

 

 

Political Leadership

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The desire to make such historical comparisons is especially evident when examining the political systems of systems of Europe and the United States in the period surrounding World War II. Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen’s article “The Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism” and Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s book Three New Deals make comparisons between the political systems of Hitler, Stalin and Roosevelt.

Both the pieces look at the leadership qualities of Hitler and compare them to another notable leader during the same time. With new Soviet archival information, Gorlizki and Mommsen argue that the Soviet Union under Stalin and Germany under Hitler were fundamentally different in leadership, country development patterns, and how WWII impacted the their systems ((Yoram Gorlizki and Hans Mommsen, “The Political (Dis)Order of Stalinism and National Socialism,” in Beyond Totalitarianism, ed. Michael Geyer and Shela Fitzpatrick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42.)). This difference is in part a result of the countries differences in “socioeconomic development and national integration” when Hitler and Stalin came to power ((Ibid., 43-44.)). According to Gorlizki and Mommsen Hitler did not micromanage and work closely with the day-to-day procedures and functions the government ((Ibid.,64-65.)). This laissez-faire approach was quite the opposite of how Stalin preferred managed his political system. They cite that Hitler’s great strengths were in his charisma and ability to exploit propaganda opportunities which the party relied heavily upon to generate support for the National Socialist party ((Ibid., 55,64.)).

Like Gorlizki and Mommsen, Schivelbusch also evaluates the Hitler’s ability to captivate an audience through public speaking. He had the ability to create a sense of commonality between himself and German citizens. Joachim Fest described a typical speech by Hitler as “a hybrid between a circus, grand opera, and Catholic liturgy” ((Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Three New Deals (New York: Picador, 2006), 62.)). These speeches were highly rehearsed and followed a common formula which was meant to engage and create emotion with the live audiences. This was then compared/contrasted with Roosevelt’s Fireside chats which were also highly rehearsed and meant to create a connection between Roosevelt and the individual. This reflected a technological and cultural transition in the United States. ((Ibid.,70-72.))

Schivelbusch makes the strong statement that without such charisma and ability to engage an audience the New Deal and National Socialism would not have been possible. To what extent do you agree?

Totalitarianism: A Comparison

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Ian Kershaw’s Totalitarianism Revisited: Nazism and Stalinism in Comparative Perspective applies the modern definition of totalitarianism to Nazism, Fascism, and Stalinism. On the surface level, these three governments appear to be similar in their nature. A powerful figurehead dominating the governments ideologies and fueling the motives at large, while controlling their state with force and surveillance. Kershaw does a good job in pointing out while the term authoritarianism needs to be adjusted based on the evolution of Nazism and Stalinism, the term can be applied to Italy’s, Russia’s, and Germany’s governments spanning from a pre-WWII era to the transition the USSR endured following Stalin’s death, but emphasizes the importance of not losing track of their singularities.

Modernity is the reason why these government systems are so similarly equated under the scope of totalitarianism. The organized bureaucracy and structure share similar characteristics while the overall motive of the state differs greatly. Both Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR were surveillance states, but with different purposes. Stalin wanted surveillance to be used as a tool of repression; to weed out counter-revolutionaries and stabilize politics. In contrast, Nazi Germany used surveillance to concentrate its power in the State and to promote its ultimately racist motives and to strengthen expansion. Italy had a more similar goal to Germany than the USSR. Mussolini also desired to expand and strengthen the Italian empire to return it to its former glory.

What can historians potentially gain by comparing these three forms of government? How are they similar to the British and American governments during the same period?

 

Modernity in the Soviet Union

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In this article, historian, David Hoffman discusses the trends of modernity during the late 19th to 20th century, particularly in Russia as it became the Soviet Union. According to Hoffman, modernity is linked with the many ideals of the Enlightenment. Many tend to link the term modernity with democracy and associate it with the political and economic systems of the United States, England, and France. Hoffman briefly discusses the ideas of the enlightenment and the need for reason. Instead of associating modernity with democracy and the spread of industrial capitalism, particularly in Western Europe, the basis of modernity are science and reason, and therefore, Hoffman argues that many facets of Enlightenment thought were integral in the emergence of the Soviet Union. Hoffman also makes the argument that modernity also largely consists of the idea of stemming away from tradition and transforming into something new using rational thinking.  Hoffman continues by giving examples of how certain aspects of Russian society such as, education, the military, health, etc. transformed into the Soviet state with the use of reason and rational thinking. Hoffman focuses a lot on the creation of the welfare state. Hoffman states, “throughout Europe the interventionist welfare state resulted from new forms of knowledge, new goals of government, and new technologies of social control … in their [government officials, political leaders, and professionals] quest to order society rationally and scientifically, they strove to know the population statistically” (252). With the use of rationale and scientific thinking, statistics and studies paved the way from new observations and developments within Russian society. Hoffman describes that when observing poverty, which had been previously been viewed as “human errors,” statistics showed that poverty was a social issue that called out for the establishment of a welfare state with social work and programs that could help the impoverished become better citizens (252). Ultimately, modernity in Russia consisted of an attempt to transform individuals and society in rational and productive manner.